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Abstract
This thesis argues for the need to answer the question how can we use critical 
theory to rethink the meta-theoretical foundations of facilitated conflict resolution. It draws 
on Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics-based framework and a methodology of 
communicative rationality to articulate the foundations of a Critical Theory of Peace 
Practice.
An illustrative example of the Oslo Channel, which led to the Declaration of 
Principles and Letters of Mutual Recognition between Israel and the PLO with the third- 
party facilitative assistance of Norwegians in 1993, sets the stage for exploring the extent to 
which facilitated conflict resolution approaches can contribute to peace practices. John 
Burton’s ideas are critically and carefully examined as he has most extensively articulated 
the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of such an approach. It is contended that 
although he identifies practices that differ from traditional mediation approaches, 
theoretically he remains committed to a behavioural-oriented human needs theory and is 
reliant on instrumental rationality in which success in the problem-solving setting is 
prioritised. Other scholars and practitioners who have attempted to expand and refine the 
Burtonian perspective are studied. It is argued that although each offers modifications to 
either the theory or the practice, all fail to fundamentally move beyond instrumental 
rationality and human needs theory.
A communicative rationality methodology and a meta-theoretical foundation of 
Habermas’ discourse ethics is proposed for grounding a theory of peace practice. By 
shifting the emphasis from needs to communication, this suggested framework is intended 
not only to impact the facilitation process, but the broader public sphere in which the 
legitimacy of any reached agreements must be accepted for establishing and sustaining 
peace. The most promising intimations of the praxeological dimensions of such an 
approach can be found in the realm of conflict transformation and peace-building with their 
associated desire to effect changes in socio-political arrangements.
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Introduction
Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be 
constructed,'
—UNESCO Constitution, 1945
Philosophers, scholars within the International Relations (IR) discipline, and 
political leaders have extensively articulated the concept of peace and the necessary 
conditions for its realisation. During the height of the Cold War era and the superpower 
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, thinkers within IR focused on 
developing strategies for war avoidance, ensuring nuclear deterrence, and formulating 
theories of containment. Finding no voice in this space, a related, but separate discipline 
developed in which scholars and practitioners concentrated on ways of reaching and 
maintaining a stable peace, as well as resolving deep-rooted conflicts.
In the pluralistic, decentred global environment of the twenty-first century, while 
analysts within the facilitated conflict resolution and peace research fields offer a 
number of approaches for practising peace, attempts to resolve protracted violent 
conflicts also continue. Political decision-makers, governments, and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) have assumed third-party roles as they endeavour to overcome 
protracted conflicts such as those in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, the former 
Yugoslavia, and the Middle East. The types of perspectives adopted have largely been 
based on the traditional understanding of direct bargaining and mediation in which third 
parties present a text for disputants to consider and negotiate, in order to arrive at an 
acceptable compromise.^ The Bosnian conflict, for example, fits into this category of 
practice.
However, one effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict produced an 
agreed framework with the real possibility of autonomy for the Palestinians in the 
Israeli Occupied Territories. This process, which has come to be known as the Oslo
7Channel (as Norwegian third parties assisted Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) to reach an agreement on interim Palestinian self-government) is 
recognised by politicians and scholars alike as being qualitatively different from other 
forms of third party mediation. The process adopted in the Oslo Channel, where the 
Norwegians played a facilitative third-party role and the disputants engaged in face-to- 
face talks, resonates with the approaches advocated by conflict resolution scholars 
including John W. Burton, Herbert Kelman, Ronald Fisher, and Jay Rothman.^
Numerous analysts have articulated the contributions and flaws of the Oslo 
Channel and its subsequent agreements. Jane Corbin, Graham Usher, and David 
Makovsky offer three of the most insightful and detailed accounts."  ^ Corbin offers an in 
depth description of the creation and progress of the Oslo Channel. This body of work 
is one of the few overtly unbiased accounts of a process that succeeded, due to luck, 
political willingness, and the third-party role adopted by the Norwegian team. In her 
book, Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace between Israel and the PLO, a 
balanced picture of Israeli, Palestinian, and Norwegian participants are presented.
Although Corbin provides a thorough account of the Oslo Channel and the roles 
played by the various parties, she offers no critical assessment of the facilitation process 
itself. One could argue that since the book is based on interviews with many of the 
participants in the process, a space for critical assessment is less significant. However, 
a critical analysis of the facilitation process can provide important insights into the 
reasons for the limited success of the Oslo Channel.^ By analysing the type of approach 
that is recognised to be different from traditional mediation, one can learn how it 
resembles yet differs from the facilitation process of problem-solving workshops, 
developed by scholar-practitioners in the field of facilitated conflict resolution.
Corbin begins with a brief discussion of the events that led to an exploration of 
direct talks between two Israeli academics and high-ranking PLO representatives. The
8background of the official stalled Washington talks, which were overseen by the US, 
motivated far-sighted left-wing politicians within the Israeli Labour Government to 
explore direct contacts with the PLO and its Chairman, Yasser Arafat. Norway was 
chosen as Terje Rpd-Larsen, then director of a think-tank known as FAFO (The Institute 
of Applied Social Sciences) persistently looked for ways of facilitating a bringing 
together of Palestinian and Israeli representatives.
The remainder of the book details the progress of this channel, beginning with 
the first meeting in Sarpsborg, Norway on 20 January 1993, to the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles (DOP) and the exchange of the Letters of Mutual Recognition 
on the White House Lawn on 13 September 1993. The impasses, possible breakdowns, 
and the ways they were overcome in-between the talks are also covered.
Other observers of the Middle East have analysed the problems associated with 
tthe agreements contained in the Declaration of Principles. One such journalist and 
(activist is Graham Usher who identifies the flaws of the Oslo Channel, as well as the 
Oslo II agreement reached in Taba, Egypt in 1995.^ He concentrates on the challenges 
presented by the excluded parties to the overall peace process including Palestinian 
nationalists and the militant Hamas movement.^ He argues that their rejection of the 
agreements which resulted from the Oslo Channel threatens attempts to engender 
acceptance of these agreements among the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and 
the diaspora. While providing insights into the authoritarian-style leadership of Arafat 
and his control over the PLO, as well as the lack of a developed Palestinian civil 
society. Usher does not provide a critical analysis of the facilitation process adopted by 
the participants to the Oslo Channel.
David Makovsky addresses the potential limitations of the Oslo Channel from an 
Israeli-oriented perspective.^ He describes Israel’s then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s 
reluctant journey to the Oslo agreement. Makovsky focuses on explaining the
9conditions that made an agreement possible, including the macro-political 
circumstances such as the collapse of the Cold War and the allied victory coalition 
between the US and Arab Gulf States over Saddam Hussein, as well as the micro-level 
environment of stalled public negotiations efforts. Makovsky concentrates on analysing 
and explaining the factors that motivated key decision-makers in the Israeli Labour 
Government, which endorsed the eventual breakthrough of the Oslo Channel and the 
Letters of Mutual Recognition in the late summer of 1993. The focus of Makovsky’s 
volume is on Rabin’s reluctant acceptance of the PLO and recognition that in order to 
reach any agreements which might start the process of resolution between Israel and the 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, direct engagement with Arafat was necessary.
While these three researchers extensively elaborate the role of the personalities 
involved, the detailed negotiation leading up to, and the challenges of implementing the 
Declaration of Principles, they neglect to engage in a critical analysis of the nature of 
facilitation and the extent this process limited the agreements that were reached.
The Oslo peace practice opens an avenue for exploring how a peace process 
might be better facilitated. The theories of facilitated problem-solving workshops are 
studied to assess the degree to which the spirit and details of the approach adopted in the 
Oslo Channel resonate with the approaches advocated by conflict resolution scholars.^ 
The foundations of these approaches are themselves subjected to critical examination 
and found wanting as a preliminary to addressing the central questions of the thesis: 
how can we use critical theory to rethink the meta-theoretical foundations of facilitated 
conflict resolution perspectives and what type of a critical theory should be incorporated 
for this endeavour.
In the disciplines of International Relations and facilitated conflict resolution, 
the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas has been incorporated by a number of scholars 
who question the underlying theoretical assumptions and offer tentative approaches for
10
confronting the pluralistic multi-cultural communities of the twenty-first century. Two 
noteworthy attempts at developing a Habermasian informed IR theory are those by 
Andrew Linklater and Anya Proops.
In his work, Linklater calls for a sociological analysis to construct an approach 
that addresses the question of universalism and difference in a pluralistic, decentred 
global world. He presents a case for focusing on citizenship to overcome the constraints 
that states aim to impose and the unequal relationships that are dominant in the 
capitalistic market forces. The ‘triple transformation’ of a political community, which 
is both universalistic and sensitive to cultural differences, forms the goal of his 
project. “ Towards this endeavour, Linklater calls for an expansion of the concept of 
community on the basis of an inclusionary dialogical process. This approach can be 
directly traced to Kant and Marx as Linklater attempts to combine the Kantian notion of 
universalism (where subjects can equally reflect on moral norms) with ways of 
expanding Marx’s analysis of unequal market structures that impinge on the freedom of 
the individual.
In doing so, Linklater develops a Habermasian-inspired critical analysis. In 
brief, a broad theory of society needs to take into account the universalistic character 
and mechanism of language, since it co-ordinates relationships between individuals in 
societies. Simultaneously, he argues that one should include the differences individuals, 
groups, and communities hold regarding the values that underlie and should underlie 
governing norms and institutions. However, whilst Linklater attempts to move beyond 
the constraints of Marxist determinism to a Kantian-oriented emphasis on individualism 
and a belief in individuals to engage in reasoned dialogues to achieve transformations of 
political communities, he concentrates too heavily on the idealisation principle of 
Habermas’ ideal speech situation and the power of the ‘unforced force of the better 
argument’ to formulate a perspective that would allow citizens to overcome limitations
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posed by state and market steering mechanisms. More significantly, Linklater sets up a 
triangular relationship between philosophy, historical-sociology, and praxeology for his 
critical theory. While he recognises the balanced importance of all these dimensions for 
a critical theory, he fails to explore avenues in which such a framework may be applied. 
In other words, in arguing for the transformation of political communities via dialogues, 
Linklater neglects the praxeological component of his critical theory articulated 
framework. Therefore, although he is one of the few IR scholars who insightfully 
advocates a rethinking of the relationship between state and citizens along dialogical, 
historic-sociological, critical lines, the combination of a narrow reading of Habermas’ 
ideas, as well as a neglect of the praxeological dimension, leaves space for exploring 
how transformation of political communities may be attempted.
In her work, Anya Proops argues that an individual’s freedoms can only be 
realised in a liberal international society that is predicated on universally acceptable 
good moral discourses. In her thesis. Proops explores the contributions and limitations 
of communitarian and cosmopolitan views of how to construct a liberally ‘good’ 
international society. While arguing that the former lacks analytic tools for research, 
she maintains that the latter framework is underdeveloped. In attempting to put forward 
one possible way of constructing such societal and institutional norms. Proops draws on 
Habermas to assert that through a combination of moral and practical discourses, one 
can contingently formulate a tentative way of constructing a liberal international 
society. Proops very briefly examines the non-violent societal transformation of South 
Africa at the end of apartheid when political rule was transferred to the black majority 
Government of the African National Congress, led by Nelson Mandela.
Like Linklater, she explores in depth the philosophical and theoretical 
foundations that may contribute to the construction and transformation of a liberal 
international society. And although she analyses the praxeological dimensions of critical
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international theory in her South African case study, it is, nevertheless, a limited albeit 
suggestive, example. It is fair to say that an exploration of philosophical and meta- 
theoretical foundations are important to deconstruct, reflect on, and to reconstruct social 
and political norms. However, the pragmatic component cannot be separated from 
philosophy and meta-theory. And yet, ways of employing the variety of rich discourses 
(in particular the political-ethical) offered by Habermas are neglected. Proops’s 
formulation is a helpful and insightful elaboration of how a Habermasian critical theory 
can contribute to the IR discipline. Nevertheless, her application of a critical theory is 
too limited in its articulation. This thesis argues that political-ethical discourses point to 
ways of practising the critical dimension that do not shy away from advocating 
universalism, as well as recognising the importance of including value differences 
present in diverging cultural contexts.
Some of the most interesting efforts to explore the praxeological dimensions are 
linked to processes of conflict resolution. John Dryzek points to such connections in his 
work Discursive Democracy}^ Hoffman in two articles also points to affinities between 
critical theory and conflict resolution p rocess .R o th a m ’s work, which is more fully 
discussed in Chapter 3, also draws insights from critical theory.
The most sustained recent attempt to explore these issues is the work of Daniel 
Jones. In parallel to the arguments developed in this thesis, Jones suggests that critical 
theory-informed discourses can be applied to the process of international mediation. 
The critical mediation concept is utilised to analyse the development of the Oslo 
Channel between Israel and the PLO with Norwegian third parties. Mediation is 
presented as an institutional form, which is reproduced through tradition and crises. 
Simultaneously, mediation is seen as an agency that allows individuals to co-exist in 
light of fragmented post-Cold War environments. In arguing for a movement from 
mediation to cosmopolitan ethics, Jones explores the challenges presented by the
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traditional strategic studies. He further considers the facilitated conflict resolution 
problem-solving workshops, most forcefully articulated by Burton, and asserts that their 
normative foundations are underdeveloped and that a preference for symbolism by such 
scholars avoids tackling the actual dispute. Jones argues for a cosmopolitan mediation 
rather than facilitation, since the latter becomes subsumed in democratic practice, 
whereas the former is more capable of contributing to policy formulations.
In short, Jones contends that an abstract conception of what is right cannot be 
reduced to facilitation exercises. Jones focuses on the Oslo Channel to argue that his 
critical cosmopolitan mediation would have been a more helpful approach than the one 
adopted by the participants. He asserts that the process of Oslo has reproduced and not 
helped to overcome structural inequalities such as an underdeveloped economy for the 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. He contends that the Norwegians contributed 
to the denial of national identity for the Palestinians, since what they need is a process 
that bolsters their international recognition and status. Jones’ conception of a 
cosmopolitan mediator is one with a sword in one hand and scale of justice in the other.
While providing an important and useful connection between meta-theory, 
theory, and pragmatic application of a Habermasian critical theory perspective for 
international relations and mediation, Jones misses some of the most fundamentally 
significant points of facilitated conflict resolution approaches, as well as the facilitation 
process adopted by the participants to the Oslo channel. He rightly asserts that the 
problem-solving exercises are limited, since the scholars and practitioners 
overemphasise the prescriptive steps which can constrain the role of third parties and 
disputants. However, their aim of approaching facilitation efforts from the perspective 
of not imposing any force, is a significant departure that is underestimated by Jones. His 
understanding of a mediator does not fundamentally differ from the generally accepted 
characterisation of such third parties. Therefore, a mediation process that follows a
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cosmopolitan ethics is still bounded by instrumental rationalityC onsequently, the 
promising Habermasian communicative rationality and discourse ethics foundation are 
undermined. The limitations of a facilitative approach highlighted by Jones illuminates 
the points at which the underlying theoretical foundations should be re-examined and 
perhaps reconstructed. However, the cosmopolitan mediation framework is ultimately 
an unhelpful perspective for the power distortions that Jones aims to overcome is not 
accomplished, but rather is reinforced. Consequently, the contribution of Habermas’ 
assertion that language allows individuals to engage in discourses through which claims 
to validity are redeemed or renegotiated become subordinate to the pursuit of a 
cosmopolitan mediator who prefers power politics on one hand, but advocates 
employment of communicative reason on the other.
Jones’ analysis of the Oslo Channel is also flawed in its treatment of the 
facilitation process, practised in Norway by the Israelis, the PLO representatives, and 
the Norwegian third parties led by Terje Rpd-Larsen. Rather than being imposed by the 
Norwegians, the Israelis and the PLO parties accepted this type of a third-party role and 
insisted on its continuance when opportunities arose to revert back to more traditional 
mediation and negotiation processes. Rather than undermining Palestinian national 
identity, the process aimed to create an opportunity for the start of constructing practical 
policies that would lead to eventual Palestinian autonomy.
It is fair to say that the power asymmetry between two Israeli academics and 
high-ranking PLO members, at the start of the talks on 20 January 1993 was not 
appropriately addressed. However, for negotiations to start and continue, historical and 
political circumstances dictated that the creation of any back-channel would reflect and 
contain some power asymmetry; the facilitation effort would have to reflect the social 
and political realities on the ground in Israel and the Occupied Territories while also 
seeking to overcome them, through according the parties the ‘parity of esteem’. It is
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right to point out that this failure to confront and diminish the power imbalance 
contributed to a flawed agreement. But the crucial point is that while Jones is right to 
highlight the significant deficiencies of the Oslo Channel, he overemphasises the aspect 
of a denial of Palestinian autonomy.
Finally, while Jones provides a most interesting account of the need for a critical 
theory perspective for International Relations and how it may be pragmatically 
incorporated into practices of mediation, his characterisation and understanding of 
mediation and facilitation limit the extent to which his cosmopolitan mediation can be 
realised. His analysis demonstrates the need to refine, elaborate, and reflect on the ways 
of formulating a critical theory framework that is self aware of its meta-theoretical 
commitments and at the same time can be pragmatically applied.
This thesis aims to present a framework that includes both dimensions. As it 
views peace practices as societal transformations that can be facilitated and not 
mediated by third parties, the ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach favoured by Jones is rejected. 
Rather, the medium of language, encouragement of a dialogical process based on 
universalisable discourses, and participatory facilitative role of third parties are adopted 
in this thesis. Consequently, though Jones and this thesis explore similar questions, the 
fundamental understandings and eventual foundational frameworks elaborated are 
significantly different.
Structure
As a part of exploring the open space provided by the philosophical and 
theoretical writings articulated by Linklater and Proops and the praxis component 
recognised by Jones, this thesis seeks to answer the question of how we can use critical 
theory to rethink the meta-theoretical foundations of facilitated conflict resolution 
approaches. Chapter 1 is a thorough exploration of the Oslo Channel. It is a descriptive
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account of the actual facilitation process, which began on 20 January 1993 and 
culminated in the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the exchange of Letters of 
Mutual Recognition and the historic symbolic handshake between two old enemies on 
13 September 1993. The ways in which the Norwegian third-party role differs from 
traditional forms of mediation is explicated. Furthermore, the unique combination of 
second-track and first-track form of dialogues and negotiations are discussed. An 
analysis of the facilitation process and the role played by the Norwegians point out the 
affinities with facilitated conflict resolution problem-solving workshops. Finally, the 
limitations of the Oslo Channel are examined.
Chapter 2 considers the ideas of John W. Burton, a pioneer of the facilitated 
problem-solving approach. The role of third parties in the facilitation exercises, as well 
as the exercises themselves, are critically examined and their limitations are explicated. 
It is argued that although Burton’s approach moves us in the direction of a discursively- 
based conflict resolution process, his articulation of a basic human needs approach is 
philosophically and theoretically inadequate. The shortcomings of this approach lie in 
its prioritisation of instrumental rationality, a lack of self-reflection, and a failure to 
deconstruct its underlying assumptions. It is contended that Burton’s meta-theoretical 
foundations require re-examination and deconstruction.
Chapter 3 is aimed at analysing attempts by other prominent scholars and 
practitioners within the facilitated conflict resolution discipline to expand Burton’s 
theories and practices. It is argued that the social-psychological perspectives offered by 
Herbert Kelman and Ronald Fisher provide interesting insights, but do not move beyond 
Burton’s limitations. Jay Rothman’s tantalising engagement with critical self-reflection, 
as articulated by Habermas, are also discussed. The perspective offered by scholars 
within the Transformative Mediation school of thought provide the most promising 
point of departure. Bush and Folger argue that the emphasis should fall on the potential
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to move from stalemate to consensus rather than strictly aiming to reach agreements. 
However, although these scholars provide clarifications and some important 
modifications to a Burtonian framework, they remain committed to instrumental 
rationality and fail to take into account the central role communication plays in shaping, 
reinforcing, and changing attitudes, perceptions, norms, and institutions.
The methodology that would underlie such an alternative approach described as 
a Critical Theory of Peace Practice is outlined in chapter 4. It is argued that the 
formalistic, procedural framework of contesting validity claims to truthfulness, 
sincerity, and normative rightness (as Habermas outlines) as well as legitimacy (which 
is developed in the thesis as an additional criteria on) provides a helpful guideline, yet 
contains the element of contingency, that can be adapted in a variety of practices. 
Therefore, in this methodology, the disputants and third parties need not be restricted to 
particular steps of conducting problem-solving workshops. Furthermore, this 
alternative methodology can be applied at a variety of levels and so can move beyond 
the workshop settings. The various components that comprise communicative 
rationality therefore are put forward.
Chapter 5 offers the theoretical, philosophical, and meta-theoretical foundations 
for a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. Towards this process, Habermas’ discourse 
ethics approach is deployed. It is contended that his discourse ethics-based theoretical 
framework— along with its related communicative rationality— allows for a more 
reflective and thus changeable theory for facilitating deep-rooted protracted conflicts, as 
well as presents an alternative that third parties can include when engaged in the process 
of facilitation.
The praxeological dimension of this proposed alternative framework is explored 
in Chapter 6. Some examples that demonstrate affinities to utilising a Critical Theory of 
Peace Practice are discussed in studying the peace-building and grass-roots efforts by
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Israelis and Palestinians. It is contended that a transformation of not only perceptions of 
negotiating representatives must be altered, but the norms, institutions and most 
crucially the positions of the broad public sphere need to be reconstructed. A Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice, which is predicated on a Habermasian discourse ethics, offers 
a meta-theoretical, theoretical, and praxeological outline for approaching the 
transformation of violent conflict situations.
In Chapter 7, potential problems and pitfalls of a Critical Theory of Peace 
Practice are explored, including the internal critique of Habermas that universalisation 
produces a process of homogenisation (as charged by postmodernists) and the possible 
limitations of steering mechanisms for fostering a transformation of a public sphere. It 
is contended that postmodernists offer a significant contribution in their assertion that 
the danger of discourse ethics like other forms of modernity-based perspectives, is that 
it often marginalises and subordinates the voices of difference. Although one must 
acknowledge the incisive critiques of postmodernists regarding subordinating 
particularities in favour of universalism, it is argued that Habermas’ discourse ethics is 
context-sensitive and context-transcendent. Additionally, the grounding of a theory on 
language recognises the distorted power formation which leads to a breakdown in 
communicative processes. The validity claims that participants can raise and contest are 
designed to overcome such asymmetrical relationships.
Second, the potential structural and steering mechanism as embodied in states 
and markets for realising a pragmatic practice of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice are 
briefly discussed. The Oslo Channel serves again as an illustrative example of how 
structural limitations can hinder the realisation of peace agreements.
Finally, further areas of research that can assist in the refinement and expansion 
of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice framework are offered for scholars and 
practitioners to explore. The answer to the question of how can we use critical theory to
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rethink the meta-theoretical foundations of facilitated conflict resolution becomes clear. 
This thesis contends that a discourse ethics-based foundation can offer a theory that can 
impact not only the workshop environment, but also the wider arenas of social and 
political practices.
20
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Chapter 1
The Oslo Channel: Peace in Practice
We must all acknowledge the futility of war; the Arabs cannot defeat Israel on the battlefield; Israel 
cannot dictate the conditions for peace to the Arabs.'
— Shimon Peres, 1993
Conflict is one of the most pervasive and inevitable features o f all social systems, however simple or 
complex they may be and irrespective of their location in time and space.^
— Jacob Bercovitch, 1996
Figure 1: Handshake between the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman 
Yasser Arafat at the signing ceremony of the Declaration of Principles on the White House Lawn, 
13 September 1993. Source; [http://dns.usis-israel.org.il/images/p007291-.jpg].
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Introduction
The announcement in late August 1993 of an agreement between the Israeli 
Government and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) surprised many who were 
directly involved in the official Washington negotiations, as well as observers of this 
protracted conflictual situation. A breakthrough between the conflicting parties had 
been reached with the facilitated assistance of a hitherto unknown group of Norwegians. 
The Oslo Channel, which had begun as an exploratory meeting, culminated in the White 
House Lawn ceremony of 13 September 1993 where the document on Palestinian 
interim self-government known as the Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed and 
the Letters of Mutual Recognition were exchanged. This historic development was 
symbolised by a handshake between Israel’s then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and 
Chairman of the PLO Yasser Arafat.
The five-year transitional period that should have brought great changes to the 
lives of Palestinians financially, geographically, and politically has fallen short of the 
aspirational aims and timetables that were outlined in the Declaration of Principles. In 
1996, the implementation of agreements first reached in Norway suffered a serious 
setback with Israel’s return to a right-wing led Likud Government. However, further 
negotiations continued to breathe life back into the Oslo process, first embarked on so 
many years earlier.
On 23 October 1998, as part of these continuing talks, Israel’s Prime Minister 
Binyamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat signed the Wye River Accord.^ This agreement 
calls for an Israeli troop withdrawal from the West Bank, which will increase 
Palestinian self-rule from 3% to 14.2%.^  ^ The following map illustrates how the 
geopolitical arrangements should change once the Wye River Accord is fully 
implemented:
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Figure 2: The map illustrates the amount of land that should fall under Palestinian control upon 
implementation of the Wye River Accord. Source: [http://cnn.com/WORLD/struggle_for_peace/ 
land_ maps/agreement.ap.html].
As the map shows, this agreement suggests a renew ed com m itm ent to fulfilling 
the pledges contained in the Declaration o f Principles, including Palestinian self-rule 
over 85 to 90% of the W est Bank and all o f Gaza. Subsequent disillusionm ent with the
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Israeli Government led to elections in which the Labour Party, headed by Ehud Barak, 
regained power. A return to a Labour Government in Israel encouraged hope of a 
speedier implementation of Israeli troop withdrawals from the agreed points in the 
Occupied Territories and the start of final status negotiations.
Although the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, Palestinian 
refugees, and Jerusalem remain outstanding issues to be settled in the final status 
negotiations, the historic achievement reached between these two parties with the aid of 
a Norwegian third party should not be underestimated. It became evident in subsequent 
weeks, months, and years as the participants to the talks in Norway openly discussed the 
process that this Oslo Channel was a departure from traditional negotiations of 
mediation. In order to discover how the process adopted in the Oslo Channel differs 
from a mediation format, this chapter will examine the background, establishment, and 
development of the Norway talks.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the background that led to the 
first tentative meeting between two Israeli academics and members of the PLO (with the 
assistance of a Norwegian third-party team) on 20 January 1993 will be described. 
Subsequently, the events of months between January and April, when the process of 
drafting the Declaration of Principles occurred will be elaborated. Then, the more 
official phase will be detailed.
The changing Norwegian third-party role will be examined, especially in the 
ways in which it differs from traditional mediation efforts. It will be argued that by 
examining a peace in practice such as the Oslo Channel, questions arise as to how the 
difficulties that followed in the aftermath of the initial euphoric celebrations may be 
more helpfully addressed. It will be asserted that the Oslo Channel, which has affinities 
to facilitated conflict resolution practices, contains substantive and procedural 
limitations.
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Background and Prelude
You cannot answer.. .the needs of the people by simple inspiration, by getting rid of the old conflicts, wars 
and addressing the necessary means of education and development. You also need compromise by both 
sides for politics. Politics...is the art of human relations. All the weaknesses and strengths that human 
beings possess are expressed in politics.^
—Shimon Peres, 22 May 1995 
The exact conditions that convinced the Israelis and the PLO to accept an 
invitation to explore an alternative form of dialoguing remain a heavily contested topic. 
It is fair to say that multiple factors contributed to a willingness to meet. First, the end 
of the Cold War and superpower rivalry presented a new opportunity for changes in the 
Middle East. From the end of World War II to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the 
United States and the Soviet Union placed great ideological and strategic emphasis on 
this region; Israel was America’s strategic ally, whereas Israel’s neighbours, especially 
the Palestinians, allied themselves to the Soviet Bloc.
The enmity between Jews and non-Jews in the area of present-day Israel, one 
could argue, dates as far back as the start of historical record-keeping. However, the 
creation of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948 had a direct effect on the Palestinian 
community as 700,000 out of 1.5 million Palestinians fled to the West Bank of the 
Jordan River, Gaza, and further afield.^ During the Suez Crisis of 1956, Israel took the 
Gaza strip from Egypt, but withdrew in the following year. However, during the Six 
Days War of 1967, under General Yitzhak Rabin, Israel reoccupied the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem.^ Four years later, under General Ariel Sharon, the Occupied Territories 
fell under complete Israeli control.^
The PLO, which Arafat commanded from 1969, was dependent on Soviet and 
Arab states for financial and political support. The PLO became the loudest voice for 
Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories and the diaspora. The PLO engaged in 
an armed struggle against the state of Israel and its citizens and the violent attacks
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attracted numerous domestic and international headlines. The 1972 Munich Olympic 
killings of Israeli athletes led to the PLO’s expulsion from Jordan. Consequently, the 
organisation moved to Lebanon where its members continued their terrorist activities. 
In 1978, Israel responded to these continuing attacks by invading southern Lebanon, 
which drove Arafat and the PLO to Tunis. Thus, it became Arafat’s exile home until 
his return to Gaza more than ten years later.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the financial support provided by Russia 
to the PLO quickly declined as it turned inward to deal with severe domestic challenges. 
The US grew wearier of guaranteeing loans to Israel, seeing little progress in the 
resolution of the Middle East conflict.^
Second, the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991 for the first time brought together 
Arab countries and the US. Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein; consequently, the PLO 
suffered greatly. That is, the PLO lost $120 million of aid from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and other Arab Gulf states.^* The expulsion of up to 400,000 Palestinian guest workers 
from the Arab Gulf states further diminished the credibility of the PLO’s ability to 
produce positive change for Palestinians in the region and in particular for those living 
in the Occupied Territories. By the end of the Gulf War in the summer of 1991, the 
PLO found itself politically alienated, economically close to bankruptcy, and isolated 
amongst the Palestinian community, while more militant groups such as Hamas 
threatened Arafat’s leadership. With no Soviet Union to fall back on and increased 
American hegemony as a result of the allied Gulf War victory, Arafat’s PLO faced 
further challenges to its credibility.
Third, Israel, affected by years of the Intifada (low intensity war with the 
Palestinians of the Occupied Territories) looked for ways out of this conflict. The 
Intifada started as direct action protests by the Palestinians in Gaza’s largest refugee 
camp ‘Jabalya’ in December 1987. On Jabalya’s overcrowded 1.5 km ,^ 700,000
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Palestinians continue to live/^ This local uprising quickly mushroomed into a 
movement and low intensity war.
Meanwhile, as the numerous attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
(including the Schultz Initiative and the London Accords that followed the ‘Land for 
Peace’ concept of Camp David) ran into seemingly insurmountable obstacles, the 
Intifada continued to escalate. Furthermore, Hamas’ increase in popularity threatened 
not only the PLO leadership, but also Israel. Initially, Israel fostered local resistance in 
the hope of toppling the Tunis-based PLO leadership.*^
Fourth, political willingness to break the stalemate received a boost by the 
Labour Party’s victory in Israel over the right-wing Likud Government in June 1992. 
The new administration led by Prime Minister Rabin provided renewed hope for 
progress on the peace process front. The Labour Party had campaigned to work on 
finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Although Rabin publicly announced that his approach to the peace talks would 
not differ greatly from the previous Likud Government, there were those in influential 
positions, including Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his deputy Yossi Beilin, who 
viewed a resolution of the Palestinian question as a crucial component of finding a 
lasting regional peace.*"*
In addition to these political and structural changes, many countries— as well as 
private initiatives by non-governmental organisations and individuals—helped to create 
an opportunity for exploring direct talks between Israel and the PLO. For the first time 
since the signing of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979, various 
countries tried to establish a dialogue between interested Israelis, Palestinians, and the 
PLO.
Among these was Norway which enjoyed a privileged position as it was trusted 
by both Israel and the PLO.*  ^ Norway had supported the creation of an Israeli state.
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Moreover, the left-wing socialist Norwegian Government, as well as many trade unions, 
established and maintained contacts with the Israeli Labour P a r t y T h o r v a l d  
Stoltenberg, an influential member of the Norwegian Labour Party, worked to forge 
connections with the PLO. In 1981 and 1982, he met with leading members of the 
PLO, including Arafat, who expressed an interest in establishing direct talks with 
I s r a e l . W h e n  Stoltenberg became Foreign Minister of Norway in 1987, while 
fostering contacts with Israel, he continued the policy of providing generous aid to the 
Palestinian community.
In subsequent years, attempts were made to arrange a meeting between the local 
Palestinian activist and intellectual Faisal Husseini and Israel’s Deputy Foreign 
Minister Yossi Beilin. Though this never transpired, Norway’s Deputy Foreign 
Minister Jan Egeland did meet with Beilin who indicated that since there was little 
progress in official efforts, he was interested in talking with the local Palestinian 
leadership.
On a private basis, Mona Juul (herself a Norwegian diplomat and expert on the 
Middle East as well as a close friend of Jan Egeland) supported her husband Terje Rpd- 
Larsen’s efforts, as he attempted to facilitate dialogues between Israelis and 
Palestinians. Having lived in Cairo, Terje R0d-Larsen, then Director of the Norwegian 
Institute of Applied Social Sciences (FAFO), decided to conduct a survey of living 
conditions of resident Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
Towards this effort, Larsen asked Marianne Heiberg (author of similar reports 
for the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and wife of future Foreign Minister Johan Jprgen 
Holst) to assist him. She notes that the process of compiling a non-biased document 
helped to establish and cement relationships with both the Israelis and Palestinians. In 
turn, this objective approach confirmed FAFO’s credibility as an unprejudiced 
organisation.^^ While carrying out the survey, Larsen developed important contacts
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with Palestinian activists in the Occupied Territories, the Tunis hierarchy, and 
influential Israelis. In May 1992, Larsen met with Beilin and suggested that Norway 
could help to facilitate a second-track channel between Israel and Palestinians. His 
willingness, keen interest, and repeated offer of using Norway as a venue for exploring 
ideas would prove to be extremely helpful and opportune.
Finally, individuals within the PLO and Israel pursued possible channels that 
would allow them to meet and dialogue. Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, 
was a key figure close to Arafat who expressed a desire to talk directly with Israel. 
However, he approached Egypt as a possible third party that could help establish such 
t a l k s . O t h e r s  in the PLO including Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala) sought to establish 
economic co-operation between Palestinians and Israelis,
On the Israeli side, two academics, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak, were 
engaged in dialogues regarding economic co-operation with the local Palestinian 
leadership including Faisal Husseini and the Palestinian spokeswoman to the 
Washington talks, Hanan Ashrawi.^  ^ Yair Hirschfeld had close ties to the Deputy 
Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin and headed the Economic Co-operation Foundation, a 
left-wing think tank initially created by Beilin. Ron Pundak, a former student of 
Hirschfeld, joined him at the Foundation to help carry out research. Together, they 
forged contacts and dialogues with Palestinian community leaders and activists in the 
Occupied Territories.^^
Public Negotiations
Despite the determination of Yitzhak Shamir, the right-wing Likud Prime Minister, not to concede an 
inch of territory, there were high hopes that the Palestinian problem could be solved.^^
—Jane Corbin, 1994
Efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict were restarted after the allied victory 
over Saddam Hussein. As part of the US and Soviet sponsored peace initiative, the
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Madrid Conference commenced in October 1991. This ‘Land for Peace’ formula, based 
on the Camp David Accords (which included bilateral and multilateral talks) followed a 
negotiations format between Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation. The parties operated under the following guidelines in Madrid. First, any 
settlements reached would be based on United Nations (Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338.^ "^  Second, direct two-track meetings would occur in phases following the 
opening meeting in Madrid. Third, although both bilateral and multilateral meetings 
would be arranged, the emphasis would fall on the bilateral ones. Fourth, the Madrid 
process would neither have binding decision-making powers nor an official mechanism 
for dealing with differences of opinion. Fifth, the United Nations would only be an 
observer. Additionally, all Palestinians serving on the joint delegation would not 
belong to the PLO nor have a direct connection to East Jerusalem, but would reside in 
Gaza.^ ^
These discussions were held up to media scrutiny and positions became 
entrenched as participants aimed to please their domestic constituencies. The Madrid 
Conference reconvened in Washington on 10 December 1991 and lasted until 24 
September 1992. In the US capital, the bilateral meetings between the disputants 
continued, while multilateral talks were held in at least thirty countries from Canada to 
China, who acted as observers or a d v i s o r s . T h e s e  more informal discussions 
concentrated on ways of co-operating on common resources such as water and how to 
develop economic co-operation.
Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal Husseini were chosen to participate in Washington 
by the PLO. However, Israel rejected Husseini because of his connection to East 
Jerusalem.^  ^ Abu Ala, the PLO’s chief economic advisor, headed the multilateral team. 
While the multilateral talks took a backseat to the bilateral negotiations, the posturing 
and openly public statements produced by all sides in Washington indicated the lack of
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any real progress.
The hope that an Israeli Labour victory in June 1992 would provide a 
breakthrough in negotiations failed to materialise. As the weeks passed in Washington, 
the PLO remained excluded from the meeting rooms.^  ^ Since the Tunis leadership 
controlled the Palestinians who comprised the joint delegation, it became evident that if 
a settlement were to be reached, it would be necessary to talk directly to the PLO. This 
frustrated status motivated Israeli political decision-makers and the PLO hierarchy to 
explore other avenues that would advance an agreement.
Towards a Norwegian Channel
We searched for other ideas in order to encourage the process.^^
—Ron Pundak, 14 May 1995
In the Washington Delegation...the structure was bad. For one thing, there were coalitions of different 
groups; they were not unified with some leadership. The common denominator was very, very low and the 
decision-making capability was very low.^°
—Yair Hirschfield, 24 May 1995
With the stalled Washington talks in the background, the parties involved started
searching for other ways of establishing a dialogue. While working for the Economic
Co-operation Foundation with Yair Hirschfeld, Ron Pundak also forged contacts with
local Palestinian activists and political leaders. He describes a meeting with Hanan
Ashrawi. He notes her dissatisfaction with the deadlocked process:
Ashrawi suggested, ‘Why don’t you go meet Abu Ala?’...Since she knew we had very good contacts 
with Yossi Beilin— head of the Israeli multilateral team and counterpart to Abu Ala of the PLO)— she 
thought it would be a good idea that we meet him.^‘
Hirschfeld also recalls expressing an interest in pursuing this proposition:
If I met someone from outside the local leadership, the Tunis leadership...I wanted to meet Abu Ala. I 
had read papers submitted by him in November 1991 and was impressed.^^
Meanwhile, Abu Ala was encouraged by Hanan Ashrawi to meet with an
interested Israeli academic who was willing to meet him.^  ^ Although initially reluctant.
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further positive encouragements from Faisal Husseini and another trusted friend 
convinced him that since it would not be a negotiating session, there could be no harm 
in meeting with Yair Hirschfeld.^"  ^ Upon receiving authorisation from Abu Mazen 
(chief advisor to Arafat) Abu Ala agreed to meet Hirschfeld in London.
The opportunity to explore a possible encounter arose in December 1992 when 
all the parties were attending a multilateral conference as part of the Madrid peace 
process. Abu Ala describes their encounter as follows:
It was not a bad meeting for a first meeting between an Israeli and an official member of the PLO. At 
that time Yossi Beilin was also in London, So this was my assessment: since he was in London with 
Yossi Beilin, it had some meaning. He said that he had met with Dan Kurtzer of the US. This was also 
something.^^
Larsen, who had arranged the meeting between Hirschfeld and Abu Ala, 
repeated his offer later that day to organise a gathering between Israelis and PLO 
members under the guise of an academic conference in Norway. Both Hirschfeld and 
Larsen recall their interest in pursuing this avenue, since their previous attempts to start 
meaningful dialogues with the local leadership in the Occupied Territories, who were 
seen to be more progressive than those in Tunis, showed no signs of movement.^^ It 
became obvious that the local leaders always deferred decisions to Tunis.
Meanwhile, events on the ground led to a cessation of the Washington talks. 
Israel’s response to the kidnapping and murder of a border policeman was to expel 400 
activists, most of whom were allegedly affiliated with Hamas, to Lebanon. The 
subsequent failure by the US to press Israel for compliance with UN Resolution 799, 
which calls for the return of the deportees, reduced the credibility of the US in the eyes 
of the PLO. Consequently, Arafat withdrew the Palestinian delegation from the public 
official negotiations and stated that they would not return to Washington until Israel 
allowed the expelled Palestinians back into the West Bank and Gaza.
This latest obstacle, coupled with an interest formally expressed by an Israeli 
with ties to Beilin, convinced the PLO leadership in Tunis to approve a meeting
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between Abu Ala and the two academics, Hirschfeld and Pundak. Having received 
authorisation from Arafat and Abu Mazen, Abu Ala accepted an invitation from Terje 
R0d-Larsen for a secret exploratory meeting in Norway, Upon informing Beilin and 
having received no outright rejection to a meeting with Abu Ala, Hirschfeld and Pundak 
as private individuals headed for Sarpsborg.^^
A Beginning in Sarpsborg
The Israelis and Palestinians were already talking to each other in Washington and they wanted to continue 
to talk to each other. They wanted to find a resolution to the conflict.^®
—Marianne Heiberg, 18 May 1995 
The unofficial and secret talks began on 20 January 1993. This first meeting 
lasted until 23 January 1993 at the headquarters of Borregard Paper Company in 
Sarpsborg, Norway, situated 100 km south-east of Oslo. High ranking PLO members 
Abu Ala, Maher el-Kurd, and Hassan Asfour represented the Palestinian delegation. 
The Israeli delegation was comprised of two academics, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron 
Pundak. The morning began with Marianne Heiberg’s presentation of the findings from 
FAFO’s living condition s u r v e y . A  lunch for all the participants followed where the 
appearance of Jan Egeland, Norway’s Deputy Foreign Minister, added credibility to the 
unofficial Israeli and Norwegian representatives and indicated Norway’s commitment 
to this effort.
The format of an academic seminar meant that if the meeting between the 
Israelis and the PLO became public knowledge, the parties could claim that the meeting 
was to discuss the living conditions survey report. Larsen recalls that during the 
morning session and luncheon, both the Palestinians and Israelis were extremely 
distracted as they waited to discuss their reason for coming to Norway
With the departure of Heiberg, Juul, and Egeland, only Larsen remained from
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the Norwegian team. Then, the direct, bilateral, and confidential meeting between the 
Israelis and Palestinians commenced. Larsen recalls that though he was asked to remain 
in the meeting room, he left as he believed the parties had to find ways of coming to an 
agreement by t h e m s e l v e s . A t  Abu Ala’s suggestion and Hirschfeld’s immediate 
agreement, the parties decided to refrain from discussing the past or apportioning 
blame."^  ^ These consensually arrived at ground rules allowed the disputants to 
concentrate on ways of reaching an agreement."^^  Although Hirschfeld and Pundak 
made it clear that they were not representing the Israeli Government and therefore the 
meeting was not an exercise in negotiations, as Hirschfeld puts it, ‘When Abu Ala said 
“Israel should be out of Gaza first”, I knew we had something to go on’.'^
This proposal signalled to Hirschfeld the seriousness of Abu Ala’s intentions. 
The PLO had always rejected a Gaza First option, for it was feared the narrow strip of 
highly overcrowded land would be the only territory it would ever control. At the same 
time, the PLO knew that suggesting an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza would be an 
attractive starting point as this idea had been publicly floated by Shimon Peres in 1980 
and had been discussed during the Camp David negotiations."^^
The PLO delegation, convinced by the academics’ credentials, commitments and 
links to their Government chose to meet again with Hirschfeld and Pundak. All the 
participants aimed to formulate a set of broad principles that could help the official 
negotiators in Washington to reach an agreement.
Larsen remained outside all discussions during the three days of meetings. He 
provided food whenever it was needed, listened to a party’s frustrations or ideas during 
breaks, and provided all general administrative support. The participants could 
concentrate on exploring ideas, for the Norwegian host saw to any physical needs. The 
working relationship that developed over this short period, as the participants talked, 
ate, and lived in the same environment was a sharp contrast to the intermittent.
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sometimes short discussions in Washington where hostility and mistrust prevailed. 
Even though the three Palestinians and two Israelis were still sceptical as to future 
meetings producing a substantive development, the fact that they were able to forge a 
common understanding was an important outcome of the exploratory meetings in 
Sarpsborg.
Towards a Declaration of Principles
After the first meeting, both sides reported back to their respective political 
leaders. Deputy Foreign Minister Beilin on the Israeli side and Abu Mazen, chief 
advisor to Arafat in Tunis. Receiving no outright rejection to convening a further 
meeting, the parties returned to Sarpsborg on 12 February 1993. The ground rules that 
the participants had agreed to applied for the duration of further talks. Moreover, the 
informal pre-negotiations phase, which lasted from January to April 1993, remained 
informal and unofficial. In this environment, the ‘wastebasket principle’ applied."^  ^
That is, all participants could freely express ideas without fear of being forced to adopt 
a specific position. Hirschfeld and Abu Ala presented a paper, which contained each 
side’s positions, ideas where they thought agreements could be reached as well as 
longer-term aspirations on how to transform the conflict.'^  ^ Abu Ala, for instance, made 
it clear that the PLO wanted autonomy and control over Gaza and not to function as a 
subordinate authority to Israel in such jurisdictions. Hirschfeld suggested a process of 
gradually transferring administrative institutions such as health and education.
During these weekend meetings, Mona Juul joined Larsen. They continued to 
remain outside the meeting rooms. Only when requested did they interact with the 
parties during talks. Otherwise, their self-defined role restricted the third parties to 
providing a conducive atmosphere and a sympathetic ear."^  ^ By the close of the 
weekend, like the Norwegians, both the Israelis and the members of the PLO envisioned
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a back-channel to the official Washington negotiations. The ideas explored and 
tentative common ground reached could be fed back into the direct, public official 
talks.
Upon returning to Tunis and Jerusalem, the document referred to as the 
Sarpsborg Document was put forward for consultation to the respective political 
decision-makers. In the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Peres and Beilin favoured the Gaza 
First option that was outlined. In this Paper, it was proposed that Gaza should be 
transferred to a UN trusteeship. However, the connotation a UN trusteeship brought 
with it (acting as a neutral authority while the colonial power departed) was rejected by 
Peres and withdrawn from the document.
In Tunis, in spite of Abu Ala’s reservations about carving out the Occupied 
Territories by focusing on one piece of land, Abu Mazen and Arafat knew that the Gaza 
First option would be acceptable to then Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The 
parties carried their amended documents back to Norway and met again from 20 to 21 
March 1993.
The Palestinians expressed their frustrations at not knowing whether the Israeli 
Government endorsed this back-channel. They also pointed out the myriad of issues on 
which no agreements seemed likely. Meanwhile, on the ground in Israel and the 
Occupied Territories, violence and terror dominated the headlines.^^ Rabin responded 
to the killings of civilians within Israel by sealing off the Occupied Territories, which 
meant that 30,000 Palestinians who commuted to Israel were suddenly unemployed. 
This, in turn, encouraged violent protests in Gaza, which elicited a strong response from 
the Israeli military with the consequences of dead Palestinians and revenge killings of 
Jewish settlers.
Meanwhile, back in Sarpsborg, another draft of the Declaration of Principles 
known as Sarpsborg III, was formulated at the third round of meetings. The discussions
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focused on the ‘Gaza First’ framework. This six page draft document, although greatly 
modified, formed the basis of the official Declaration of Principles. In the draft version, 
Israel agreed to a complete withdrawal from Gaza within two years. The dominant 
view within the Government was that Gaza was a pariah and separating herself from 
Gaza would mean a more secure Israel. The fifteen articles and accompanying annexes 
covered topics ranging from the final status negotiations of Jerusalem, to Palestinian 
economic powers to be gained after elections, to the creation of a Palestinian National 
Authority. Difficult issues including Jewish settlements, Palestinian refugees of the 
1948 war, and Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem, were deferred. However, as Shimon 
Peres describes:
Israel had to demonstrate a good will intention: the issue of withdrawal from the West Bank had to be 
included. Thus, ‘Gaza First’ became ‘Gaza Plus’. I preferred to offer Jericho as a sign of our intent to 
continue negotiations, even if ‘Gaza First’ would be the main policy. There were no Jewish settlements 
in the immediate Jericho area; therefore, there would be no need to discuss their fate. We proposed an 
administrative centre to be set up in Jericho to take pressure off Jerusalem... Its proximity to the Jordan 
River opened a preferred solution in my eyes for the future, a confederation between Jordanians and 
Palestinians.^*
The third round of meetings ended with demands from the PLO delegation that a 
more official Israeli be included if there were to be further discussions.^^ Hirschfeld 
and Pundak relayed these messages to Beilin and Peres. At that juncture, neither the 
Foreign Minister nor his deputy believed that the Oslo avenue would lead to any 
substantive agreement. Rather, any ideas that emerged from the Oslo Channel would be 
fed back into the official Washington talks. Dan Kurtzer of the US State Department 
was informed, but he dismissed the Norway channel as an academic exercise.
Simultaneously, the Washington talks were stymied as the Palestinian delegation 
refused to return to negotiations while Rabin failed to revoke the order which had led to 
the expulsion of the 400 Palestinians from the Occupied Territories. Since the 
Washington track remained suspended and in order to continue with Oslo, Israel 
insisted that Abu Ala restart these stalled negotiations.
The US, under the leadership of President Bill Clinton, was eager to see
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progress. Consequently, the US declared itself an equal partner to the Arab and Israeli 
delegations.^^ After the US brokered a deal to have some of the deported alleged 
Hamas activists returned, the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (including the 
previously excluded Faisal Husseini) returned to restart the Washington talks.
Meanwhile, the well-informed and supportive Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Thorvald Stoltenberg was replaced by Johann Jprgen Holst on 13 April 1993. Holst 
was the husband of Marianne Heiberg and both were close friends of Larsen and Juul. 
The change of foreign ministers would lead to a change in the role played by the 
Norwegians in the subsequent months.
From Pre-negotiations to Negotiations
On 29 April 1993, the parties involved in the secret Norway talks returned to 
Oslo. During this meeting, the discussions focused on three issues: Israeli withdrawal 
from Gaza, gradual transfer of powers, and economic co-operation.^"  ^ The request from 
Abu Ala for the inclusion of an official Israeli representative became a prerequisite for 
further meetings. Although the academics had played a crucial role in establishing a 
dialogue and exploring ideas and options for possible agreements, the PLO delegation 
was adamant that Hirschfeld and Pundak had contributed as much as they could.^  ^ An 
official Israeli representative would be needed if the ideas were to lead to any 
substantial development. Since Abu Ala demonstrated over the next few weeks his 
close ties to Arafat by providing compromises on texts during the public multilateral 
negotiations in Rome and Oslo, Peres and Rabin agreed to send Israel’s highest 
diplomat, Uri Savir, to Norway.^^
As the Oslo Channel began to develop momentum, the Norwegian third-party 
team expanded to include Geir Pedersen, a member of the Foreign Ministry and soon to 
be head of the International Section at FAFO. As a close friend of Larsen’s, Pedersen
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could be trusted to keep the channel a secret and to assist Larsen and Juul.
The official phase of the negotiations, which lasted from May until August 
1993, commenced with the arrival of Uri Savir on 20 May 1993. He was the Director 
General of Israel’s Foreign Ministry. Before Savir and Abu Ala’s meeting, Larsen 
helped to pave the way for ensuring that both parties could accept the other’s ability to 
deliver, if an agreement was reached.^  ^ Larsen’s role as an administrator who helped to 
provide accommodation and arrange transportation began to change.
Uri Savir recalls the purpose of his meeting with Abu Ala and other members of 
the PLO. He notes:
The Prime Minister and Beilin decided that I should go to Oslo to meet with Abu Ala and the 
Palestinians ...to find out if the mandate was workable. They wanted to see if the PLO would agree to 
keep Jerusalem outside the autonomy, which was one of the big obstacles in the Washington talks and 
was a condition from our point of view.^®
At the meeting, Savir expressed his interest in this secret channel. However, he 
also made evident his dissatisfaction with some of the Palestinian demands made in the 
Washington talks, such as prisoner releases before any progress had been made. 
Nevertheless, Abu Ala immediately felt that Savir could be trusted and was someone 
with whom an agreement could be forged:
Uri Savir...was sent and this was the first time that an Israeli official and a Palestinian official formally 
met. This was a significant development.^^
Savir was also impressed by the approach that governed this secret channel:
I was very impressed with the people I met and by the seriousness of their intentions. What impressed 
me the most was not that the Palestinians accepted certain conditions...but they had a basic philosophy. 
Rather than resolving the issues only through co-operation, there was a whole philosophy here of 
cordiality, co-operation, and mutual dependence.^
In between the meetings, the participants would take walks with Larsen. 
Though the participants had become accustomed to his approach, Savir was surprised 
by the Norwegian’s style of facilitation. During the walks in between meetings and 
during meals, Larsen often asked how the parties felt about the proceedings, their fears, 
and aspirations for the future. Questions regarding the actual substance of their talks 
were not included.^  ^ By encouraging emotional relationships and personal trust to
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develop, Larsen believed a positive outcome was achievable.^^
Although the meeting between the Palestinians and the new Israeli arrival lasted 
just two days, a new phase of talks was under way. That is, at the very minimum, Israel 
was officially meeting with the PLO, albeit secretly.
Back in Jerusalem, Savir confirmed that the Oslo Channel was a viable, serious 
series of meetings between Israelis and representatives of the PLO. He recommended 
the upgrading of talks to negotiations and suggested that a lawyer be included in future 
meetings. In late May, Joel Singer, a trusted individual by both Peres and Rabin was 
chosen to be legal advisor to the Foreign Ministry. His analysis of the document, which 
resulted from the March meeting, was gloomy: T thought the first half was
catastrophic. I wanted the part about Jerusalem being outside the deal in writing and not 
just a verbal promise’.T h o u g h  the paper contained no firm commitments of any kind, 
the ‘verbal promises’ given by the PLO seemed to indicate a change of position.^
The Palestinians in the official Washington talks continued to insist that a 
transfer of authority had to include Palestinian jurisdiction over Jewish settlements in 
the Occupied Territories as well as East Jerusalem. The Sarpsborg document suggested 
that the PLO was willing to move from this public position. After meetings with Peres 
and Rabin, Singer was given a remit to work out an agreement that would end the 
conflict with the PLO while protecting Israel’s security and identity.
Back in Oslo in early June, the participants assembled once again. Singer 
demanded clarity on issues that had stymied the official Washington talks. The 
character of this meeting was still of the pre-negotiations type, for Singer wanted to 
discover the sincerity and level of commitment of the Palestinian delegation. The PLO 
for the first time learned of Rabin’s awareness of this secret channel. For two days, 
detailed questions that had been raised, but not resolved in the Madrid and Washington 
talks, were raised by Singer to Abu Ala. This differed from all previous sessions in that 
it was a lawyer asking direct questions and one member providing answers. The other 
members of the PLO delegation remained silent and this new type of talks rankled them.
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A Change of Phase, A Change of Tracks
After the meeting in which Abu Ala was tested by Singer, in Tunis, Abu Ala 
realised that clarity of issues was essential for any practical agreements which might 
eventually result. However, the process of reaching that clarity had brought feelings of 
humiliation.^^ Nevertheless, Abu Mazen and Arafat realised that with Rabin’s 
involvement came the prospect of a real breakthrough. Singer reported his positive 
assessment and with the approval of both Peres and Rabin, worked to present a 
document that was based on what Abu Ala indicated could be agreed to, while 
articulating Israel’s non-negotiable issues.
Meanwhile, the official talks that included Americans as a third participant 
continued without any sign of progress. On 30 June 1993, the Americans presented a 
Bridging Document that was viewed by the Palestinian delegation as being biased. As 
these talks showed little sign of advancing, while Oslo had been considered to 
contribute to them, it became evident that a separate channel with its own momentum 
and agreement was developing.
On 3 July 1993, the Israeli contingent comprising of Hirschfeld, Pundak, Savir, 
and Singer met their Palestinian counterparts. While Hassan Asfour remained, Maher el 
Kurd was replaced by a lawyer, Mohamad Abu Koush, who served on a Palestinian 
committee on a UN body which concerned itself with encouraging social and economic 
co-operation. Singer presented a new draft of the Declaration of Principles, which the 
Palestinian delegation viewed as containing too many required concessions on their 
part, while Israel conceded hardly anything. This document detailed a timetable of 
withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho by Israeli troops, an insistence that the issue of 
settlements be deferred, a scheduling of elections, and guidelines for transferring 
administrative institutions to Palestinian control.^  ^ Though the previous Sarpsborg
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document had included Gaza and Jericho (for the West Bank town of Jericho signalled 
to the PLO that they would not be trapped into governing only Gaza) the precise details 
of the Israeli terms were new developments and very much unwelcomed. The 
document was studied in detail and where the Palestinians objected, amendments were 
added. The result was a new version of the Declaration of Principles. There remained 
five points of contention: UN Resolutions 242 and 338, the fate of Palestinians from the 
1948 war, the Gaza and Jericho option, permanent status negotiations, and elections for 
the Palestinian National Authority.^^
Larsen, who led the Norwegian third-party team along with Geir Pedersen and 
Mona Juul, continued to remain outside the discussions and offered interpretations and 
assistance when requested. Jan Egeland joined the Israelis and Palestinians for dinner 
in between the meetings to reaffirm Norway’s commitment. Before departing from 
Norway, each side met with Foreign Minister Holst to offer updates of the talks. Holst 
reaffirmed Norway’s continuing commitment to the peace process.
A week later on 10 July 1993 the parties returned to Oslo for further direct 
negotiations. The bargaining process had started.^  ^ The Palestinians, like the Israelis at 
the previous meeting, presented a new document which surprised the Israelis as they 
were ready to discuss the five identified sticking points, plus further security concerns 
raised by Prime Minister Rabin. Abu Ala included at least 20 more points such as 
incorporation of the word ‘Palestine Liberation Organisation’ rather than the previously 
used term, ‘the Palestinians’. In this redrafted document, the PLO would also have 
control over the passage between Gaza and Jericho, an area of 150 km^ .^ ^
This Oslo Channel came close to collapse during the summer months as 
negotiations intensified and positions became entrenched. Savir and Singer concluded 
the proposal presented by the Palestinians, would be rejected by Rabin and Peres. 
Therefore, the next day it was agreed that the participants would return to Jerusalem and
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Tunis for further consultations.
During a visit by Foreign Minister Holst to Tunisia, he met with Arafat to 
fathom the Chairman’s intentions and level of commitment towards the Oslo Channel. 
On 13 July 1993, Arafat expressed his distrust and frustrations with the stalled 
Washington talks and concluded that little progress could be made with two pro-Israeli 
parties.^  ^ Along with Mona Juul and Terje R0d-Larsen, Holst met with Abu Ala and 
then with Arafat. To meet the request that Jericho and Gaza should have a corridor 
through which Palestinians could travel safely from one to the other, Holst suggested 
the words ‘safe passage’ Arafat accepted this phrase. After the short meeting, the 
Norwegians believed that the PLO Chairman was informed and committed. As a result, 
the Palestinian delegation would return to the Israeli proposal with changes/^ As Abu 
Ala maintains:
Singer wanted to re-negotiate the text and agreements encompassed in the draft of the Declaration of 
Principles. We needed clarifications and assurances, which they seemed to back away from.^^
Larsen and Juul travelled to Jerusalem carrying a letter containing Arafat’s 
views written by Holst to P e re s . Th e r e ,  they briefed both Rabin and Peres of their 
meeting with the PLO leadership in Tunis. As Peres notes:
We need to know if we entered into a dialogue and compromise, especially in matters relating to 
security, the Palestinians could deliver so that our security wasn’t threatened.^^
Carrying a letter from Peres to Holst asking for clarifications regarding the definition of 
a ‘safe passage’, Larsen and Juul returned to Tunis. Along with Holst, they met with 
Arafat again, but failed to extract a clear definition of this term. In Paris, before 
returning to Oslo, Pundak was updated on developments.^^
Soon after on 24 July 1993, all the participants travelled to Norway to continue 
negotiations based on the document and changes made to it. This document had initially 
been proposed by the Israeli lawyer Joel Singer. Meanwhile, an escalation of violence 
returned to the headlines. Rabin’s response to the attacks by Hezbollah on civilians in
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northern Israel was to authorise an air assault on their bases in southern Lebanon/^ 
Hundreds of civilians in this region were forced to flee to Beirut and the Hezbollah 
guerrillas retaliated by further attacks on Jewish settlements in northern I s r a e l T h i s  
series of events, however, was not alluded to by any of the participants as they engaged 
in further negotiations/^
The Israelis led by Savir and Singer agreed with the Palestinian delegation to 
review both of the previous documents that each side had produced and to formulate a 
common paper. This type of negotiation was not built on trust, but rather on the mutual 
recognition that all participants were dependent on each other for success or failure.^  ^
The session consisted of constant bargaining; often one party took one step forward 
while the other took two steps back. This followed the Arab style of bargaining.
As the negotiations intensified, the suspicions felt by both sides toward each 
other became apparent. For example, during this round of meetings the parties had 
agreed to meet at 9:00 a.m. for breakfast, for it was agreed in the ground rules that all 
the participants would share meals. On 25 July 1993, the Palestinians arrived at 10:00 
a.m. and accused the Norwegians of siding with the Israelis because they had had an 
hour to discuss strategies.^  ^ The Norwegians, and in particular Larsen, became the ones 
to absorb the frustrations of Abu Ala and his Israeli counterparts.
As the speed of progress diminished, a game of brinkmanship was deployed 
between Savir and Abu Ala. The Israeli Director General of the Foreign Ministry 
informed Abu Ala that he and the others would be leaving and the channel was at an 
impasse unless the Palestinians withdrew their version of the Declaration of Principles. 
Abu Ala announced his ‘resignation’ from the talks, but pledged to support his 
successor. Savir responded by intoning a well-known phrase regarding the PLO’s 
incredible ability to always miss an opportunity. Savir reiterated how close they had 
been to an agreement and still the PLO were walking away.^^
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In order to halt the breakdown in talks, Larsen intervened directly for the first 
time and requested that Abu Ala meet alone with Uri Savir.^  ^ Juul and Pedersen 
conversed with the other delegates, while Larsen convinced Abu Ala not to leave and 
Savir to meet with Abu Ala. In agreement with Singer, Savir put forward a proposal to 
divide the most difficult issues into two groups: security and the Gaza and Jericho 
option. Each side would take points back to convince their leaders to compromise 
where compromise was possible; for Israel, this meant flexibility on the transfer of 
power and organisational arrangements for handing over Gaza and Jericho. For the 
PLO, this meant they would have to give way on matters of security, allowing Israel to 
retain control over the areas between Gaza and Egypt, Jericho, and the Jordan as well as 
providing continued security to the Jewish s e t t l e r s . I n  addition to these suggestions, 
Savir put forward a draft of Letters of Mutual Recognition that could be exchanged 
between Israel and the PLO.
Towards An Agreement
Larsen continued his role in between meetings as a deliverer of messages since 
it was impossible for someone in Israel to communicate with someone in an Arab 
country due to the non-existence of telephone lines. As the two sides continued to 
posture, Abu Ala met with Hirschfeld, Larsen, and Juul in Paris. Meanwhile, the US 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher engaged in busy diplomatic rounds between 
Israel and Syria. As the official Washington talks and positions by the Palestinians 
indicated no real progress, the US turned to this part of the Middle East puzzle. 
Although Rabin briefed Christopher about the Norwegian channel, from the sceptical 
observations concerning the PLO’s commitment, Christopher concluded that this 
channel would not be fruitful, whereas the Israeli-Syrian situation might have better 
chances of being settled.^^
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The local Palestinian leadership who had participated in the Washington talks 
was frustrated and surprised to discover that Arafat and Abu Mazen had made 
concessions that they themselves were forbidden to offer in the public a r e n a . T h e  
PLO’s financial problems attracted headlines. Protests erupted over unpaid salaries and 
telephone lines in some PLO offices were disconnected due to non-payment of bills. At 
the same time, Rabin realised that the Oslo Channel was no longer a back-channel, but a 
possibly direct route for a deal between Israel and the PLO.
With this background, on 13 August 1993, the parties returned to Sarpsborg, 
where the first round of meetings in January had conunenced. As the meetings opened 
on the following day, the Palestinians presented a document which incorporated some 
of the concerns expressed by the Israeli side regarding security. These were the points 
that the Palestinian delegation had taken back to Tunis as part of the swap exchange 
proposed by Savir in their last meeting. The Israelis agreed to include the final status 
negotiations as a goal in the Declaration of Principles and accepted that final status talks 
would lead to a complete withdrawal from the Occupied Territories.^^ Abu Ala failed 
to receive a go-ahead from Arafat for this new document of compromises.
This time, as Larsen fulfilled a personal obligation, Mona Juul took over the role 
of the observer and provider of assistance if needed. Hirschfeld and Pundak who had 
remained with the Israeli team to provide continuity and ideas indicated that the 
prospects for an agreement were gloomy.^^
On 17 August 1993, Larsen travelled to Stockholm where Holst, at the request 
of Peres, arrived to meet him. Peres and his policy advisor, Avi Gill, joined Holst, Juul, 
and Larsen in Stockholm. Savir remained in Israel for his presence might have attracted 
unwanted a t t en t i o n . P e r e s  requested that Holst act as the intermediary on the 
telephone and Larsen contacted Arafat directly.
Singer dominated the Israeli negotiation side whilst Abu Ala conferred with
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Arafat. Holst passed messages back and forth. Following the facilitation approach 
adopted by Larsen, Holst conveyed messages, summarised options, but did not propose 
any particular one.^ ® The Palestinians made the first concession in that the Jewish 
settlements would remain Israel’s responsibility. The Declaration of Principles states 
that ‘the withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel exercising 
powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council’
The second point concerned Annex II of the Declaration of Principles. The 
word ‘responsibility’ was changed to ‘matters’ in the paragraph, which refers to Foreign 
Affairs and settlement issues outside of direct Palestinian control. The final point 
regarding the location of the soon-to-be established Palestinian National Council was a
92compromise.
The final compromise resulted in the acceptance by both sides of the Declaration 
of Principles. The document is short and the details with specific dates are contained in 
the annexes. The main document sets out broad principles of agreement. The 
document aims to:
Establish a Palestinian interim self-government authority, the elected council...for the Palestinian 
people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading 
to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.’^
These Resolutions call for the PLO to recognise Israel’s right to exist and their 
renunciation of violence and terrorism. Within two months of the Declaration of 
Principles’ enforcement, Israel was to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. 
Subsequently, ‘direct and free’ elections for the Palestinian National Authority were to 
be held, no later than nine months hence. By this time, Israel was to redeploy its 
defence forces from the West Bank. During this period, a Palestinian police force was 
to assume responsibility for security and order from the departing Israeli troops. 
However, Israel would retain control over Foreign Affairs. Powers over education, 
culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism would be transferred
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gradually from Israeli control to the Palestinian Authority. No later than two years 
following this event, final status negotiations would begin, including the tackling of 
seemingly insurmountable issues such as Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, and the 
problem of Palestinian refugees. "^^
The Declaration of Principles was signed first in secret by Peres and Abu Ala on 
20 August 1993 in Oslo. US Secretary of State Christopher was informed and a few 
days later, the historic breakthrough was announced to the world. Before the famous 
White House Lawn ceremony on 13 September 1993, Holst played an active role in 
helping to formulate the wording of the Letters of Mutual Recognition between Israel 
and the PLO. Mutual recognition by these two enemies signalled that direct talks 
between Israeli and PLO officials could continue without need for secrecy in the future. 
The remarkably short Declaration of Principles envisaged a co-operative relationship 
between Palestinians and Israel. The framework contained within the document 
imagined further substantive progress as the agreements were implemented.
Lessons of the Oslo Channel
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Is peace on its death-bed?
Figure 3: Source; Middle East International, no. 623 (21 April 2000) (cover)
One of the important ingredients during the talks (all the way through, but especially in the beginning) 
was that you could freely express ideas and that we agreed not to blame each other for the past. This is a 
circle that we get stuck in too often and then you can’t move forward at all.’^
— Hassan Asfour, 23 May 1995 
The implem entation of the Declaration of Principles has faced innumerable 
obstacles and delays since the historic signing cerem ony in 1993. The initial support 
expressed by the public on both sides quickly gave way to dissatisfaction and 
frustrations. W ithdrawal from Gaza and Jericho was delayed whilst the controversial 
expansion o f Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories continued. Israel has had 
two governm ents since 1996. The assassination of Prime M inister Rabin by a Jewish 
extrem ist triggered an election in which a Peres-led Labour Governm ent was defeated 
by the right-w ing Likud under the leadership o f Binyam in Netanyahu. The return of
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Likud to power resulted in a loss of faith by the PLO that the Declaration of Principles 
would be adhered to. Netanyahu, who had campaigned on a platform of ensuring that 
Israel’s security would be the number one priority, reluctantly continued 
implementation of the Declaration of Principles. On 17 May 1999, Labour regained 
power which was viewed with optimism and hope. However, the peace process always 
seems on the verge of collapsing as the deadlines for final status negotiations and the 
full implementation of the Declaration of Principles have come and gone.
There are many from diverse backgrounds who criticise the Oslo Channel and 
the Declaration of Principles. In particular, the Declaration of Principles is criticised by 
Palestinian nationalists and local intellectuals such as Hanan Ashrawi for conceding too 
many points to Israeli demands.^  ^ Simultaneously, many within Israel believe that the 
Declaration of Principles represents an unacceptable sell-out, for recognition of the 
PLO means according legitimacy to a terrorist organisation that has brought killings and 
violence upon the Israeli military and civilians.^^
Marianne Heiberg points out that at the time, Tt was the best agreement 
available’. S h e  too criticises arrangements concerning the transfer of power from the 
Israeli military and civilian administration to the Palestinian National Authority:
It made the task of the Palestinians to create viable institutions close to impossible. When you are 
given money for all the things that cost money such as health, education, social welfare, but not given 
adequate authority to deal with matters that create wealth such as the economy, you have a terrible 
problem.^^
In spite of this and other flaws within the Declaration of Principles (including a 
perhaps unrealistic timetable for implementation of Israeli withdrawal and 
redeployment) all the participants directly involved in the Oslo Channel rightly defend 
the transformation that this agreement, and especially mutual recognition, has brought 
to this protracted conflict. The Declaration of Principles offers a framework within 
which Israelis and Palestinians may coexist and co-operate. Simultaneously, mutual 
recognition opened up the possibility for all future negotiations and talks to be arranged
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directly between the Israeli Government and the PLO. Through recognising the 
existence of Israel, the PLO acknowledged the need to insure the Jewish state’s 
security. Similarly, Israel legitimised the authority of Yasser Arafat and the PLO as the 
representative of Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories and in the broad 
diaspora.
In addition to the specific difficulties contained in the Declaration of Principles, 
four significant flaws regarding the process of the Oslo Channel are evident. They are 
secrecy, the re-entry problem, the third-party role, and the approach of facilitation. 
Each will be considered in turn.
Secrecy: An Asset or a Liability?
All the participants to the Oslo Channel agree that the secret, informal 
environment allowed the parties to explore ideas without fear of permanent 
commitment. Consequently, frank positions and exchanges were possible. As Abu Ala 
puts it, ‘You can say what you really feel without having it reported or...having 
meanings become distorted’. S a v i r  adds that in a confidential, secret setting:
The process becomes a laboratory where you can explore constructive new ideas that surpass the 
preconceived notions of what kind of an agreement you want to achieve.
The secrecy component of the Oslo Channel was an asset both during the pre­
negotiations and negotiations phases. One could argue and the parties support the 
notion that secrecy contributed to the free exploration of ideas as well as the ability of 
parties to offer compromises, which would not have been possible in a public, open 
format. Geir Pedersen describes the positive role that secrecy played during the pre­
negotiating period from January to April 1993:
Without a pre-negotiations phase where Ron Pundak and Yair Hirschfeld sat down with Abu Ala and 
his colleagues, and established a very firm relationship...it would not have been possible for them to 
develop a more concrete and precise language for the Declaration of Principles. In a non-public setting 
where different scenarios and solutions can be explored, the parties can grow to trust each other. They 
also have the deniability factor.
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However, as Mona Juul points out, the secrecy component can also be a 
liability. Any agreements reached in a confidential setting may not receive public 
endorsement once the agreements are announced. It is essential, Juul importantly notes, 
that agreements reached in a non-public environment be formulated into a framework 
that can be seen as legitimate by the representatives’ constituencies. Without the 
public’s endorsements, the agreement most probably has to be reworked. The 
continuing involvement of the Norwegians in mobilising financial support for the PLO 
and sustaining contacts with the two sides demonstrate how one can attempt to 
overcome the obstacle of reintegrating the parties with changed perceptions, as well as 
assisting in transforming the attitudes of the wider public.
The Re-entry Problem
Despite the emotional trust gained during the Oslo Channel in 1993, due to 
changes in political circumstances and a lack of realising progress on the ground, the 
key ingredient of the Oslo spirit has failed to be translated into the broader political 
public arena. Consequently, the disadvantage of reaching agreements in a secret 
environment manifests itself during the re-entry process. One could argue that an 
agreement would not have been possible in the glare of a public. However, since the 
agreements arrived at by Israel and the PLO did not simultaneously bring about 
changed perceptions among their respective political and social communities, the 
agreements reached have been challenged and criticised by those who should have 
benefited from the direct, face-to-face pre-negotiations and negotiations. The failure to 
translate the Oslo spirit into a broader societal framework may in part be due to the 
development of the ‘personal chemistry’ or the ‘emotional trust’ that developed among 
the disputants, which was encouraged by L a r s e n . H e  emphasised the significance of
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changing a group’s perceptions by having them live together in the same environment. 
The participants to the Oslo Channel did undergo a transformation of attitudes. That is, 
however sceptical they may have been at the beginning of the talks, a certain 
relationship did develop as the process unfolded.
Unfortunately, the development of emotional trust meant that the participants 
had much more work to achieve in convincing their publics of the legitimacy of the 
agreements once they were announced. Abu Ala’s reference to Savir and himself as 
‘the two traitors’ echoes some of the sentiments expressed by opponents to the 
Declaration of Principles.Furthermore, it points out the gulf between the personal 
chemistry and trust developed between them versus the mistrust that pervades the two 
communities’ perception of the other.
The Norwegian third party did not address this problem of re-entry. As Larsen 
and other members of the facilitation team were focused on providing assistance as 
requested, this resulted in a tunnel vision of helping the parties to conclude successful 
negotiations. The effects of any reached agreements were not contemplated for it was 
assumed that the substance of the document, or what Larsen refers to as the cognitive 
framework, would overcome any obstacles of re-entry.
This raises the question of what kind of third-party role the Norwegians played 
for the type of role relates to the two further significant flaws of the process. These two 
points, the nature of a third party and the process of facilitation, will be discussed next.
The Third Party Role
We always insisted that they needed to talk directly. From the first day we gave them the possibility to be 
left alone to solve their own problems and so that they realised we didn’t want to impose on them. If they 
wanted us we were there.*110
—Mona Juul, 24 May 1995 
The Israelis and Palestinians were also eager to find a solution, but they were
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interested in securing a suitable location and a helpful and unobtrusive third party. The 
offer to meet in Oslo came at an opportune moment as the Washington talks had 
reached an impasse. Norwegians as third parties were acceptable, since their 
government was known to have good relations with the US. This interested both the 
Israelis and the PLO. In short, Oslo was the place and the Norwegians seemed to be the 
right hosts.
The common interest to meet in Oslo served other divergent ones. For example, 
the Israeli academics needed financial help. The Israeli Government could not sponsor 
them, since there was a ban on official contacts with the PLO. Hence, Hirschfeld and 
Pundak received financial assistance from FAFO. A meeting with these academics in 
Norway would allow the PLO delegation to gauge Israel’s level of commitment to the 
resolution of this conflict.
The third-party Norwegian team consisted of Terje R0d-Larsen, Mona Juul, Jan 
Egeland, diplomat Geir Pedersen and the late Foreign Minister Holst. From the outset, 
their role was an administrative one. They organised venues for the meetings, arranged 
transportation, and accompanied everyone to and from the chosen sites. Although the 
Israelis and Palestinians engaged in direct face-to-face dialogues, the team interacted 
with the Israelis and Palestinians during meals, coffee breaks, and walks between 
meetings in the Norwegian countryside. Larsen approached the Oslo process from a 
sociologist’s perspective:
I did my degree in organisational theory and was interested to learn how the dynamics of small groups 
differed from big formal ones...so I told both parties that I initially wanted only two people from each 
side and I wanted them to live with me in a small place...to get them to grow together as people do in 
small groups.*
For Larsen, the emotional trust developed between parties is essential for 
creating the opportunity to reach agreements. For Larsen then, building emotional trust 
means breaking down the often entrenched perceptions parties hold of one another. 
Thus, he aimed to develop an emotional trust between the opposing sides for in his
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view, the conflict is about ‘political emotional issues’ For the Palestinians, it is 
about ‘self-respect’ and ‘dignity’ Since these are value-related questions, Larsen 
contends that they are emotionally related questions.
Larsen describes the substantive content of discussions that only the parties 
involved in the conflict can decide as the cognitive framework. The third party here can 
assist only if the conflicting disputants request it. This role includes an influential 
component in affecting the outcome of a process to the extent that in addition to 
ensuring smooth administrative arrangements, Larsen and others also interpreted 
messages.
There were two arenas: the meeting-room arena and the telephone conversations...in between the 
meetings— since the Israelis were forbidden to talk to the PLO and there were no physical lines 
between Jerusalem and Tunis—you had to interpret the messages, not just give them. That puts you in 
a very powerful position. During the breaks of the meetings, instead of slugging it out with each other, 
you offered yourself as the punching ball. This also paradoxically puts you in a powerful position... 
because you learn the positions of the parties very well.'*'*
Though Larsen could be influential as an intermediary in between face-to-face 
meetings and as a sounding board while the parties met, the extent of Norwegian 
involvement was always determined by the conflicting parties. Therefore, Larsen, Juul, 
and Pedersen adopted a reactive and passive third-party role. The administrative role 
did not include an opportunity for disputants to explore issues that lie beneath the 
surface of a conflict. A less reactive third party would have suggested the participants 
engage in an analytic process where the third parties would have facilitated discussions 
and explored the hidden motivations of the conflicting parties.
The process adopted by the participants to the Oslo Channel reveals some 
affinities to facilitated conflict resolution approaches. This discipline contains a rich 
body of literature and thought that aim to provide guidelines for the role to be played by 
a third party in its attempts to resolve protracted c o n f l i c t s . T h e  most significant 
approach arose out of observations and experiences in mediating international conflicts, 
as well as studying the process of settling disputes in industrial relations. This approach
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was pioneered by John W. Burton and would resonate with Larsen, a trained sociologist 
and an active trade unionist, as his institute of FAFO grew out of the trade union 
movement in Norway/
In a Burtonian practice of problem-solving workshops, the third party role can 
be compared to an analyst who assists the disputants in discovering that the conflict is 
neither based on material interests such as money and territory, nor on cultural values 
that change over time. Rather, through a process of examining the motivations that 
sustain positions, the parties can discover that the conflict is a shared problem as the 
sources of the conflict can be traced to unfulfilled human needs such as identity, 
security, and recognition.
An application of the Burtonian approach in the Oslo Channel would have 
helped to address the underlying issues at stake, such as why security for Israel and 
recognition for the Palestinians were viewed as essential components of the Declaration 
of Principles. A facilitated analysis might have contributed to the disputants 
discovering how to meet their respective needs, without negative consequences for the 
other.
A process that favours a passive, administrative third-party role has 
consequences for the substantive content or the cognitive framework of talks. Since the 
Norwegian third-party role was limited to providing organisational and administrative 
assistance, the apparent dominance of the Israeli bargaining position in the drafting of 
the Declaration of Principles was neither explored nor discussed. Therefore, as Heiberg 
notes, the success of this agreement first reached in Oslo in 1993 leaves the Palestinian 
National Authority dependent on Israel’s continued political willingness to implement 
the Declaration of Principles. A critic and scholar of the Oslo Channel, Azmi 
Bishara, argues that the PLO’s dependency on Israel stems from the failure by the 
representatives in the Oslo talks to agree upon definitions of concepts such as self­
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determinat ion.By leaving the disputants to engage in direct bargaining tactics as the 
Oslo Channel developed, the underlying issues remained unconfronted. Therefore, the 
agreements that were reached, though historic and important, were likely to run into 
serious difficulties.
In a Burtonian style of resolving conflicts, the Palestinians’ need for land could 
be seen as a desire for autonomy and r e c o g n i t i o n . O n  the other hand, Israel’s 
hesitance to transfer land to Palestinian control could be identified with its fears over 
security. It is the partly self-defined and imposed third party role that points to the most 
flawed aspect of the process first undertaken in Sarpsborg— namely the process of 
facilitation. The views expressed by all participants regarding facilitation demonstrates 
the inherent limited potential of the Oslo Channel. This comprises the focus of the 
following section.
Facilitation: A Limited Understanding
Israelis, Palestinians, and the Norwegians involved in the Oslo Channel ascribe 
to a specific understanding of facilitation. They define it as providing an administrative 
structure, assisting the disputants and encouraging confidence-building measures. 
Interestingly, the Norwegian team members distinguish between facilitation and 
mediation. Facilitation is explained as providing the organisational structure and 
offering help whenever requested, whereas mediation is described as traditional 
bargaining power politics. The official process in Washington, where the US proposed 
ideas on how to settle the conflict, is cited by the participants as an example of 
mediation. Mediation is viewed by the participants as unhelpful for it does not allow 
the conflicting parties to explore ideas freely, suggest options and most importantly, 
hinders them from designing their own solutions and settlements. The American 
suggestion of the Bridging Document, for instance, led the PLO to believe that the
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mediator was biased towards I s r a e l T h e  PLO viewed the process as unhelpful and 
unlikely to produce any satisfactory outcomes.
Larsen insists that the establishment and encouragement of emotional trust 
should comprise a facilitation approach. He urges that a facilitator should employ four 
tactics when playing the role of a third party. First, the third party should treat each 
party to a conflict equally. This includes providing an even handed approach towards 
both sides in all aspects during the facilitation process from interactions and 
communicating with the disputants to offering similar types of accommodation, 
transportation, and so forth. For example, Larsen and his team tired to ensure that the 
PLO representatives and Israelis, despite their difference in the level of political 
decision-making importance, were equally dealt with. Simultaneously, their views were 
viewed with similar weight when Larsen was asked to act as an intermediary in 
communicating messages and ideas.
Second, the third party should aspire to develop friendship and trust. Larsen 
believes this is the most important ingredient in achieving breakthroughs and 
agreements. The personal chemistry and friendships that developed between the 
participants in the small working group process allowed for trust building. 
Consequently, they were able to arrive at an agreement. Without building friendships, 
Larsen argues that trust building becomes extremely difficult. This arises out of his 
commitment to organisational and psychological approaches in which the bonding 
between individuals in small groups is deemed to be a key feature of rebuilding 
relationships that can lead to the resolution of a conflict situation.
Next, a third party should be willing to be the punching bag. Larsen maintains 
that by offering himself as the individual upon whom frustrations can be displaced by 
both Israelis and Palestinians throughout the talks, the conflicting parties refrain from 
directing their hostilities towards one another. By absorbing the disputants’
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frustrations, the third party is able to communicate such views to the other, which can 
help in the process of coming to an understanding and finding a formula for consensual 
agreements. If the third party does not assume this role, Larsen contends that the 
disputants will direct their frustration upon one another, making a move beyond the 
stalemate a difficult step to achieve.
Finally, the third party should maintain a balanced view of the situation. This is 
the perceived neutrality element that is also necessary for the disputing parties to accept 
the legitimacy of a third party. If the third party, at any point during the facilitation 
effort, is viewed to be biased and these perceptions cannot be overcome, then the 
facilitation attempt is likely to break down. Therefore, Larsen argues that all these four 
notions are crucial for the facilitator to keep in mind whilst engaging in a facilitation 
process.
Larsen’s role, along with the direct talks between the Israelis and members of 
the PLO, does not fit neatly into the widely accepted differentiation between mediation 
and facilitation. Although the bargaining process associated with traditional power 
politics was employed by the Israeli and Palestinian participants, especially in the 
negotiations phase from May to August 1993, the third-party Norwegian team’s role 
differed from that of a mediator. Larsen and the other Norwegians did not disseminate 
a text around which negotiations occurred, as they were not present during the actual 
talks. However, the Norwegians’ influence during breaks between meetings, as well as 
in follow-up telephone conversations throughout the process, allowed them to play an 
encouraging and eventually a directly contributive role. As Hassan Asfour points out, 
‘They facilitated; they left us to find our own way to success or failure. They did not 
impose a solution’. P u n d a k  agrees with Asfour’s assessment and adds, ‘They were 
always there and willing to help. They also travelled to Jerusalem and Tunis when 
problems did arise, in order to convey messages’.
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The positive aspect of such a facilitation approach is that the conflicting parties 
are left to talk directly and face-to-face. This allowed the two sides to establish their 
own ground rules at the start of the process in which ideas were freely exchanged. 
Rather than adopting a Camp David-style understanding of an Israeli withdrawal 
followed by immediate Palestinian control, the early meetings in Norway allowed the 
participants to explore a variety of options, including the principle of gradual 
transference. This applied especially to the early phase of pre-negotiations.^^^
Savir notes that a pre-negotiations phase and the inclusion of academics allowed 
the exploration of ideas that might resonate, but could not be expressed at an official 
l e v e l . T h e  affinities between the pre-negotiations phase of the Oslo Channel and the 
approaches of facilitated conflict resolution is pointed out by Jan Egeland:
I believe your John Burton would describe Yair and that January Sarpsborg meeting as a workshop 
because it was confidential, informal, and confidence-building between the two academics and three 
people from the Palestinian side, who comprised an official delegation.
Following the common understanding of what is involved in negotiations, the 
official negotiations stage in the Oslo Channel involved more bargaining tactics 
employed by both Savir and Singer on the Israeli side and by Abu Ala, Hassan Asfour, 
and the third member of the PLO team. This approach of bargaining and negotiating 
around a text— albeit without the direct imposition of a powerful third party— conforms 
to the common understanding of mediation where compromise and not settlement or 
resolution is s o u g h t . T h e  Norwegians’ role came to resemble that of a mediator from 
May to August 1993. The participants argue that the Declaration of Principles and the 
exchange of Letters of Mutual Recognition were not designed to settle or resolve the 
conflict, but rather to form the foundation for co-operation and building peace. 
However, as the overall facilitation process and the participants were inclined towards a 
power bargaining approach, the aims of the framework became all the more difficult to 
realise in practice. Yet, Savir contends that the Norwegian third-party team led by
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Larsen played a helpful, necessary role during the negotiations phase:
I think he was the psychological architect of this rapprochement...by putting always the emphasis 
on the positive intentions of the other side. Secondly, he encouraged a framework that turned two 
delegations into one group, of course with different interests, but with common ambitions to come 
to an agreement. He also created opportunities for us to express our frustrations and anger during 
negotiations in a way that were not destructive to the negotiations themselves. Furthermore, he and 
his wife Mona were absolutely determined to make it work. They worked as a most effective 
facilitator, which is perhaps more difficult than the role of a mediator.
While the facilitation process and the third-party role may have helped Israel 
and the PLO to reach an agreement initially, the compromises arrived at contain serious 
flaws because of their unrealistic deadlines and expectations. That is, if political 
representatives fail to address the technical issues while agreeing upon general 
principles, the process becomes difficult to sustain when those agreed upon policies are 
being implemented. In other words:
The advantage of dealing with technical issues in the early phase is that resolution can be sought in the 
context of broader principles, where trade-offs should be easier to make. Although this may involve 
making more difficult decisions up front, it would prevent a later loss of momentum when issues are 
more likely to be viewed in isolation from the bigger picture.
Whether or not discussing technical details first would have meant a more 
practicable Oslo Channel is contestable. However, by deferring the most controversial 
issues such as Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, Palestinian refugees, and 
Jerusalem, the Declaration of Principles can only produce a limited transformation of 
attitudes and perceptions. In the subsequent years of implementing the agreements 
reached as a culmination of the Oslo Channel, public opinion among the Israelis and 
Palestinians towards one another have changed little, for these limited agreements have 
yet to demonstrate a substantial transformation in the daily lives of the two 
communities. Moreover, critics argue that the continuation of a flawed process only 
compounds problems. For instance, Edward Said in evaluating the Wye River Accord 
(which is a follow-up to the Declaration of Principles) argues:
[It] allows Israel a generous number of phases by which the transferral is to be completed without any 
mechanism to enforce delays or delinquencies. Opponents of Arafat will be considered haters of
134peace.
Another flaw of the facilitation process adopted during the Oslo Channel is that
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in the intensive negotiation sessions, the participants overlooked the events on the 
ground. Therefore, when the Declaration of Principles was announced, the agreement 
was associated with unrealistic expectations; a sudden breakthrough was viewed as a 
long awaited cure to the disease of protracted hatred and violence. However, as 
agreements are slowly being implemented, opposition to the Declaration of Principles 
and subsequent accords continue to be voiced by numerous sections within Israel and 
among the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, as well as by academics and 
experts. The extreme right-wing views in Israel are echoed in the Knesit, the Israeli 
Cabinet. To the opposition, Oslo represents giving away land without any tangible 
improvements in security. The continuing cycle of violent attacks by extremists 
associated with the Palestinians reinforces perceptions that the Oslo accords were a bad 
idea and should not be adhered to.
Dislike for the Oslo accords are expressed by many members of the Palestinian 
community, since few practical gains have yet been experienced. The view articulated 
by Raeda Ghazaleh, a West Bank theatre arts administrator who promotes Palestinian 
women’s issues, is just one example of the lack of confidence in the post-Oslo era: ‘You 
don’t see the hope in the eyes that you saw in the Intifada. Everything since the 
beginning of the peace process has gone downhill’.
Since the signing on 13 September 1993 of the Declaration of Principles, every 
phase of the implementation dates for Israeli troop withdrawals has been delayed. For 
example, the redeployment of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza occurred 
fourteen months later than was originally agreed. Although one specific delay does not 
mean the end of a process, the incremental stalls have eroded hope, particularly among 
the Palestinians. Since the election of the Palestinian National Authority, an average 
Palestinian’s economic living standard has fallen dramatically. In short, the Oslo 
accords have brought forth no substantive transformation in the lives of those who live
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in Gaza and the West Bank.
Simultaneously, the inability to reduce violence by the Palestinian National 
Authority has confirmed Israeli belief that the Palestinians cannot be trusted to govern 
themselves. In short, as Afif Safief puts it, ‘If the process becomes static, the very 
pillars of its legitimacy would be seriously shaken
According to Hassan Asfour, by 1998 (five years after the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles) the PLO expected to rule between 85 and 90% of the West 
Bank. The final status negotiations were due to start no later than three years after the 
implementation of the agreements. The comments from Israel’s Foreign Minister Ariel 
Sharon in late 1998 point towards further difficulties in maintaining a co-operative 
relationship and commencing these all significant talks:
Everyone should take action, should run, should grab more hills. W e’ll expand the area. Whatever is 
seized will be ours. Whatever isn’t seized will end up in their hands. That’s the way it will be...that’s 
what must be done now. 137
Sharon, who has long championed the expansion of Jewish settlements in the 
West Bank, was chosen to represent Israel during the negotiations regarding the final 
status of Jerusalem. These inflammatory remarks, along with then Prime Minister 
Netanyahu’s delaying tactics as a response to terror attacks, further challenge the 
implementation of the Declaration of Principles. More significantly, these frustrating 
developments highlight the increasing number of toll stations to be passed along the 
road to peace.
A final flaw of the facilitation approach utilised in the Oslo Channel is the lack 
of vision by the participants to the process to work out how to transfer the changed 
perceptions the disputants held of one another to the broader societal level. It is fair to 
say that in the process of searching for a breakthrough agreement which can lead to 
transformations of norms, institutions, and attitudes, some parties might have to be 
initially excluded. A problem-solving workshop-like attempt in which a small group of
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individuals come together to find new ways of governance is a process whose 
importance is not to be underestimated. It is one among many necessary happenings 
that can lead to societal transformations. The participants in the Oslo Channel, 
however, neglected to develop ways of mobilising public opinion, as well as to 
encourage argumentation and debate.
Although the Norwegian third parties aimed to elicit financial assistance from 
the international community, neither the Israeli Government nor the PLO formulated 
ways of transcending the Oslo Channel. Instead, the Declaration of Principles was 
purported as the only way forward and thus had to be accepted. Any critiques of the 
agreement expressed by members within both communities were viewed to be enemies 
of a peace process. Neither Israel nor the PLO sought to incorporate critiques for 
refining or clearly articulating the advantages contained in the Declaration of Principles.
The failure by the Israeli Government and the PLO to engender a dialoguing 
process has led to a stall in implementing the agreements. Only with Labour’s return to 
power in the Israeli election of 1999 has Israel re-injected hope for complying with the 
Oslo accords. All the provisions contained in the Declaration of Principles should have 
been completed by May 1999. Additionally, final status negotiations should have 
commenced by this date. The direct talks between the PLO Chairman Arafat and Israeli 
Prime Minister Edhud Barak, with US President Bill Clinton as a mediator (during July 
2000 in Camp David) signals the employment of power politics as the disputants aim to 
overcome the final hurdles of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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Conclusion: The Oslo Channel - An Assessment
The framework then was the Declaration of Principles, but now we have no clear framework. We 
don’t have any confidence in the Israelis,*^*
—Hassan Asfour, 18 September 1998
Since the resolution of conflicts depends upon effective communication, it can come only from the 
parties themselves. Processes are required that alter perceptions and promote the points of view of the 
parties.
—John Burton, 1969
The imaginative process embarked on at the start of the Oslo Channel ushered in 
a political transformation in the relationship between Israel and the PLO. An analysis 
of the background, establishment, and development of the process demonstrates the 
coming together of a multiple of factors that made a Declaration of Principles and 
mutual recognition possible. An exploration of some of the most significant flaws of 
the document and more importantly, the process of the Oslo Channel itself reveals its 
affinity to the approaches practised in the facilitated conflict resolution discipline.
Although many remain sceptical of the achievements attained by a small group 
of Israelis, Palestinians, and Norwegian third parties, this process is recognised by 
scholars, practitioners, and students as fundamentally different from most negotiation 
processes that are designed to mitigate international conflicts. A back-channel, which 
was intended to feed into official talks, became the front-channel.
The participants’ unusual willingness to discuss publicly the process and content 
of the talks reveals interesting insights. While the content was left to the conflicting 
parties— perhaps too much so— the process of facilitation combined both a second-track 
and a first-track approach. This is the mixing of pre-negotiations and negotiations. 
However, the first track official bargaining sessions were not conducted in public, but in 
a similarly secret, socially-conducive environment as that of pre-negotiations.
The intent and spirit of the Oslo Channel resemble the problem-solving 
methodologies of facilitated conflict resolution. The similarity lies in the
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encouragement of disputants to find their own solutions, as well as a preference for 
facilitators, rather than the use of mediators. By not playing the role of a mediator, the 
Norwegians allowed the parties to dictate their own pace.
Hirschfeld summarises ten ways in which the Norwegians helpfully 
facilitated. These points resemble and differ from facilitated conflict resolution 
practices in the following ways. First, the administrative role played by the Norwegian 
third party comprises, but does not play a central part in problem-solving workshops. 
Second, the interpreter of messages in between meetings is similar to the guidelines 
outlined for the role of a third party in the literature. Third, by demonstrating the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry’s level of commitment with the inclusion of the Deputy 
Foreign Minister Jan Egeland, the high-ranking PLO officials were balanced out, since 
the Israelis at the start of the talks in Sarpsborg were academics. This is not a role that a 
third party would aim for in a facilitated conflict resolution workshop. There, the power 
asymmetries are not always most explicitly addressed and perhaps this is one way of 
evening out an imbalance.
Fourth, the Norwegians assisted when requested. This resembles in part a third- 
party role; however, the one envisioned in a facilitated conflict resolution process would 
be more active as the panel would help the participants to conduct an analysis of their 
positions and motivations. The absorption of frustrations expressed by the conflicting 
parties is a role to be played by any third party in order to encourage the sides to move 
forward and not to direct frustrations at the other. Fifth, Larsen, along with the other 
members of the third-party team, was able to establish links with decision-makers 
beyond the immediate representatives in the dialogue process. It is difficult to say 
whether this would be mirrored in a problem-solving workshop format; however, 
follow-ups and further strengthening of relationships are not discouraged.
Sixth, the Norwegian third parties adapted to the changing status of negotiations
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as they moved from second-track unofficial to first-track official talks. Larsen and 
Holst became increasingly involved in the discussions themselves, at the request of 
Peres and Arafat. Though problem-solving workshops are designed to be a second- 
track forum, which would eventually contribute to first track talks, it is unclear whether 
the third parties would have adopted such a position. Seventh, as the talks drew to a 
close, Holst offered appropriate words to bridge the gap between the Israeli 
Government and the PLO in the formulation of the Letters of Mutual Recognition. 
From the writings on facilitated conflict resolution, it can be inferred that if requested, 
the third-party team could assume such a position. Eighth, the Norwegians had 
informed the US, which had invested over two years of time and financial resources in 
trying to settle the Middle East conflict, including the Israeli-Palestinian one. Although 
Israel also informed the Americans, by having the third parties update the State 
Department on the existence and development of such talks, US approval could be 
assumed if an agreement were finally reached. As this role is also designed for third 
parties involved in a first track phase, the guidelines of facilitating conflicts do not 
cover this aspect. However, from the neutral position that third parties are meant to 
maintain, one could conclude that it would be left to the conflicting parties to decide 
whom to inform and when.^ "^ *
Ninth, Foreign Minister Holst suggested that the two sides exchange Letters of 
Mutual Recognition, saying that, ‘This would be a significant symbolic gesture’. 
This proactive step would not be practised in a facilitated conflict resolution framework. 
The third party can suggest options, but not one which directly affects the conflicting 
parties. Finally, the Norwegians in late August embarked upon a process that is still 
continuing: of organising and mobilising financial assistance to the Palestinian National 
Authority. This is an important role in the aftermath of an agreement for economic aid 
which would hopefully allow the PLO and the Palestinian National Authority to
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improve the standard of living of residents in their zones of control.
These ten points of facilitation demonstrate some of the affinities between the 
Oslo Channel and the problem-solving workshops of the facilitated conflict resolution 
discipline. The flaws and limitations which have been discussed regarding the process 
utilised in the Oslo Channel raise some important questions. For example, what type of 
assumptions underline the Oslo approach? From the interviews conducted with most of 
the participants who were directly involved in the discussions and negotiations, it is 
clear that a power politics understanding informed the thinking of the participants: it 
was a bilateral deal arrived at by tough negotiations and some concessions. 
Compromises were reached as both sides gave where they could.
If the Oslo Channel contains some affinities with problem-solving workshops, 
would adopting a problem-solving workshop methodology offer a more helpful basis 
for engaging in and thinking about the resolution of violent protracted conflicts? 
Furthermore, why is it important to consider the underlying assumptions to facilitation? 
It is the framework that steers the talks, dialogues, or negotiations toward particular 
kinds of outcomes. How parties perceive reality shapes practices and how they view 
practices shapes reality and perceptions.
As such theoretical positions cannot be separated from the practice conflicting 
parties engage in; not only must the practices be analysed, contemplated, and 
constructed, but so too must their underlying assumptions. The foundational views 
individuals ascribe to largely influence the practices they will advocate and adopt. As 
facilitation involves transforming the perceptions and attitudes of individuals, groups, 
and communities, the basic driving assumptions warrant critical examination so that 
positions may be appropriately renegotiated.
Although the Oslo Channel contains unique elements that cannot be reproduced 
or made applicable to other international conflicts (as the process resembles the aims
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and ideas that continue to flourish in the facilitated conflict resolution discipline) the 
Oslo Channel offers an accessible avenue for raising and exploring these types of 
questions. The practical, theoretical, and philosophical positions of John W. Burton 
(the most influential scholar in this field) thus comprises the focus of the next 
chapter.
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Chapter 2
The Facilitated Conflict Resolution Approach of John W. Burton
When two enemies meet to discuss Jerusalem, there is nothing to agree on. If two friends meet to 
discuss Jerusalem, maybe they can work out some kind of a settlement...A trust-building process that 
would lead to the possibility of agreeing on resolving problems was, and still is, the idea.^
— Jan Egeland, 4 May 1995
The contribution of problem-solving conflict resolution to political philosophy is not an alternative set 
of norms, or some subjectively arrived at values and assumptions, but the discovery of the realities of 
the conflict as perceived by the parties and facilitators involved in conflict resolution. The next task is 
to find explanations of them, and a theory of behaviour that explains and make prediction possible.^
— John Burton, 1990
Introduction
While the facilitation format utilised by the participants to the Oslo Channel and 
the consequent Declaration of Principles contain serious flaws (including the limited 
third-party role) this process contains features which would be very familiar to scholars 
within the facilitated conflict resolution discipline. The illustrative case of the Oslo 
Channel provides an entry point for exploring how a facilitated conflict resolution 
theoretical framework would have contributed to the process of facilitation and possibly 
the outcome.
The pioneer of the facilitated conflict resolution field is John W. Burton. He 
was the first scholar to articulate ways of collaboratively resolving conflicts through 
facilitated analysis and encouraging parties to find their own solutions. Burton 
challenged the dominant approach to peace within the International Relations discipline, 
which viewed states as billiard balls that formed alliances to maintain balances and 
stability.^ As his theoretical framework and practice have significantly influenced other 
scholars and practitioners within the facilitated conflict resolution discipline, including 
Herbert Kelman and Jay Rothman, this chapter focuses on Burton’s ideas."^
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It is contended that Burton’s approach offers important insights for the process 
adopted by the participants to the Oslo Channel. It will also be asserted that his 
practical guidelines could be enhanced by critically re-examining his theoretical 
foundations.
Why are theories particularly relevant? Like practices, they influence the 
realities that individuals choose to construct. In other words, theory and practice are 
intrinsically linked. Individuals bring to bear certain conceptions including the image 
of the other parties, as well as their own constituencies. These presuppositions reflect 
historical experiences and the worldview that the members of a particular community 
subscribe to. Therefore, they affect the practices being carried out in a protracted 
conflict situation. More importantly, however, theories reveal the fundamental 
assumptions individuals hold about themselves and others. These assumptions, which 
can be described as meta-theories, are concerned with questions such as human nature 
and other existential issues. They coalesce into theories that can lead to either 
broadening or limiting the types of practices individuals may adopt. In the case of the 
Oslo Channel, one could argue that neglecting theories of facilitation meant that only a 
negotiated settlement resulted.
The question that will be explored is, what are the foundations of Burton’s 
theory and practice? It will be argued that this is only a partial theory. The foundations 
of Burton’s theory construction will be scrutinised and it will be contended that the 
assumptions underlying his approach remain unreflective. A critical examination of 
these will lead to a discussion of the nature of theory as Burton sees it. It will be argued 
that his meta-theoretical and philosophical frameworks are inadequate to achieve what 
Burton himself advocates, since they depend on a flawed theory of human needs. It will 
be further argued that his theory is rooted in a particular type of rationality. 
Consequently, his capacity to break out of the human behavioural approach, positivist
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methodology, and epistemology are restricted. Finally, the relationship between meta­
theory, theory, and practice will be discussed.
A Brief Background
Peace research as a discipline grew out of the dissatisfaction with mainstream 
International Relations’ preoccupation with power politics and deterrence theories, 
which dominated the discipline during the 1950s and 1960s. Arising from the 
behaviouralist movement that sought to quantify phenomena by observing facts and 
data, scholars, including Kenneth Boulding and David Singer, argued for a departure 
from understanding peace as an absence of war or viewing war as an inevitable outcome 
of state interactions.^ For Boulding, peace is based on stability, while Singer, in his 
famous ‘Correlates of War’ project, asserts that by plotting the occurrences of war, 
evidence could be located to show that war was not an inevitable phenomenon. Other 
scholars, most notably Johann Galtung, established the International Peace Research 
Institute in Oslo, Norway in 1959. In the 1960s, he offered a definition of peace which 
is based on an absence of violence.^
Still dissatisfied with the approaches to reducing violent conflicts and based on 
practical experiences, the diplomat-tumed-academic John Burton formulated and 
pioneered an alternative framework.^ He, along with other scholars and practitioners, 
first formed the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, which was affiliated with the 
University of London. This Centre examined numerous conflicts and how they might 
be resolved. For example, in the conflict situation between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
representatives of the opposing parties were invited to take part in informal, face-to- 
face, confidential workshops. In these sessions, with the assistance of a third-party 
panel consisting of academics and practitioners, disputants were asked to state their 
positions and to put forward what they viewed to be the possible causes of the conflict.
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Burton observed that free-flowing discussions, such as those in an academic seminar, 
allowed the participants to explore all positions and ideas. The third-party panel during 
this particular session, which consisted of scholars including Anthony De Reuck, Chris 
Mitchell, and John Burton, contributed by drawing ‘parallels’ with other conflictual 
situations and providing interpretations, in order to clarify misperceptions. In short:
The sessions overall allowed the parties to correct mutual misperceptions, redefine the conflict, 
readdress the course of their objectives and envisage new policy options.®
The format adopted during this process comprised the basis of Burton’s 
facilitated problem-solving workshop practice. Moreover, out of the observations of all 
participants, the grounds for his theoretical and philosophical positions were 
established. This initial exercise, which was a challenge to conventional mediation and 
negotiation approaches, led Burton to explore how international conflicts could be non- 
violently resolved. In doing so, he notes the importance of using different concepts and 
vocabulary.^ Conflict, for him, is ‘a struggle between two opposing forces’. I t  differs 
from disputes, which are concerned with interests over scarce resources and can be 
settled through compromises. Conflicts, he argues, have to do with unmet ontological 
needs that will be pursued by individuals, groups, and communities, regardless of the 
consequences.^^ Therefore, the way to resolve conflicts is by a process of facilitated 
analysis, which involves discovering ways of solving the problem of unmet needs.
A third party who is outside the conflict itself can offer insights into the causes 
of the conflict that may be missed by the disputants, since they are often too 
preoccupied with defending their positions. The disputants may also feel unable to alter 
their positions if they resort to a bilateral process. A third party can provide the 
environment where agreements can be reached and issues can be explored, without a 
need for complete commitment. Furthermore, a third party who is seen to be neutral by 
both sides can facilitate the communication process, so that the participants can move 
away from merely repeating already known positions.
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The constituent elements of the method proposed by Burton and their 
implications for both practice and theory, including the Oslo Channel process, will be 
examined as the theoretical and philosophical foundations of his approach are based on 
his experiences/^
The Problem-Solving Methodology: A Prelude
Conflict resolution assumes that given a full understanding of shared goals and an appreciation of the 
environmental constraints, the...parties would arrive at realistic means...to resolve their conflict, 
rather than to endure its ongoing and escalating costs.
—John Burton, 1990
Burton’s methodology was initially a challenge to traditional power-politics 
approaches that favoured direct bargaining and imposing settlements on conflicting 
parties. He rightly maintains that settlements do not resolve conflicts but merely diffuse 
them. Since causes of conflicts are not addressed in direct bargaining, arbitration, or 
negotiations, he asserts that conflicts are likely to erupt even more violently, at a 
subsequent time. Settlements in these situations, according to Burton, rest on the use of 
power and coercion. These two instruments, though useful in the short-term, cannot 
form the basis of co-operative political and social arrangements, since any agreement 
reached is unlikely to sustain itself once the threat of power and coercion by a strong 
third party diminishes. Examples of such attempts that fail to address the underlying 
issues are numerous, from the brokered Dayton Accord designed to restore order 
between Serbia and Bosnia, to the protracted situations in Cyprus, Lebanon, and Sri 
Lanka, among others.
Burton argues that resolving conflicts through mediation is only slightly more 
useful than direct power bargaining because agreements are sought through 
compromises.^^ However, mediation also results in settlements. Since mediation and 
direct bargaining can often lead to deepening the protracted nature of conflicts, Burton
79
prefers resolution which yields ‘outcomes that develop from the analysis of the total 
situation by the concerned parties to meet all their needs’.*^  His methodology, first 
termed ‘collaborative problem-solving’, aims to transform the perceptions of those who 
are affected by the conflict. In this approach, with the help of a third-party panel, the 
disputants are encouraged to formulate their own solutions. Therefore, a co-operative 
relationship can develop and agreements reached can be self-sustaining since they 
require neither enforcement nor coercion.
Hoffman, a scholar sympathetic to Burton’s approach, describes this facilitated 
problem-solving methodology as ‘[t]he attainment of a non-hierarchical, non-coercive, 
integrative solution that is derived from the parties themselves’. T h i s  idea of an 
informal framework, where the third party plays a facilitative role of assisting in first 
analysing the causes of the conflict and then the possible ways of resolving them, is an 
important departure from earlier approaches in International Relations, as well as peace 
and conflict studies. It is not the actual procedures of the methodology, but the 
potential of such an approach that is most promising since the format offered by Burton 
implies that the parties can reach consensus through the medium of communication. 
The potent point of departure is that the parties themselves are encouraged to find their 
own ways out of the conflict. The potential lies in the idea that an informal framework 
presents an opportunity for disputing parties to consensually transform the conflict, 
without resorting to the traditional means of bargaining or negotiation. This 
understanding of facilitation would have meant for the Oslo participants an exploration 
of the underlying deeper issues, which help to perpetuate the conflict including Israel’s 
need for security and the Palestinians’ need for autonomy. The negotiation phase from 
May to August 1993 led to the disputants employing the direct bargaining method.
One could therefore argue that the role of a third-party panel as a facilitator and 
not as a mediator is one of Burton’s most significant contributions. For the practitioner.
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he provides a raison d'être that had been missing. At the theoretical level, the third- 
party role is fundamentally altered. No longer is the third party merely engaged in 
imposing ideas, but listens to the conflicting parties in the process of facilitation. 
However, Burton neglects the inherent potential of the discursive nature of the 
facilitation process and thus his methodology takes a more directive and prescriptive 
path.
It is worth remembering that problem-solving workshops grew out of the 
controlled communication experiments described in Burton’s 1969 book Conflict and 
Communication}^ In it, he outlines the definitional understandings and the essential 
procedures for conducting such sessions. The hope was to formulate possible 
hypotheses and establish a framework that might guide the disputants in a non-coercive 
situation to resolve the conflict.
In the first few sessions, the representative parties helped the scholars in a 
learning process to avoid rigid ways of assisting or directing the talks. Thus, through 
interaction and mutual learning, the third-party team’s approach was reassessed. The 
lesson was that the control of communication was an essential factor that played a part 
in the resolution of conflicts. The term ‘controlled communication’, one could argue, is 
simply a convenient concept employed by Burton at that time, as a consequence of his 
connections with the behaviouralist movement, which dominated the IR discipline, of 
which he was a part. However, the idea that communication must be effective and 
controlled in order for the conflicting parties to be directed through the analytical stage, 
holds important implications that will be discussed in subsequent sections. It is 
significant to signpost this term here, since the ideas embodied in ‘controlled 
communication’ point to the two major flaws of Burton’s perspective. First, he does not 
question the concept of control and its possible negative implications for the practice of 
conflict resolution since it leads to a preference for directing, costing, and achieving
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success. Second, Burton sees the role of communication as being limited to 
transmitting effective, clear messages.
Even at this early stage, an attachment to a type of rationality that prioritises 
success and outcomes is evident. This controlled communication experiment has since 
been refined and modified into a methodology that relies on the discovery of ways of 
satisfying human needs. Since they are socio-biological and ontological, their adequate 
fulfilment is necessary in order for individuals to coexist in functional socio-political 
communities. In short, individual needs-satisfaction is fundamental to the human 
species, since continual denial of needs by governing authorities and institutions at a 
certain point will manifest itself in violence, and if not adequately met, a conflict will 
develop and become protracted.^® It is through facilitated analysis that parties can 
discover their unmet needs.
The analysis resembles an archaeological uncovering of the causes of the 
conflict. By discovering that disputing parties have common unmet needs that lie at the 
root of the conflict and as they are limitless in supply, the conflict can be perceived as a 
shared problem. With the assistance of a third party, if the disputants can recognise that 
needs and not material issues are the causes of the conflict, through analysis a resolution 
becomes achievable. Therefore, it becomes more likely to reach agreements that will 
bring about a comprehensive resolution of the conflict.^^
The procedure for conducting problem-solving workshops calls for inviting 
representative parties to a conflict by a third-party panel that consists of academics and 
other appropriately qualified professionals.^^ Four or five members are recommended, 
although area specialists are discouraged due to possible biases. What follows is a more 
detailed exposition of this process: the role of constituent parties and the third-party 
role. Additionally, some difficulties with the process will be discussed.
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The Third-Party Role: An Essential Component
The role of the third party is to help parties in conflict focus on the fulfilment of human needs, in the 
present and (in the long-term) as the fundamental norm.^^
— John Burton and Frank Dukes, 1990
Burton provides a strict set of rules for conducting problem-solving workshop 
facilitation efforts. Concerning the make-up of the third party panel and a sponsoring 
institution, he is most interested in academics trained in conflict resolution and those 
who are perceived to be neutral.^ "^  For example, in his 1987 Resolving Deep-rooted 
Conflicts: A Handbook, rule 1 states:
A sponsor should not approach parties to a dispute with a view to facilitating a resolution, unless the 
sponsor can provide facilitators who possess the required training and skills.^^
Rules 19 to 26 discuss in detail the special role of sponsors, including 
continually informing the participants with a report after a meeting or series of 
meetings, assisting in the transition between unofficial and official stages of resolution, 
and securing sufficient funding to implement the workshops .The  panel of four or five 
experts in conflict resolution compiles a list of potential parties who will be asked to 
participate in the workshops.
The initial impetus for attempting this facilitation process will have been agreed 
between a third party and key representatives of the disputing sides. The decision of 
who to include and exclude is an important one. But, since Burton argues that all 
parties to a conflict must be actively included in order for the resolution process to be 
meaningful and legitimate, as many representatives of groups in the conflict situation as 
appropriate are chosen. Another way is to ask government officials to nominate 
representatives who will speak for their side. Burton insists that it is essential that the 
selected participants put forward the values of the groups they represent.^^
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Rules 3 to 9 involve the detailed arrangements for setting up the first exploratory 
set of meetings?^ Burton maintains that the invitation to possible participants should 
clearly identify the purpose of the meeting, the approach, and the fact that discussions 
will not necessarily amount to any agreements. The role of communication is 
emphasised, but only in terms of disseminating accurate and concise information.^^
The third-party team. Burton continues, chooses a leader who acts as the 
spokesperson and host.^  ^ He states that a third-party team may be the sponsor, or a 
separate institution may sponsor workshop sessions. The availability of funding, 
accommodation, and meeting rooms are important details to create the feeling of equal 
treatment among all the participants. The third-party team first identifies the parties to a 
particular conflict and the issues that are at stake. Then, they draft a letter of invitation 
to those who are either official government representatives or unofficial private 
individuals who have access to key decision-makers. No agenda should be put forward 
and only the process should be explained.
These seemingly minute details are essential for convincing sceptical disputants 
to agree to a facilitation format. If we recall from the previous chapter, the leader of the 
Norwegian third-party team (Terje Rpd-Larsen) emphasised the necessity of appearing 
to treat each side equally in preparation for and during the initial meeting.^^ That is, 
both the Israeli academics and the more official PLO representatives needed to be seen 
as being received by the third party on equal terms, ranging from similar types of 
accommodation, the allocation of conferencing facilities, to attaining a not too 
undifferentiated status by the Norwegians.
At the start of a problem-solving workshop. Burton suggests that the third-party 
team meet to formulate an introductory statement that will explain the unique 
characteristics of this facilitation method. During the process, the third party’s role is to
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assist in the clarification of concepts or to reiterate a position to avoid 
misunderstandings. As he puts it, the role of the third party is:
To facilitate analysis so that the goals and tactics, interests, values and needs, can be clarified and 
later...help to deduce possible outcomes on the basis of the analysis.^^
After the first day, the third-party team drafts a list of statements and reports the 
findings to the disputants on the following day. In the search for options, the third-party 
team should present a possible range of options, without putting forward any firm 
solutions. This should continue until the disputants have decided to either abandon the 
process due to its lack of feasibility or agree to continue with this unofficial format. 
At that point, the third party’s role does not end. Maintaining contacts throughout the 
implementation stages of any agreed policies is important role as well. Burton suggests 
that the panel should maintain links with the participants and offer to reconvene the 
process if requested.^^
The Third-Party Role: An Assessment
The third-party role described by Burton contains elements that could have 
contributed to a more sustainable Oslo Channel in at least two important areas. 
Simultaneously, however, this specific approach has at least three difficulties. First, 
Burton’s focus on the need to include as many of the disputing parties as possible when 
beginning a facilitation effort is an element overlooked by the participants to the Oslo 
Channel. The Israelis and Norwegians concluded that the Tunis leadership of the PLO 
had to be directly engaged if an agreement was to be reached. Their conclusion was 
arrived at after numerous attempts to explore talks for reaching a consensus with local 
leaders in the Occupied Territories—including Faisal Husseini— had failed.^  ^ The 
exclusion of such well-known intellectuals and activists meant that the feelings of the 
residents of Gaza and the West Bank were neglected. In searching for a path to reach a
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breakthrough, the participating parties ruled out many diverging but influential voices 
both within Israel and the Palestinian community. Therefore, when the Declaration of 
Principles was announced and as Israel and the PLO attempt to implement its 
agreements, the public community in both societies have not been mobilised to the 
validity and meaningful change this breakthrough was designed to achieve. As a result, 
extremists on both sides have been able to capitalise on the fears and suspicions that 
pervade these societies.
Furthermore, as this agreement was reached in a process that depended on 
personalities. Burton’s analytic approach would have helped to formulate an agreement 
that could endure beyond the individual participants. The changes in Israeli 
Government led to a change of players and thus the PLO lost confidence in realising the 
commitments endorsed by Israel in the Declaration of Principles. As the confidence 
among the PLO members who participated in the Oslo Channel erode and little 
transformation on the ground occurs, the degree of mistrust of the peace process 
increases.
Second, a Burtonian third-party role would have involved an exploration of the 
underlying issues, which when addressed, would have meant a transformation of the 
understanding of the parties’ conflict situation, rather than simply assisting in providing 
a conducive atmosphere and allowing the parties to continue with direct negotiation. 
This is a significant and crucial insight offered by Burton. If the disputants continue to 
resolve conflicts by tackling the easier issues and avoid the deeper ones for future 
negotiation, then the agreements help in the process of transforming attitudes, building 
trust, or encouraging peace. However, this can lead to a deepening of entrenched 
positions and a hardening by their constituencies who must be convinced of the 
legitimacy and meaningfulness of any agreements arrived at by political elites. 
Therefore, the process adopted in the Oslo Channel could have benefited from a third
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party who was more active than Larsen and his team. That is, the third parties could 
offer ways of exploring issues that would not initially not have been considered by the 
disputants. For example, the need for security and autonomy could have been 
approached by the third party even if the conflicting parties, in the end, would have 
rejected such discussions. However, by deliberately limiting their role to one of 
administrative assistants and a ‘punching ball’, the Norwegians overlooked an 
opportunity to help the disputants to resolve and not only settle the conflict.^^ In short, 
a slightly more active third-party role could have led to a more sustainable consensus 
that would have helped the participants of the Oslo Channel to convince their publics of 
the legitimacy and advantages of a Declaration of Principles and the Letters of Mutual 
Recognition.
While the Burtonian description of a third-party role has much to offer for peace 
practices such as the Oslo Channel, Burton’s conception possesses some shortcomings. 
First, one criticism is that rather than assisting the flow of communication, the third- 
party team may hinder it.^  ^ For example, third parties, who act as interpreters of 
perceptions and concepts, may become too preoccupied with providing explanations or 
bring to bear their own biases. By emphasising programmatic rules. Burton overlooks 
the types of communicative processes and the role language can play in reframing 
conflictual situations. The role of communication is primarily understood as something 
that should be to be effective and under individual control.^*
Second, the neutral, objective professionalism ascribed to the third-party role 
limits the contributions they can make to a facilitation process. Burton rightly contends 
that a perception of a neutral third party is necessary if the conflicting participants are to 
embark on a facilitation process. This is an important aspect in the practice of conflict 
facilitation. Yet, he seems to equate a need for apparent neutrality by third parties with 
a requirement for absolute objectivity."^  ^ Here, Burton suffers from the influences of the
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behaviouralist movement, which is also premised on an archimedian point of 
detachment from the event being observed and from which objective claims can be 
derived.
Burton argues that he is countering the Behaviouralist School in his particular 
approach."^  ^ Yet, his argument that the third parties can be objective since the team 
members are not directly involved in the conflict illustrates his commitment to a 
scientistic understanding of rationality.'^  ^ That is, his description of the third-party role 
suggests that the team can professionally facilitate, since they will not affect the 
outcome of any reached agreements. However, this assumption is flawed. By virtue of 
participation in facilitated problem-solving workshops, third parties become actors who 
will contribute to the formulation of any agreements that are reached. Although the 
third parties may not take a stance that favours one conflicting party over another, as a 
participant in the process, the sum of interactions among everyone will differ from a 
Burtonian process in which the third-party role is seen not to significantly influence 
outcomes.
Third, the description of the methodology indicates a deliberate separation 
between theory and practice. Since needs theory informs the facilitation process, the 
disputants are directed into an analytical procedure during which these unmet needs can 
be discovered and recognised. Subsequently, ways of satisfying them can be considered 
and formulated. Burton’s conception of the third-party role remains an important 
contribution to the thinking of how to resolve conflicts, other than through the 
traditional means of diplomacy, arbitration, dispute resolution and mediation. However, 
the type of role the third party should play in engaging in a particular form of analysis 
inhibits the potential immanent in the aim of the methodology. Burton argues that only 
the parties can design solutions if that agreement is to be self-sustaining, and would thus 
not require the overt threat of enforcement. With an outline of some of the
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shortcomings present in this methodology, what becomes clear is that it relies on 
assumptions tied to Burton’s needs theory. It will be argued in the following section 
that this framework is inadequate for thinking about a theory of facilitated conflict 
resolution.
Needs Theory: The Foundation of Problem-solving Methodology
Needs...describe those conditions or opportunities that are essential to the individual if he is to be a 
functioning and co-operative member of society... Needs are always present, individual needs are basic 
to harmonious social relationships as food is to the individual.'*^
—John Burton, 1996
As explicated in outlining Burton’s workshop methodology, it is clear that 
discovering the unmet needs of individuals is the key to moving disputants’ positions 
from protracted confrontation to constructing a formulation for resolution."^ Questions 
arise from this assertion as to what these needs are. This section will examine the 
nature of needs that makes them an ontological aspect of human beings, if needs theory 
is an adequate theoretical framework, and what Burton means by theory. It will be 
argued that needs theory is at best unhelpful, since it limits the potential of the 
suggested methodology. It will be also contended that needs theory relies on a 
restrictive form of rationality.
Second, it will be asserted that needs theory is only a partial theory. To support 
this position, the wider approach adopted by Burton will be included. Here, it will be 
contended that the theoretical framework, which Burton maintains underlies a 
facilitated conflict resolution approach, is also partial. It will be maintained that these 
partial theories contain a specific understanding of knowledge formation, and a 
philosophical stance that limits the potential that is initially apparent in the 
methodology.
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Through the experiences gained from conducting informal workshops, Burton 
concluded that there were certain issues that individuals would not negotiate. He 
asserts that individuals who appear to be deviant were, more often than not, pursuing 
means to satisfy what they perceive to be their unmet needs."^  ^ Since they cannot be 
negotiated or compromised, he maintains that ways of satisfying them lie at the core of 
formulating a theory of facilitated conflict resolution."^  ^ Based on the writings of 
Maslow and Sites, Burton outlined the following nine basic human needs
1. A need for consistency in response. Only through consistent responses can there be learning and 
consistency in behaviour.
2. A need for stimulation. This is the other side of the coin to consistency of response. The 
individual must be stimulated in order to learn.
3. A need for security. Without security, there is a withdrawal from response and stimulation.
4. A need for recognition. Through recognition, the individual receives confirmation that his or her
reactions to stimulation are approved. Recognition also provides the encouragement factor in 
learning.
5. A need for distributive justice. Distributive justice provides an appropriate response or reward in 
terms of experience and expectations.
6. A need to appear rational and develop rationally. This follows from the need for consistency of
response. Rationality is a function of the behaviour of others. Inconsistent responses invoke 
irrationality.
7. A need for meaningful responses. Unless responses are meaningful to the individual, they will be 
interpreted as inconsistent.
8. A need for a sense of control. Control is a defence mechanism; if the other needs are met, there is
no need to control. Since the other needs are never fully met, the ability to control, rather than
react to the social environment, is consistently a need.
9. A need to defend one’s role. The individual has a need to secure a role and to preserve a role by
which he or she acquires and maintains recognition, security and stimulation.'**
Unlike Sites, Burton asserts that needs should not be conceived in a hierarchy, 
since the satisfaction of one or more is dependent on specific circumstances. He 
maintains that they are ontological to the human species."^  ^ In attempting to ground 
needs theory on a socio-biological basis, and drawing on Nisbett’s placement of the 
individual as the unit of analysis. Burton contends that the adequate satisfaction of 
needs are universally required by all individuals, in order to avoid eruption of violence 
in conflictual situations.^®
Burton argues that since needs are universal and ontological, they take primacy 
over values. Values, he maintains, are culturally learned, which can change over time 
and contexts. Interests, for Burton, are related to issues of scarce material resources and
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as they do not threaten an individual’s existence, they can be traded and negotiated.^  ^
Burton illustrates his argument when he challenges the notion held in the International 
Relations discipline that ‘deterrence deters’. H e  argues that if the sense of belonging, 
security, recognition, and control over the self are sufficiently undermined, individuals 
would not necessarily yield to the threat of force.^  ^ In fact, they are likely to disobey 
norms and rules. For example, if the identity of an individual, or the group to which he 
or she belongs, is threatened with punitive measures by governing authorities, then the 
group or individuals would not be deterred and take action including resorting to 
violence to protect that felt identity.
The uprising by Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories (the Intifada) 
against Israel’s policies in the late 1980s is a case in point. Despite the threat of further 
restrictions on the movements of the Palestinians, they formed a militant opposition and 
continued to express their frustrations with violence. Therefore, the most functional 
way of transforming violent protracted conflicts to healthy relationships, in and among 
societies, is to attain satisfiers that meet the needs of everyone.
The contributions of needs theory can thus be summarised as follows: first, this 
theory fills the gap in expanding the traditional conception of the role a third party can 
play. Second, by conceiving of needs theory as an ontological character of being 
human, the positive nature of persons can be included. Third, by asserting that a 
conflict can be viewed as a shared problem, a way of resolving the conflict and thus 
achieving positive outcomes becomes the directed goal. However, this theoretical 
framework contains more weaknesses than strengths. The following section will 
critically examine this framework.
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Needs Theory: Elaboration and Critique
All people in all cultures at all times and in all circumstances have certain needs that have to be, that will be 
fulfilled. This is not a should or an ought, but will be fulfilled regardless of consequences to the self or the 
system.^ '*
—John Burton, 1965
By placing needs at the core of developing a theory for facilitated conflict 
resolution, Burton leaves unexplored a variety of connected issues specific to needs 
theory. The most prominent difficulties, which are relevant to this thesis, will be 
addressed in turn. First, another weakness in this aspect of Burton’s formulation is 
attributed to a neglect of the cultural dimension. Avruch and Black put forward an 
anthropological perspective and contend that the path to resolving conflicts lies in 
understanding the particular cultures of disputants. Avruch asserts that ‘practice must 
drive theory’ and as cultural experiences fundamentally shape the development and 
escalation of conflicts, they assert that a facilitation effort should be premised on 
understanding cultural contexts. However, by suggesting that culture should form the 
foundation of a conflict resolution practice, Avruch and Black fall into the relativist 
trap.^  ^ That is, they argue that local groups’ understandings should be prioritised and 
protected.
They do offer a powerful critique regarding the relegation of culture by Burton 
in their challenge of the universality and ontological nature of human needs theory.^  ^
Burton maintains that culture reflects the values of political communities; consequently, 
culture, like values, vary over time. As cultures and values are contingent, he argues 
that they are not a fundamental aspect of being human. On the other hand, needs for 
identity, security, and recognition are viewed to be essential for co-operative functional 
relationships. Therefore, Burton contends that culture along with values and interests 
should be subsumed under basic human needs.^  ^ In contrast, Avruch and Black assert 
that needs vary according to specific co nt e x t s .N ee ds  are not constant over time or
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space and are neither physical nor mental. Hence, they assert that culture should form 
the centre of attempts to theorise facilitated conflict resolution. They maintain that 
Burton’s categorisation of culture misses an important point: that the ‘white western 
male’ discourse is accepted as ‘dominant’ and establishes itself as the measure against 
which other conceptions and approaches to conflict resolution are compared. In this 
case, the deviant is the ‘other’ who does not enter into a debating session.^^
The universality component of Avruch and Black’s criticism is legitimate. That 
is. Burton’s needs theory and his conception of resolution are designed to transcend 
cultural differences, but do not adequately do so. He notes the importance of culture 
and values when he discusses the significance of the individual and the ways that he or 
she has been socialised in the process of acquiring satisfiers. However, Burton does not 
explicate the influence and the role of culture in relation to needs satisfaction.^®
Nevertheless, an approach to facilitated conflict resolution should be universal, 
insofar as a methodology of problem solving should be applicable to a variety of 
cultures. Furthermore, since Burton contends that conflict is a generic cross-cultural 
phenomenon (a fundamental assumption) then the needs theory framework contains 
similar assumptions. The universality component is not an essential problem as 
Burton’s conception of conflict and the requirement for global applicability are 
important, helpful points to keep in mind. Therefore, while Avruch and Black draw 
attention to the saliency of culture in the process of facilitating conflicts, their assertion 
that a resolution approach should be based on culture does not offer a better method.^  ^
If culture is prioritised (as needs are by Burton) the larger dimension of general issues 
that cut across cultural cleavages may be ignored. Both the cultural perspective and the 
universal needs approach would benefit from a self-examination of their underlying 
assumptions.^^ By engaging in such an uncoupling of underlying assumptions that 
ground both needs theory and a cultural perspective, one may learn of alternative
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directions in which a theory and practice of facilitated conflict resolution can be 
constructed.
Second, there is the hierarchy question.^  ^ That is, although Burton maintains 
that his needs framework remains non-hierarchical, he does not address the question of 
who decides the order of needs and the ways in which they can be adequately 
satisfied. "^  ^ He does not elaborate whether fulfilment of one need means that individuals 
do not pursue others or whether it is an endless process where individuals pursue 
fulfilment of their needs, with institutions having to adjust to them if societies are to 
remain healthy. Furthermore, by asserting that needs are ontological to the human 
species. Burton does not engage in an examination of the origins of needs. How did 
they come to be so essential to individuals? Are there certain historical processes that 
led to such a development? Can needs ever be imagined as malleable? In Burton’s 
avoidance of explicating extensive answers to such questions, he seems to indicate that 
needs are an a priori set of precepts.
If needs are an ontological component of being human and they are non- 
hierarchical, how do these needs emerge, and how and when do individuals decide that 
their needs are not being met sufficiently.^^ Burton largely neglects the issue of which 
unmet need (assuming there may be more than one) becomes the catalyst for violent 
action. He looks to the authorities and elites in power, who compete for legitimacy, as 
an important constricting factor in stifling the realisation of individuals’ needs 
satisfaction.^^ Therefore, a further question emerges of whether institutions have to 
adjust to meet the needs of individuals and groups who feel stifled by the existing 
system. In his view, this is the case. However, it is not clear how this is possible if 
institutional needs are a representation of the existing needs of certain groups without 
undermining the needs of others.
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Third, another difficulty is the implicit determinism that characterises Burton’s 
needs theory. Whether one accepts his more recent description of needs as ontological 
or his earlier definition as socio-biological, the theory points to a very specific way of 
resolving conflicts.^^ That is, if one accepts that there are needs which are common and 
necessary for human survival, then an analysis of what those needs are and how they 
may be satisfied becomes the logical and only relevant avenue of resolving conflicts. 
This deterministic component, like the hierarchy question, is a contradictory argument. 
That is, the determinism of Burton’s needs theory limits the extent to which the 
participants in a facilitation process can design their own solutions. In other words, the 
nature of problem-solving workshops suggests that other ways of framing social 
relationships should be considered— a possibility that is excluded when the whole 
approach is grounded on a needs conception.
Finally, this ontological attachment points to a fundamental flaw in Burton’s 
needs theory, and thus the theory of facilitated conflict resolution: the relationship 
between theory and practice and the nature of theory-building. Is needs theory a theory 
of facilitated conflict resolution? If not, what does Burton understand by such a theory? 
These points will be covered in the following sections.
Limits of Burton’s Foundations
Conflict resolution, since it cuts across all social levels and areas...challenges commonly held 
assumptions. It rests on empirical evidence and deduced theories, but always within the context of 
total knowledge rather than one which is limited by disciplinary boundaries: it is abductive.^*
—John Burton, 1996
Burton’s approach to facilitated conflict resolution has undergone some 
modifications as he explored ideas of various social scientists, political theorists, and 
philosophers. However, his fundamental commitments to needs theory remain. In this 
section, the ways in which he sought to bolster his perspective will be studied. This
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process of defending without fundamentally questioning his own foundations leaves Burton 
with a flawed needs theory and an unsatisfactory theoretical and meta-theoretical basis. 
The kinds of challenges left unexplored in his perspective will be outlined.
In his desire to ground his needs theory on scientifically sound foundations, Burton 
briefly engages with Popper’s ideas.^  ^ Popper argues that there are three worlds in which 
the individual operates: the objective world (facts and observable events); the subjective 
(the inner mental); and the intersubjective.^  ^ He asserts that a hypothesis is valid so long as 
its falsifiability is possible.^  ^ Burton maintains that Popper’s critical rationalism fell short 
of truly undermining empiricism, since his falsification thesis relies on testing through the 
presentation of counterfactual situations. This critical rationalism suggests that scientific 
investigation is likely to be successful if the measurement for the validity of a hypothesis is 
prediction. Burton does recognise Popper’s many contributions, including expanding an 
approach utihsed in social sciences.
Yet, Burton contends that Popper’s falsification thesis is inadequate, as his 
conception of a hypothesis (as something personal) means that the whole inductive- 
deductive argument has been conducted on this ba s i s . Bu rt o n  defines induction as ‘a 
process of reasoning by which a conclusion is drawn from a set of premises, based on 
empirical e x p e r i e n c e H e  argues against inductive methodologies adopted by scholars 
in both the International Relations and peace and conflict fields. This influence, he claims, 
arose from the dominance of the behaviouralist movement, which asserted that facts could 
be observed and general patterns could be set into statements, via quantitative analysis and 
empirical testing.^ "^  As Burton puts it, ‘This is the problem of inductive reasoning, of 
coming to conclusions on the basis of observed evidence’
Consequently, he argues that decision-making theories such as cybernetics, which 
are inductively oriented, can be self-fulfilling.^^ In short, as decision-making influences 
observed data and decisions reached from such sets of information are a reactive process.
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outcomes are often reproductions of the initial facts. Additionally, Burton contends that 
content analysis does not assist the discovery of hidden motivations, since it is seen too 
often as a top-down power-based process. Inductive decision-making then is seen as either 
a stimulus response or cybernetics ‘trial and error’
The inductive methodology of the behaviouralist and decision-making theories that 
Burton critiques and claims to move away from is retained in his formulation of a problem­
solving workshop technique. That is, his specific set of procedures, which he maintains 
should comprise a facilitated analytic effort, is inductively arrived at. This set of guidelines 
is derived from direct observations and practical experiences in conflict resolution attempts.
In short, Burton retains an inductivist methodology despite his expressed opposition 
to such approaches. In articulating the apparent deficiencies of an inductivist methodology. 
Burton considers deduction.^  ^ He defines it as ‘a process of reasoning by which a 
conclusion logically follows from a set of premises, based on theoretical 
explanation...in general use’.^  ^ Burton maintains that a deductive approach is not much 
more helpful, in the sense that theoretical interpretations are ‘obviously misleading unless 
there are some opportunities for falsifying the theory by some adequate tests—which in the 
international field are not available’.
Although deduction is seen as a slight advancement in formulating a theory for 
facilitated conflict resolution. Burton asserts that deduction is limited since it is also firmly 
attached to empiricism. He engages with Peirce’s abduction approach in order to locate a 
more satisfactory basis for a methodology.^^ Abduction involves using evidence to make 
conclusions about a wider pattern. It infers that the best assertion is accepted by 
communicating individuals in order to postulate theoretical ideas.^  ^ Following Peirce, 
Burton defines abduction as:
A process by which empirical evidence and theories, frequently reflecting personal prejudices in their 
selection and interpretations, would be challenged by intuitions and insights, which would be derived 
from all available knowledge.®^
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Peirce aims to reveal the presuppositions that inform a particular hypothesis. He 
puts forward a combination of three inference categories. They are induction, 
deduction, and abduction. These inference categories are used to understand how a 
particular theory is formulated and becomes d o mi n a n t . H e  challenges the progress of 
modem science, which had not previously been seriously contested.
Peirce formulates a principle which suggests that it is the institutionalisation of 
the process of inquiry that defines the course of action individuals take. This process 
shapes the action individuals engage in, as beliefs arrived at receive uncompelled and 
intersubjective recognition.*^ The process of inquiry Peirce embarked on is designed to:
1. To isolate the learning process from the life process. Therefore, the performance of operations is 
reduced to selective feedback controls.
2. To guarantee precision and intersubjective reliability. Therefore, action assumes the abstract form of 
experiment, mediated by measurement of procedures.
3. To systematise the progression of knowledge. Therefore, as many universal assumptions as possible 
are integrated into theoretical connections that are as simple as possible.*^
He argues that beliefs are maintained and controlled by adopting certain precepts 
or articles of faith. That is, beliefs that arise to form frameworks become rigidified in 
the process of defending them. Peirce’s formulation implicitly suggests that beliefs 
(repetition of behaviour as habit) provide the possibility for an intersubjective realm. No 
longer are individuals limited to the objectifying world of only the observable. The 
abductionist method includes recognition of the role that communication and language 
plays in co-ordinating social relationships. Unlike induction and deduction, which rely on 
a scientistic basis for theory-building, abduction prioritises mutual communication as a part 
of constructing a theoretical framework.
Burton viewed this approach as a contribution to theorising about conflict 
resolution. Implicit in the abduction method is a formulation of a dialogical, rather than 
monological, process which pervaded the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s, 
including the peace and conflict research discipline. Therefore, his brief engagement 
with Peirce’s abductionist approach was designed to provide an alternative to induction.
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In order to strengthen his claim that analysis must be the process by which parties 
undergo reperceptioning of positions and the conflict itself, Burton tentatively argues 
that the abduction method offers a better basis for conceiving the individual, his or her 
relationship and their place in the social environment.
However, Burton considers the possible contributions of Peirce only at the very 
superficial level. Consequently, some of Peirce’s major difficulties are overlooked. 
For example, a significant weakness of Peirce’s approach is that it does not escape 
scientism, since he appeals to a notion of a knowable, discoverable, uncoverable truth. 
Therefore, if his method were to be adopted. Burton would not free his framework from 
a positivist methodology, which prefers empirical measurements and is based on a 
belief that facts and truths can be discovered. On the other hand, as Burton retains a 
scientific method in formulating the procedures for problem-solving workshops, the 
interesting and original contribution offered by Peirce in emphasising the importance of 
intersubjective communication is overlooked. Therefore, Burton’s claim that an 
abductionist method is present in his framework is inaccurate. He maintains that since 
conflict resolution is multidisciplinary, induction and deduction are present, but within 
the context of abduction. Evidence of this assertion is not firmly supported as Burton’s 
reading is partial and he quickly moves away from Pierce.
Instead, Burton seems to utilise this concept in order to overcome his separation 
between a deductively arrived at theory and an inductively oriented method. In short, 
despite the criticism regarding the deductive approach. Burton favours it as the basis for 
building a conflict resolution theory and an inductive methodology. He argues for a 
general theoretical framework, since conflicts arise out of ‘the frustration of basic human 
needs that cannot be compromised or suppressed’ Therefore, he asserts that a general 
theory would be more helpful. Burton’s rehance on a deductive approach can be seen, 
when he argues that ‘general theorising’ is deductive to the extent that ‘persistent features
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and... partial theories’ are examined, but not ‘inductively, from an examination of history 
and raw data’ He further argues:
General theory itself provides a deductive means of analysis and it can only be tested in reality.. .by actual 
application to a situation, and not by reference to subjectively interpreted past or current events.^^
Burton’s preference for a general theory is not problematic in principle; however, 
his insistence on the requirement of human basic needs satisfaction which limits an 
exploration of other equally important perspectives. In order to further bolster the 
predominance of needs theory. Burton incorporates behavioural theories.^  ^ He argues that 
the psychological components of behavioural responses are not adequately addressed in an 
IR realist approach, where the main focus is on power-based, man-as-aggressor, and 
systemic explanations to explain the causes of war and conditions needed to achieve 
peace.^  ^ Additionally, based on his practical diplomatic experience. Burton suggests that 
only by promoting behavioural changes can conflicts be resolved so that long-term 
functional arrangements can be implemented.
The inclusion of behavioural theories is designed to support the argument that 
needs are ontological, and therefore must be satisfied in order to avoid later eruptions of 
violence. That is, behaviours individuals adopt can be seen as attempts to satisfy unmet 
needs.^ "^  Therefore, the individual must form the unit of analysis, as he asserts that the 
system and groups all stem from valued relationships that individuals attach to one 
another.^^
Although he points out the significance of the system. Burton insists that since 
systems are maintained by elites and authorities who wish to retain power by suppressing 
the needs of individuals and groups if necessary, systems and institutions must be changed 
to accommodate individual needs. Otherwise, violence may result. As deep-rooted 
conflicts are caused by a lack of needs being met and a perpetuation of powerful 
institutions, the ways of meeting individuals’ needs form the point of departure.
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Here, Burton misses the insight of the individual in a social context, although he 
recognises the relational aspect among individuals and institutions. However, Burton 
fundamentally views institutions and individuals in opposition, since their needs are 
incompatible. In other words. Burton cogently emphasises the importance of 
relationships among individuals and how they shape the process of needs fulfilment. 
Yet, he misses the dimension of the individual operating in social contexts of their 
cultures, historical specificities, and so forth. Therefore, the nexus of convergence, and 
how individuals in social relationships shape those very institutions and norms that 
govern them, are neglected.^^ This oversight, along with a neglect of the 
communication dimension, arise as Burton aims to locate firm a variety of sources 
particular ideas that can support his needs theory. The unquestioned attachment to 
needs theory is perhaps one reason why Burton fails to appreciate its foundational 
shortcomings. That is, the aim of allowing parties to find their own solutions cannot be 
fully realised if one is restricted to his methodology. They are based on a particular 
type of rationality that prioritises success and encourages cost-benefit calculations for 
attaining ends. Strategic means are employed in this instrumental rationality-informed 
foundational perspective. If instrumental rationality informs Burton’s method of 
facilitated problem-solving workshops, then is his epistemology also grounded on 
instrumental rationality? This question will be explored in the following section.
Epistemology: Limits of Positivism?
Only an adequate theoretical framework, one that has a universal application and is not one that 
emerges from considerations of local empirical evidence only, can lead to reliable definitions and 
policies.
— John Burton, 1990
By this juncture, it should be clear that when one critically re-examines Burton’s 
theory, it is incomplete in light of his aims for facilitated conflict resolution.^^ As the
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methodology is scientistically oriented, Burton’s epistemology is positivistic.^^ Like 
the broader social sciences, he prioritises instrumental rationality. In spite of his 
conclusion that man cannot be analysed from a perspective of ‘rational-economic man’ 
(by positing man’s motives as being based on ontological non-changing needs) he 
indicates there are patterns that can be discovered. This foundation of scientific 
objectivism is one component that sign-posts a positivist epistemology which holds that 
knowledge can be accumulated and independently verified. Conflicting parties 
naturally bring to bear their prejudices and entrenched attitudes. While the third-party 
team may be perceived as neutral, each constitutive member of that team has specific 
attitudes and positions, which however subtly expressed, will influence the facilitation 
process. Burton’s evident attachment to scientific objectivism is not explicit. 
Nevertheless, this theme appears throughout his extensive elaboration on the theory and 
practice of conflict resolution.
The apparent commitment to a technically-grounded knowledge is compounded 
by a lack of self-reflection and analysis of his theory. For example, the non-negotiable 
nature of needs is rarely put under the microscope and questioned as to whether it alone 
can form the basis of a theory and practice of facilitated conflict resolution. Although 
Burton has changed the tone of his needs theory perspective, these are largely 
modifications in etymology. Needs theory is never taken apart so that its constitutive 
elements can be critically examined. A deconstructive process would reveal these 
problematic meta-theoretical assumptions. As part of this process, critical self- 
reflection would allow one to locate the points at which needs theory may be altered, 
reconstructed, or abandoned. Simultaneously, reflecting upon one’s assumptions that 
underlie a theory may lead to explorations of alternative theoretical formulations, which 
though different, may be more helpful in fulfilling the promise of aims contained in the 
overall project. Rather than engaging in a critical self-reflection and deconstruction of
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his foundations, Burton incorporates changes at the surface level. Hence, needs theory 
becomes infused with anomalies, but its validity remains unquestioned.
The lack of self-reflection, and a sustained preference for a method based on 
scientific objectivism, lead Burton to ground his theoretical components on a type of 
rationality that is instrumental. The differentiation between types of interests and the 
knowledge they produce are overlooked, since he deems interests as only materially 
significant. Interests are more than scarce material resources such as water and 
territory. Rather, they are informed by different types of knowledge formations. For 
instance, empirical analytic knowledge produces interests that are oriented toward locating 
empirical facts and observing physical states of affairs. This type of knowledge-interest 
relationship, along with a practical cognitive interest that is based on hermeneutic 
knowledge (the need for mutual communication and interpretation of symbolic structures) 
inform instrumental rationality. By asserting that interests are material and that experiences 
alter knowledge, the possibility to conceive of other types of rationality is missed since the 
nexus between knowledge and interests is ignored. It is not argued here that Burton’s 
needs theory should be replaced by an alternative knowledge guiding interest. These 
differentiations are pointed out in order to assert that interests reflect deeper phenomena 
than his description.
Burton’s understanding that predicates itself on a separation between observer and 
the observed and a belief in a value-neutral social science produces a special kind of 
empiricism. Such a positivist epistemology is unhelpful, as the inherent potential 
present in Burton’s formulation of a facilitated problem-solving workshop framework 
becomes subsumed. What takes priority and centre-stage is the needs-based analysis of 
individuals and groups, the goal becomes how to reach a ‘win-win’ solution, rather than 
a contingent changeable consensus that can only be validated in praxi s . Instead,  what 
results is a sophisticated and ambitious formulation of the motivations that may drive
103
some individuals to enter and remain in deep-rooted conflictual situations. The insights 
he provides are powerful; in particular, the role of a third party as neither an arbiter nor 
a negotiator is an important point of departure. However, the steps that participants are 
required to take in order to move from confrontation to consensus cannot be realised 
within the confines of Burton’s theoretical framework. In other words, a positivist 
epistemology cannot resolve conflicts in the way Burton thinks it can for his 
epistemology as he constructs it, can lead to limited transformations. The rebuilding of 
norms and institutions become difficult to realise when there is a neglect of self- 
reflection and other forms of rationality are included.
It can be inferred from his brief engagement with various scientific methods that 
for Burton, truth can be known and a concept of control is important and prediction is 
possible. These further three points will be discussed in order to highlight the 
difficulties within Burton’s meta-theoretical and theoretical assumptions. First, Burton 
overemphasises the significance of the idea that truth can be discovered. The resolution 
process, he argues, is about outcomes of the conflict situation that must meet the 
ontological needs of all.^ ^^  The underlying assumptions of the facilitated problem­
solving workshops are that if perceptions can be readdressed and information clarified, 
then the truth can be located. The whole thrust of facilitated analysis based upon 
needs highlights Burton’s insistence that there are truths that can be resurrected, if the 
parties are helped to uncover them through the identification of issues and learning the 
causes of the conflict.
It can be argued that a facilitated analysis applied in the Oslo Channel might 
have resulted in not only broad agreements of principles among the participants, but in 
specific policies that would have taken into account other excluded voices. If we recall, 
the participants represented the dominant views within the two communities and 
engaged in what Burton would term settlement, rather than resolution. The third-party
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role would have differed significantly, as the parties would have been made aware of 
conflict theories, however partial (a deficiency recognised by Larsen) as well as a 
discussion of how to view the conflict as a shared problem. In short, a Burtonian 
type of facilitated analysis might have yielded a more sustainable peace process, since 
the third-party team would have been able to engage the disputants in a deeper analysis 
of the conflict. By doing so, ways of transforming institutions and norms would have 
been included in discussions, rather than settling for tenuous compromises.
While a facilitated analysis points to a more helpful direction of transforming 
perceptions, a Burtonian procedure is limited by its reliance on a theory based on needs 
and a positivist epistemology. Burton asserts that he is moving away from a realist 
worldview of war avoidance and a behaviouralist methodology to a foundation based on 
a world society, conflict resolution, and a behavioural needs perspective.^®* However, 
by relying on an inductive methodology and an approach that is oriented towards 
reaching goals and costing outcomes, he only succeeds in reinforcing concepts he aims 
to transcend.
For example, in his engagement with Waltz’s ideas articulated in The Man, The 
State and War, Burton critiques the pessimistic conception of man’s nature, as well as 
Waltz’s prioritisation of the system as an explanation for why war occu rs . I ns t ead ,  
Burton constructs the individual as being inherently non-aggressive.^^® Rather than 
formulating a conception of the self as being comprised of many dynamic elements 
from the social environment, he merely takes up the opposite position from Waltz. By 
adopting a position in opposition to Waltz, Burton does not present a way forward for 
constructing a new paradigm, as he purports to do.^ ^^
The individual alone should not comprise the unit of analysis, as members of a 
third-party team bring particular ideas and forms of knowledge to bear on a facilitation 
process. Furthermore, the interactive process cannot preclude, as Burton insists, the
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views and influences of the third-party panel. The participatory nature of problem­
solving is all inclusive, and though it is essential for the third-party position to be 
viewed as independent, there are presuppositions that each person involved in the 
facilitation effort will bring with him or her. Therefore, a philosophical foundation of a 
theory cannot be based on a positive conception of man and prioritise the individual as 
the unit of analysis.
Additionally, Burton’s argument against the behaviouralist school is not entirely 
tenable, since the assumptions on which the behaviouralist movement was based 
become incorporated into his theoretical and epistemological framework. He does 
move away from the overt ideas of behaviouralism; nevertheless, he continues to share 
some of its fundamental commitments including the notion that truth can be discovered. 
Burton argues for a psychologically-oriented needs theory for discovering a truth, 
whereas the behaviouralists preferred quantitative analysis. Therefore, although the 
positioning is different, the foundational attachment remains fundamentally unaltered.
Second, the positivist epistemology can also be seen in Burton’s attachment to 
the concept of control. He initially critiques the power politics understanding of inter­
state relations. He argues that monarchs and other authorities in power aim to exercise 
control over those they rule. However, in modem democracies, the legitimacy of these 
authorities is being undermined, since control means denying individuals’ ontological 
needs. Consequently, since needs are no longer being met, some groups and persons 
express dissatisfaction with those in positions of power, by violent or nonconformist 
means. This, in turn, leads to the labelling of deviance.
The point of this exposition is to argue that individuals need to be able to have 
control over their own identities if violent eruptions of conflicts are to be avoided or 
r e s o l v e d . B u r t o n ’s problem-solving methodology offers the possibility of a 
dialogical process, where the parties may come to reach agreements through a process
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of specified form of communication. Yet, by formulating procedures in which the third 
party follows specific theoretical premises, Burton fails to develop his promising 
insight. Instead, he proceeds directly to finding ways that would allow individuals to 
gain control over their nature. Ultimately, the means of reaching consensus in his 
facilitated conflict resolution formulation involves calculating the benefits and costs of 
perpetuating the conflict situation. In this conception, actions are seen only as 
instrumental, and for some specified purpose. This framing limits Burton’s capacity to 
realise his vision of the possibility of allowing parties to reach agreements consensually, 
since instrumental rationality forms the meta-theoretical grounding for his theory.
His theoretical formulation overlooks the rich concept of communication. All 
conflict researchers do recognise the importance of communicating effectively and 
clearly. Burton too perceives communication in a similar fashion. He rightly starts from 
the position that ‘there is communication in all relationships’ however, in viewing 
communication as something that can be either effective or misinterpreted. Burton 
concentrates only on the detailed and practical ways that communication can be improved 
in transmitting information. By arguing that communication is a medium to be controlled. 
Burton misses the fundamental role communication and language play in hindering, 
developing, and transforming facilitation efforts. Burton views communication as a tool 
and not as a basis for theorising about the resolution of conflicts.
The concept of communication is a most significant dimension, as it offers the 
possibility for an inclusion of another type of a rationality other than instrumental: 
communicative. Burton’s theoretical outline takes for granted instrumental rationality 
as the basis of practising conflict resolution facilitation efforts. By doing so, he is 
unable to break away from behavioural, scientific approaches. In arguing for a new 
vocabulary, for Burton, the role of language and the process of communication involve 
accurate semantics and effectiveness. The socially co-ordinating aspect of language and
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its tendencies towards producing distorted perceptions and relationships remain 
unexplored. Therefore, the dominance of instrumental rationality continues.
It is fair to say that in the practice of many facilitation efforts, the strategic 
actions and the foundation of instrumental rationality are explicitly present. For 
instance, the Norwegian third parties and the representatives of Israel and the PLO in 
the Oslo peace process defined their goal as producing a sellable agreement. However, 
if the third party’s role is to be a facilitative one, as is maintained by those participants 
and conflict resolution scholars, then an understanding of how individuals construct 
relationships through the medium of language must be included as a significant element 
of practising resolution.
Burton’s understanding of language and communication arise not only from his 
commitment to instrumental rationality, but also from his separation of theory and 
practice. By arguing that theories are derived from observing practices. Burton 
maintains the separation between theory and practice. Practice relates to theory insofar 
as a needs-based approach is seen to underlie various types of facilitation efforts. Since 
Burton views theory as being borne out of practice, his theoretical foundations are 
partial and eclectic. He asserts that partial theories can lead to the construction of a 
more complete theory, but only through experience and p r a c t i c e . H i s  needs theory is 
formulated based on empirical experience. Other theoretical strands explicated by 
Burton are designed to support this needs approach. By prioritising practice, the 
process of formulating theories of facilitated conflict resolution are viewed as 
important, but not fundamental.
Burton’s lingering commitment to instrumental rationality can be also be 
evidenced in his notion that prediction is possible. He argues that by observing human 
behaviours, deriving a theory from established studied patterns, prediction about future 
behaviours can be made. Although he recognises that absolute prediction cannot be
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achieved, Burton insists that the goal of a problem-solving conflict resolution is ‘to 
make possible more accurate prediction and c o s t i n g ' T h i s  goal is a logical consequence 
of incorporating the first two points that truth can be discovered and communication can be 
controlled. All of these elements are constitutive of a rationality that is oriented to attaining 
success, which results in actions that are rooted in developing strategies that promote 
winning solutions. Here, it is relevant to note the cost-benefit approach that Burton 
advocates is a core component of the consequences which arise from using rational 
instruments to achieve specified objectives. The flaw is not that the Burtonian problem­
solving needs theory perspective includes instrumental rationality in the process of 
resolving conflicts. It is that his approach is premised on such a basis, hence, his desired 
paradigm shift is not achieved.
Burton purports that human needs theory provides the best foundation for 
facilitated conflict resolution, since it is the uiunet needs of individuals that lie at the root of 
protracted conflicts. However, a needs-based theory combined with a lack of critical, self­
reflection excludes possibilities for conceiving alternative ways of transforming deep- 
rooted conflicts. For instance, his philosophical assumptions lead to a belief in a specified 
methodology that advocates following predetermined procedures. The epistemology that is 
based on positivistic notions of discoverable truths, prioritising empirical practices, coupled 
with the knowledge that is oriented to reaching success prevents Burton from moving 
beyond the boundaries of instrumental rationality.
In short. Burton’s belief that prediction is not only possible, but can be refined by 
studying theories of human behaviour, demonstrates his commitment to an instrumental 
rationality-informed framework. His philosophical orientation connects the needs theory 
and human behaviour relationship to improve prediction:
An adequate theory of behaviour is a prerequisite for policy-making and also a prerequisite for reliable 
prediction. What this predicts is global conflict, unless human developmental needs are pursued 
and...resolved...A theory of behaviour, based on human needs as a starting position and a 
philosophical approach, enables us to think of these difficult problems.*'^
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The behavioural theories advocated are derived from examining systems and social 
organisational theories at the group l e v e l / A t  a first glance, it appears that needs theory 
is chosen to enhance the systems approach. Rather, it is the contrary. Systems theory is 
used to underpin a needs-based explanation and to provide justification for following a 
particular type of facilitated analytical problem-solving workshop. Concerning systems 
theory, Burton asserts that:
In systems theory, attention is given to the role of social learning and culture, in the ways in which 
social systems change. The theory holds that although social systems are learned by their members, 
who adjust their world views according to experiences, socio-cultural systems also have underlying 
assumptions, which make the system as a whole, more resistant to change than their individual 
members.'120
In other words. Burton argues that it is institutions that fail to change adequately 
to meet the needs of their constituent members. When needs are continually unmet, 
protracted conflict situations become manifest. Therefore, resolution and provention 
involve finding ways of satisfying these unmet needs.
If we conceive of Burton’s theory-building as a pyramid, at the base lies conflict 
resolution methodology of problem-solving via facilitated analysis. At the midpoint, 
there is a connection between the methodology and needs theory. At the peak exists 
systems theory and human behavioural theory of social psychology, which follow from 
needs theory. While needs plus systems yield resolution, needs plus human behavioural 
theories results in provention. Burton defines provention as ‘doing something about 
problems before they cause conflict’.There fore ,  he argues that provention ‘presupposes 
prediction. It could be that our inability to predict is our main problem in conflict 
provention’.^ ^^  He suggests that needs theory is the most promising ‘adequate theory of 
human and societal behaviours’, since it can assist with more accurate prediction.
Provention as an ideal could render conflict resolution less significant. That is, 
provention is concerned with how to avoid the occurrence of protracted deep-rooted 
conflicts. The appropriate application of provention. Burton argues, would result in
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infrequent need of conflict resolution as conflicts would be eliminated or dealt with 
before they erupted into violence and developed into protracted situations.
In the process of constructing and justifying his needs-based approach, Burton 
includes the concepts of first-order and second-order learning. In first-order learning, 
actors forget they can alter the system; instead, problems of conformity are handled by 
either falling back on the socially learned positions or ‘default values’. S e c o n d - o r d e r  
learning, argues Burton, promotes creativity, ‘which requires a willingness and capacity 
for challenging assumptions
This second-order learning, linked to system theory, is utilised by Burton to 
underpin his needs approach. However, a needs theory that is supported by a second- 
order change does not result in a paradigm shift, as Burton suggests. Conversely, this 
attempt to bolster needs theory fails to change it dramatically, since a process of critical 
self reflection and deconstruction are not included.
A positivist methodology and epistemology merge in the foundational 
assumptions that underlie needs theory. That is. Burton asserts that a truth can be 
discovered, communication can be controlled, and prediction about human behaviours 
can be offered. Consequently, a foundation premised on empiricism which is tied to 
instrumental rationality emerges.
In sum, based on the concepts of provention and resolution. Burton formulates a 
philosophy that places the behavioural motivation of individuals, which are concerned 
with attaining needs-satisfaction, as the foundation for building a facilitated conflict 
resolution theory. In other words, if we begin from the premise that it is vital to 
understand human behaviours, then the process of needs satisfaction becomes the 
medium through which resolution of conflicts are encouraged. As noted earlier, 
individuals are the unit of analysis, since it is their needs that are represented and 
reproduced at societal levels. All of these assumptions suggest that the type of theory
Il l
asserted by Burton is comprised of partial frames that are designed to promote needs 
theory. Therefore, the point of departure he initially provides in arguing for a 
facilitative approach is not fully thought through in-depth, since he overemphasises the 
significance of needs theory.
Conclusion
Obstacles in dealing with basic problems, such as deep-rooted conflict, has been the absence of an 
adequate theoretical framework, and even more serious, the absence of a realisation that such a 
framework is necessary for solving a problem.
— John Burton, 1990
The opening Burton provides in formulating a facilitated conflict resolution 
approach is mitigated by his lingering attachment to needs theory and instrumental 
rationality. This foundation orients his approach towards attaining goals, achieving 
success, and valuing technical knowledge of scientifically-rooted methodologies. 
Although Burton’s ideas present an important first step in conceiving an alternative 
perspective from the traditional mediation approaches, his philosophical and theoretical 
orientations limit the extent to which the alternative can be constructed. In addition to 
the bounded instrumental rationality which pervades his framework, the separation 
between theory and practice and deconstruction further curbs the potential expressed in 
the facilitation methodology.
If the intrinsic link between practice and theory is taken into account, the 
underlying assumptions of theories and practices can be questioned. During this 
deconstructive process, ways of further opening up the space he initially presents can be 
constructed and considered.
The contributions Burton has to offer are significant and should not be 
dismissed. At the time of his initial conception, he challenged the views that dominated
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the mainstream peace research and International Relations disciplines. Burton’s 
approach is one that offers many insights into the traditional bargaining approach and 
the facilitation process practised by the participants to the Oslo Channel. The 
shortcomings of the Oslo Channel can be better understood if one considers Burton’s 
perspective. First, the facilitated approach, which is premised on analysis, would have 
led to a discussion by the participants of the underlying issues such as the importance of 
security for Israel and the desire for autonomy by the PLO for the Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories. The style of facilitation, which included both pre-negotiations 
and negotiations, did not allow for any such explorations since the conflicting parties 
engaged in direct discussions.
The Norwegians played an administrative role and therefore assumed a reactive 
position. This is where Burton’s facilitated conflict resolution practice could have 
significantly contributed. The third parties would have played a more active role as 
they would have encouraged the participants to explore the deeper underlying causes of 
the protracted deep-rooted conflict so that a fundamental shift in perceptions could 
begin to take shape. An analytic problem-solving approach resolution is sought rather 
than achieving compromises. As the participants to the Oslo Channel approached the 
process of reaching compromises, and as the Norwegian third-party role was a reactive 
one, a fundamental change in the perceptions the parties held of one another was not 
achieved. Since the emphasis was placed on building personal relationships and 
emotional trust, ways of translating the changed attitudes could not be imagined so that 
the constituencies within the both communities could be included in a process of peace­
building. Although a significant breakthrough was achieved as a result of the Oslo 
Channel, the crucial understandings and the relationship between Israel and the PLO did 
not essentially change.
113
A facilitated analytic approach, such as the one proposed by Burton, would have 
aimed for shifting the perceptions of parties so that confidence-building could follow. 
Furthermore, a problem-solving approach aims for a long-lasting resolution and views 
compromises as settlements that often can deepen the protracted situation. In short. 
Burton’s conflict resolution perspective has insights to offer to practices in peace such 
as the Oslo Channel. However, his methodology is inhibited by the theoretical 
restraints. It is argued in this thesis that Burton does provide a philosophy and a theory. 
Nevertheless, the attachment to needs is inadequate for realising the implicit potential of 
conflict resolution. His theories are partial, since they are used to support the overall 
philosophy of human needs. From the method of problem-solving, it becomes evident 
that needs theory comprises its underlying foundation. Other theories of the system, 
such as world society and social psychology, are incorporated to establish a philosophy 
of human behaviour. An adequate theory of human behaviour is sought since needs are 
deemed to be ontological to the human species. Consequently, by understanding how to 
fulfil the unsatisfied needs that have led to a protracted conflict, then resolution 
becomes possible.
Burton’s theory and methodology has added dimensions which were neglected 
by all the participants to the Oslo Channel. However, this facilitated conflict resolution 
approach of problem-solving workshops and needs theory contain serious difficulties, 
due to its meta-theoretical underpinnings. If Burton’s philosophical, theoretical and 
methodological contributions do not go far enough towards presenting an alternative to 
third party intervention approaches such as mediation, then do scholars in the facilitated 
conflict resolution discipline who attempt to refine Burton’s framework offer vastly 
improved approaches? This forms the focus of the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Extending the Burtonian Foundation
We need to think of peace not as a condition, but as a process... *
— Michael Banks, 1987
It now seems useful to redirect attention to the basic conceptions because Burton and his fellow 
theorists, in their desire to apply the basic principles to practical problems of analysis and action, have 
neglected to spell out some of the nuances of the broad conceptions underlying the approach.^
— Michael Banks, 1987
Introduction
The scholars and practitioners within the facilitated conflict resolution field owe 
much to the ideas of Burton. In the previous chapter, the contributions and limitations 
of his approach were discussed. It was argued that the potential present in his 
methodology of problem-solving cannot be realised within the theoretical framework of 
needs and a foundation of instrumental rationality. Numerous scholars and practitioners 
within the facilitated conflict resolution discipline have attempted to expand Burton’s 
theoretical framework.
Therefore, in this chapter, the efforts to refine his approach will be examined. 
First, the social-psychological approaches of Fisher and Kelman will be explored. 
Second, the differing perspectives offered by Mitchell and Azar, as well as from other 
scholars, will be discussed. Third, attempts to expand the Burtonian needs theory by 
conflict researchers such as Banks, Azar, Scimecca, and Rothman will be analysed.
It will be argued that these approaches do not offer a more adequate foundation 
for approaching the facilitation of conflicts. Some thinkers provide more insightful 
accounts of how to handle the resolution process than others. However, as they 
subscribe to the Burtonian foundation, they are subject to similar limitations as his 
framework. Finally, it will be contended that these thinkers attachment to instrumental
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rationality indicates the need to rethink the meta-theoretical foundations of conflict 
resolution. It will be asserted that one promising formulation includes an expanded 
understanding of rationality.
Social-Psychology: Changing Perceptions
An eclectic model of intergroup conflict, based primarily in social-psychological theorising, provides a 
context for needs theory and a broader framework for understanding and ultimately resolving 
protracted conflict. Humanism and humanistic psychology provide a starting point.^
— Ronald Fisher, 1990
The facilitation of conflicts in practice and theory involves an exchange of ideas 
and encounters among the scholars and practitioners within the conflict resolution 
discipline. Many of these scholars and practitioners were influenced by Burton’s 
formulation of a collaborative problem-solving workshop framework and needs theory. 
They attempted to expand Burton’s theoretical ideas or his description for practising 
conflict resolution. Two scholars who sought to extend the account of the causes and 
ways of resolving conflicts from Burton are Ron Fisher and Herbert Kelman."  ^ As their 
writings are the most influential in this specific area, the models they offer will be 
discussed.
Fisher outlines an eclectic model, illustrated by the following figure:
1 2 0
11 ME
A N T t C t D f c N I S  G R i r N T A T l O \ S O U T C O M F S
L f c V t L
P e r c e p t u a l
c o g n i t i v e  b ia se s
M i s t r u s t
—►  C o m m u n i c a t i o n
 ^  J o i n t  p a y o f t
ü n t c o m e
s a t i s f a c t i o n
F igu re  1: The Eclectic Model of Intergroup Conflict^
As the figure indicates, there are corresponding levels of analysis and variables 
that become prominent at different times during various stages of a conflict. They are 
individual, group, and intergroup (levels) and antecedents, orientations, processes, and 
outcom es (variables).^ The antecedent variables are characteristic of the relationship 
among individuals, groups, and intergroups. They occur before the conflict becomes 
manifest. Orientations arise in the early stages o f conflicts and greatly influence the 
strength of the developm ent of the conflict. They represent attitudes and perceptions. 
Process variables feed and express the conflict. They represent individual, group or 
intergroup behaviours and interactions. Outcomes are ‘products o f the conflict at the 
different levels of analysis’.^
Fisher asserts that many of the principles stated in his eclectic model are derived 
from existing theories of intergroup conflict. The first encom passes both subjective
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sources of incompatible values (unmet needs, power, perceived threats, ethnocentrism) 
and the objective approach to conflict found in realistic group conflict theory. There are 
an additional four principles, stated below:
1. Real conflict causes a mutually competitive orientation and reciprocal competition interaction.
2. Real conflict, cultural differences, a history of antagonism and competitive orientation interaction 
cause perceived threat.
3. Perceived threat causes ethnocentrism including in-group solidarity and outgroup hostility.
4. Competitive orientation, perceived threat, and ethnocentrism escalate conflict through ineffective 
communication, inadequate co-ordination, contentious tactics and reduced productivity.®
In other words, self-esteem, which is tied to group identity and cohesion, 
depends on perpetuating hostilities against other groups. Consequently, conflicts 
become increasingly intractable. Recognising the dual nature of identity, Fisher 
critiques needs theory for conceiving of group identities as something that is essentially 
positive. He asserts that the negative consequences of group identities (ethnocentrism) 
should not be excluded. Rather, he argues that an identity group should form the ‘core’ 
of a conflict resolution theory, since it is through the identity group that fundamental 
needs are satisfied.
Fisher contends that the eclectic model is a fundamental element, which is 
required for understanding and explaining intergroup conflict. He maintains that the 
most significant level of analysis is the intergroup, since it represents the relationship 
between individuals and groups. By placing the emphasis on the intergroup level, 
however, the dynamic relationship within groups is missed. This aspect is also 
important to understand as an analysis of such relationships can contribute to the 
resolution of conflicts. Simultaneously, one can gain insights into the causes and 
escalation of conflicts.
As discussed in the previous chapter. Burton emphasises the individual level. 
As a result, he overlooks the social component of the individual as a part of the larger 
whole. By shifting the focus from the individual to the intergroup, Fisher faces a 
similar problem; he ignores the relationships at the levels of individuals and groups.
1 2 2
The dynamics between smaller components is lost when one overem phasises the 
com posite interactions between groups. Therefore, the focus should be on the 
individual and his or her role in the social environment. This is not so much a social- 
psychological approach, but a socio-historical one. The products o f learning and 
tradition passed down to individuals and groups shape their orientations and 
perceptions. Thus, historic traditions as well as the social learning individual’s 
experience should be included if one is attempting to associate a level of analysis with a 
particular subject.
In F isher’s eclectic model, there are low and high intensity conflicts. The 
process of transition from one to the other is escalation and de-escalation.^ In low 
intensity conflicts, the parties fight over interests and values, which are either rooted in 
cultural traditions or material sources. As their identities are not threatened, the outcome 
can be a mix of costs and benefits. In high intensity conflicts, the identity o f the group 
is threatened. See the following figure:
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Figure 2: An Alternative Contingency Model.
Interestingly, Fisher considers questions of territory as an aspect of high 
intensity conflict; therefore, territory is linked to needs.** Under this conceptualisation, 
one could argue that many facilitation efforts— including the Oslo process— could not 
succeed in producing workable agreements, since neither Israel’s need for security nor
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the Palestinians’ need for identity were discussed under a rubric of facilitated analysis/^ 
However, Fisher’s slight shift in the emphasis of territory, as it is related to needs, does 
not significantly alter a needs-based approach. He seems to indicate that territory is an 
expression of the threat to a group’s identity and, if perceptions can be altered, then 
needs ‘are the cause, escalatory element, and hold...the potential for resolving’ conflicts 
at all levels.
Fisher’s social-psychologically-oriented theory is outlined as an interactive 
conflict resolution approach which involves:
Small group problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of identity groups or 
states engaged in destructive conflict that are facilitated by an impartial third party of social scientist 
practitioners.
This description does not differ significantly from Burton’s formulation of the process 
of problem-solving.^^ For instance, Fisher remains attached to the role that need 
identification plays in the process of resolving conflicts. The foundation of needs 
theory is not critically reassessed, and by preferring a social-psychological perspective, 
correcting misperceptions is viewed as the main task of facilitators. Like Burton, the 
third-party role is facilitative and analytical. A group of ‘skilled’ and ‘knowledgeable’ 
professionals work to uncover the reasons why conflicts have reached a stalemate and 
how through joint problem-solving they may be resolved.
Fisher asserts that an important analytic concept for problem-solving is identity 
and its implications for intergroup relations. Since conflicts are cognitively either 
maintained or transcended, he incorporates humanistic psychology (subjective, 
descriptive, and holistic) as a theoretical basis for underpinning and explaining conflict 
resolution. By doing so, Fisher further clings to needs theory from a different starting 
point; he subscribes to a humanistic philosophy, which asserts that moral values 
constructed on ‘critical reasoning’ and ‘scientific inquiry’ can be located in ‘human 
experience’.F i s h e r  contends that this humanism requires the meeting of basic 
economic, physical, and cultural needs. He categorises these needs into seven groups:
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1. Self-actualisation needs: the ultimate motivation, involving the need to fulfil one's unique 
potential.
2. Esteem needs: the need for achievement, competence and mastery, as well as motives for 
recognition, prestige and status.
3. Aesthetic needs: the craving for beauty, symmetry and order.
4. Cognitive needs: the desire to know, to understand, and to satisfy one’s curiosity.
5. Belongingness and Love needs: needs that are satisfied by social relationships.
6. Safety needs: needs that must be met to protect the individual from danger.
7. Physiological needs: basic internal deficit conditions that must be satisfied to maintain bodily 
processes/*
Fisher argues that these needs are changing and following Cantril, argues that 
the range of satisfiers grows over time, while individuals need to feel they have the 
freedom to implement and trust the authorities to maintain and secure their needs.^° 
When these needs become increasingly incompatible, violent conflict erupts. Therefore, 
since conflicts are relationships between groups, conflicts are ‘social’ Fisher asserts 
that the significant factor to consider is how these social relationships are interpreted
and conceptualised. The ways of changing perceptions are key issues to address, if a
facilitated conflict resolution process is to bring about positive change.
At the theoretical level, Fisher contends that the identity of individuals and 
groups represents the interconnected nature of needs theory and intergroup relations. 
He points to other sympathetic scholars who place similar emphasis on identity as the 
most important need. For example, following an open systems approach, Oscar Nudler 
argues that identity is developed and maintained through a process of exchanges with 
the environment, which parallels Mead’s view that identity is formed through social 
interactions.^^ Fisher also points to Galtung, who argues that identity arises from social 
structures and borrows heavily from the psychologist Erikson, insofar as that individuals 
express their identities both as individuals and as g r o u p s . B y  exploring the ideas of 
Nudler and Galtung, Fisher outlines a social identity theory. He states there are four 
propositions of social identity theory:
1. Individuals strive to maintain a positive self-concept and social identity.
2. Membership in groups contributes to an individual’s social identity.
3. Evaluation of one’s own group is based on a social comparison with other groups.
4. A positive social identity is based on favourable comparisons.^'*
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Fisher argues that these four propositions suggest that whilst an analysis should 
start with the intergroup, followed by a study of how these groups are comprised and are 
integrated or disintegrated. The eclectic model he outlines is designed to take account 
of all the stages of conflict development and resolution. The social-psychological 
theory, which is both the foundation and the methodology, is a ‘combination of 
induction and deduction’. H e  outlines his theory construction as:
The process of theory building moves from specifying the basic variables to the laws of interaction, the 
boundaries and system states, the propositions and empirical indicators, and finally moves to the 
hypotheses to be tested by research.^
This type of theory construction is rooted in a particular type of rationality. 
Fisher argues theory building begins with locating appropriate variables and moves to 
laws, to empirical indicators, and finally to testing. His starting point lacks any great 
self-reflection. For example, what types of attitudes, knowledge, and interests does one 
bring to bear when formulating a specified theory for facilitating conflicts? As 
discussed in the previous chapter, a theory grounded on these type of assumptions, and 
where a critical self-examination of the theory’s underlying assumptions is overlooked, 
leads to an automatic preference for instrumental rationality. Where Burton squarely 
places the focus on the individual as the unit to be analysed, Fisher opts for the identity 
of individuals and g r ou p s .Ho we ver ,  at the theory-building level, both share the 
emphasis they place on meeting the needs and finding appropriate satisfiers in order to 
resolve violent conflicts. Hence, at the meta-theoretical level, Fisher, like Burton, 
subscribes to a foundation that is premised on instrumental rationality. This, in turn, 
limits the possibility for conceiving other foundations that may better realise the aim of 
his project.
Fisher’s description of theory construction demonstrates that meta-theoretical 
considerations are not significant, while types of empirical knowable knowledge is 
prioritised. This instrumental rationality favours scientific verifiable facts, and suggests
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a methodology that can produce successful outcomes, which, over time, can be 
predicted through observing events and happenings.^^
Since instrumental rationality remains the foundation and the methodology does 
not significantly differ from Burton, Fisher’s development is limited. At the theoretical 
level, his social-psychological approach neither furthers an understanding of the causes 
nor possible ways of resolving conflicts, since Burton incorporates a social- 
psychological component in his framework. For example. Burton attaches great 
importance to the role of perceptions, as well as the need to analyse and alter human 
behaviours.
In short, Fisher offers a model that includes more causes, escalatory steps and 
possibilities for resolving conflicts. His contradictory approach to needs theory, his 
failure to critically self-reflect on his own underlying assumptions, and his preference in 
formulating a framework that is designed to achieve successful outcomes limits the 
extent to which restructuring normative institutions can be conceived and enacted. 
There is another scholar who employs a social-psychological perspective, Herbert 
Kelman. The following section will examine whether he provides an alternative 
foundation for framing conflict facilitation and a theory of peace practice.
Kelman's Interactive Problem-solving
Facilitated problem-solving is an unofficial academically based third party approach to the analysis of 
resolution and of international and ethnic conflicts anchored in social-psychological principles.
— Herbert Kelman, 1990 
Kelman attempts to expand the facilitated conflict resolution field by altering the 
problem-solving workshop as well as incorporating a social-psychological component.^^ 
Building on the formulation explicated by Burton, he develops the types of third parties 
that can assist in a resolution process, namely, the inclusion of interested citizens 
including students and journalists as a part of the third-party team.^  ^ The social-
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psychological aspect of his approach can be seen in the emphasis placed on addressing 
the fears disputants e x p r e s s . A s  an active practitioner, he has arranged numerous 
workshops between Arabs and Israelis concerning the Palestinian question, the status of 
Jerusalem, as well as the Cyprus conflict. In his view, conflict resolution is about 
changing individuals’ attitudes and the images they hold of the other. Kelman describes 
his framework as ‘interactive problem-solving’, which considers the following:
1. A broad range of elements that influences relationships. In short, one looks to positive incentives 
and to developed positive strategies, for example, Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.
2. Our social-psychological analysis suggests broader goals to which negotiations are to be directed.
3. This analysis focuses on the way interactions among parties, at different levels, create the 
conditions that help to feed, escalate and perpetuate conflicts.^^
The problem-solving workshops form a prenegotiations step towards official 
negotiations. As the prenegotiations stage is unofficial and participants are free to 
express ideas without committing to anything, a political environment is created that is 
conducive to achieving agreements.^"  ^ Kelman contends that the second-track problem­
solving workshop can continue to contribute to official negotiations, even while official 
negotiations are under way. Moreover, after particular negotiation processes, the 
workshop format can be utilised by participants to cement relationships and to assist in 
the implementation of agreed policies.^^
Kelman’s composition of a third-party panel differs from other scholars such as 
Fisher and Burton. That is, in addition to academics, Kelman introduces preinfluentials 
(interested postgraduate students and those who have links to decision-makers).^^ The 
positive role that may be played by influentials (journalists and advisors to decision­
makers) as well as representatives of decision-makers are preferred, since they have 
direct access to the authorities who would implement policies. He also asserts that the 
third-party members, who are scholars, should have intimate knowledge of the conflict 
area.^  ^This conception differs from other descriptions. For example. Burton insists that 
third parties should be social scientists who are skilled experts in resolving conflicts. 
Area specialists are discouraged as they may be either prejudicial or their perceived
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neutrality might be compromised.^^ Kelman maintains that this second-track effort 
could transform and has influenced official first-track negotiations such as the Oslo
40process.
Kelman’s concentration on the Israeli-Palestinian question can shed interesting 
light on the Norwegian-facilitated process between Israel and the PLO. In the 
‘interactive problem-solving’ workshop format, a third-party panel of knowledgeable 
academics assist the disputants in a facilitated analysis of the conflict. Each side sends 
three to six representatives. A preliminary session is held with each group to explain 
the purpose and procedures to be followed in the facilitation process."^  ^ This is followed 
by joint meetings for two-and-a-half days in an academic setting. The environment is 
confidential, private, and does not bind any party to particular formulations. The 
disputing parties begin by describing how they see the conflict; the causes, positions, 
and any possible ways of transforming it. The third-party panel can re-articulate all 
parties’ positions and, if appropriate, introduce a comparison with other conflicts. 
Subsequently, the conflicting parties are encouraged to explore the motivations and 
causes that may underlie the expressed conflict. During this analytic phase, ways of 
overcoming the political and psychological obstacles are discussed.
The third-party panel acts as a repository of trust, enforces ground rules, and 
intervenes to keep discussions moving. The panel assists in identifying steps, which are 
designed to reassure one’s identity, quell existential fears, and foster confidence- 
building. Kelman suggests that these can be shown in the form of symbolic gestures 
such as the Letters of Mutual Recognition offered by Israel and the PLO in conjunction 
with the Declaration of Principles (DOP). Such gestures can help change the attitudes 
and perceptions of the parties in the resolution process. Changed perceptions among 
parties can feed back into the official political debate.
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Kelman maintains that out of the six Palestinian representatives who participated 
in these unofficial efforts under the auspices of the Harvard Centre for International 
Affairs, four went on to participate in the Madrid Peace Process/^ The problem-solving 
workshops apparently continued until the autumn of 1993. Additionally, meetings were 
held subsequently to discuss how to overcome the challenges of the Oslo peace 
p r o c e s s . K e l m a n  claims that these workshops comprised of small groups, which 
occurred after the signing of the DOP and received advice from individuals who were 
involved in the initial unofficial and subsequent official phases.
There seems to be a contradiction in Kelman’s assertions. First, he purports that 
the problem-solving workshops indirectly helped to make the Oslo Channel a success, 
since some of the Palestinian representatives participated in both his and the Norwegian 
process. He summarises the contributions his unofficial workshop process made to the 
official negotiations as follows."^ First, the unofficial process helped individuals to 
prepare for conducting
[p]roductive negotiations by sharing information and formulating new ideas that provided important 
substantive input to the negotiations and by fostering a political atmosphere that made the parties open 
to a new relationship.'*^
Second, by injecting new intellectual ideas during the unofficial process of problem­
solving workshops, individuals could refer back to the format to re-ignite the 
momentum, sustain and improve the outcomes back in the official arena."^ ^
Yet, as demonstrated in the first chapter, the process of the Oslo talks did not 
precisely follow an ‘interactive problem-solving’ format. Furthermore, although the 
spirit of Oslo included some elements present in the formulation of a problem-solving 
workshop methodology, the Norwegian third-party panel leader, Terje Rpd-Larsen, 
expressed that he was following an organisational theory approach and that he was not 
aware of any specific theories of conflict resolution."^^
Subsequent to his alleged contribution to the Oslo process, Kelman seems to 
contradict such contributing roles as he asserts that the DOP was a series of
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compromises/^ Thus, a settlement—and not a resolution of the conflict between Israel 
and the Palestinians— was reached. Kelman contends that the Letters of Mutual 
Recognition were an important development. Interestingly, this document resulted from 
the very final stages of official negotiations, which was suggested by the late Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Holst. These letters were designed to rescue and to reaffirm each 
side’s commitment to the overall peace process. The participants have asserted the 
principles themselves and the policies contained within them are as significant as the 
symbolic gestures of recognition."^^
The question becomes if some of the parties who participated in the Oslo 
channel were influenced by the concepts and the process of ‘interactive problem- 
solving’, then why were no references made to any conflict resolution literature? 
Kelman’s contribution lies in his insightful critique of the substantive process. He 
points out that the major flaw in the document was that
[i]t was designed to give the Palestinians the hope and expectations that in the end, they would have an 
independent state and to give the Israelis the assurance that they were not committing themselves 
irrevocably to a dangerous set of arrangements.^®
Following an ‘interactive problem-solving’ process would have aimed at 
resolution rather than compromises. One could contend that the different roles played 
by a third-party team in both an ‘interactive problem-solving’ scenario and the Oslo 
Channel are essential components for shaping the format of the facilitation process. 
Following Kelman’s formulation, a third-party panel would help the disputants to 
identify satisfiers that would meet their needs in an analytic process. Additionally, 
theories of conflict and conflict resolution, including the principle of reciprocity, would 
be introduced for discussion. The Norwegian third-party team remained mostly outside 
the talks and acted only when asked directly by either side.
While the Norwegian third-party team overlooked conflict theories of dynamics, 
escalation, and de-escalation, the problem-solving workshop described by Kelman 
ignores the possible contribution a third party can make by remaining outside of direct
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dialogues between conflicting parties. Neither framework includes a process where 
third parties can question their own motivations and assumptions. Questioning of the 
predispositions and presuppositions that third parties hold might lead them to recognise 
that third parties, by virtue of interactions, shape any facilitation process. Furthermore, 
a critical examination of one’s assumptions might introduce previously excluded 
frameworks for inclusion in a facilitation effort.
In short, at the methodological level, Kelman’s ‘interactive problem-solving’ 
formulation is only a slight modification of the fundamental principles of Burton’s 
dominant approach. That is, in the method of problem-solving workshops, the 
analytical role to be played by the third-party team does not differ substantively from 
the one explicated by Burton.^  ^ Kelman is right to point out that the benefits of the 
workshops should not be underestimated, since disputants in such an environment can 
learn that there is someone to talk to and something worthwhile to talk about.^  ^
Consequently, they discover that positive change is possible and achievable.
Kelman does not formulate any specific theoretical framework for underpinning 
his practice of ‘interactive problem-solving’. There is a clear attachment to the 
requirement for meeting basic human needs; however, even needs theory is not 
articulated as a possible foundation for his methodology. He explicitly asserts that his 
approach is ‘not anchored in any t h e o r y T h e  construction of theories is deemed less 
important than conceiving of helpful and specific procedures. This raises at least one 
significant problem. Suggesting that a theoretical foundation is not essential in 
developing a practice of conflict resolution implies that only the ways of practising 
facilitation is important to consider in the conflict resolution discipline. This further 
indicates that only by observing facts and events can theoretical frameworks be derived. 
The inference that practice not only drives theory, as Burton and others have asserted.
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but should form the core position in formulating facilitation perspectives suggests that 
any number of substantive frameworks can be used to achieve successful outcomes.
Following Burton, Kelman argues that the parties’ existential fears, which are 
intrinsically tied up with identity and security, must be addressed for resolution to take 
place and not settlement. Second, conflict should be viewed as an intersocietal 
happening and the relationship not only between groups but within them must be 
analysed in the facilitation process, if agreed policies are to be deemed legitimate and 
self-sustaining.^"  ^ Third, conflict is an escalatory process where perceptions become 
reified, creating situations of protraction. Since attitudes become entrenched, Kelman 
argues that individuals impose cognitive constraints on absorbing new information or 
new ideas; hence, communication breaks down.^  ^ Gaining insights into the other’s 
perspective and sharing positions can contribute to re-establishing communication thus 
making change possible. Thus, a conflict that has greatly escalated can be de-escalated 
so the dynamic shifts from power politics to reciprocity.^^ Fourth, positive incentives 
and the principle of reciprocity is essential in bringing about resolution of conflicts. 
That is,
[sjearching for solutions that satisfy the needs of both parties create opportunities for mutual influence 
by way of responsiveness to each other’s needs.^^
Finally, international conflict is a dynamic phenomena that encompasses and 
always has the potential for producing positive change. These social-psychological 
principles suggest the anchoring of Kelman’s approach to particular assumptions and 
therefore his practice is geared towards fulfilling the principles’ conditions. The 
principles of identifying the identity group and the relationship between them as 
appropriate units of analysis ignore the individual in the socio-historical context. 
Conflicts are indeed a clash of values between groups and societies. However, by not 
including the social environments in which individuals operate, the goal becomes 
reaching functional relationships, rather than explicitly conceiving ways of transforming
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norms. One could argue that parties seek to restructure norms and institutions when 
they enter into a facilitated resolution process. However, by aiming primarily for 
successful outcomes, important as they are, the process of building legitimate norms and 
the ways of transforming them are overlooked. Consequently, a dialogical process that 
would allow for the participants to consider how new norms may be arrived at are also 
neglected.
The principles of cognitive impediments and the need for reciprocity further 
demonstrate that social-psychological elements are present in Kelman’s procedural 
formulation. As the success of outcomes becomes prioritised, the consideration of 
underlying assumptions of the facilitation process is marginalised. This lack of self­
reflection combined with an assertion that his practice does not need to be grounded in a 
theoretical framework, makes Kelman’s approach less adequate than other formulations. 
Although Fisher and Burton attach great importance to effects of practice on theory 
building, they nevertheless do firmly explore the foundations for formulating a theory of 
facilitated conflict resolution.
However, Kelman unhelpfully prefers practice over theory. As all practices and 
theories are intrinsically connected, for both shape and are influenced by one another, 
his claim that his approach is not anchored in any theory is misleading. In his case, the 
methodology of ‘interactive problem-solving’ is rooted in needs theory. By not 
recognising his theoretical commitments, Kelman fails in questioning the underlying 
assumptions associated with a needs-based approach. The process of theory 
construction is essential to reflect on as its consequent frameworks can either expand or 
restrict the possibility of any suggested methodologies. A critical examination of one’s 
underlying assumptions reveals the socially constructed nature of both theories and 
methodologies. As Kelman ignores such an endeavour, he does not substantially 
expand a way of engaging facilitated conflict resolution efforts. Instead, Kelman
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succeeds in contributing to reinforce the Burtonian problem-solving methodology and 
its theoretical commitments to human needs. The practical contributions of elaborating 
on the types and nature of third parties are important as the methodology is broadened 
to encompass hitherto unconsidered options. Nevertheless, the ‘interactive problem- 
solving’ methodology does not suggest a fundamental shift in the way conflicts are to be 
resolved. His social-psychological perspective adds additional components to Burton’s 
framework; however, these components can be easily incorporated into the dominant- 
facilitated conflict resolution perspective, presented by Burton.
Needs Theory: Proponents and Critics
The fundamental need in a programme of studies on conflict resolution is to examine violent conflicts, 
not as problems in themselves, but as features of an international political system which is failing to 
meet the needs of the world’s peoples.^*
— Michael Banks, 1987
Self-reflexivity and freedom are inseparable; both are ontological needs. Freedom is a universal need 
wherever self-reflexive minds develop. Without freedom to develop, the mind is restricted and we 
become less than human beings.^’
— Joseph Scimecca, 1990 
The social-psychological approaches, exemplified by Fisher and Kelman, 
suggest the prominence of needs theory. In this section, scholars who attempted to 
expand and refine needs theory through critique will be discussed. This section will 
address the following questions; to what extent do some attempt to expand needs 
theory? Are the criticisms levelled against it so far-reaching and are radically different 
frameworks offered?
The Defenders
A contemporary of Burton, Edward Azar suggests a methodology of problem­
solving. He argues that the analytic ‘phase of need identification is essential to the
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resolution process and must precede negotiation...or other settlement processes’ The 
problem-solving workshop methodology is designed to help the disputants identify and 
ascertain ways of satisfying unmet needs with the facilitated assistance of a third-party 
team. Additionally, the workshop process is intended to be a second-track effort, which 
can pave the way for official first-track negotiations.
One problem-solving effort regarding the conflict in Lebanon is described. A 
workshop series was held for a period of four days, which included influential non­
decision-makers (such as community and religious leaders) to discuss the causes and 
possible ways of resolving the conflict. Azar insists that the third-party panel must be 
‘objective, knowledgeable, skilled...trusted’ While they do not need to be experts as 
Burton asserts, members of a third-party team should possess general knowledge of 
conflict theories.
The problem-solving workshops began with each side presenting their own 
positions. This was followed by a facilitated analytic phase where the hidden 
motivations of the disputants and possible ways of resolving the conflict were 
examined. The interchange revealed a number of common needs and values including 
security, identity, equality, participation, control, and freedom.^^
Azar asserts that this type of a process can help towards formulating ideas and 
agreements, which can translate into concrete implementations such as the 1989 Taif 
Accords.^ Consequently, through the process of facilitated conflict resolution, the 
observable features that tend to protract conflicts, including social, political, and 
economic inequalities, can be re-addressed.
At the theoretical level, Azar argues that conflicts are related to problems of 
underdevelopment and lack of distributive justice. He places the focus not on the 
individual as the unit of analysis, but on the identity group.^  ^ He argues that it is 
necessary to explore the relationship between conflict and structural inequalities that
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characterise underdevelopment, since they are the causes of protracted conflicts. 
Causes of structural inequalities are social, since it is the interaction between institutions 
and their impingement on identity groups that perpetuate conflicts.
We are led to the hypothesis that the source of protracted social conflicts is the denial of those elements 
required in the development of all people and societies and whose pursuit is a compelling need in all. 
These are security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity and effective participation in the 
processes that determine conditions of security and identity and other such developmental 
requirements. The real source of conflict is a denial of those human needs that are common to all and 
whose pursuit is an ontological drive in all.^ ^
Like Fisher, Azar shifts the focus from the individual to the identity group as 
the unit of analysis. Furthermore, although Azar places much emphasis on the role 
of underdevelopment, he views the satisfaction of needs as an integral part of 
resolving protracted conflicts.
The needs framework is contextualised in an approach that includes the 
concept of underdevelopment. This is an added component to the needs theory 
framework. Burton values the ontological nature of needs, while Kelman and Fisher 
situate needs within a social-psychological perspective. Although contributing an 
important insight, Azar’s structural inequality argument does not consider how these 
unequal structures have developed. That is, he excludes a deep study of the socio- 
historical nature of structures .He  contends that the inequality among groups and 
communities can be located in the economic deprivation.^^ The causes that have led 
to structural inequalities though are overlooked, including the technical progression 
of modem institutions. As Marx and Weber have diagnosed, the pathologies of 
modernity lie in the bureaucratisation and prioritisation of scientific methods.^^ 
Science, technology, and administration in modernity affect both states and markets. 
The necessity for increasing efficiency means at times overlooking the possible 
detrimental costs to individuals and groups. If political communities believe their 
needs cannot be satisfied as the institutions are arranged against them, conflicts arise 
and violence may empt.
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By neglecting the formation of unequal structures, Azar misses an underlying 
reason for occurrence of structural inequalities. That is, one consequence of 
prioritising scientific methods and technical progress is the dominance of 
instrumental rationality. To this extent, Azar is no different from Fisher, Kelman, or 
Burton. Consequently, Azar expands needs theory but does not go significantly 
beyond it to formulate a framework that could allow the parties in conflict to find 
their own solutions. Azar runs into similar difficulties as Burton when he ignores the 
predominance of instrumental rationality
Bridging the Theory-Practice Divide
Michael Banks most actively seeks to complete the theoretical gaps in Burton’s 
formulations. He concurs with most of Burton, including needs theory, facilitated 
problem-solving methodology, and a commitment to a broad theory that can go beyond 
realist conceptions of international politics. Burton contends that theories, including his 
needs-based framework, are largely derived from practices. However, unlike Burton 
who maintains that theories are largely derived from practices. Banks asserts that theory 
and practice are intertwined.^  ^ In his words:
There is indeed an international relations system out there, and its institutions and organisations are 
real enough. But the real world is also made up of habits and practices and theories of how it all 
works. The theories are, to some degree, self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating. They help to create the 
reality that we have to deal with. We do need to recognise that the existing system is shaped and 
conditioned by ideas.^^
This insight is one ignored by many scholars and practitioners within the 
facilitated conflict resolution field. Banks’ ‘moderate’ position becomes apparent when 
he argues that only by recognising the interconnected relationship between theory and 
practice can an adequate general theory of conflict resolution be formulated.^^ He 
rejects the view that either practice or theory should be considered to be more 
important. Those who contend that theory drives practice are subjectivists, maintaining 
ideas and institutions directly shape practices and policies. Conversely, those who
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advocate that practice drives theory are objectivist as they believe that data and 
observations can be produced on a value-free basis. However, as Banks subscribes to 
Burton’s theoretical and methodological frameworks, this important connection that he 
aims to establish and develop becomes marginalised.
At the methodological level. Banks adopts a Burtonian approach to conflict 
resolution. In a later work with Chris Mitchell he offers a detailed procedure for 
conducting facilitation efforts, favouring the process of problem-solving that is 
proposed by Burton.^ "^  For example, the facilitated analytic role to be played by third 
parties is endorsed.^  ^ Furthermore, he insists that the content of a resolution process 
should be decided by the parties themselves, since participation along with identity is a 
felt ‘human need’.
As a follower of Burton’s problem-solving methodology, Banks subscribes to 
the significance of needs theory as a basis for formulating a general theory of conflict 
resolution.^^ In short, his theory of conflict resolution is founded on ‘a recognition that 
the point of departure must be the needs and values of ordinary people’ As 
extensively discussed in the previous chapter, a Burtonian needs-based approach 
prioritises the individual. The individual comprises the unit of analysis, since needs are 
ontological to a person. As conflicts arise from the inability of individuals to have their 
needs adequately fulfilled. Banks suggests that conflicts transcend state boundaries. 
Therefore, a world society perspective is offered as a contributing component for 
building a ‘new paradigm’ of pluralism.^  ^ This world view, which incorporates a world 
society approach, holds that a cobweb of networks cuts across state boundaries to affect 
individuals and groups within and between countries.^  ^ This differs from the dominant 
realist account of international politics, where power was seen to lie in the interaction 
between states. Furthermore, the two schools viewed war and conflict differently. 
According to the realist school of thought, war was seen to be inevitable and scholars
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searched for palliatives. In contrast, the pluralists viewed wars as avoidable and 
conflicts as resolvable. Therefore, scholars following this school of thought, including 
Burton and Banks, sought to formulate frameworks to resolve violent international 
conflicts.
Banks positively views the concepts produced during the behaviouralist 
movement’s dominance in International Relations. Banks views pluralism as:
The product of the behavioural revolution because it is based on empirical findings produced in that 
very solid period of critical scholarship and quantification in the discipline. The findings consist of 
things that scholars have observed in the world, technical findings from technical studies which do not 
fit realism and cannot be explained by the old paradigm.*®
Since observations indicate that the realist paradigm cannot explain phenomena such as 
violent conflicts, then a new world view based on focusing on the relationships of 
individuals who strive to meet their needs is apparently required. While he supports the 
methodological challenge undertaken by the behaviouralists. Banks rejects the resulting 
specialisation in theory-building.^^ A general theory for conflict resolution is advocated 
since, ‘It is simply not possible to talk about the world without having a general theory, 
however tacit or implicit’.
Like Burton, Banks maintains that needs theory is deemed a significant 
component of building a general theory of world society as he maintains
Conflict is both inevitable and necessary. It is inevitable because both people and groups have basic 
needs, which are expressed in society through competing values and clashing interests. It is necessary 
in order to provide the catalyst for social processes, without which life would hardly be worthwhile: 
stimulus, challenge, change and progress.*^
By remaining committed to a Burtonian theoretical framework and methodology. Banks 
falls short of realising his goal of completing the theoretical gaps in Burton’s project in 
at least three ways. First, there is a direct contradiction between choosing needs theory 
as a basis for formulating a general theory and the aspiration to formulate a framework 
that recognises the interconnected relationship of theory and practice. The Burtonian 
needs theory based approach is entirely endorsed by Banks. This theoretical 
framework. Burton maintains, is derived from practices as practices are viewed to drive
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theories. '^  ^ However, according to his own distinctions, any theory that is derived from 
observing events and practices is incomplete. That is, theories grounded on practices 
are inductively-oriented, objectivist, and empiricist.^^ This type of an approach to 
theory. Banks asserts, should be replaced with an approach to theory formation that 
views theory and practice as inseparable; in other words, praxis. This understanding of 
the theory-practice relationship indicates a theory that would be intersubjectively- 
oriented. Since practice and theory equally shape one another, how they become 
constituted by individuals would have to be addressed. The mechanism and processes 
that shape praxis should be considered including communicative interactions.
Consequently, according to his own suggestion of adopting a theory-practice 
connected relationship, it would appear that needs theory is not a sufficient basis for 
constructing a general theory of conflict resolution. Yet, rather than exploring the 
possible frameworks that might include the concept of praxis. Banks falls back on needs 
theory. As a result, the concept of praxis is dropped. Furthermore, his aim of
suggesting a new basis for building a general theory is lost.
Second, inductivist methodology rejected by Banks is kept in his acceptance of 
problem-solving. The belief by observers that they can be neutral in the process of 
gathering and interpreting data is seen by Banks as an unhelpful stance for developing a 
methodology. However, the methodology advocated by Burton is not critically 
examined. The assumptions that underlie needs theory as well as the theory itself is 
preserved without any changes. Consequently, though he objects to an inductively 
oriented methodology. Banks seems to be firmly committed to precisely such a 
methodology.
Third, Banks’ subscription to needs theory and lack of self-critique led to a 
prioritisation of instrumental rationality. That is, under instrumental rationality, one 
aims to gain control over one’s nature. For example. Banks asserts that conflict requires
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healthy expression and should be ‘brought under societal c o n t r o l T h i s  expression 
illustrates the implicit commitments to instrumental rationality. A rationality that 
prioritises the inductivist methodology— which he views unsatisfactory in one aspect of 
his argument— is chosen as an appropriate methodology that can form a theory for 
conflict resolution.
Banks powerfully argues against the dominance of realist approaches to 
achieving peace.^  ^ However, his failure to critically reflect on the assumptions that he 
utilises to propose a theoretical framework leads him to undermine his goal. If the 
underlying assumptions of his purported theory were critically examined and reflected 
on, then inadequacies of those theories and meta-theories would become evident. That 
is, if one critically scrutinises needs theory, for instance, the methodology it suggests as 
inductivist would be apparent.^  ^ Consequently, alternative frameworks might be 
considered that would help Banks to construct a theoretical framework that incorporates 
the concept of praxis. However, this understanding of a theory-practice relationship 
cannot be fulfilled as he does not question his own assumptions and moreover, accepts 
the Burtonian framework as a good basis for constructing a general theory.
A number of other scholars have attempted to elaborate needs theory, but only 
Banks presents the insight of the concept of praxis. By not exploring ways of 
constructing theories based on praxis, the aim of completing the theoretical gaps in 
Burton’s ideas becomes difficult to achieve. That is, in order to fill in the gaps, the 
constitutive components should be deconstructed and their underlying assumptions 
closely examined. As this process is not carried out in Banks’ writings, the theoretical 
gaps are not filled in. Rather, the Burtonian theory and methodology are reinforced as a 
promising framework in the conflict resolution field.
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Another Proponent
One thinker who attempts to elaborate needs theory, while preserving its 
primacy is Joseph Scimecca.*^ He follows Burton when he asserts that a study of 
human behavioural relationship offers a way of formulating a theory for resolving 
conf l i c t s .Sc imecca  argues conflict resolution should be a ‘normative, prescriptive’ 
science.^  ^ He insists that Burton’s needs theory is the most developed conflict 
resolution framework.
Therefore, he puts forward a needs-based approach that is ontological, but not 
genetic, suggesting two universal needs can subsume all others:
1. Self-consciousness, which can only be derived from self-reflexivity (the ability to think back and 
reflect upon one’s actions).
2, The concomitant need for freedom, which is the only condition which enables self-reflexivity fully 
to develop.^^
Scimecca incorporates Eccles’ notion that the human mind is not genetic and 
Mead’s argument that the human mind is shaped by interactions and relationships 
between the self and others, which is reinforced by the use of ‘significant symbols’. 
Scimecca further notes Mead’s understanding of language as a social activity that 
governs social relationships.^"  ^ He argues that self-reflexivity is an ontological need, 
since all individuals can interpret and think back on actions that have been undertaken 
and those that have yet to transpire.^  ^ Therefore, self-reflexivity is a basic need.
The second basic need of freedom is defined as freedom of an individual’s 
capacity to develop.^^ This capacity is moderated and influenced in the context of 
social relationships. Since freedom can produce positive and negative consequences, he 
maintains that it is social and ontological. Hence, self-reflexivity and freedom are 
coterminous since these two needs can counter the genetic basis of Burton’s approach 
and Scimecca contends that all other needs can be subsumed under them.^  ^ The criteria
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for needs fulfilment can be judged according to whether individuals have the freedom of 
‘thought’ and ‘action’.
Scimecca’s identification of the significance of self-reflexivity presents the most 
promising point of departure within the needs theory approach. However, the 
philosophical and theoretical assumptions such a framework raises remain undeveloped. 
The Mead perspective of role-taking and labelling of language as an interactive social 
activity are not used to formulate a consideration of radical alternatives to needs. There 
is still the belief that satisfaction of needs is ontological to the human species. While 
removing himself from a socio-biological stance, Scimecca is not sufficiently self­
reflexive. How individuals in relation to one another act within the infrastructure of 
language and how this act brings forth a variety of reasoning is overlooked.
Scimecca engages in a critique of the paradigm he wishes to expand by 
considering each of Burton’s nine identified needs.^  ^ While recognising Burton’s 
unhelpful attachment to a genetically-oriented understanding of needs, unfortunately 
Scimecca rejects the genetic argument only because there is no empirical evidence to 
support the existence of needs beyond the purely p h y s i c a l . S u c h  an assertion 
overlooks a more fundamental difficulty with a genetically or socio-biologically 
grounded theory. That is, a genetic foundation of needs is inadequate as it indicates a 
reliance on a positivist epistemology and foundation of instrumental rationality. Needs 
are socially constructed and mediated through interactions among individuals, groups, 
and political communities. A genetic-based approach ignores this social component. 
Hence, the ways in which needs are developed and identified through a variety of 
differing knowledge formations are excluded.
In short, the deconstructive process is not carried to its full conclusion, as 
Scimecca does not question the fundamental necessity of framing a theory of facilitated 
conflict resolution grounded on needs. Rather than engaging in such a deconstruction.
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the critique is partial. Furthermore and more importantly, rather than formulating or 
conceiving alternative theoretical frameworks that are different from needs, he contends 
that a ‘prescriptive theory of conflict resolution can be deduced’ from the foundation of 
self-reflexivity and freedom needs. In this line of development, the theoretical 
framework relies on a positivist epistemology of deduction. More unfortunate is the 
missed opportunity of extending self-reflexivity to re-write a promising approach to 
facilitating violent conflicts that would include reflexivity and a different foundational 
form of rationality.
Critiques
Critiques of Burton and his approach to facilitated conflict resolution are 
numerous. Wehr and Lederach suggest a different type of a third party for facilitating 
c o n f l i c t s . B a s e d  on direct experiences as facilitators in Central America, they 
contend that the third party should come from the conflicting environment. They 
assert that if third-party team members are chosen from the environment of the conflict, 
the third parties will have the advantage of already having established trust with the 
disputants.
The type of a facilitative role this team should play does not differ significantly 
from other descriptions. For instance, Wehr and Lederer follow Burton’s facilitated 
analytic approach including identification of needs. The difference lies in the kinds of 
third parties that are favoured under this rubric; a sympathetic party who comes directly 
from the conflicting environment is preferred.
The contributions these types of third parties can make in helping to advance 
negotiations is an interesting point. Disputants may feel they are able to trust someone 
or persons with whom they have had prior contacts. However, for the same reasons, the 
conflicting parties may only be willing to participate in workshops with neutral third
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parties. If experiences are to be the basis, then the practices of the Oslo Channel would 
suggest that an outside third party is viewed more favourably, since they are deemed to 
be less biased than a third party team which comes from the local environment. As 
Burton argues, perceived neutrality is an important component for confidence-building 
between the disputants and a third party team.
The methodological broadening of the types of third parties is Wehr and 
Lederer’s greatest contribution. Otherwise, they do not explicate any theoretical 
frameworks. Theories and—more significantly— the assumptions that form the 
grounding for theories are essential to contemplate as praxis is constituted by both 
practices and theories. Therefore, it is contended that Wehr and Lederer’s critique 
applies to a very specific component of practising facilitated conflict resolution.
Avruch and Black provide a very powerful critique of needs theory along similar 
lines. That is, they adopt a cultural anthropological position as they argue that culture is 
the basis for building a theory of resolving conflicts. Only by starting from the local 
context can ways of resolving conflicts be located. Similarly, Avruch and Black 
contend that third parties should come directly from the local environment as they most 
probably possess a greater understanding of the desires and aims of the disputants. 
They assert that Burton ignores culture in his formulation of needs theory and problem­
solving workshops.
By arguing that culture should form the core of a conflict resolution approach, 
Avruch and Black indicate their preference for a similar understanding of the theory 
practice relationship as Burton. That is, culture is derived from practices and observing 
events. As discussed previously. Burton prioritises practice over theory. Hence, like 
Burton, they fail to approach the two concepts as a unified whole.
Additionally, a cultural perspective does provide a helpful reminder in 
rethinking needs theory because it sparks an unravelling of the assumptions that
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underlie it. However, a culturally-grounded perspective, while providing an 
understanding of possible causes and the protracted nature of conflicts, does not offer a 
helpful perspective for overcoming cultural differences between political communities. 
It is an important element to include in the formulation of facilitated conflict resolution 
theories. However, as a theoretical basis, it too is incomplete. Avruch and Black 
simply replace needs with culture. The critical examination of assumptions that would 
underlie such a relativist position are not explored. Therefore, they do not provide an 
alternative foundation that can expand the facilitation of conflicts. Rather, they offer an 
often neglected dimension to be included in the construction of conflict resolution 
perspectives.
There is yet another important critic who contributes in pointing out the 
shortcomings of needs theory. Mitchell asserts that needs theory fails to take into 
account the possibility that needs can be both positive and n e ga t i v e .L ik e wi se ,  the 
increasing proliferation and pursuance of them may lead to a more protracted conflictual 
situation:
1. The need for security could become the need for dominance.
2. The need for identity could become the need for an outgroup and an enemy.
3. The need for recognition could become the need for admiration or status, at the expense of 
others.*108
Interestingly, Mitchell points out that a flaw of needs theory is that it relies on 
observations of behaviours, rather than conducting direct observations about needs 
t h e m s e l v e s . H o w  needs are to be directly observed is not clarified. The difficulty in 
such an approach is that Mitchell is still reliant on direct observations to formulate 
theories about conflict resolution. He does not deviate significantly from a Burtonian 
problem-solving workshop methodology. Mitchell articulates his problem-solving 
workshop approach as follows:
1. Representatives of the parties in dispute should meet in the presence of a panel of ‘consultants’ who 
facilitate exchange.
2. The consultants should be fully competent and qualified in relevant disciplines and have practical 
experience.
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3. The objective of the meeting should be to analyse all the aspects...examine all options for moving 
the conflict towards an acceptable solution.
In this conception of the facilitated conflict resolution process, Mitchell asserts 
that third parties can introduce different theories to assist the disputants to understand 
how the conflict came about and how it may be resolved. He favours such theories as 
integration, escalation, and de-escalation. Mitchell suggests that as needs exist in 
degrees of importance, a variety of third parties can help to locate different satisfiers in 
the problem-solving workshops. At the methodological level, Mitchell’s conflict 
resolution approach does not greatly extend Burton’s framework. Simultaneously, his 
perspective does not fundamentally differ from those of Banks and Azar. Mitchell 
seems to subscribe to a facilitated analysis method where needs theory plays an 
important focal point.
In other words, while he continues to critique needs theory, Mitchell does not 
offer a framework that goes beyond needs theory. He questions assumptions such as 
which needs promote or hinder conflict resolution, how one distinguishes between 
needs that are directed at fulfilment and those that are not, and whether resolution 
means fulfilling needs completely or not at all, or only by degrees, if they divisible.^
Mitchell suggests that needs can be better understood if one sees them as 
occurring in shades. If needs can be exchanged, then they can be negotiated.
If needs are essentially static then particular, limited, strategies become the only ones available to 
achieve a resolution of a needs-based, deep-rooted conflict. If needs change over time, then a range of 
other strategies become, in principle, feasible for dealing with the adversaries. Different satisfiers can 
become appropriate in different circumstances.**^
Unlike Burton, Mitchell blurs the distinction between resolution and 
settlement. For Mitchell, the emphasis lies on locating particular satisfiers to resolve 
a conflict. As he puts it, ‘[sjuccessful conflict resolution then becomes a matter of the 
extent to which alternative termination arrangements will fulfil the parties’ basic 
needs’.**^  Therefore, he contends that satisfiers should form the starting point in 
theorising about conflict resolution. In this way, one can see how conflicts arise,
148
escalate and can be resolved, for example by expanding satisfiers or providing 
alternative ones/^^ Mitchell maintains that there is a hierarchy of needs satisfiers. He 
identifies the task of a general conflict resolution theory as discovering which satisfiers 
meet which needs of individuals so that violent conflicts can be avoided or resolved. 
Furthermore, it is important to know which satisfiers are culturally-dependent and 
which can be transcended.
This slight shift in emphasis from examining needs to satisfiers does not suggest 
that Mitchell is providing an alternative foundation for building a theory of conflict 
resolution. Rather, he highlights some of the ambiguous implications of applying needs 
theory. To this extent, he clarifies the existing gaps in Burton’s framework. He also 
offers ways of broadening the facilitated problem-solving workshop methodology by 
incorporating different types of third parties as well as prioritising the importance of 
locating appropriate satisfiers to resolve conflicts. Additionally, Mitchell articulates 
reservations regarding the ontological character ascribed to n e e d s . T h o u g h  all of 
these criticisms are insightful and help to clarify ideas to be explored, Mitchell does not 
offer a radically different foundation. Indeed, the methodology he suggests is still 
firmly rooted in needs theory. Therefore, although a space is opened up by the 
critiques of needs, a specified alternative framework is not fully explicated. Mitchell 
supports this contention as he states:
The study of conflict and its resolution is badly in need of a sound foundation from which both analysis 
and practical strategies for resolution can proceed.*^®
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Recent Scholarship
The unique promise of mediation lies in its capacity to transform the character of both individuals and 
society as a whole. Because of its informality...mediation can allow the parties to define problems and 
goals in their own terms, thus validating the importance of those problems...goals.*^*
—Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger, 1994 
Thus far, alternative frameworks for facilitating conflict resolution as outlined 
by Fisher and Kelman have been presented. Subsequently, proponents and critics of 
need theory and their attempts to expand or complete Burton’s theoretical gaps were 
discussed. All of these scholars aim to move beyond the dominant theory offered by 
Burton. While their perspectives contribute to an understanding of needs theory, the 
scholars mentioned thus far only offer slight modifications to Burton’s approach. 
Hence, none move significantly beyond the instrumental rationality-based philosophical 
foundation of Burton. More recent writings have generally consisted of even more 
guidelines and technical advice on the conduct of actual facilitation or third-party 
i n t er ve nt i on . At  the theoretical level, theories of integration and fragmentation have 
been utilised to provide an understanding of the apparent increase in intra-state and 
inter-communal conflicts.
Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse argue that since conflicts are habits which 
pervade social relationships, they can be transformed by adopting measures of social 
j u s t i c e . R a t h e r  than focusing on conflict resolution, these scholars focus on conflict 
transformation. They follow a Galtung or Azar line of argument as they view conflict 
transformation as altering social structures and bringing about more equal development 
among the underdeveloped states. A bottom-up approach is advocated and internal 
third parties are encouraged to resolve these international social c o n f l i c t s . T h e  
second-track informal conflict resolution is put aside in favour of third-party actors such 
as the UN, regional organisations, and NGOs. Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse 
provide an interesting shift from the original positions of Banks, Azar, and Fisher from
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world society or pluralist, to structural change and social-psychology by including the 
wider social environment. Yet, a methodology based on quantitative data collection is 
favoured.
Finally, the advocates of transformative mediation. Bush and Folger, offer a 
promising move from the facilitated problem-solving approach to one based on a 
facilitation effort that emphasises communication. They argue for a foundation of a 
prescriptive theory that is based not on needs, but on the concepts of empowerment and 
recognition. Building a framework for facilitating conflict resolution should involve 
‘empowering’ disputants to define their goals, problems and s o l u t i o n s . T h e  third 
party’s role is to enhance ‘interpersonal’ communication. Bush and Folger assert that 
the transformative approach based on engendering moral progress (for oneself and 
empathy for others) that can translate into new institutions and structures should be the 
most important goal of the facilitation e f f o r t . T h e y  argue such a framework would 
result in ‘better people’ and a more satisfactory prescriptive t h e o r y . B u s h  and Folger 
argue that transformative mediation is qualitatively different from problem-solving 
approaches because success is not defined as reaching agreement, but as improving the 
individuals who participated in such a process. A mediation is successful:
1. If the parties have been made aware of the opportunities presented during the mediation for both 
empowerment and recognition.
2. If the parties have been helped to clarify goals, options.. .resources and. ..to make informed, 
deliberate and free choices regarding how to proceed.
3. If the parties have been helped to give recognition wherever it was their decision to do so... 
Successful mediation will bring out the intrinsic strength and goodness that lie within.. .human 
beings, to the fullest extent.'^*
Bush and Folger suggest that empowerment is concerned with allowing the 
participants to gain control over their positions as well as learning to empathise with the 
other side. Recognition is achievable since the third party’s role is to help the 
participants make small steps in the mediation process such as recognising the other’s 
position and the suffering that may have been experienced. In this way, a successful 
resolution becomes a tangible goal. Furthermore, conflict is viewed not as a problem
151
but as an opportunity where persons can attain moral growth, which is automatically 
deemed a positive step/^^
This framework contains at least three weaknesses that limit its potential for 
forming a foundation of a conflict resolution approach. First, their insistence on 
providing a prescriptive theory for facilitated conflict resolution is an unhelpful 
characteristic of their argument. A theory should not be focused on offering 
prescriptions, for the specific approaches parties choose can only be implemented and 
either accepted or rejected in practice. Rather, what is needed in the field of conflict 
resolution is a framework that offers insights and principles to be considered by third 
parties and the disputants in both problem-solving situations and reconstructing 
normatively regulated conceptions. A prescriptive theoretical framework is not helpful 
for realising the transformation that these practitioners seek.
Moral growth and moral development indicate a reflective perspective. Yet, 
Bush and Folger do not consider the kinds of moral points of view parties already 
possess and the positions that may be adopted with the reconstruction of institutions. 
Consequently, Bush and Folger’s contribution is their notion of transformation rather 
than resolution. Transformation allows the conception of a theoretical framework that 
leads to building a process of peace whereas resolution indicates a certain end point is 
r e a c h a b l e . A  prescriptive theory is limited by its foundational commitment to 
instrumental rationality. Therefore, the exclusion of other types of rationality ultimately 
limits Bush and Folger’s capacity to formulate an approach of transformative mediation. 
At best one can offer procedural guidelines that might assist the parties in judging the 
validity of positions and ideas. The third party and the disputants would not be 
restricted to follow a prescribed format, but would have the opportunity to explore 
numerous ways of resolving or overcoming protracted conflictual situations.
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Second, the implicit notion of self-reflection remains unelaborated, as a type of 
rationality that is oriented to achieving success is prioritised. The understanding of self­
reflection is one outlined by Jürgen H a b e r m a s . T h i s  concept encompasses self- 
criticism for it considers a range of ‘inevitable subjective conditions which both 
constrain and make theory possible’. F o l l o w i n g  Kant, Habermas conceives of reason 
as consisting of at least science, morality, and art. He asserts that no one cognitive 
orientation should dominate another. Self-reflection should reveal the masked, hidden 
assumptions which are often forgotten in modernity, especially in the scientific 
approaches employed in the social sciences. A process of self-reflection by scholars 
and practitioners in the facilitated conflict resolution field would expose the supremacy 
of instrumental rationality. For example, if the implicit assumption of self-reflection 
were fully undertaken by Bush and Folger, it would become evident that their 
preference for a prescriptive framework for conflict resolution limits their aim of 
formulating a general theory which is qualitatively different from either the dominant 
paradigm of needs-theory or power politics. Consequently, a concept of self-reflection 
should be fully incorporated in a transformative approach, since only by engaging in a 
critique of one’s own motivations and framings can the individual be seen as not only 
achieving ‘positive moral growth’, but also the ability to pursue a number of moral 
questions as he/she performs in an intersubjective social world.
Third, as self-reflection remains an implicit concept and instrumental rationality 
continues to form a theoretical foundation, there is an imbalance in pinning a theoretical 
framework to a particular moral growth. That is, the negative aspect of moral growth is 
not discussed in any great detail. Instead, they maintain that empowerment and 
recognition are the objectives that can be better achieved in transformative mediation, 
since this process allows for an improvement not only in the situation itself, but among 
the participants’ natures. Furthermore, although Bush and Folger argue that we ‘are
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possessors of moral consciousness’, the ways in which these moral consciousnesses are 
developed, maintained and reshaped are not explicated.
In short, the transformative mediation approach offered by Bush and Folger 
promises a tantalising opening-up of space for alternative theories of facilitated conflict 
resolution. Unfortunately, the scholars fail to develop a transformative process that 
takes into account an individual who is capable of both moral growth and stagnation. 
The potential for reaching consensus is dismissed and measurements of small 
‘successes’ via recognition and empowerment are preferred. Finally, a foundation of 
transformative mediation that is aimed at changing norms that govern relationships and 
institutions means a partial framework at best, since the types and ways these norms can 
or should be constructed are not fully discussed. More significantly, the role of 
language and its effect on fostering change are not considered, while the unquestioned 
assertion that people would become better subjects as a result of a transformative 
mediation methodology is an unhelpful c o n c e p t i o n . A  move away from instrumental 
rationality and an inclusion of self-reflection would present an opportunity to explore 
other types of rationality that might form a basis for a theory of conflict resolution that 
would simultaneously encompass the aim of these thinkers.
Expanding the Resolution Space
Critical theory can provide conceptual support for a human needs-based approach to policy analysis and 
policy making.
—Jay Rothman, 1992
Another scholar who attempts to reformulate extensively the needs approach of 
facilitated conflict resolution is Jay Rothman. Recognising the rigidity of the 
problem-solving perspective employed by Burton and Kelman, among others, Rothman 
seeks to expand the facilitation approach. The term ‘conflict management’ is 
preferred as he believes that a separation of management and resolution produces
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unnecessary ambiguities. "^ *^ His suggested framework is one of the most interesting to 
the extent that it offers an avenue for moving beyond needs theory. Rothman strives to 
combine the adversarial (power politics) with the integrative (needs theory, problem­
solving) approach via the reflexive method,*"*^
He maintains that this method would allow the disputants to move from an 
adversarial stance to an integrative one. The inadequacy of a strictly needs-based 
approach, Rothman asserts, is the absence of the reflexivity concept. Reflexivity 
consists of ‘publicly employing introspective analysis about one’s own motivations...in 
a conflict situation’.*"*^ By allowing the participants in a workshop to express their 
fears, hopes, traumas, and so forth, the emphasis shifts from a focus on the ‘other’ back 
to the self. According to Rothman, this opens up the possibility for movement from an 
adversarial to an integrative framework (defining the conflict) and improves the 
potential for reaching consensus. This Adversarial-Reflexive-Integrative (ARI) 
approach, which aims to expand the dominant paradigm, is summarised in the chart on 
the following page.
155
ARI Conflict Management Framework
Framing: Adversarial Reflexive Integrative
DEFINITION
01:
Other side is problem
02:
Own goals and values 
at stake
03:
Shared problems over 
relationship
Legalistic and factual Culturally and 
experientially
Integrative, empathetic, 
contextualised
CAUSES
Cl:
Blame for and 
competition over 
resources
C2:
Derived from own 
threatened or frustrated 
needs and values
C3:
Derived from mutually 
threatened or frustrated 
needs and values
Aggressive acts of 
other side seen as 
dispositionally 
determined
Aggressive acts of own 
side seem situationally 
derived
Aggressive acts of both 
sides seen as 
situationally derived
Solving: Distributive
Bargaining
Reflexivity Integrative
Bargaining
ALTERNATIVES
A l:
Noncompelling for 
other side
A2:
Compelling for own 
community
A3:
Compelling for both 
sides
Redress problems of 
scarcity and 
competition
Address fears and meet 
hopes of own side
Redress needs of both 
sides
IMPLEMENTATION
11:
Short-term, self­
directed
12:
Address participants’ 
re-entry to and 
sensibilities of own 
group
13:
Long-term, directed 
toward all parties
Concerned with ways 
to enforce settlement 
and its implementation
Concerned with own 
group solution- 
acceptance
Concerned with mutual 
aid in re-entry, and 
implementing solutions
144Figure 3: Rothman’s ADR approach
As the table indicates, the ARI approach is intended to help the disputants reach 
the integrative stage. Conflict resolution specialists and interested individuals would be 
trained as third parties to assist the disputants in moving through the four stages. 
First, the participants present and discuss the problems that perpetuate the conflict as 
they view them. Then, a definition of the conflict situation would be sought. Rothman 
argues that these two steps are carried out on an adversarial basis. Third, parties to a 
conflict would be assisted in a careful analysis, using reflexivity to redefine the conflict
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situation. Fourth, if and when consensus emerges, various policy options that could be 
implemented are designed with the help of third parties.
While outlining his ARI perspective, Rothman insists that this type of conflict 
management is appropriately deductive and predictive. It is deductive as the causes 
and reframing of conflicts can be successfully achieved through the method of 
facilitated analysis. It is predictive in the sense that certain positive policy options will 
be advocated.
Rothman’s deductive method of facilitated analysis is unsatisfactory because 
this line of facilitation indicates that if an archaeological expedition of the hidden 
motivations and emotions are correctly conducted, then the true cause will become 
evident. This line of reasoning employed by Rothman follows those of Kelman and 
Burton. That is, the significance attached to following a facilitation process based on 
analysing needs remains an essential feature of Rothman’s theory and practice. 
However helpful analysis may be, its role is limited due to its ties to needs theory and a 
foundation based on instrumental rationality. Deduction, as Rothman implies, cannot 
lead to the uncovering of certain truths, which in any case are purely subjective; only 
the degree of the validity of a party’s views can be negotiated or redefined.
Like all other approaches to facilitated conflict resolution thus far covered, 
Rothman holds to a flawed faith in prediction and prescription. Consequently, he 
overlooks the possibility that third parties and disputants together can create agreements 
from a more fluid vantage point.
In putting forward his framework, Rothman compares three different forms of 
epistemology that are associated with three modes of approaching conflict management: 
adversarial, reflexive and integrative.^^® First, he equates the empiricist epistemology 
with the adversarial approach. In it, theoretical descriptions and assumptions are 
observed from an abstracted portion of reality. This comprises the truth or the ‘real
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world’, for example the assumption that war is an inevitable phenomenon. By locating 
law-like patterns across cultures, time and space, a general truth can be derived. That is, 
since war is inevitable, strategies of achieving victory are sought. This can lead to a 
protracted conflict or at best a settlement which has been attained through bargaining.
Second, Rothman considers hermeneutic epistemology which forms the basis of 
his reflexive a p p r o a c h . U n d e r  this epistemology, events are interpreted in which 
meanings can be contextualised. Hermeneutics is preferred as it challenges the 
objectivity taken for granted in the adversarial tradition where facts are assumed to be 
isolatable and objectively analysable. What is sought in the interpretive science of 
hermeneutics is the intentionality of individuals. The emphasis shifts from causes that 
are external to the individual and his or her relationships in the social world. However, 
as scholars critiquing hermeneutics in the social sciences note, its capacity ends at the 
interpretative s tage.Understanding meanings is, of course, an important component 
in deciding what possible directions a resolution can take.
Although Rothman is correct to highlight the contribution hermeneutics can 
make in formulating an alternative theory of facilitated conflict resolution, a reflexive 
approach requires his third epistemology, which is inaccurately and inadequately 
described. He argues that critical theory as an epistemology should underpin a theory of 
human needs, since both embody a goal of transform ation.Rothm an summarises the 
varied forms of critical theory’s goals. Critical theorists are interested in formulating 
ways of transforming unequal structures of power—for instance institutions— once the 
present governing structures have been decons t ruc t ed . Yet ,  the project of critical 
theory, and in particular Jürgen Habermas’ framework is quite incompatible with the 
theoretical foundations of the basic human needs approach. The ideas borrowed from 
Habermas are used by Rothman merely to expand a needs theory. The argument put 
forward by Bush and Folger recognises the incompatibility between needs theory and a
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framework of transformation. Though their ideas are less developed than Rothman’s 
at the theoretical level, their insight is one missed in the ARI approach.
Here, it is worthwhile to note that Rothman fails to recognise that even his 
hermeneutic reflexive framework remains positivistic. The objectivist depiction of what 
constitutes human needs, as well as the foundations of needs and problem-solving 
methods, are not thoroughly questioned. Moreover, by merely wishing to expand 
Burton’s theory and method, Rothman fails to notice that human needs and the filtered 
problem-solving workshops, remain empiricist. The critical theory aspect he 
incorporates is a very limited idea. That is, though the approach of critical theory and 
Habermas in particular are noted as important points of departure, the engagement is 
restricted to borrowing small concepts including transformation and reflexivity.
In short, Rothman offers the most promising framework for building a theory of 
facilitated conflict resolution. His inclusion of reflexivity addresses one of the major 
weaknesses of a needs-based perspective. However, the ARI approach contains two 
difficulties. First, as Rothman prioritises the importance of prediction and prescription, 
a foundational faith in instrumental rationality is retained. Second, as he is committed 
to expanding needs theory and not replacing it with the ARI approach, the initial steps 
away from instrumental rationality are not carried through. This is compounded by his 
restricted incorporation of critical theory. The step of considering the possible role 
communicative rationality can play in formulating a framework for facilitated conflict 
resolution is ignored. Consequently, Rothman adds insightful components to needs 
theory. His aim to expand needs theory is achieved. Therefore, his goal of an ARI 
approach, which is to offer a way of transforming institutions and norms, remains 
underdeveloped. An exploration of another type of rationality, other than instrumental, 
to ground an approach to facilitated conflict resolution could encompass the goal of 
transformation and possibly reaching consensus and agreements which could be tested
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in praxis. Yet, as a deeper engagement with critical theory is not fully undertaken, the 
promising point of departure offered in his assessment and framework remains 
unfulfilled.
What is at stake here is something much more fundamental than Rothman’s 
promising attempt to rework a theory of facilitated conflict resolution or Mitchell’s 
insightful critiques of human needs theory. The opening space implicit in the 
methodology of problem-solving workshops is lost, since the theoretical foundations 
rely on flawed needs theory and its associative form of instrumental rationality. 
Burton protests that a philosophical basis underlies the use of workshops in his 
problem-solving method to the extent that he argues that it is the unsatisfied needs of 
individuals that must be understood and resolved in order to realise a healthy and 
functional world society. To this minimal extent, it can be argued that those who accept 
Burton’s theoretical contributions, such as Kelman, Banks, and Rothman, subscribe to a 
similar p h i l o s o p h y . T h e  philosophical assumptions adopted by scholars such 
Kelman, Azar, Fisher, and Mitchell fall under the functionalist viewpoint. That is, they 
see the goal and justification for engaging in conflict facilitation as the production of 
functional and healthier societies. Describing morality as an individual’s capacity in 
society to achieve not only a ‘better life’ but to become ‘better persons’, assumes a 
culture-specific ethical approach to the good life.^ ^^
The preference for a good life ties this approach to ethical questions that cannot 
be applied across cultures, whereas moral judgements can form a universalising 
principle, since all individuals have the potential to reach consensus via the raising of 
claims to the legitimacy of positions. A theory grounded on functionalism anchors 
theoretical frameworks to instrumental rationality, since functionalism entails 
considerations of solving problems, gaining success and locating strategies of increasing 
benefits and decreasing costs. Similarly, these scholars who aim to offer an alternative
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to Burton’s dominant framework fail to link the relationship between theory and 
p r a c t i c e . P r a x i s  encompasses both theory and practice; they are informed by one 
another and thus influence each other. In everyday life, social interactions among 
individuals precipitate praxis. The interplay between speaking and acting shapes theory 
and practice. The process of communication is procedural, where interacting subjects 
shape the content of the dialogues.
As power relations between disputants in a protracted conflict are often 
asymmetrical, the third party may play a role in pointing out these power distortions, for 
instance, how power is translated into meaning through language and conununication. 
This emphasis on communicative action allows for a consistently grounded and 
dynamic interplay between practice and theory. As this component remains unexplored 
by Rothman (who offers the most promising framework for moving beyond needs 
theory) ultimately, the ARI perspective-like formulations offered by other scholars 
remain incomplete.
Conclusion
Reason...must approach nature in order to be taught by it, but not in the character of a pupil who agrees to 
everything the master likes, but as an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions he 
himself proposes.'^'
—Immanuel Kant
Communicative rationality tolerates a plurality of values, practices, beliefs, and paradigms of 
personhood (masculine or feminine). Moreover, it neither presupposes nor seeks to generate any 
universal theory of human needs.
— Stephen K. White, 1987 
This chapter has examined a variety of refinements and extensions of Burton’s 
framework, which are articulated by some of the most prominent thinkers in the 
facilitated conflict resolution discipline. It is argued that social-psychological 
perspectives of Kelman and Fisher provide important additions to the dominant 
Burtonian approach, but at the level of theory and practice, both offer only slight
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modifications to human needs theory. Moreover, Kelman and Fisher do not present an 
extension of Burton’s philosophical framework.
It is contended that although Banks recognises the need to complete Burton’s 
theoretical gaps, he does not formulate a way of proceeding in such an endeavour 
because a critical deconstruction is not of the underlying philosophical assumptions is 
not undertaken. Furthermore, it is asserted that other needs theorists who aimed to 
expand the conception of needs, such as Scimecca and Azar, only help to reify the 
concept.
Finally, it is argued that approaches offered by Bush and Folger, as well as 
Rothman opens up a space for deconstructing the dominant theory of needs and the 
facilitation methodology. Bush and Folger provide an important point of departure of 
thinking not only about resolving conflicts but transforming them. The difference 
between the two is on their emphasis on the inclusion of the broader socio-political 
communities. Transformation is concerned with not only affecting perceptions, as is the 
case with resolution, but aims to include how to bring about change in the norms and 
institutions that govern social relationships. Rothman’s reflexivity-based perspective 
allows for the consideration of the possible contribution a critical theory can bring to 
formulating a theory for practising peace. However, the opportunities these scholars 
present for conceiving a theoretical framework on a different approach from needs 
remain underdeveloped.
Furthermore, it is maintained that these scholars rely on an inductive 
epistemology. The various methodologies are still based on discovering causes and 
motivations and finding ways of meeting unfulfilled needs. The openings provided by 
Rothman, in particular, point a way forward for grounding a theory of conflict 
resolution that can offer all participants a more interactive and inclusive praxis of 
facilitating violent conflicts. The sum of these scholars’ contributions suggests a
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consideration of a theory which takes into account a broader understanding of 
rationality. As already discussed, instrumental rationality is based on a knowledge- 
interest nexus that is oriented towards reaching success and mutual understanding. It is 
not suggested that instrumental rationality should be excluded from a theory 
construction of practising peace. The goal of achieving agreements is a vital component 
of transforming conflict situations. Disputants and third parties clearly set out to 
accomplish something when they participate in a facilitation process. However, 
theories that only include goals and outcomes as a foundation for praxis are limited by 
their own bounded rationality. That is, despite the promising openness of conflict 
resolution practices, the theoretical underpinnings that conflict resolution scholars and 
practitioners subscribe to limits the extent to which institutions and structures can be 
transformed.
A starting point, which could broaden the concept of rationality and better help 
realise these thinkers’ aims is first a deconstruction of their own underlying 
assumptions. The process would include critically questioning concepts such as needs. 
More fundamentally, as a part of deconstruction, the process of self-reflection would 
involve an exploration of examining the basic assumptions that form the foundation of a 
theory of facilitated conflict resolution. For example, one would explore why the goals 
of resolution and mediation are automatically tied to achieving success and why the 
implicit openings offered by the problem-solving methodology and needs theory remain 
unfulfilled.
In short, it is asserted that the various scholars and practitioners are bounded by 
the preference for instrumental rationality. Like the International Relations discipline, 
of which conflict resolution is a part, the pre-eminent importance ascribed to 
instrumental rationality distorts the possibility of examining other types of rationality.^^ 
With the process of bureaucratisation and the increasing networks of administrative
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structures, knowledge guiding interest has been oriented towards reaching success by a 
method of collecting data and observing, accumulating, and compiling facts. Habermas 
argues that the enlightenment project has not failed, but has been diluted. A 
restoration process requires the consideration of Kant’s other categories of reason and 
rationality including the theoretic and the practical. It is not contended here that one of 
Kant’s formulation of reason should replace instrumental reason. Rather, it is suggested 
that types of reason, rather than the purely instrumental, can offer a promising 
foundation for overcoming the bounded rationality that constrict the present conflict 
resolution perspectives. For facilitated conflict resolution, an inclusion of a different 
type of rationality can assist in suggesting a procedural framework and praxis that might 
more fully realise the aim of allowing parties to reach their own solutions.
Towards suggesting an alternative type of rationality, the Habermasian 
communicative rationality concept is chosen for two reasons. First, it offers the 
possibility of expanding the concept of rationality. He recognises the fundamental 
interconnectedness between the social environment and the individual . Individuals  
operate in socially co-ordinating lifeworlds which shape and are influenced by them.^ ^^  
Though facilitated conflict resolution scholars such as Rothman and Burton discuss the 
role of society and the social environment in relation to individuals, since they prefer 
the individual as the unit of analysis, the integral relationship between them remain 
neglected dimensions in their approaches.
Second and more importantly, the concept of communicative rationality as a 
building block for constructing a critical theory of practising peace offers the 
opportunity to fully explore an incorporate the role of communicative interactions 
between individuals who exchange ideas, reinforce, and transform norms and 
institutions in an intersubjective milieu. Communicative rationality offers a formal 
procedural framework for co-ordinating intersubjective interactions via self-reflection
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and the process of argumentation. It follows that communicative rationality is 
intrinsically connected to the medium of language and the employment of discourses. 
Moreover, this concept is both context-dependent and context-transcendent. Therefore, 
an inclusion of conununicative rationality and practical reason would present an 
expanded foundation for thinking about conflict and peace. A more inclusive way of 
practising peace can be envisioned for third parties and disputants, if one includes praxis 
and moves away from instrumental rationality.
Finally, the concepts of self-reflection and communicative rationality, as well as 
an understanding that ethics is about offering ways of conceiving moral judgements that 
can be mutually negotiated, comprise the basis of one promising alternative theoretical 
framework. Therefore, Habermas’ articulated relevant concepts, their foundations and 
how they contribute to the formulation of an alternative Critical Theory of Peace 
Practice, will be put forward in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 4
Communicative Rationality: An Alternative Method
What raises us out of nature is .. .language. Through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited 
for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained 
consensus.'
—Jurgen Habermas, 1987
Introduction
This thesis began with an examination of a conflict settlement known as the Oslo 
Channel. It was asserted that although the facilitation efforts presented an interesting 
departure from traditional methods of power bargaining, only the surface problems were 
addressed as the process was not grounded in a theoretical framework. Consequently, 
the underlying issues that have led to a protracted conflict situation between Israel and 
the PLO were not explored. Hence, a transformation of the deep-rooted protracted 
conflict remains an elusive task. The flaws of the Oslo peace process warranted the 
consideration of approaches that are predominant in the conflict resolution literature. 
Therefore, the ideas of the dominant scholar in the field, John Burton, were critically 
scrutinised in chapter two. It was argued that due to his focus on needs theory, the 
implicit potential in the suggested resolution methodology is limited, namely, the 
obvious but powerful assertion that only by designing ways of building new norms 
together can a long-lasting peace practice be constructed. In short, it was asserted that 
Burton’s approach relies on an instrumental rationality. This type of rationality is 
oriented to technical knowledge and inductive methodologies. Consequently, methods 
that rely on empirical facts and theories that aim to find ways of attaining success are 
produced when instrumental rationality forms the meta-theoretical foundation.
In chapter three, alternative frameworks to Burton offered by scholars—  
including Ronald Fisher, Herbert Kelman, and Jay Rothman— were studied. An
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analysis of these perspectives reveals the common marginalisation of self-reflection and 
instrumental rationality. Rothman’s desire to move beyond the confines of needs theory 
to a framework that is more self-reflexive, as well as Bush and Folger’s emphasis on 
transforming conflicts via orienting a process towards moral growth, opens a point of 
departure for exploring how to use critical theory to rethink the meta-theoretical 
foundations of facilitated conflict resolution perspectives. As these lines of explication 
lack a grounded—yet contingent— substantive component, a way of inscribing an 
alternative philosophical meta-theory and hence a different theoretical framework, is 
suggested. This namely is a theory of peace practice that involves a critical, 
conununicatively rational methodology, inspired by Jürgen Habermas, and is outlined in 
this chapter.
In short, if an instrumental rationality-informed theory is inadequate for building 
a theory of peace practice, then what other types of rationahty can we consider as the 
basis for a Critical Theory of Peace Practice? This chapter argues for one which allows for 
the participants to decide the content of a process in praxis, while putting forward a meta- 
theoretical grounding for engaging in the transformation of protracted conflicts. It is 
argued that communicative rationality, as a core component of discourse ethics, forms the 
base of such an alternative. It will be argued that applying Habermas’ formal-pragmatic 
theory of language offers a superior account of how individuals and groups in protracted 
conflicts can potentially reach reasonable agreements.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, the idea behind formal pragmatics 
(previously called universal pragmatics) will be put forward. Second, the insights formal 
pragmatics provide for the current dominant approaches in facilitated conflict resolution 
will be discussed. Third, the type of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice that is suggested 
by including formal pragmatics will be detailed. Finally, the contextual contingency of 
formal pragmatics embodied in the method of communicative rationality will be examined.
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This Critical Theory of Peace Practice is grounded on a foundation of self­
reflection, praxis, and communicative rationality. While the subsequent chapter will offer 
the theoretical and meta-theoretical explication of the proposed Critical Theory of Peace 
Practice, this chapter sets out communicative rationality as a procedural methodology for a 
Critical Theory of Peace Practice, Therefore, the various aspects that comprise a theory of 
communicative rationality will be put forward.
Formal Pragmatics
In developing a broader critical theory perspective, Habermas’ significant 
contribution lies in his articulation of a formalistic procedure. This orientation is 
based on a formal pragmatics concept, which is used to express the universal 
characteristics that discourse and language possess.^ Discourses include the moral, 
pragmatic, ethical, and practical and language is the socially co-ordinating 
mechanism through which meanings, relationships, institutions, and norms are 
mediated. This concept, formerly termed universal pragmatics, is intended to provide 
only procedural outlines for judging between contested validity claims.^ This idea 
expresses the notion that language is the medium through which we communicate 
across cultural, socio-economic, religious, and ethnic boundaries. Formalism is 
preferred as claims to validity are taken from practical discourse and abstracted, to 
judge not only their validity, but also to provide general guidelines. The ideas 
disputants hold and the process of engaging in dialogues that include the possibility of 
reaching consensus through shared acceptance of new norms and relationships shape 
the content for formal pragmatics. It is seen as universal, since individuals possess 
the capacity to engage in communicative action that cuts across cultural boundaries.
This Habermasian concept of formal pragmatics follows Kant’s categorical 
imperative, which suggests that one should ‘act’ only when it is in the greater general 
interest. The general will embodied in this principle forms is intended to be
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universally valid/ While subscribing to the universalistic tendencies in Kant’s 
formulation, Habermas articulates a more precise and pragmatic type of universalism.
A formal pragmatics is inclusive of general guidelines and differs from the 
prescriptive steps detailed in the facilitated conflict resolution literature. Under a formal 
pragmatics perspective, the specific methodologies discussed in the previous two 
chapters, including Burton’s problem solving and Rothman’s adversarial, reflexive 
integrative (ARI), are no longer seen to constitute the core component of a facilitation 
process. Rather, they become one possible way that conflicting parties can work to 
transform the political landscape. Adopting general guidelines allows for the inclusion 
of alternatives and the contesting of uttered statements. The component of formal 
pragmatics is one step in shifting the emphasis away from instrumental rationality and 
towards a broader conception of reason and rationality. The procedure that follows 
from formal pragmatics, which involves contesting statements according to specified 
validity claims, suggests adopting a different form of method for utilising the potential 
of reaching consensus than is present in the analytical process of problem-solving 
workshops. Furthermore, the role of the third party in such a milieu changes. At the 
theoretical level, formal pragmatics reveals the flaws of the problem-solving 
methodology. These three points will be considered in the following sections.
Claims to Validity
It is not because we agree that we hold a claim to be valid; rather we agree because we have grounds for 
granting its validity.^
— Thomas McCarthy, 1994 
First, the procedure offered by Habermas consists of the process of raising 
claims to validity.^ That is, as social situations are diverse and motivations and 
intentions differ depending upon circumstances, each individual attempts to ascertain 
whether the statements of others should be believed. This is particularly relevant for the
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resolution effort. While the participants engage in discourses that are oriented towards 
gaining an understanding of the other’s position and subsequently consider ways of 
reaching consensus, if the parties are to move towards normative reconstruction of 
institutions and practices, the motivations and intentions of the other need to be 
accepted as legitimate. During this process, there are a variety of speech acts in which 
communicatively competent agents engage.
Habermas asserts that stated propositions can be judged as legitimate according 
to three validity claims. There is the claim to truthfulness, Wahrheit, which involves 
stated, prepositional content or the existential presuppositions of a mentioned 
prepositional content. Second, the claim of normative rightness, Richtigkeit, involves 
norms or values that, in a given context, justify interpersonal relations which are 
performatively established. Third, the claim of sincerity, Wahrhaftigkeit, involves 
expressed intentions in raising these validity claims. The communicatively competent 
individual interacts with and also demarcates him or herself from the social structures 
that shape the raising, acceptance and refusal of these claims to validity.^ That is, an 
individual delineates him or herself from an objectivating segment of reality. Relations 
to the objective, subjective, and social worlds are mediated by validity claims, which are 
expressed in grammatical sentences. Consequently, an individual can inter-relate 
between these mental states of the ‘pragmatic functions of representing facts, 
establishing legitimate interpersonal relations and expressing one’s own subjectivity’.^
In short, these claims are accepted as pragmatic presuppositions by all 
participants insofar as any one individual can contest the validity of any statement. It is 
within this context that an orientation to reaching understanding becomes possible, but 
the possibility of raising the question of legitimacy of a claim is important as all 
subjects engage in orienting themselves toward reaching understanding and consider the 
position of the other. The raising of validity claims utilises the procedural framework of
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formal pragmatics and makes it possible to judge the legitimacy of any reached 
agreements, since its counterfactuals have been explored in this approximated process 
of uncoerced communication.
The legitimacy that is required for the acceptance of claims to validity and, in 
the process of constructing new norms of governance, could be called a fourth claim of 
validity. This validity claim can contextualise the three aforementioned ones. 
Truthfulness of the positions of conflicting parties, their intentions, and claims to 
rightness cannot be re-negotiated without raising the question of legitimacy. That is, in 
raising the claims to truthfulness, normative rightness, and sincerity, legitimacy is 
intrinsically connected to each claim. As the three claims outlined by Habermas are 
criticisable and justifiable by the participants through shared intersubjective 
communication, legitimacy can be as well. In any exchange between speakers and 
hearers, the sincerity, normative rightness, truthfulness, and legitimacy are raised and 
negotiated amongst them.
As discussed earlier, formal pragmatics suggests that language is a universal 
medium or infrastructure through which meanings, relationships, and structures are 
formed and reformed. Formal pragmatics is designed to reconstruct and identify 
conditions of possible understandings that are not bound to cultures, but can be arrived 
at by the employment of various speech acts.^
Speech Acts
As the employment of different speech acts produces varying relationships and 
domains of reality, the raising of the claims of truthfulness, sincerity, and normative 
rightness suggests that a speaker engaged in a performative attitude relates to the world 
in at least three ways. That is, the individual cognitively conceives of the objective, 
intersubjective and subjective world:
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Domains of Reality Modes of 
Communication: Basic 
Attitudes
Validity Claims General Functions of 
Speech
‘The’ World of 
External Nature
Cognitive: Objectivating 
Attitude
Truth Representation of Facts
‘Our’ World of 
Society
Interactive: Conformative 
Attitude
Rightness
Establishment of 
Legitimate Interpersonal 
Relations
‘M y’ World of 
Internal Nature
Expressive: Expressive 
Attitude
Truthfulness
Disclosure of Speaker’s 
Subjectivity
Language Comprehensibility
Table 1: Features of Universal Pragmatics 10
As the table outlines, engaging in different speech acts produce specific forms of 
social realities that shape a subject’s relationship to others. Speech acts serve:
(a) To establish and renew interpersonal relations whereby the speaker takes up a relation to 
something in the world of legitimate (social) orders;
(b) To represent (or presuppose) states and events, whereby the speaker takes up a relation to 
something in the world of existing states of affairs;
(c) To manifest experiences— that is to represent oneself, whereby the speaker takes up a relationship 
to something in the subjective world to which he/she has privileged access,'*
In other words, when a speaker refers to one or more of these three social 
spheres, he or she assumes that a stated proposition can be contested for its validity, 
since all participating subjects agree hermeneutically that such an effort is necessary in 
the process of attaining mutual understanding. In the employment of various types of 
speech actions, constative speech acts become obligations only when a speaker and 
hearer agree to base their actions on situational definitions that correspond to what they 
have accepted to be true at a particular time. An obligation to act flows from expressive
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speech acts where speakers specify what it is that their behaviour does not and will not 
contradict/^ Esoteric statements that appear in constative speech acts can be said to be 
related to facts. Similarly, normative statements in regulative speech acts are related to 
interpersonal relations.
Habermas borrows from the theories of speech acts, articulated by Austin and 
Searle, to elaborate the role they play in forming the three validity claims. One could 
say that the truthfulness claim to validity relates to the external world of existing states 
of affairs; facts can be verified to a certain extent. Normative rightness is related to 
reproducing regulated norms that govern social relations. Likewise, sincerity is 
connected to one’s subjective reality. All these claims are accepted or rejected in the 
process of argumentation where the claims to validity can be raised, contested, 
accepted, or refuted.
The medium through which these claims to validity are contested is language, a 
concept borrowed from Wittgenstein who asserts that truth claims arise in language 
games and are constructed purely in social context s .Only  by understanding the nature 
of social relations between individuals can one make sense of a language game.^  ^ By 
placing intersubjective social actions and their constitutive speech acts in a context of 
social relationships, where the dimension of language is understood as something more 
than a set of semantics and rules, Habermas argues the ways speakers and hearers relate 
to differing aspects of reality can be better understood.
An expressed intention to perform an action or a description of an existing state 
of affairs produces various types of knowledge constitutive interests. Simultaneously, 
the employment of speech acts points to how each of the three validity claims may be 
contested and justified in the evolving process of communicative interactions. In other 
words, statements that are being contested regarding their claims to validity are social 
performances.^^ When individuals are engaged in the process of argumentation in
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which the validity to claims can be redeemed through discourses, they bring to bear 
pragmatic presuppositions about the external world, the relationship between the subject 
and others, and the possibility for outcomes. It is this author’s contention that these 
pragmatic presuppositions arise from the life histories of each individual and are not 
abstract ‘cores’, as Habermas periodically suggests.
Therefore, when entering any dialogical process, the preceding experiences 
shape one’s original intent and position. By bringing in the dialogical process of 
conununicative rationality as a constituent component for suggesting a procedural 
framework for facilitating violent conflicts, participants can raise, contest, or justify 
utterances according to the three validity claims, as well as legitimacy. The validity of a 
statement is measured against these claims to truthfulness, normative rightness, sincerity 
and legitimacy. The participants in the communicative process can work through the 
justification of a statement in relation to those claims.
It should be understood that participants do not engage merely in abstract 
exchanges of utterances where agreements are contracted. Within the process of 
contesting claims to validity, aspects of intersubjective communication that are rooted in 
everyday practice come into play. The role of the third-party is crucial here, since if, in 
a resolution process, a third party is needed— and often one is— then the concept of 
reaching understanding and exploring how to renegotiate structures that govern 
institutions and societies can be brought about by raising claims to validity. In a 
protracted conflict where parties have agreed to attempt a communicative process that is 
not solely instrumental, then it would be helpful for the third party to be aware of 
certain general principles, keeping in mind that only in praxis can the concrete 
protracted conflict be thematised, described, and transformed.
To summarise, formal pragmatics refers not to the reconstruction of the 
universal features of language itself, but to the multiple ways agents employ discourses
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in particular contexts. The universal component of this procedural framework refers to 
the possible understandings at which participants in the process can arrive. Validity 
claims can be succinctly put as: uttering something understandably; giving the hearer 
something to understand; making oneself thereby understandable; and coming to an 
understanding with another person.
When a hearer accepts the validity of a claim being put forward, then the 
symbolic structures of not only language (grammatical sense) but those that govern 
social interactions are recognised. These claims to validity, propositionale Wahrheit, 
normative Richtigkeit und subjektive Wahrhaftigkeit, as well as legitimacy, make it 
possible for any two agents (speaker and hearer) to engage in a communicative process 
across cultures and customs; hence, the mechanism is universal. The process of 
contesting these validity claims is always an approximation of an idealised form of 
communication, since such ideahsations provide insights into how distorted forms of 
communication may be rebalanced.
The Ideal Speech Situation
No matter how the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding may be deformed, 
the design of an ideal speech situation is necessarily implied in the structure of potential 
speech, since all speech, even of intentional deception, is oriented towards the idea of 
truth.^° During the process of raising a claim to validity, Habermas explores how 
participants may best come to understand the perspective of another participant. In an 
ideal speech situation, argumentation is designed to ensure that all those concerned, at 
least in principle, can take part freely and equally in a co-operative search for a ‘true 
form of the better argument’ The process is an ideal insofar as it is an environment in 
which subjects suspend everyday communicative action to take up a position where 
propositions and claims are accepted as valid through the process of argumentation and 
sufficient justifications. This process allows for the possibility of reflection, critique.
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and readdressing claims to validity as participants agree to dialogue and explore all 
options that may form the basis of transforming normatively-regulated structures.
Given that the communicative process is often distorted due to a variety of 
reasons including unequal relations of power, misinterpretation, clashing values, and 
conflicts, Habermas borrows Mead’s ideal role-taking to describe an ideal speech 
situation.^  ^ This small component links validity claims to communicative action and 
communicative rationality. That is, in formulating this segment of a communicative 
rationality thesis, Habermas considers Mead’s important contribution of ideal role- 
taking and his incomplete explanation of self-individuation.^^ The development of self­
individuation, coupled with the realisation of belonging or the need to transform group 
membership— through the process of argumentation—is one promising entry point for 
bridging the conflict resolution gap of ‘getting to the table’ and the politicisation of 
intersubjectively constructed discourses, as well as moving beyond the needs foundation 
of the discipline’s dominant theories.
According to Mead, as Habermas argues, self-individuation depends on the 
individual’s ‘ability to differentiate progressively between his/her relations to the social 
world’ and his or her ‘internal world that monitors behaviour and migrates from without 
to within'?"  ^ Individuation, which occurs as a result of ego development, is a 
‘linguistically mediated process of socialisation’ and a ‘constituent of the life history 
that is conscious of itself
For Habermas, Mead’s contribution lies in his developing a connection between 
“structure” and the “formation of conscience and in autonomy by individuals who are 
socialised in an increasingly differentiated conditions.”^^  In short, he asserts that the 
self develops primarily in a social milieu and in an intersubjectively constituted 
community where agents acknowledge the statements of others within or coming into 
that environment.^^ Habermas incorporates into his formulation of an ideal speech
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situation Mead’s arguments that individuals intersubjectively relate to one another and 
the role that the language medium plays in shaping the individual and community. The 
importance placed on language and communication in Mead’s formulation is borrowed 
by Habermas as a strand for grounding a Critical Theory of Society on a linguistic 
foundation.^^
Furthermore, Habermas is influenced by Mead’s performative attitude of the 
first person towards the second person of the symmetrical ‘you-me’ relationship.^^ That 
is, the formation of a self-consciousness is how the subject conceives of him or herself, 
and depends on the medium of language. It is through language that the ego forms its 
identity through exchanges of communication and the experience of a multitude of 
learning processes, which can only occur in everyday practice. As a part of this process, 
self-reflection involves ‘mobilising motives for action and of internally controlling 
one’s own modes of behaviour’ A ‘me’ becomes the generalised other; the 
behavioural expectations of one’s social surroundings that have migrated into the 
person. That is, an ‘I’ relates to the agency of that eluded consciousness. A ‘me’ places 
limits from the intersubjective perspective of a social ‘we’ on the impulsiveness of ‘1’.^ ^
The social nature of language for structuring both the motivations of I’ and ‘me’ 
means that these ego identities can be (not at the cognitive expectation level, but at the 
practical level of interactions) redefined and can help reshape the socially constituted 
‘we’.^  ^ In communicative action, one can recognise one’s own autonomy in the other. 
Identity claims aiming at recognition as a subject must not be confused with the 
recognition of the claims that are being challenged as valid. An addressee rejects by 
‘no’ an utterance in a speech act that is being offered up and not the identity that 
constitutes the speaker, since the very nature of engaging in a dialogue means that the 
speaker and addressee take each other seriously. One must have recognised the other as 
an accountable actor whenever a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ speech act is put forward.
182
Normative contexts establish the set of all interpersonal relationships that are 
held to be legitimate in a given intersubjectively shared lifeworld. Whenever the 
speaker enters an interpersonal relationship with a hearer, both become actors in a 
network of normative expectations. However, in linguistically structured interactions, 
taking up various social roles does not imply only a reproduction of norms and 
structures. The interwoven perspectives of the first and the second person are indeed 
exchangeable, but the one participant can adopt the perspective of the other only in the 
first person, that is, never as a mere representative, but always in propria persona?^ 
Hence, the structure of language itself promotes the idea that the individual should 
remain as his or her own person.
In action guided by norms, the initiative to realise oneself cannot, in principle, 
be taken away from anyone and no one can give up this initiative. For this reason. 
Mead never tires of emphasising the moments of unpredictability and spontaneity in the 
manner in which the actor interactively plays his or her roles.^ "^  Although Mead’s 
conception of self-individuation leads him only to a two-actor relationship in ideal role- 
taking, nevertheless it points out that individuals are shaped by the processes of societal 
norms and enter into dialogues to either confirm or renegotiate these norms. This 
concept ties into Habermas’ ideal speech situation where the subject, disabled by the 
distorted forms of modem pathologies such as the dominance of instrumental 
rationality, can become undisabled in an idealised environment. This conception 
demonstrates the notion that all agents engage in some form of an attempt at idealised 
speech situations in everyday practices. For example, when persons are engaged in 
conversation (putting across claims to validity of truthfulness, sincerity, and normative 
rightness) in trying to understand the legitimacy of the statements being uttered, hearers 
will assume some form of the speaker’s perspective, however limited.
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Though claims to validity can be located in everyday communicative action, the 
process of engaging in discourses presupposes a certain suspension of prejudices and 
distortions associated with everyday practices, whilst simultaneously recognising the 
individual’s ‘social life’.^  ^ Furthermore, claims to truthfulness, normative rightness, 
sincerity, and legitimacy are redeemed in a variety of discourses. For example, 
hermeneutic discourses allow for the raising of interpretive claims, while empirical 
discourses call for contestation of empirical claims and explanations. In addressing 
questions of mutual understanding, interpretations, and explanations, the truthfulness 
propositionale Wahrheit and normative rightness normative Richtigkeit claims to 
validity are redeemed as these are directly concerned with objective and interpersonal 
worlds. As Habermas asserts, ‘Practical discourses address the application of 
methodologies that are derived from the theoretically-oriented hermeneutic 
discourses’.^ ^
Other types of discourse include the aesthetic and the therapeutic. In the former, 
judgements do not imply a standardisation of values. The values that are offered for 
justification and consensus arise from specific forms of life and do not, as in practical 
discourses, directly concern practicability. In pragmatic discourses, questions are 
concerned with finding suitable means for realising the individual’s goals and 
preferences. These directives have the semantic form of conditional imperatives. 
Ultimately, they borrow their validity from the empirical knowledge they take in. They 
are justified in pragmatic discourses:
The outcome turns on arguments that relate empirical knowledge to given preferences and ends and 
that assess the...consequences of alternative choices according to previously accepted maxims or 
decision rules.^^
Ethical discourses, on the other hand, are concerned with coming to an 
agreement about how to live the good life, questions of how to transcend the present and 
develop a societal set of norms and institutions that relates to improving groups’ 
perceptions of what constitutes a peaceful, better life. Critical analysis helps to address
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ethical questions in the form of what would be good for us.^  ^ That is, the critical 
component is important as the outcome of ethical discourses depends on taking into 
account the historically defined understandings of the self in relation to the community 
and society. By critically examining the development of the self as well as the larger 
social environment and norms, the underlying characteristics of institutions’ and 
individuals’ life histories become evident.^^
In pragmatic discourses, the efficacy of strategies are tested under the 
presupposition that we know what we want, whereas in ethical discourses, we reassure 
ourselves of a configuration of values under the presupposition that we do not yet know 
what we really want."^  ^ In pragmatic and ethical discourses, then, legitimacy can be 
accepted based on the conditions that policies and norms are good for us and are also 
effective. Unlike the claims of truthfulness and normative rightness, which can address 
possible consensus formations at the non-action level, and sincerity, which can only be 
confirmed or rejected in action, legitimacy applies equally at both points within the 
dialogical process.
Claims to validity that address what would be good for all can only be redeemed 
in moral discourses, which are governed by the principle U. This calls for the process of 
argumentation to validate and refute contested claims, according to the specified three."^  ^
Questions regarding the moral point of view and general ideas of reconstructing norms 
and institutions imply that the participants consider, at least in principle, the effects of a 
specific type of social arrangement on all members of a community."^  ^ In moral 
questions, the emphasis shifts away from efficiency to the adopting of a standpoint from 
which we Judge the existing validity of norms and institutions."^  ^ A norm is just only if 
all can will that it be obeyed by each in a comparable situation.
In other words, moral precepts resemble Kant’s categorical imperative. The 
imperative component is seen as an ‘ought’ that does not depend on subjective
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preferences or the ‘absolute goal’ of a good life."  ^ The ‘ought’, as it is intersubjectively 
arrived at, Habermas contends is just since their validity can be contested in moral 
discourses. Here, the outcome turns on arguments showing that the interests embodied 
in contested norms are unreservedly universalisable."^^
These different types of discourses reflect the varying motivational orientations 
and perceptions individuals hold in the process of confirming, renegotiating, or rejecting 
claims to validity. The moral discourses allow for the justification of competing claims 
and are not dependent on cultural differences and specificities. The ethical, which is 
most related to politics since it concerns how to maintain or reconstruct norms and 
institutions that govern social relationships, can be examined for its legitimacy in the 
employment of moral discourses. Consequently, both the ethical-political and moral 
discourses, like other types of discourses, can contribute to the transformation of deep- 
rooted protracted conflict situations. However, it is the moral discourse that allows 
participants to transcend particular positions in the process of constructing and 
reconstructing new ethical-political arrangements which can themselves be contested 
and revised. The relationship between this philosophical foundation based on the role 
of language and is consequent differing effects for facilitated conflict resolution forms 
the focus of the following section.
Discourses and Conflict Resolution
Habermas’ differentiation of discourses illuminates the neglected aspect of 
moral discourse in the facilitated conflict resolution literature. That is, the approaches 
to facilitated conflict resolution contain pragmatic and ethical forms of discourses. 
Although in practices of political will formation and institution building, moral 
discourses occupy centre stage, this dimension is overlooked by scholars including 
Burton, Fisher, and Rothman."^  ^ Moral discourses occupy the core pragmatic elements
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of a resolution process, since it is within a generalisable reconstruction that the 
practicability of any reached agreements can be conceived. Conflicts over clashing 
action orientations raise ethical questions such as ‘according to which should we live 
together’
Habermas’ outline of what is involved in a political discourse applies to the 
political process of resolving violent protracted conflicts. That is, political will- 
formation must address three questions:
1. The question underlying compromise formation.. .how we can reconcile competing preferences;
2. The ethical-political question of who we are and who we seriously want to be; and
3. The moral-practical question of how we ought to act in accordance with principles of justice.'*®
Correspondingly, in a negotiations process;
An aggregated will can develop from the co-ordination and adaptation of different preferences. In 
hermeneutic discourses of self-understanding, an authentic will can arise from shared value 
orientations; and in moral discourses of justification and application, an autonomous will can emerge 
from shared insights.'*^
An inclusion of praxis as a component of an alternative framework would 
encompass these pragmatic, hermeneutic, and moral discourses. All come into play in 
the process of facilitating the transformation of a conflict. Moral discourses of 
justification and application can help the participants move from a stalemate to 
conceiving ways of transforming the protracted situation. The hermeneutic and the 
pragmatic would be included in constructing new norms and institutions. In testing the 
legitimacy of any consensual agreements, employment of these discourses can 
encourage and mobilise not only the emergence, but the proliferation of a political will 
by the members of various political communities. In order to gain and sustain political 
legitimacy, questions of ethics and compromise formation will have to be continually 
contested according to the moral practical question of justice. In protracted conflicts, 
the possibility to engage in such a process is hindered due to reinforced, fixed positions. 
A third party can assist the disputants to re-establish broken and distorted 
communication. Additionally, the emergence of political will formation can fuel a 
conflict or its resolution. Therefore, the facilitating format, such as those envisioned by
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Burton, Fisher, Kelman, among others, can allow the representing participants to gain 
perspective under a condition of an ideal speech situation. This approach to facilitating 
the stalemated conflict situations is not fundamentally dependent on analysis and 
locating appropriate satisfiers to meet human needs. The procedural language-oriented 
framework allows for the participants to explore a variety of options in that through a 
dialogical process, ways of coexisting can be arrived at that can address the needs of 
many members of the opposing communities as well as transcend the workshop 
environment. Consequently, ways of overcoming distorted communication can be 
conceived and practised through exercising different discourses.
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In short, the figure below summarises the types of discourses and the political 
will formation that can emerge:
Pragmatic discourses
Procedurally regulated 
bargaining
Ethical-political discourses
Moral discourses
Legal discourses
50Figure 1: A Process Model of Rational Political Will Formation
One can infer that a Habermasian foundation for a process of resolution fulfils 
the potential embodied in the methodology of facilitated conflict resolution. This 
‘conscious conflict resolution’, or Verarbeitung, is attempted under conditions of an 
approximated ideal speech situation.^  ^ The formal pragmatics proceduralism and 
raising of validity claims shifts the emphasis away from either direct power bargaining 
or needs theory to a communicative process that allows for both flexible, context- 
sensitive, and generalisable consensus.
Simultaneously, the abstract universalism of Kant’s categorical imperative is 
modified to a practicable framework. Instead of asking what an individual moral agent 
could or will, without contradictions, be a universal maxim for all, one asks what norms 
or institutions would the members of an ideal or real communication community agree 
to as representing their common interests after engaging in a special kind of 
argumentation or conversation. The procedural model of an argumentative praxis 
replaces the silent thought experiment enjoined by the Kantian universalisability test.^^
Habermas presents several ways of resolving conflicts and rightly argues that 
conflict resolution that is conscious (aimed at reaching consensus) combines the variety
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of discourses which together can form the outline for moving from stalemate to 
transformation:
Problems
Mode of action 
co-ordination
Regulation of
interpersonal
conflicts
Pursuit of collective goals:
Goal Setting Implementation
Value orientation Consensus Decision by 
authority
Power of command 
with organised 
division of labour
Interest Position Arbitration Compromise
Table 2: Elementary Types of Conflict Resolution and Collective Will-formation^^
As the table indicates, ephemeral moments of reaching understanding and 
potentially finding a consensus through the proceduralism of formal pragmatics can 
help to realise the original intent of facilitated conflict resolution. This is not to say that 
other forms of accepted analysis offered by scholars in the field should be dismissed; 
rather, they should be included along with formal pragmatics in a process that grounds 
itself in communicative action. Conscious conflict resolution includes the possibility 
for differing engagements with various types of discourses and allows for the redeeming 
of appropriate validity claims dependent on which context the participants choose to 
address in which order. This form of resolution process indicates a possible move away 
from a framework based primarily on instrumental rationality. Not only can the 
participants to the facilitation process be offered a previously unimagined alternative, 
but the third-party facilitators themselves can explore the reflective and critical 
components of conscious conflict resolution, before conceiving ways of rebuilding 
norms and institutions.
Consequently, what is suggested is not a mere shift in emphasis of a theoretical 
underpinning, but a different philosophical and subsequently a different type of
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methodology for transforming conflicts. That is, as this methodology is grounded on 
discourses and the language medium and not needs and behavioural analyses, the 
methodology and any outcomes reached through consensus necessarily differs. A 
methodology predicated on a different understanding of how attitudes, norms and 
institutions are formed and reconstructed means that different processes and reasonings 
are at play. Thus, any agreements reached in the process of argumentation would 
probably differ.
In short, by following a procedure which is based on a different starting point 
than the one that underpins facilitated conflict resolution problem-solving workshops, it 
follows logically that an alternative outcome may result that need not resemble the types 
of agreements reached in a problem-solving workshop process. It is fair to say that the 
effect of a proceduralist universal outline may produce similar suggestions for 
reconstructing norms and institutions; however, the ways in which these would be 
applied and understood would differ. Hence, a different praxis would result.
Furthermore, without critique and self-reflection, the transient moment where potential 
for reaching understanding and consensus can carry the conflict parties from opposition 
to co-operation, cannot be adequately explored. The facilitation process advocated by 
Burton, Kelman, and others neglects this dimension and thus the process moves from 
statement of positions to diagnosis of misperceptions and behavioural expectations 
through facilitated analysis.
Most importantly, the foundation of instrumental rationality can be expanded to 
include the communicative type. This communicative rationality incorporates
instrumental rationality in achieving goals, but a framework based on the
communicative rationality argument means that the dialogical process and
argumentation come to occupy centre stage. The components described by the scholars 
and practitioners within the facilitated conflict resolution field would be subsumed in a
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communicative rationality-based model. A methodology based on communicative 
rationality can better help the disputants to find their own solutions as the necessity to 
discover unmet needs gives way to a procedural framework that opens up the 
reconstruction of norms and institutions based on the acceptance of legitimate claims to 
validity. Therefore, a different philosophical foundation emerges. Additionally, the 
intrinsic connection between theory and practice would become explicit as 
communicative rationality understands praxis as an application of the inseparable 
relationship of both elements.
A conscious conflict resolution or a methodology of communicative rationality 
also offers a normative account of what the facilitation process should involve. That is, 
as moral discourses would occupy the core of this segment, the universalisable norm- 
building acceptance would be taken into account by the participants. Simultaneously, as 
ethical and pragmatic discourses would also come into play, and all would be tested for 
validity, the type of norm-regulating institutions and communities the parties decide 
would have to be co-operatively constructed. Of course, compromises or outright 
disagreements are also possibilities. However, as parties agree to enter into this 
approximated ideal speech situation, there are certain presuppositions and belief 
suspensions that participants bring to the process. By doing so, the potential for 
reaching consensus and understanding increases insofar as alternatives to traditional 
methods of facilitation or bargaining are not dismissed. The participants are more open 
to alternative ways of resolving the conflict that they otherwise may not consider in a 
negotiations format. As Habermas puts it:
Entry into moral discourse demands that one step back from all contingently existing normative 
contexts. Such discourse takes place under communicative presuppositions that require a break with 
everyday taken-for-granted assumptions; in particular, it requires a hypothetical attitude toward the 
relevant norms of action and their validity claims. The categorical ‘ought’ of moral norms is directed 
toward the autonomous will o f actors who are prepared to be rationally bound by insight into what all 
could will. '^*
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In the process of resolving conflicts, claims to validity are contested in numerous 
forms of discourses including the moral, ethical, and pragmatic. Transforming 
institutions and norms require the consideration of generalisable structures as well as 
sensitivity to the particular communities in which the changes will be practised. The 
pragmatic discourses, as already mentioned, are concerned with construction of possible 
policies and their likely effects. In a process that adopts the formal pragmatics 
approach, the participants, along with the third party, would decide the level at which 
the conflict should be explored following the rule of argumentation under the principle 
of universalisation. For example, a moral issue such as a particular social policy would 
be contested by the parties according to the four validity claims. Similarly, if an ethical 
matter is seen more important by the participants themselves (such as the sustainability 
of the environment or protection of ethnic minority cultures) then discourses would 
allow the participants to reflect on the deeper consonances, Ubereinstimmungen, in a 
common form of life.
Habermas insightfully argues that if neither of these discourses can be clearly 
seen to be employable, then the alternative is bargaining, which only results in 
compromise and a negotiated agreement, VereinbarungP The process of bargaining 
presupposes moral discourses, since justification of their validity is required for a 
compromise to be accepted. In other words, bargaining is indirectly imbued with the 
discourse principle of reaching uncoerced consensus, since each of the participants 
would have equal opportunity to influence or pressurise others. Though compromises 
are a part of transforming conflictual situations, the possibility of exploring ethical, 
moral, and other forms of discourses are not restricted to circumstances where a specific 
priority has been articulated. This aspect is decided by the participants and the third 
party in communication and only in a specific context. For example, one can begin with 
the specifics of building bridges and securing fuel as in former Yugoslavia, or with the
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general principles incorporated in the Declaration of Principles, which resulted from the 
Oslo Channel. The participants to the process will clarify the level of entry and 
continuation in the contestation of validity claims. As the participants engage in mutual 
understanding and self-reflection, the type of discourses being employed will become 
evident within the act of communicating.
The process of engaging in conflict resolution can be helped with the 
proceduralism of formal pragmatics. This translates to a communicative action and a 
rationality that goes beyond the needs-based instrumental which forms the foundation of 
facilitated conflict resolution approaches. A communicatively rational perspective 
contributes to the achieving of consensus via a process that is agreed to by the 
participants themselves. As the types of discourses and arguments individuals put 
forward produce differing kinds of action (according to their relation to the world) 
Habermas explores four types of sociological action in elaborating his concept of 
communicative rationality. Therefore, each will be outlined in the following section.
Sociological Concepts of Action: Four Types
The concept of reaching understanding suggests a rationally motivated agreement among participants 
that is measured against validity claims. They characterise knowledge in symbolic expression. Alfred 
Schütz asserted that the lifeworld is an unthematically given horizon within which participants in 
communication have more in common when they refer thematically to something in the world.^^
— Jürgen Habermas, 1984 
The first of four actions outlined by Habermas is the teleological action.^  ^ Here, 
actors attain ends by choosing means that might be successful. Realisation of such ends 
leads to prioritising strategic action and can be said to be utilitarian. Teleological action 
is purposive, calculated and used to yield optimal results. Individuals pursuing this type 
of action engage in cost-benefit analysis and are guided by maxims of utility.
The second type of action in which the actor relates to the social world is 
normatively regulated action. This form of action refers to members of a social group
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who orient their actions according to common values. In this context, members of a 
particular community or society aim to express their behaviour so that the accepted 
norms are reflected in performative actions. The regulating pattern of norms and 
institutions is important here since common values, which structure social interactions, 
can be preserved and reproduced.
The third sociological concept of action is the dramaturgical form. This action 
refers to participants in interaction creating a public for another. It regulates mutual 
action to reflect one’s own subjectivity. Since the participants aim to address an 
audience so that the subjectivity of the individual can be presented according to his or 
her construction, actions here are performative. Neither norms nor strategic action 
occupy the centre focus; rather, the public presentation of an individual identity is most 
important.
The fourth type of action is the communicative. This form of action refers to 
interaction between two subjects who are capable of;
Speech and action, who establish interpersonal relations...The actors seek to reach an understanding 
about an action situation and their plans of action in order to co-ordinate their actions by way of 
agreement.^®
In each of the four types of action, certain relations between the individual and 
the world are presupposed. That is, as in teleological action, normatively-regulated 
action suggests relations between an actor and two worlds: the objective and the social, 
verstehen. '^  ^ In a dramaturgical form, it is the public and participants who ‘perform’ for 
one another.^® All of these three types of relating to the world rest on goal-directed 
action. On the other hand, communicative action encourages consensus formation that 
is, in principle, linguistic. However, language can also be one-sided when only strategic 
action is the object that actors hope to achieve. In the first three types of action,
1. Language is about achieving success to serve one’s own interest. In this attitude, utterances are 
both intentionalist and semantic.
2. Language takes on a culturalist concept of understanding. That is, actors presuppose a consensus 
that is merely reproduced with each addition to the existing understandings.
3. Presuppositions of language serve as a medium of self-presentation. The illocutionary force 
becomes marginalised whereas the expressive attitude increases.
195
4. Language is a medium of uncurtailed communication whereby speakers and hearers, out of the 
context of the reinterpreted lifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in the objective, social, and the 
subjective worlds, in order to negotiate, conunand, and affect the situation.^'
The infrastructure of everyday language is relevant from a pragmatics viewpoint
when speakers employing sentences relate to the world not just in a direct, but reflective
way. The teleological, normative-regulated, and dramaturgical concepts can be
integrated into a system that is based on the interpretations of strategic action.^  ^ In
communicative action, reaching an understanding acts as a co-ordinating mechanism for
actions, but only through the interactions of participants who come to an agreement
concerning the contestation of claims and their validity. In this process, the rationality
potential for understanding can be mobilised by the participant who is engaged in
communicative action.^^
In short, the individual’s perceptions of the objective, subjective, and
intersubjective worlds determine or influence the types of social actions that will be
produced. Communicative action is most helpful for understanding the relationships
between individuals in social environments, since the medium of language and
employment of discourses allow for the raising of validity claims through the process of
argumentation (U). This pragmatic procedure occurs, as stated earlier, only in practice
and first in an approximated idealising situation, where the participants put forward
pragmatic presuppositions to be contested and justified. A claim can be contested and
the counterfactuals of any claim can be explored in an environment of uncoerced power
relations where the ‘unforced force’ of the better argument can prevail.^
The instrumental rationality that underlies the other three types of action
produces incomplete understandings for creating a basis for an alternative philosophical
foundation that can inform a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. The approaches
articulated by scholars in the facilitated conflict resolution field are infused with one or
more of these types of action. Therefore, the instrumental rationality that informs the
actions and the relations the individuals adopt to the world comes to form the
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foundation of these thinkers’ perspectives. Communicative rationality is based on an 
idea that individuals are oriented towards reaching understanding. Through the process 
of raising claims to validity, which includes self-reflection and critique, the potential for 
a transformative praxis can be realised in facilitation efforts. Instrumental rationality, 
the foundation of all approaches offered in the literature of facilitated conflict 
resolution, is preferred and its dominance remains unchallenged.
This predominance can be partly attributed to the epistemologies that underline 
conflict resolution perspectives. That is, the scholars and practitioners overlook the 
distorted communicative process, which stifles communicative rationality whilst 
promoting the instrumental.
This is related to the development of system and lifeworld in modem societies 
more generally. In short, the lifeworld is made up of the cultural traditions of an 
individual’s life history. Interpretative hermeneuticists such as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
asserted that communication and the need for mutual understanding cut across the 
horizon of culture and life experiences. The lifeworld forms the context in which 
individuals make references to the objective world and put back intersubjectively 
negotiated statements to confirm their validity. This lifeworld is reproduced and handed 
down through traditions, practices, and customs. Although individuals constitute this 
lifeworld that they have inherited, they can and do reshape it by passing it on to others. 
A specific claim accepted as valid in one historical circumstance can be interpreted or 
reinterpreted as different in retrospect, and no one person can predict whether the 
justification for a validity claim will apply once that justification has been made.
The significant point is that a justification for a validity claim is accepted by the 
participants to a particular communicative process in order to reach an agreement about 
how institutions may be governed and what norms should constitute them in principle.^  ^
The lifeworld relates to the system in that the system is the larger whole, which has
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within it many lifeworlds.^^ When considering the development of modernity, 
Habermas explores Freud and Weber to articulate that with prioritisation of science and 
technologies, instrumental rationality has become the dominant rationality that pervades 
the social sciences and relationships among individuals in varying communities.^^ The 
ideas of Freud and Weber are far-reaching and diverse. However, to present an 
understanding of why a communicative rationality needs to be grounded in construction 
or reconstitution of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice, it is relevant to touch briefly 
upon the place of Freud and Weber in Habermas’ works.
Freud's Contributions 
Habermas examines the psychoanalytic model outlined by Freud. The 
patient/therapist process of reflection and the use of ordinary language are studied in 
formulating possible ways of overcoming distorted communication. Through the 
employment of reflection and a particular form of psychoanalysis that involve the use of 
everyday language, the patient can find the moment of insight that leads to the 
reconstitution of the individual ego identity. In a therapeutic relationship context, 
individuals do not refer to abstract ideas about who they are and why they have the 
problems they do. Rather, individuals use practical discourse to relate problems and 
work through traumas, childhood situations, and present difficulties. It is not the 
method of psychoanalysis that is important for Habermas, but the process of reflection 
as it allows for the evaluation and raising of validity claims. In the Freudian conception 
of psychoanalysis, it is the universal characteristics of language where the potential lies 
for recovering forms of distorted communication.^^
The psychoanalytic environment also provides the basis for conceiving of an 
ideal speech situation; that is, in a secure setting where the individual is free from 
external pressures, the therapist remains a participant only to the degree that he or she
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assists the patient. The patient is left to talk freely of dreams, experiences, and 
fantasies, and link them with repressed memories or events.
Through reflection, however inaccurately, the individual can re-assimilate the 
problematic past and thus rebuild a more balanced ego. By doing so, what was 
repressed becomes fully conscious and the patient is better able to integrate this 
forgotten part of him or herself and gain a feeling of a more whole self. As Habermas 
writes:
Reflection is the social process through which impaired or broken communication is restored...The 
process of reflection is rationally redeemed in a strange territory, through the medium of speech and 
symbolic interactions,^^
The process of reflection present in a psychoanalytic relationship for Habermas 
points to a distinctive characteristic of a critical theory. Therefore, the process of 
reflection is incorporated in suggesting the suspension of everyday beliefs in a 
dialogical process. Furthermore, the patient-therapist relationship symbolises the 
colonised lifeworld that has been subsumed under mechanisms of system integration. 
While Freud concentrates on the pathology of an individual, Weber examines one 
particular form of modem society’s pathologies.^^ That is, the development and 
dominance instrumental rationality gained with the progression of industrialisation and 
technical advances in modem societies.^^ The following section will consider Weber’s 
contribution towards fully articulating a communicative rationality methodology.
Weber's Contributions
The rationalisation of a potential through reason embedded in communicative action is a world- 
historical process. In the modem period, it leads to a rationalisation and the increasing prevalence of 
more abstract and more universal norms.^^
— Jürgen Habermas, 1984
In exploring Weber’s analysis of the development of modemity most notably 
affected by the spirit embodied in the Protestant Ethic, Habermas follows Weber’s 
diagnosis of modemity’s pathology. Weber asserts that the multi-dimensional sides of
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reason have been reduced to the instrumental form favoured by science and 
technology/^ The mode of production that sustains relations among individuals and the 
identity formation of them, as asserted by Marx, are challenged by Weber/"  ^ He views 
the materialist paradigm as a product of a rationalisation process that is intrinsically 
linked to the processes of modernisation. For Weber, both critical reason (adopted by 
Horkheimer, for example) and the orthodox Marxists’ appeal to scientific positivism are 
part of a single rationalising development.^^ Weber argues that the ‘progress’ towards 
administrations, and bureaucratic state structures according to legal standards closely 
parallels the development of capitalism.^^ He maintains:
The modem capitalist enterprise rests (internally) primarily on calculation. It requires for its existence a 
legal and administrative system whose functioning can be rationally calculated, at least in principle, on the 
basis of fixed general norms, just like the expected performance of a machine.^’
In his analysis of the rationalisation processes of modernity, Weber distinguishes 
between formal and substantive rationality.^  ^ The former is the degree to which action is 
oriented towards rationally calculated rules, the latter is the application of rational 
calculation to further definite goals or values. The substantive success of the formal 
rationalisation process for Weber means a process that would inevitably lead to a loss of 
freedom, Freiheitverlust, and a loss of meaning, SinnverlustJ^ His conclusion that men’s 
fate is to live in an ‘iron cage of instrumental rationality’ foresees a society where men 
worked to dominate and control nature. The following clearly illustrates his position:
Modem order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production, which today 
determine the lives of all the individuals who are bom into this mechanism...Perhaps it will so determine 
them until the last ton of fossilised coal is bumt.*®
The pessimistic determinism regarding the fate of individuals is seen by 
Habermas as something that is not necessarily inevitable. Weber’s insightful 
diagnosis of modernity as a society interested primarily in gaining control over 
nature does not mean all other forms of rationality must irrevocably be subsumed. 
Rather, because we can see that one-sided reason has come to dominate the way we
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think about social institutions and relations, a space for conceiving of alternative 
rationality types or re-balancing this one-sided form of rationality is possible.
While introducing communicative rationality, the lifeworld and system 
concepts are uncoupled to explain how individuals bring the kinds of pragmatic 
presuppositions to bear on speech acts. Moreover, these concepts demonstrate how 
communication becomes distorted, both from the cultural horizons of agents and also 
from the social institutions that constitute societies. Habermas maintains that 
economic and administrative activities contribute to the colonisation of the lifeworld 
by a system integration. Societal rationalisation, therefore, happens at the cost of the 
lifeworld. A lifeworld remains the subsystem that defines the pattern of social 
system as a whole. Systemic mechanisms need to be anchored in the lifeworld: they 
have to be institutionalised.^^
In short, the contributions of Weber’s and Freud’s analyses mean that these 
elements, combined with the earlier sections, comprise communicative rationality.
As it forms the substantive component for a Critical Theory of Peace Practice, the 
following section will focus on this methodology.
Communicative Rationality
Communicative rationality characterises the activity of reflecting upon our background assumptions about 
the world, bringing out basic norms to the fore, to be questioned and negotiated. Instrumental rationality 
takes these background assumptions for granted, in the pursuit of new gains.*^
—Jurgen Habermas, 1984 
The previous discussion of the role of language as a universal medium for 
procedurally allowing individuals to engage in dialogues in an intersubjectively 
constituted relationship, was explicated to show that it constitutes a central part of 
communicative rationality. The concept of reaching understanding suggests a 
rationally motivated agreement among participants that is measured against
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Habermas’ three validity claims to truthfulness, normative rightness, and sincerity as 
well as a fourth claim introduced by this author, namely legitimacy. Following the 
concept of communicative rationality, forms of argumentation are carried out in an 
idealised environment where participants are made aware that claims to uttered 
statements can be challenged. Habermas maintains that:
Discourses are islands in the sea of practice...improbable forms of communication. The everyday 
appeal to validity claims implicitly points, however, to their possibility.*^
It is via this potential for discourse and, more to the point, the fact that claims to 
validity are discursively redeemed that communicative action and its unexplored but 
underlying type of rationality can be conceived. Communicative rationality is understood 
and studied in connection with the structure of language, for the embedded nature of 
language is inseparable from the concept. Individuals who are engaged in the social 
practice of communicative action can be said to be motivated to reach consensus, even if 
that consensus is only for self and mutual understanding. During this process, claims to 
validity can be seen to be rooted in differing forms of knowledge, while at the same time, a 
stated proposition can be retranslated meaningfully back into social action. The following 
reinforces this point:
Der Begriff der kommunikativen Rationalitat am Leitfaden sprachlicheverstandigung muss analysiert 
warden. Der Begriff der Verstandigung verweist auf ein unter Beteiligten erzieltes rational motiviertes 
Einverstandnis, dass sich an kritisierbaren Geltungsansprtichen bemisst. Die GeltungsansprUche 
(propositionale Wahrheit, normative Richtigkeit und subjektive Wahrhaftigkeit) kennzeichnen 
verschiedenen Kategorien eines Wissens, das in Ausserungen symbolisch verkorpert wird.*^
This formulation allows for the restoration of practical reason and the formation of 
a communicative rationality methodology. Since only the participants to a process can 
construct the content of a formal procedure, the theoretical bases for approaching social 
practices in this fashion are more adequate than the foundations that are either explicitly 
or implicitly stated in approaches to facilitated conflict resolution. This form of a theory 
is also ‘critical of social scientific approaches that are incapable of deciphering the 
paradoxes of societal rationalisation’.^  ^ Furthermore, a theory of communicative action, 
which is premised on communicative rationality, can ascertain for itself ‘the rational
202
content of an anthropologically deep-seated structure by means of analysis, that science 
proceeds reconstructively’.^  ^ It describes structures of action and structures of mutual 
understanding that are found in the intuitive knowledge of competent members of modem 
societies.^^
Communicative action, which has at its core an understanding of a different form 
of rationality, is designed to make evident that through employing a non-instmmentalist 
form of rationality, a theoretical framework emerges that is based on praxis and can offer 
a more helpful perspective for approaching the task of reconstructing and renegotiating 
norms and institutions. Consequently, a critical theory perspective that includes 
communicative rationality as a core component shifts the emphasis from needs to the 
socially co-ordinating mechanism of language and the transformative role discourses can 
play in altering existing political arrangements.
In summary, at the broadest level, a theory of communicative action and 
communicative rationality suggest that if institutions and human life are maintained 
through socially co-ordinated actions of a society’s members and, in certain instances, are 
established through communication aimed at reaching consensus, but always through a 
form of communication such as speech, nonverbal, body language, and so forth, then the 
reproduction of society means that we must satisfy the conditions of rationality, mutual 
understanding, and contestation of validity claims that are intrinsic to communicative 
action. Communicative action is then a form of social interaction in which the 
individuals’ action-plans are co-ordinated through a process of intersubjective 
communication, sometimes engaging in an approximated ideal speech situation.^  ^ This 
enables participants to adopt different attitudes toward the world, thereby showing that 
communicative action under communicative rationality has three functions which 
contribute to the reproduction of the lifeworld: ‘reaching understanding, co-ordinating 
action and the socialisation of individuals’.^  ^ One can then conclude:
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Dieser Begriff kommunikativer Rationalifât, fühit Konnotationen mit sich, die letztlich zuriickgehen auf 
die zentrale Erfahrung der zwangslos Einigenden, konsensstiftende Kraft argumentativer Rede, in der 
verschiedene Teilnehmer ihre zunachst nur subjektiven Auffassungen iiberwinden und sich dank der 
Gemeinsamkeit vemiinftig motivierten Überzeugungen gleichzeitig der Einheit der objektiven Welt und 
der intersubjektive ibres Einheit Lebenszusammenbangs vergewissem,’ *
Implications for a Critical Theory of Peace Practice
Consciousness and thought are seen to be structured by language, and hence are essentially social 
accomplishments. The deliberating subject must be relocated in the social space of communication 
where meanings enhance individual identity, which is structured by social meanings, and are matters 
for communal determination through public processes of interpretation.^^
—Jürgen Habermas, 1993 
The preceding sections have detailed the elements that comprise the concept of 
communicative rationality. It is argued here that this concept is fundamental for 
discourse ethics, which forms the theoretical and philosophical foundation for a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice.^  ^ In the following final section, the implications of 
incorporating the communicative rationality procedural methodology for a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice will be put forward.
The Method
The formal pragmatics of language, outlined earlier in this chapter, points to a 
foundational flaw in perspectives of facilitated conflict resolution. Burton, Kelman, 
Rothman, Bush, and Folger, among others, overlook the dimension of the language 
medium. This leads to several difficulties. Perhaps the single most important insight to 
be gained from a formulation of communicative rationality is that the raising of validity 
claims should form the methodology of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. The 
facilitated conflict resolution theoretical frameworks are founded on either a social- 
psychological underpinning of perceptions or needs, thereby dismissing the significance 
of theory and favouring instead practice.
Scholars such as Burton, Kelman, and Rothman completely neglect the role of 
language as a medium where discourses can be redeemed in the contestation of validity
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daims. Instead, the conflict resolution scholars concentrate on the need for clear, 
effective communication— the analytic-genealogical digging of hidden motivations—  
and presenting the conflict as a shared problem which can be solved if behaviours are 
modified. "^  ^ In doing so, they prioritise an instrumentalist aspect of communication. By 
leaving out the universal infrastructure of the language medium, the conflict 
researchers’ frameworks of problem-solving workshops are incomplete, where 
participants are meant to come to a renegotiated understanding of the conflict by 
themselves, hence making resolution possible through the mode of analysis to the extent 
that only the constituent elements are studied and reflected on.
Since communicative rationality is excluded from the facilitated conflict 
resolution theoretical equation, not only is the key idea of language as the socially co­
ordinating medium of relationships among individuals left out, but equally important, 
the needs-theory approach is in danger of being stuck in the trap of instrumental 
rationality, a type of rationality Burton and Rothman, for example, evidently wishes to 
escape. Hence, both scholars’ intentions to construct a theory for transforming 
institutional structures cannot be fulfilled as they indicate it should.^  ^ In other words, 
the paradigm shift that Burton and Rothman assert as occurring by grounding a conflict 
resolution practice on needs theory fails to materialise, since their underlying meta- 
theoretical assumptions remain tied to instrumental rationality.
A Critical Theory of Peace Practice is not premised on needs theory but is 
premised on a different philosophical underpinning of communication. Communication 
here refers to more than effective transmission of ideas and interpretations but 
incorporates a type of rationality that is oriented to reaching understanding in the first 
instance and encouraging consensus-building when such moments arise.
It is fair to say that the scholars and practitioners within the facilitated conflict 
resolution discipline do in practice formulate a method for reaching consensus. After
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all, this is the objective of a facilitated problem-solving workshop process. But the 
reliance on one form of rationality, and a lack of questioning the basis as a valid 
foundation for theorising, mean that facilitated conflict resolution approaches have not 
moved away from conceptualising conflict resolution from an instrumental viewpoint.
The first and most fundamental formulation of a Critical Theory of Peace 
Practice would put at its centre the formal pragmatics of language, raising validity 
claims through the employment of different discourses and the process of argumentation 
(U) in an approximated ideal speech environment. As humans, we all possess the 
capacity for intersubjective communication to reach understanding, form a consensus, 
learn appropriate behaviours, attain success, and ground our world views generally. 
Since the philosophical foundation of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice includes a 
communicative rationality concept and its consequent methodology, the outcomes 
resulting from facilitation efforts may differ from the problem-solving format. This is 
the difference between facilitated conflict resolution and a Habermasian-informed 
methodology of communicative rationality. Rather than engaging in facilitated analysis 
of needs, participants to a facilitation process employ discourses to contest the validity 
of uttered statements in order to find a way of moving beyond the protracted situation. 
The different foundation builds on insights Burton very briefly alludes to and seizes the 
opening provided by Rothman, Bush, and Folger. By including a methodology of 
communicative rationality, this proposed framework can finally overcome the bounded 
restrictions imposed by a commitment to needs theory.
Additionally, a critical examination of the foundation of a theory allows for a 
clear understanding of why one particular concept is dominant. In this thesis, it is 
contended that discourses can bridge the gap between social practice and pragmatic 
presuppositions of communicatively competent agents, which means that a theory takes 
into account, for instance, distorted power relations. By first deconstructing the
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formation of power among societal structures, communities, and individuals, ways of 
overcoming existing power asymmetries can be conceived. The informal environment 
of facilitated conflict resolution problem-solving workshops, like an ideal speech 
situation, aims to promote equality among participants. However, the idealised 
conception of the undisabled subject differs from a conception of the individual outlined 
in problem-solving workshop approaches. In other words, under a communicative 
rationality informed perspective, the distorted power relations, which are present in 
various types of communication, include the problem of unequal power formations.
Another difficulty with the neglect of praxis is that in conflict resolution, 
scholars and practitioners persistently cling to the theory-practice divide.^  ^ That is, 
scholars within the facilitated conflict resolution field prefer either a theoretical or, more 
often, practice-driven procedures to resolve violent, protracted conflicts.^^ Although 
Burton at least attempts a theoretical formulation for his problem-solving workshops, he 
still insists that the realm of practice is more significant. The facilitation exercise 
involves following sets of procedures, however important or limited they may be, in 
creating a conducive environment for dialogues. A philosophical foundation for a 
general theory of facilitated conflict resolution is put aside in favour of providing step- 
by-step details for conducting the workshops.^^
The location of universalism by Habermas in the sphere where individuals 
engage in an interactive social process of communication has a small, but important 
implication for an alternative theoretical formulation. The practice of facilitation must 
be contextualised and understood from the perspective that language is the socially co­
ordinating mechanism through which ideas and positions can be discursively redeemed 
and a process of reaching consensus is communicatively acted. It is a relatively simple 
idea, but one rarely explored in the study of facilitated conflict resolution.
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A relocation of the subject, including the third-party role, from a neutral, 
objective participant to a sphere of intersubjective communicative action forms one very 
significant component of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. Needs-based theories or 
social-psychological approaches only explore the superficial effects of actions and 
perceptions structured through language. If we take the point that consensus and 
conflicts are formed, maintained, or renegotiated through the employment of discourses, 
the modes of rationalities that operate within them helps one to understand the different 
types of consequences that result from adopting a particular form of rationality. In other 
words, different types of rationality are expressed in the kinds of discourses and in the 
medium of language. It is important to remember that rationality refers not to the 
specific mental states or actions of individuals, but to the underlying assumptions that 
underpin various theories, praxis, norms, and institutions. The process of 
communication includes all of these dimensions of language and discourses.
Another required element of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice incorporates the 
feature of communicative rationality; that is, a realisation that each agent possesses the 
capacity to orient him/herself towards reaching understanding and, eventually, 
compromise or consensus. These universal qualities are not meant to replace merely the 
universalistic tendencies of the facilitated conflict resolution approaches. Rather, they 
are aimed at superseding them, for the Habermasian-derived universalism is more 
limited. Since social actions are located in the milieu of social interactions, an 
understanding of common or clashing cultural histories of the subjects, the socio- 
historical character of language tied to universal pragmatics concept helps to bridge the 
gap between the universal and the particular. Habermas recognises that the specific 
contexts of will formation are as important as the general moral project of 
reconstructing norm-regulating institutions. Consequently, the quasi-universalism
208
present in communicative rationality can be included in a process of facilitating 
conflicts.
Although formal pragmatics is largely procedural and other steps in the 
development of a discourse ethics approach are needed, the insight it offers is not to be 
underestimated. Numerous criticisms regarding the formulation of communicative 
rationality and its constituent components have been levelled against Habermas . The  
two most predominant merit mention and justification.^^ The first claims the quasi- 
transcendental universalism is, indeed, primarily transcendental. The second asserts his 
framework neglects the cultural dimension.
Regarding the former point, it is appropriate to remind the reader of the 
modification of Kant’s categorical imperative carried out by H a b e r m a s . I n  short, he 
argues that the individual is not an isolated subject and does not abstractly design rules 
and apply it to a general will formation. Rather, the individual is to be understood in a 
social context where the interactions between the subject and members of a society or 
communities shape and reshape actions that the individual may take. Furthermore, 
formulated ideas are intrinsically located in social practices, since they are derived from 
and translated back into the social environment as a form of communicative action. 
Moreover, there is the charge that universalism hinders individuals from various 
cultures and value orientations to reach consensus. The type and level of language is to 
be agreed by the participants, and despite the difficulties this may present, it is crucial to 
understand that language is a mechanism for engaging in communicative action.
The second critique loses its bite once the hermeneutic component of 
Habermas’s theory is acknowledged. The life histories of a society, and the individuals 
that comprise them, are taken into account as they are embedded and influence the 
process of argumentation. It is due to different cultures and value orientations that 
distorted communication arise; how we may put forward an adequate structure for
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overcoming them forms a motivation for building a framework for a facilitated conflict 
resolution theory. In these perspectives, agents are taken through a series of self- 
discovering steps. First, they state their positions; then, through uncovering their hidden 
motivations, the participants come to learn that the conflict is a shared problem; one that 
can be solved, since resolution does not mean the deprivation of one group’s needs at 
the expense of others.
But how are we to judge between these approaches in such a limited context if 
the claims are justifiable and valid? A communicative rationality methodology can 
better realise the potential for reaching consensus with the assistance of a third party.
In this newly conceived conflict resolution process, the third party would not only be 
informed with all the traditional methods, but also would possess a philosophical insight 
into the transformations necessary in order to construct new norms and institutions. By 
recognising that there is more than one type of rationality and that we orient ourselves 
towards reaching understanding, at least in principle third parties can include this point 
in a facilitation process which can open up the process of resolution itself.
Once the agents agree to participate in a facilitation exercise, a strictly analytical 
method is not necessary for the parties to realise that their needs are under threat. The 
participants could also pursue an open communication process. The third party or third 
parties have a proactive role to play here. Since they are a part of the communicative 
process by virtue of participation, a third-party role can help disputants to seize the 
moment when consensus becomes possible. That is, third parties can offer self­
reflection and the procedure for raising validity claims.
When agents put forward assertions, demands, or suggested compromises, the 
third party can guide the contestation of validity claims. This is not an imposed process 
since, as Habermas rightly insists, the raising of claims to validity is rooted in everyday 
language. In the process of argumentation, norms which are based on particular
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forms of knowledge guiding interests, including the empirical and the hermeneutic, can 
be contested and deemed legitimate or false, according to the four validity claims and in 
discourses of the pragmatic, ethical, and moral. For example, the claim to truthfulness 
can be contested by looking at the counterfactuals, by resorting to empirical evidence, 
theoretical possibilities and unforeseen alternatives. It is fair to assert that a validity 
claim to truthfulness can change over time. However, this potential points not only to a 
possible negative consequence, but also to a positive one. That is, all claims to validity 
can be recontested and reconfirmed as legitimate by participants. For example, the 
sustainability of specific claims to truthfulness can foster confidence-building, the 
fundamentals of a Burtonian and other conflict resolution efforts.
Acceptance of sincerity is crucial for fostering trust. Although it is often absent 
when the disputants first encounter one another in a facilitation process, the validity 
claim of sincerity, if seen as legitimate, can help to maintain the facilitation process. 
Sincerity refers not to attributes of a specific individual, but to the intention of sincerity 
expressed in a speech act that can be criticised. Claims to normative rightness are 
perhaps the most difficult to conceive of in a problem-solving effort for resolving 
violent conflicts. However, as moral discourses indirectly inform the contestation of 
claim to normative rightness and moral discourses presuppose generalisable will and 
consequences, ways of reconstructing societal institutions and redefining relationships 
can be explored. Moreover, participants to the process have accepted that each validity 
claim can be contested inasmuch as they all have realised that the current political 
circumstances cannot be maintained.
Here, the significance of instrumental rationality can be seen, but the need to 
subsume it under a communicatively-rational concept also becomes evident. That is, 
the process of raising claims to validity allows the participants to alter social 
relationships. Claims to validity help individuals to judge the appropriateness of
211
accepting one form of arrangement over another. The act of raising validity claims 
inherently contains the process of argumentation. Although in resolution efforts, 
political texts and arrangements of alternative norm-guiding actions are often 
negotiated, the potential in this type of communicative process frees all to express their 
intentions.
This differs from the facilitated analytic methodologies in three specific ways. 
First, speech acts can be measured against criticisable validity claims, as the participants 
have accepted the viability of such a process to help achieve transformation at the 
outset, at least implicitly. Since they have agreed to explore an unorthodox method of 
resolving conflicts and, more importantly, by engaging in a process of argumentation 
that is not solely for media consumption, all participants bring pragmatic 
presuppositions into the dialogical process, which should be reoriented if a 
transformation of the stalemate is to be formulated and practised.
A consensus, if reached in this dialogical process, can be judged and reflected 
upon, as to whether the stated propositions are valid for all being represented, and in 
what ways they may become acceptable to all who will be affected by changes in 
practices. The ability to contest validity claims means that individuals can judge the 
process itself, the legitimacy of any reached consensus as well as the continued 
legitimacy of any new norms and institutions. In this way, the role of validity claims is 
part of procedural methodology of communicative rationality.
Second, during the process of raising validity claims, the importance of 
reflection becomes apparent. Habermas looked to Freud and Kant for the best way of 
incorporating this important concept. The Kantian notion will be left for consideration 
in the following chapter. However, the Freudian psychoanalytic model is taken up by 
Habermas as it provides an interesting insight into the appearance of reflection and how 
the patient in a therapeutic relationship can attain autonomy. He or she does this by
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recovering past traumas, dreams, repressed desires and other forgotten but significant 
events that have stunted the development of the ego. The patient is able to stand outside 
him or herself in the first instance as he or she reflects upon the experiences within a 
secure environment of a therapeutic situation. Once repressed histories are brought 
forward by confronting and reflecting on these situations in a critical manner, the patient 
is able to work towards reintegrating this part of the personality back into a more 
centred ego that has control over the self and hence the individual’s development. In 
the study of facilitated conflict resolution, reflection of the critical type is lacking in the 
process of constructing and advocating theories. That is, although in a broad sense 
Burton and others favour such a component in the process of discovering options for 
resolving conflicts, at the level of theory their self-critical examination is rather limited. 
Although Burton engages with various ideas to support his needs theory framework, the 
validity of needs-based underlying assumptions are excluded from his published 
d i s c u s s i o n s . S i m i l a r l y ,  scholars who attempt to expand Burton’s original 
formulation, including Rothman, do not go far enough in critically analysing and 
considering the fundamental ideas that frame a needs theory approach.
Third, the process of reflection makes it possible to realise the immanent 
potential within the structure of a problem-solving facilitated conflict resolution 
workshop. This immanent moment comes about through both reflection and raising 
claims to validity. Unlike Rothman’s assertion that potentials for critical insight and 
transformation lie within intra-group interactions, the possibility for immanent critique 
and insight, it is argued here, can and does occur among individuals within a particular 
group as well as amongst them. Moreover, this immanent moment is the nexus where 
knowledge meets interests (both strategic and communicative) and where a 
transformation among the participants makes it possible for agreements and consensus 
to be reached. This is an important point for an immanent moment of a potential for
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reaching consensus, produced by a convergence of reflection and raising of claims to 
validity, broadens the space for formally describing a Critical Theory of Peace Practice.
A prescriptive procedure, as detailed by the conflict resolution practitioners, is 
not the task of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. Rather, it is suggested that a formal 
proceduralism and the concept of communicative rationality be included in the 
facilitation process, particularly by a third party who offers a variety of ways of 
conducting the facilitation efforts.
Finally, how we choose to construct the normative foundations of institutions 
and forms of government are the questions that arise from adopting a communicative 
rationality perspective. As discussed earlier, communicative rationality encompasses 
other forms of rationality including the instrumental. This type of rationality has 
come to dominate modem life and affects the conscious decision-making policies and 
abstract inferences in either confirming the status quo or attempting to transform the 
public sphere. Once an agreement has been reached and consensual action can be 
employed, the next step is to postulate how to actualise, in practices of intersubjectively 
constituted social relations, any of these reached agreements. As the theory practice 
relationship is incorporated and understood to be intrinsically linked, a Critical Theory 
of Peace Practice can assist in addressing the ‘re-entry problem’. That is, as praxis 
constitutes both the formulation and implementation of any agreed-upon policies, those 
policies can be contested in the broader public socio-political environment. As the 
process is a dialogical one, if necessary changes can be incorporated to the original set 
of agreed policies.
In order to reconstruct the norms that should govern communities and their 
members, one must adopt a particular moral point of view.^ ®^  Adopting a moral point of 
view means that one takes into account the general effect any consensus may have on 
all those who would be affected by such decisions. It constitutes possibilities for
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comprising normative structures that would assist in making apparent distorted 
communicative structures that translate into direct actions. Distortions at the 
communicative level, which result from an individual’s previous life histories and the 
systemic mechanism that invites institutions to confirm their predominance, produce 
certain types of action or at least favour the outcome of a specific type of action.
It is in the construction of new norms and through communicative rationality 
that one hopes to readdress the Weberian diagnosis of modernity’s pathology of 
instrumental rationality.^®  ^ The pursuit of dominance and technical control are features 
that prolong conflicts. The desire to master and gain control over nature can be seen in 
the continued pursuit and acquisition of economic or military dominance and power. 
The violent methods used to prove that one group of society, or a segment of it, can 
exist only if the other is expelled demonstrate Weber’s cogent diagnosis and forecast of 
modem societies with the dominance of instrumental rationality.^^®
Yet, against this background lies the potential for the emergence of another type 
of rationality.^Power asymmetries, present in the state, the market, and individuals, 
are not excluded in this conception. It is precisely because of unequal relations of 
power among individuals, which is expressed in everyday language, that an ideal speech 
situation is suggested. In it, under the rule of argumentation (U), the ‘force of the better 
argument’ can prevail because of its legitimacy and not efficiency.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, the constitutive components of communicative rationality, which 
forms the methodology of discourse ethics, were carefully examined. It was asserted 
that communicative rationality comprises the methodology for a Critical Theory of 
Peace Practice, since it provides a broader understanding of rationalities that can 
constitute a foundational framework for a facilitated conflict resolution theory. 
Consequently, a Critical Theory of Peace Practice moves beyond the instrumentally 
rationality-based needs theory frameworks of facilitated conflict resolution. It was 
further argued that Habermas’ formal pragmatics contains a universalistic, critical 
dimension that is simultaneously sensitive to contextual variations. Hence, a superior 
account of how individuals can come to reach reasonable agreements is offered.
Unlike the approaches articulated by scholars in the facilitated conflict 
resolution field, a Critical Theory of Peace Practice incorporates the interconnected 
relationship between theory and practice. While the subsequent chapter will explore the 
theoretical underpinnings of this suggested alternative framework, this chapter 
illuminated the preferred methodology of communicative rationality. This inclusion of 
praxis is one key difference between a Critical Theory of Peace Practice and the 
perspectives offered by conflict resolution thinkers. As discussed in the previous 
chapter. Banks recognises the need for bridging the gap between theory and practice. 
However, a suggested framework that connects this relationship is not put forward in his 
writings.
The concept of praxis is taken from Habermas to establish the theory-practice 
relationship and to place it at the centre of a proceduralist methodology. As theory and 
practice are intrinsically linked, during the process of suggesting ways of transforming 
practices, a critical self-reflection on the theories that shape those practices is required. 
Self-reflection and a deconstruction of stated propositions, norms, rules, and so forth.
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reveal the foundational components that underpin social and political structures. A 
critical self-reflection allows an individual to learn about the developments that have led 
to protracted conflictual situations. Moreover, one can begin to formulate ways of 
transforming those socio-political and norm-regulating structures and institutions. 
Hence, it is asserted that self-reflection is a key aspect of formal pragmatics as well as 
in formulating a resolution of conflicts. In short, critical self-reflection and praxis shape 
the outcomes in the social and political worlds. As the extent to which social and 
political actions shape praxis are made explicit in a process of critical self-reflection, the 
influence of both concepts are channelled back into practices, via the process of 
reconstruction. Consequently, these elements, which are overlooked by conflict 
researchers, are included in the communicative rationality methodology of a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice.
As already suggested, conscious conflict resolution, which includes a 
communicative rationality methodology, would mean that the universalisai/ 
particularism and the theory/practice dichotomies can be overcome. The constituent 
components of a method based on communicative rationality points towards praxis, 
which is an interactive, fluid process that shapes practices and theories, since each can 
be, and is, altered through the interaction between them. In conscious conflict 
resolution, universalistic, and particularistic aspects of praxis are viewed as intertwined, 
insofar as an inclusion of moral, ethical, and pragmatic discourses suggest that both the 
general principles that may constitute new norms, as well as the specific contexts and 
cultures of the participants, equally need to be accepted. For a sustainable resolution to 
be practicable, the conflicting parties must be able to agree upon the pragmatic and 
moral aspects of a legitimate resolution that respects their differing ethical value 
orientations.
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Only a broad formal framework can and should be outlined, as a communicative 
rationality-based method allows for the participants (including third parties) to explore 
as many alternative ways of resolving conflicts as necessary, to grasp the potential for 
reaching consensus. Adopting a method based on communicative rationality alters the 
substantive approach to facilitated conflict resolution problem-solving workshops. At 
the formalistic procedural level, individuals’ subjective and cognitive attitudes affect 
their actions. It follows that a communicatively-informed rationality would produce a 
different grounding for a theory of practising peace. The foundation is one of language 
and the process of communication rather than premising a framework on instrumental 
rationality and needs theories which call for facilitated analysis. An alternative Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice is interested in more than an analytic process of altering 
perceptions or changing attitudes. The methodology is concerned with addressing the 
validity of individuals’ claims so that not only perceptions and attitudes, but new norms 
and institutions can be imagined. Moreover, rather than a conflict resolution endeavour, 
a Critical Theory of Peace Practice is intended to be applicable beyond the workshop 
environment to the public sphere by a variety of individuals, groups, and communities.
A theory that takes into account the concept of communicative rationality and 
the method it implies would present more possibilities for realising the original intent of 
facilitated conflict resolution scholars such as Burton. A communicative rationality 
methodology suggests a different type of facilitation process than those formulated 
either by practitioners within the discipline or the participants of the Oslo Channel in at 
least three ways.
First, the role of the third-party team would be altered. In a perspective based on 
communicative rationality, third parties are active participants. By offering ideas and 
information regarding types of approaches in conflict resolution and the process of 
critical self-reflection, they contribute to the creation of the procedural format of the
218
process as well as the outcome of any reached consensual agreements. By assisting the 
disputants in a process of critical self-reflection, third parties can present the sum of 
such processes. More importantly, in so far as they participate by a myriad of ways, 
including offering ideas for moving beyond the protracted conflict situation, clarifying 
interpretations, exploring ideas put forward by the disputants, and so forth, the third- 
party role is an interactive one. This differs from the ‘interactive’ nature assigned to 
problem-solving workshops by Kelman and Fisher, since their formulations indicate 
that only the conflicting parties interact with one another .^The third parties are not 
meant to contribute in any significant manner to the outline of any resolution.
Of course, the disputants must decide the content of any agreements. However, 
third parties can and do play a more proactive role than a facilitator who assists in 
analysing the hidden causes of conflicts. Third parties can take up a neutral position, 
while simultaneously contributing toward the process of considering if consensual 
agreements can be formulated and accepted. Furthermore, third parties would offer a 
variety of possible methods that might be chosen for attempting conflict resolution, 
including the formal pragmatics approach. Consequently, the participants can engage in 
argumentation where contested positions and norms are raised for examination, 
according to the validity claims of truthfulness, sincerity, normative rightness, and 
legitimacy. The procedure, as outlined in this chapter, can be put forward in simpler 
terms and offered as one possible way of discussing how to move from a deadlock to a 
progressive environment, where transformation of the conflict can be conceived and 
applied. Hence, this conception of a third-party role also differs from the Oslo Channel, 
where the Norwegian third parties played an administrative role. The interactions 
between them and the disputants were even more restricted. As a result, the disputants 
are left to negotiate compromises without being given an opportunity to explore other 
ways of transforming conflicts. It is fair to say that this limited role of a third party was.
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in part, predetermined by the d isputants/H owever,  as Terje Rpd-Larsen maintains, 
the leader of the third-party team, the administrative role and the type of facilitative 
assistance were also defined by the third parties.
Ultimately, an inclusion of a communicative rationality method would expand 
the procedural guidelines for engaging in facilitation efforts, so that no option is 
excluded from the project of resolving deep-rooted conflicts. Therefore, the third party 
role in a Critical Theory of Peace Practice would be recognised as a direct participant, 
which at the methodology level expands the definition ascribed to this role by facilitated 
conflict resolution approaches. The expanded role allows equal participation amongst 
all the participants.
Second, the process of facilitation would be a dialogical one. That is, under the 
rule of argumentation, the participants would orient themselves toward listening and 
attempting to understand the other positions that may be contrary to their own. The role 
of communication occupies centre stage in this proposed alternative method. The 
understanding of a communicative process, ensuring that messages are understood and 
delivered clearly, changes in a communicative rationality method. While this point is 
included, participants focus on contesting propositions and claims to validity. 
Contestations can lead to an exploration of previously unconsidered and unconceived 
possibilities, which can contribute toward the formulation of agreements.
In short, an expanded concept of rationality can result from a process based on 
dialogues. The facilitation process would encompass more than the instrumental, 
strategic goal of achieving success. Although this is an important component of conflict 
resolution, by engaging in a dialogical form of argumentation, third parties would assist 
in the re-establishment of broken and distorted communication. Consequently, both the 
positive and negative effects of communication can be considered. Additionally, in the
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process of reconstruction, dialogues help in formulating ways of sustaining the norms 
and institutions that are being recast.
A dialogical process, in facilitation efforts such as the one practised in the Oslo 
Channel, would concentrate on the cementing of norm-building and institution-building, 
rather than focus on fostering the development of personal relationships. That is, as 
participants intersubjectively arrive at agreements of how to reshape institutions and 
norms, through listening and taking up the other’s position in the process of 
argumentation, ways of buttressing any reached agreements in the long term can be 
incorporated into refining the immediate set of consensual agreements. Consequently, 
if certain participants are replaced or remove themselves from a facilitation and peace 
process, the attained confidence-building does not have to vanish with those 
individuals’ departures. Simultaneously, an employment of the communicative 
rationality method in the public sphere can assist in the building of new norms so that 
institutions that reflect changed political arrangements can be established and 
developed. The focus would be on constructing new norms and institutions by all 
participants. As all positions and ideas are equally explored, the confidence built during 
the process of contesting validity claims can help in the concrétisation of those 
agreements.
This leads to the third point. The question of re-entry can be better tackled by 
following a communicative rationality method. The rule of argumentation that governs 
the facilitation process can be transferred to a broader environment. In the public 
sphere, individuals, groups, and communities can engage in a similar contestation of 
ideas and propositions. The substantive procedure may vary according to specific 
contexts, yet general principles of how to construct norms and institutions can be 
arrived at by engaging in critical self-reflection and a dialogical process. Additionally, 
as praxis constitutes and is constituted by practices, the task of transferring any reach
221
consensus to a broader level is taken into account in the suggested alternative 
methodology.
A communicative rationality procedural framework would have presented an 
opportunity for the Oslo Channel participants to engage in a process of argumentation 
and self-reflection along with the concrete agreements. That is, the specified content 
and context, as well as the general principles of any reached agreements, would be 
explored in the broader social and political arenas. As the participants concentrated on 
the content, ways of sustaining the legitimacy of reached agreements were overlooked. 
Similarly, the facilitated conflict resolution literature takes account of the context, the 
necessary culture for facilitating conflicts, but neglects the formulation of general 
principles and procedures that can be transferred from the workshop setting to the wider 
socio-political spheres. Therefore, the conflict resolution scholars and practitioners 
remain bound to describing specific procedures for carrying out problem-solving 
exercises. A theory based on communicative rationality includes all three dimensions: 
the development of contents and principles as well as sustainable contexts which can 
assist in concretising agreements and altering public opinion.
The process of raising and justifying claims to validity by participants in a 
variety of discourses, with the aid of the third party who takes into account 
communicative rationality, may mean an earlier seizing of the potential present in the 
self-reflection, which involves critical deconstruction. Consequently, if conflicting 
parties realise the potential and explore ways of reaching consensus at an earlier stage 
than they would in traditionally-facilitated conflict resolution practices, transformation 
of normatively-regulated political structures and institutions can be more fully explored 
and imagined.
In sum, it is through the medium of language and discursively redeemed validity 
claims that ideas are exchanged and political change implemented. Therefore, a
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linguistic methodology of communicative rationality is necessary for a Critical Theory 
of Peace Practice. This formal proceduralism is grounded on discourse ethics. The 
assumptions and insights discourse ethics offers in formulating a Critical Theory of 
Practice is the focus of the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
Discourse Ethics: Meta-theory for a Critical Theory of Peace Practice
Introduction
In the previous chapter, the methodological basis for formulating a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice was put forward. It was asserted that this procedural 
framework for an alternative theory of facilitated conflict should be grounded on 
communicative rationality, since this inclusive concept would allow conflicting parties 
to judge the validity of claims by discursive means. In this chapter, the theoretical 
framework that should underlie this method, and the philosophical heritage from which 
it is derived, will be explicated. Additionally, the implications and insights that a 
Critical Theory of Peace Practice framework can offer for facilitated conflict resolution 
approaches, which are conceived on a different type of rationality will be outlined. 
Finally, the ways in which this alternative perspective can contribute to peace practices 
will be discussed.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the idea of discourse ethics and 
its constituent components will be outlined. Second, the foundation for a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice will be articulated. Third, the differences between this option 
and other approaches to facilitated conflict resolution will be examined. The final 
section will address how this alternative may contribute to peace practices.
Discourse Ethics: A Foundation
Discourse ethics stands or falls with two assumptions. Firstly, normative claims to validity have 
cognitive meaning...Secondly, justification of norms and commands require that a real discourse be 
carried out and thus cannot occur in a monological form.*
—Jürgen Habermas, 1990
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As communicative rationality forms the methodology of a Critical Theory of 
Peace Practice, discourse ethics, as outlined by Habermas, constitutes the theoretical 
framework and philosophical position of the proposed alternative perspective. 
Discourse ethics is interested in how we, as socialised individuals, communicate in an 
intersubjective environment, as well as negotiate the transformation of public 
institutions as it focuses on moving from the narrow environment of reaching 
agreements between political leaders to affecting change at the broader societal level. 
Communicative rationality is integral to discourse ethics, which takes account of the 
individual and his or her social contexts.
In formulating discourse ethics, Habermas incorporates the ideas of Kant and 
Hegel.^ However, Kant’s original transcendental assertions are modified. That is, the 
individual is no longer viewed as an abstract construction, but is contextualised in his or 
her social milieu. Simultaneously, Hegel’s understanding of a social subject is 
incorporated by Habermas.^ In combining elements of Kant and Hegel, the discourse 
ethics framework is formalistic in the sense that only general principles and guidelines 
are suggested. This formalism of discourse ethics is aimed at reconstructing practical 
reason, locating interaction in the intersubjectively constituted social world and 
highlighting ways of reaching consensus. Similar to communicative action, which is 
intrinsically related to communicative rationality, discourse ethics is not prescriptive, 
since only the interacting individuals can legitimate the agreed-upon normative 
structures in praxis.
A discourse ethics framework demarcates the boundaries between what is the 
‘good life’ from what is right, since the former can only be discursively redeemed in 
individual cultural-social practices, whereas the latter can be universalised. The 
rightness of an uttered statement is discerned through a process of contesting claims to 
validity, where participants can judge the facticity or falsity of arguments that are put
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forward. Since this Habermasian discourse ethics informs the foundation of a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice, its constitutive elements will be explicated.
The Discourse Ethics Principle
The principle of discourse ethics (D) refers to a procedure: the discursive 
reappropriation of normative claims to validity. D is formal since ‘it provides no 
substantive guidelines, but only a procedure: practical discourse’.'* Practical discourse, 
as part of formal discourse ethics, is not a procedure for producing justified norms, but 
points to a method of communicative rationality which is designed to test the validity of 
norms that are being proposed for adoption by participants. This means that practical 
discourses depend on the content brought to them from the outside world. In other 
words, the social environment directly influences the participants’ presuppositions and 
predispositions, which include values, beliefs systems, and cultural traditions. These 
discourses hinge on the contexts, which in turn, are built on differing values. Habermas 
refers to this as the ‘lifeworld’.^  Habermas argues that as cognitive subjects interact in a 
communication community, the historical background or lifeworlds of each individual 
is integrated into the actions and communicative statements that each puts forward for 
interpretation and understanding.^ A dispute about norms is still rooted in the struggle 
for recognition.
Justification offered for a quasi-transcendental nature of discourse ethics is 
similar to the defence put forward for the universalisation principle. That is, since 
subjects act and aim to make sense or communicate through the medium of language, 
the formal nature of discourse ethics allows for universal application of this idea. The 
content can only be contextual and contingent as participants to a communicative 
process bring to bear their own cultural and social orientations. However, since 
individuals arrive at consensus or disagreements through the shared medium of
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language, the idea of discourse ethics remains universal. It is true to say that this idea is 
a product of particular socio-historical and cultural traditions of experiences lived by 
western European intellectual (often white male) scholars. Nevertheless, a concept that 
infers individuals attempt to reflect on the shaping of norms, based on contestation of 
validity claims, implies that discourse ethics can be applied in a variety of cultures and 
systems. Although ‘cultural values’ may ‘claim’ intersubjective acceptance, they 
cannot ‘claim normative validity in the strict sense’. That is, ‘by their very nature, 
cultural values are at best candidates for embodiment of norms that are designed to 
express a general interest’.^
As discourse ethics is intended to cut across cultural and socio-historical 
cleavages (although taking account of them in the process of argumentation) the 
heritage of Kant’s ideas concerning reflection and rationality is evident in this 
formulation. That is, according to Habermas, reflection is traditionally used to refer both 
to a subject’s reflection on what makes it possible for him or her to perform certain actions 
and then to adopt a more critical insight towards the distortions, which are often built into 
processes of communication, as well as the perpetuation of norms and institutions. 
Rationality is seen as an emergent form of human life.  ^ Reflection is emphasised and 
rationality is understood to account for practical reason, a point that will be elaborated 
shortly. But returning to the issue at hand, both reflection and rationality show the 
direction, as does communicative rationahty, of the type of deontological ethics asserted 
by Habermas. In deontological ethics, the emphasis shifts from concentrating on the value 
preferences of the concerned individuals to rationally debating practical questions, such 
as those that hold out the prospects for consensus.
Discourse ethics implies that it is crucial to contest the validity of normative 
superstructures. In this way, it transcends local conventions. In other words
No participant in argumentation can escape this claim as long as he takes a performative attitude, 
confronts normative claims to validity seriously and does not objectify norms as social facts, i.e., 
avoids reducing them to something that is simply found in the world.^
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Practical discourses must address inter alia the question of how needs are 
adequately interpreted. In turn, it is linked with two forms of argumentation: aesthetic 
and therapeutic. Agents reflexively consider these in intersubjective communication to 
the extent that stated propositions are contested and either accepted or refuted and 
modified. But if forms of argumentation constitute a system and cannot be isolated 
from one another, then the socio-historical contexts embedded within discourses 
become intrinsic and inseparable from the practice of practical discourses. In short, a 
complete subsumption of value spheres can lead to a bounded discourse ethics in that its 
constituent components will not allow the principle to escape and emancipate itself 
towards reconstructing normative structures.
One could rightly assert then that in facilitated conflict resolution literature 
generally, and in the writings of Burton more specifically, the subordination of values 
under a needs-theory philosophy all too often stifles the potential implicit in the 
methodology of problem-solving workshops. Burton and his predecessors are clear in 
their aim when proposing the problem-solving method as one that should promote free 
and uncoerced arguments, out of which consensus may be reached by all the 
participants. However, by grounding the method on needs rather than communicative 
rationality and the role of discourse, these scholars and practitioners remain stymied in 
the primary analytical task of intervening according to specific guidelines, and more 
importantly, continue to think about conflict resolution in instrumentalist terms. A 
discourse ethics-based philosophical grounding opens up the consideration for various 
claims as to what is and is not valid, as well as to alternative types of rationality inherent 
in everyday communicative practices. As Habermas asserts
Practical discourse resembles islands threatened with inundation in a sea of practice where the pattern 
of consensual conflict resolution is by no means the dominant one. The means of reaching agreement 
are repeatedly thrust aside by instruments of force. Hence, actions that are oriented towards ethical 
principles have to accommodate it, to imperatives that flow not from principles but from strategic 
necessities.
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In practical discourses, both the normative validity of individual’s socialisation 
process and institutional norms can and are critically addressed. Habermas’ inclusion of 
Weber’s description of the development of modernity is designed to demonstrate that 
morality and ethics can be changed, since they have been constructed for certain 
purposes. That is, Weber asserts that the Europeans have come to construct and 
legitimate separate spheres of value such as law, morality, and art into spheres of truth, 
taste, and justice. These differentiated spheres are present in the lifeworlds of 
individuals, which in turn, shape moral and evaluative questions; that is, what is valid or 
right versus what is good or how can one be happy. As Habermas puts it
Lifeworlds appear as practice with which theory is to be mediated as life, with which art is to be 
reconciled or to ethical life to which morality must be related...Thus the development of moral points 
of view goes hand in hand with the differentiation within the practical into moral questions and 
evaluative questions.'^
Questions concerning moral points of view can be decided rationally based on 
justice or reflective general interest whereas evaluative questions only address self- 
realisation: how to live the good life. These latter questions of ethics can be explored in 
concrete socio-historical situations and individual lives. These answers are dependent 
on the value spheres that individuals inherit and learn. In contrast, the question of 
rightness belong to the abstract formal realm where one can establish procedures for 
judging the validity of statements and norms so that they may be re-negotiated. In sum, 
although discourse ethics encompasses individual lifeworlds and the system of society, 
the questions that these particular forms produce can only be answered in concrete 
cultural contexts and practices.
The formal concept of discourse ethics with practical discourse (as one 
important constituent element) is universalisable, since it aims to explicate how valid 
norms may be arrived at and on what basis they may be consensually reconstructed. 
Since Habermas includes the neglected conception of reason articulated by Kant, this 
thesis explores a possible foundation that is excluded by the facilitated conflict
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resolution scholars and practitioners. As discussed in chapters two and three, 
instrumental rationality that underlies the facilitated conflict resolution approaches 
limits the potential of allowing disputants to reach their own resolution and to instil 
transformation at a broader societal level. The frameworks are bounded by the 
rationality they aim to escape. That is, by conceiving problems in terms of means and 
ends, thinkers such as Burton, Fisher, Kelman, and Rothman fail to identify real sources 
of conflicts, while simultaneously ignoring other aspects that underlie their theoretical 
orientations. The shortcomings of their theoretical frameworks require that we identify 
and develop alternative foundations since a processes of critical self reflection on their 
underlying meta-theories is neglected. A critical self-reflection involves deconstruction 
of the foundations that underlie theories. By engaging in such a process, either other 
types of rationality may be considered or the boundedness of instrumental rationality 
may become evident. In order to articulate an alternative to instrumental rationality, 
Habermas re-examines and modifies Kant’s ideas. First, let us briefly turn to the 
reconstruction of Kant.
Restoring Reason and Locating Rationality
Habermas distinguishes strategic/purposive action from normatively regulated 
and communicative action. Strategic action involves instrumental forms of knowledge 
guiding interests. That is, individuals aim to achieve a particular goal using the most 
efficient means at their disposal. This purposive action, Habermas points out, does not 
always converge with moral action. But by appealing to reason and thereby criticising 
immoral action, he rightly argues that moral judgements can be associated with claims 
to v a l id i ty .T h e  raising and contestation of these claims to validity are cognitive acts. 
However, the questioning of validity claims in modem sciences in which purposive
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rational action is most highly prized has become marginalised. The cognitive nature of 
moral judging means that:
An individual life history or an intersubjectively shared form of life is the horizon within which 
participants can critically appropriate their past with a view to existing possibilities of action.'^
Through reflection on these lifeworlds and the systems of institutions, possible 
ways of transforming existing normative structures can be enacted. This act of 
reflection is carried out by agents at the levels of the objective, social and 
intersubjective worlds. Therefore, discourse ethics can at most suggest ‘general features 
of self-reflection’ and the appropriate types of associated communicative actions.
Since reflection can reveal the paths individuals may choose to construct or 
reconstruct both morality and ethics, it is important to reiterate the Habermasian 
distinction between them. Morality refers to adopting a moral point of view (defined as 
something related to general stable principles and formal procedures); that is, taking up 
the other’s position and judging contested propositions and ideas according to the 
validity claims of truthfulness, normative rightness, and sincerity, as well as 
leg it imacy.Eth ics  refers to constructing answers to how one can live the good life. 
Ethical questions are therefore concerned with individual’s personal satisfaction with 
him or herself and their place in the larger community. Since questions explored 
following a moral point of view are concerned with formulating general principles for 
building or reconstructing social norms and political institutions, it is the moral point of 
view that informs the foundation of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice.
Habermas rightly insists that philosophy aims to illuminate and expose the 
constituents and possible alternative ways of reconstructing general norms and 
institutions. The content can, and should be, filled in by those who are affected by a 
particular situation such as a specified protracted unresolved conflict. The task of a 
philosophical grounding is to elaborate these features. A moral point of view thus 
preoccupies us here.^  ^ A moral point of view means that each impartially considers
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questions of justice; namely, whether claims of particular statements are valid. As 
Habermas suggests:
The moral point of view requires that maxims and contested interests be generalised, which compels 
the participants to transcend the social and historical contexts of their particular form of life and 
particular community and adopt the perspective of all those possibly affected.^®
As the above quote illustrates, this understanding of the moral point of view 
differs from the commonly understood definition in everyday life where morality, or 
words associated with this meaning, refers to the correct or socially accepted behaviour 
of individuals. Burton, in his conflict resolution theory writings, rightly suggests that 
no one individual can be given preferential treatment if the transformative process that 
the resolution process is designed to instil is to succeed.^  ^ However, he, like conflict 
resolution scholars including Kelman, tends to associate moral points of view with 
specific circumstances and situations. Therefore, a moral point of view is associated 
with ethical questions.
However, Habermas considers a moral point of view as being concerned with 
addressing general questions and principles. Hence, he reverses the common 
delineation between ethics and morals. Ethics is usually understood to mean exploring 
general norms, while morality is seen to encompass specific questions of conduct. This 
converse conception is a helpful development in Habermas’ theoretical formulation, 
since addressing moral questions allows the raising of validity claims. Consequently, 
the role intersubjective communicative interactions plays in shaping praxis can be 
included in a theoretical framework for practising peace. More significantly, the moral 
point of view allows the construction of a theory and practice that can be based on 
communicative rationality, which encompasses other types of rationalities. For this 
reason, Habermas’ modification of Kant’s categorical imperative and transcendental 
pragmatics are retained in a theoretical formulation of a Critical Theory of Peace 
Practice. Habermas asserts that the individual in isolation cannot alone outline the 
validity of particular maxims—how everyone should behave comprises the same rule
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according to which one also ought to act. In the attempt to locate the individual in the 
social-contextual horizon of his or her culture and membership to society, Habermas 
instead reshapes the principle of the categorical imperative.^^ Rather than a belief in the 
perfectibility of man through reason, the individual is understood to be a social being 
who operates in the lifeworld of his or her culture and is shaped by a system of distorted 
communication. This communicatively competent agent not only modifies his or her 
views of social reality, but influences others by interacting with subjects in that social 
world.
The Kantian component of the question of justice is helpful in thinking about a 
practicable theory of communicative rationality, since through the process of moral 
argumentation, agents can consider the possible consequences of what is agreed in a 
specific setting or in the public sphere. In other words, the question of justice, the 
process of judging claims to validity, or the moral point of view is modified to have, at 
its base, a quasi-transcendental pragmatics. Furthermore, language forms the vehicle 
through which intentions and actions are conveyed, interpreted, and realised. 
Habermas’ adjustment of the Kantian formalist ethics is helpful for a facilitated conflict 
resolution perspective. By adopting the universalisation principle, the connections 
between the individual and the social environment are taken into account. In short, the 
intersubjective nature of communication means that the interaction between the 
speaking and acting subjects with the social world are seen to equally influence the 
perceptions, beliefs, and actions of opposing conflictual parties. By positing language 
as the medium of social interaction in which reflection and discourses, through the 
process of argumentation, can lead to a transformation of existing normative structures, 
the specific Kantian-inspired understanding of the moral point of view allows 
individuals to question what is moral, as well as how that knowledge comes to be either 
accepted as valid or rejected.
237
In formulating a more flexible and a praxis-oriented philosophical grounding for 
a theory, Habermas outlines a procedure forjudging claims to validity As he puts it:
If we understand prepositional truth as a claim raised, constitutive speech acts that can be redeemed 
discursively only under the exacting communicative presuppositions of argumentation, the claim to 
rightness raised in regulative speech acts which is analogous to the claim to truth can be freed from 
assumptions concerning correspondence/'*
In other words, if propositional truth claims can be contested, then under the 
conditions of all speaking and acting subjects aiming toward reaching understanding, 
claims to the validity of norms and statements can also be contested. We engage in 
such communicative processes on an everyday basis in order to make sense of the 
present social reality at the cognitive level. The point here is that since we participate in 
the act of communicating, each actor performing these tasks possesses the pragmatic 
presuppositions and can hence, orient themselves towards reaching understanding. The 
procedural framework suggested for raising and contesting validity claims at the level of 
theorising is the rule of argumentation. Again, this idea arises out of concrete practices. 
However, the formalising process suggests that argumentation should come to mean not 
monological forms of speeches, but interactive dialoguing: approximating an ideal 
speech situation is suggested for judging validity claims so that individuals can explore 
positions of others and attempt to understand them.^^
In an approximated ideal speech situation, those who enter into a dialogue are 
not obligated to any particular mode of conducting themselves. In other words, it is 
only the unforced force o f the better argument that can prevail.^  ^ Individuals become 
aware of the socially constructed nature of normative values and by employing the rule 
of argumentation, judgements can be rendered regarding the validity of various 
propositions. The rule of argumentation is a part of discourse ethics. It follows that 
discourse ethics is meant to locate a rule of argumentation where moral norms can be 
justified. Moral principle performs the role of a rule of argumentation, where rules are
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understood as the validity claims to truthfulness, sincerity, and normative rightness, 
only for justifying moral judgements .The rule of argumentation justifies
Generalised behavioural expectations or modes of action...norms that underlie the general practice...U 
belongs properly to the justificatory discourses in which we test the validity of universal precepts or 
their simple or double negations, prohibitions and permissions.^*
In formulating this aspect of discourse ethics, influences of Karl Otto-Apel and 
Klaus Gunther are evident.^  ^ Habermas asserts that a norm could be accepted as valid 
and appropriate when the ‘consequences and side effects of its general observance for 
the interests of each individual in every particular situation’ could be accepted by the 
participants.^® Raising the need to think about the side effects show what is meant by 
justificatory discourses. They cannot expunge the notion of impartiality, but they can 
contextualise it. In other words, in the discourses of application, the principle of 
appropriateness takes on the role played by the universalisation principle in justificatory 
discourses.^^ The two parallel principles of appropriateness bring to bear hermeneutic 
insights and universal pragmatics—which assert that consensus-building is a 
universalisable act employed by all human agents—bridge and help to actualise a 
discourse ethics-based approach. For example, in a discourse ethics framework, all 
parties including third parties are viewed as observer-participants. Each individual is 
both an observer of the social world in which he or she interacts and is simultaneously, 
a participant insofar as he or she can influence social norms:
The impartiality of judgement...is essentially dependent on whether the conflicting needs and interests 
of all participants are given their due and can be taken into consideration from the viewpoint of the 
participants themselves.^^
In the Habermasian discourse ethics being set out here, the integrity of the 
individual is maintained in the right of each to contest the validity of the other’s 
positions. Furthermore, the justification of norms is based on any uncoerced rational 
agreements, which may be reached by participants in this process. This necessarily 
involves an abstraction of general norms. Although abstraction may appear unhelpful 
for grounding a framework that includes a dimension of practice, the formal nature of
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discourse ethics allows social groups and individuals to include the general guidelines 
of moral insights, as well as the procedure of communicative rationality.
In short, the combination of the rule of argumentation (which is tied to universal 
pragmatics), the modification of the categorical imperative and the inclusion of an ideal 
speech situation provide important starting points for constructing a Critical Theory of 
Peace Practice. A discourse ethics approach is suggested for facilitated conflict 
resolution, since it encompasses the concept of praxis (the intrinsic inseparability of 
theory and practice) in which the reconstitution of normative structures and social 
relations can be realised. When claims of particular statements are allowed to be heard, 
despite the often distorted process of communicative interactions, there is a possibility 
inherent in the medium of language for agents to orient themselves toward reaching 
consensual agreements. Within this universal conduit, a basis for co-operative non­
violent social and political coexistence emerges.
The connection between discourse ethics, described by Habermas, and his 
method of communicative rationality can be better understood by examining the 
development of cognitive learning processes. The following stages of moral 
development illuminate the process through which individuals acquire and change 
attitudes and social structures.
Understanding the development of the cognitive learning process presents an 
opening for altering existing normative structures and public political spheres. For this 
endeavour, a comparison with the learning process that a child encounters in forming 
views about him or herself and the society within which he or she is located merits 
closer study. Additionally, the developmental stages of an individual illustrates the 
phases societies undergo as one type of a normative structure is replaced by another. 
The learning process attributed to a child who progresses to the most advanced level 
(the postconventional) resembles the development of societies from the Palaeolithic to
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pre-industrial to modernity. Within modernity’s decentred norm-regulating structures, 
the postconventional stage of morality becomes possible. Although the individual child 
and society exist at different levels, a comparison between individual and society is 
outlined, since the stages of moral development can be evidenced in both spheres.
Social Evolution: The Learning Process
A brief exploration of Lawrence Kohlberg’s central ideas shows that discourse 
ethics is a cognitive-linguistic approach. The American pragmatist puts forward six 
stages of learning that a child follows.^^ These developmental stages, which are 
hierarchical in nature as the child progresses from one to the next, are important in that 
they provide clues as to how moral judgements and the ability to contest claims to 
validity emerge. The learning stages are important as they provide the link between 
moral consciousness and communicative action or the discourse ethics principle and the 
potential it provides for actualising a transformation of positions, norms and institutions.
In Kohlberg’s six stages of development, two are present in the preconventional, 
conventional, and postconventional levels respectively.^"  ^ The first stage concerns the 
level of punishment and obedience. Here, the child obeys authority because he or she 
fears physical harm and punishment. The goal is to avoid physical discomfort: the 
Freudian pleasure-pain principle. Rules are followed to achieve this objective. Second, 
the child moves on to stage two, the level of social interaction. Stage three consists of 
mutual interpersonal expectations. The fourth is the stage of social system and 
conscience maintenance. In the fifth is the stage of prior rights and social contracts. 
Finally, there is the stage of ethical and universal principles. The table on the following 
page fully explicates these developmental stages.
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I
I
?
2.
g
Içn
Ino
îg
Ioss
H-*o\
?
3
Cognitive structures
Perspective
structure
Structure of
behavioral
expectations
Concept of 
authority
Concept of 
motivation
Social perspectives State of
Types of action Perspective Justice concept
moral
judgment
Preconventional 
Interaction 
controlled by 
authority
Reciprocal 
interlocking 
of action 
perspectives
Particular 
behavior pattern
Authority of 
reference persons: 
externally 
sanctioned will
Loyalty to 
reference persons; 
orientation toward Egocentric
perspective
Complementarity 
of order and 
obedience
I
Cooperation 
based on self- 
interest
rewards and 
punishments
Symmetry of 
compensation
2
Conventional 
Role behavior
Coordination 
of observer 
and
participant
perspectives
Group-wide 
generalization of 
behavior 
patterns: social 
roles
Internalized 
authority of 
supraindividual 
will (Mûr): 
loyalty Duty vs.
Primary-
group
perspective
Conformity to 
roles
3
Normatively
governed
interaction
Group-wide 
generalization 
of roles: system 
of norms
Internalized 
authority of an 
impersonal 
collective will 
(M): legitimacy
inclination Perspective of 
a collectivity 
(the system’s 
point of view)
Conformity to 
the existing 
system of norms
4
Postconventional
Discourse
Integration 
of speaker
Rules for testing 
norms: principles
Ideal vs. social Autonomy vs.
Principled 
perspective 
(prior to 
society)
Orientation 
toward principles 
of justice
5
and world 
perspectives
Rules for testing 
principles: a 
procedure for 
justifying norms
validity heteronomy Procedural 
perspective 
(ideal role 
taking)
Orientation
toward
procedures for 
justifying norms
6
242
Kohlberg’s first stage relates to egocentric types of actions. Physical security is 
the focus. In the second stage, the self-interest of the individual is recognised and the 
conflictual nature of this is weighed against the interests of others. The ways of 
overcoming or resolving conflicts, however, remain outside the cognitive capability of 
the person. At the third stage, in which the individual moves from the preconventional 
to the conventional level, the individual sees him or herself in relation to others. Here, 
they learn the importance of shared ideas and the possibility that they may sometimes 
predominate the interests of the individual or groups. The ‘golden rule’ is appropriate 
at this level. At the fourth level, the differentiation between societal and interpersonal 
interests becomes apparent and the idea of a larger social system is integrated into the 
existing learned process. This completes the conventional stage.
The transition from the conventional to the postconventional stage is 
significant.^^ In stage five, the individual is rational in the sense he or she is able to 
reason and is aware of promises and social contracts. Here, contracts are settled through 
agreed principles. Habermas asserts that Rawls remains at this stage. However 
unsatisfactory this view may be, it is relevant here insofar as the utilitarian principle and 
Rawls’ imprints do not encompass the practice of everyday communicative 
interactions—its distortions and the idea of finding new normative structures through 
practical discourse—in the approximation of an unlimited communication community. 
Rawls’ philosophical and theoretical frameworks do not take sufficient account of the 
social milieu in which individuals intersubjectively operate.^  ^ Habermas rightly 
maintains that Rawls’ formulation of the communicative process is too abstract, since 
the social situatedness of discourses are ignored. Furthermore, the utilitarian approach 
preferred by Rawls does not move sufficiently beyond instrumental rationality. 
Additionally, Rawls is interested in ethical questions, which can only address specific 
questions of individual and group value preferences. Since norm and institution-
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building are concerned with general principles, Habermas’ cognitive moral perspective 
is more appropriate for grounding a praxis of facilitated conflict resolution.
Finally, at stage six (the postconventional level) the individual can distinguish 
between moral and legal views and realise the conflictual nature of morality and ethics. 
However, the individual remains confused about how to integrate them, as well as the 
learned knowledge and interests from the previous stages.
In short, the preconventional level is composed of participants in a social 
environment. In contrast, the conventional level includes the observer, since the 
individual is able to distinguish between his or her interests from that of others. Finally, 
the postconventional level brings together (through the medium of language and the 
methodology of communicative rationality) the participant and observer aspects of the 
ego. It is at this postconventional level that participants agree to enter a conflict 
resolution process, not because of their particular developments, but because they have 
agreed beforehand to explore alternative ways of resolving conflicts. Therefore, in the 
postconventional level, new normative structures can be conceived and constructed. 
Here, where norm-guided actions turn into norm testing, is the arena of discourse.^^ It is 
the process of engaging in discourses that brings in the methodology of communicative 
rationality. The nature of interaction between individuals at the postconventional level 
is a significant component that is overlooked in various conflict resolution approaches. 
In contrast, a process that allows for claims to validity to be redeemed through 
discourses comprises a core part of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice.
In facilitated conflict resolution theories and methods, there is an implicit 
understanding that the observer (the intervening third party) is a neutral participant in 
the problem-solving workshop process. This observer role assigned to the third party, 
arises from an instrumental and scientistic approach to the subject. Obviously, the 
disputants are active participants, since their particular prejudices and seemingly
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unchangeable attitudes have led to the protracted conflictual situation. However, 
Burton, Kelman, and Rothman, among others, insist that the third-party role must be 
value-free and neutral.^  ^ Although the particular prejudices of individuals who will 
comprise a third party team must be overcome, as too must those of the disputants for a 
transformative structure to be conceived, an understanding that the third party must be a 
participant and observer by virtue of his or her engagement with the conflict is 
neglected. By realising the dual nature of the individual when he or she is interacting 
with other agents in the social world, the dual modes of overcoming entrenched 
attitudes and ideas can be contested. The method is through the raising of validity 
claims of truthfulness, sincerity, and normative rightness, as well as legitimacy in the 
procedure of argumentation, where individuals are free from compulsion and do not 
have to make commitments or fear that stated propositions will be used against them.
This idea that the third party, by participating in a resolution effort, is an integral 
proactive part of reconstructing normative institutions constitutes a foundational 
element of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. Although the third party offers a 
different perspective, as well as possibly unknown ways of transforming a protracted 
conflict situation, the third party in a discourse ethics-based framework is viewed as a 
full participant and not merely an observer.
Habermas argues this norm-orientating process is necessary in order to translate 
interest-guided behaviours that underlie a conflict resolution process into strategic 
action and the sociocognitive structure of normatively-regulated actions. This stage of 
norms, where the individual can either choose to conform or to reject socially 
acceptable standards of behaviour, serves as the conduit between the inner and outer 
worlds. The cognitive process of employing constative speech acts is now combined 
with the interactive social nature of the normatively-regulated speech acts. The initial 
linkages between the ego and possible ways of actualising autonomy, as well as its
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connectiveness with solidarity to the social community come into the conscious focus. 
The individual does not suddenly realise that he or she is a member of a community, but 
instead understands that he or she is no longer able to be primarily concerned with only 
fulfilling their own needs. The social links that comprise a multitude of lifeworlds, 
which shape and are simultaneously shaped by the participant-observer, must be 
accounted for.
The next movement is from the conventional to postconventional level where 
the individual realises the decentred nature of his or her understanding. ‘Decentred’ 
means the questioning and self-reflection on the apparent natural cohesion of the social 
network to which the individual belongs. What results is an understanding that the 
social world is not simply a force that solely impinges or directs the person, but the 
agent has the ability, however minute (by virtue of participation) to shape that social 
world. In other words, the speaker, hearer, and bystander perspectives are all 
constitutive and constituted through the intersubjective employment of discourses and 
communicative rationality. The broader framework of the system comes into play here. 
A collection of lifeworlds and the wide background of society feature in the mix of 
redeeming a new, possibly transformative, social reality through discourses. 
Argumentation, as part of universal pragmatics, serves as a rule or set of procedures that 
involve the contesting and raising of validity claims, namely communicative rationality 
and communicative action.
Discourses are the reflection of that conununicative rationality and action and 
thus constitute an essential feature of a discourse ethics approach.'^® Conflicts are settled 
here through means of reasoning, rather than adhering and turning to the existing 
normatively-regulated structures, the physical harm avoidance tactics or strategic action 
present in the preconventional level.
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The discursive procedure is the very praxis of communicative rationality where 
the autonomous subject can aim towards reaching understanding and consensus in an 
approximation of the ideal speech situation. The process of judging from a moral point 
of view about the validity of normative structures is, in the end, an attempt to reach 
mutual understanding.'^  ^ Thus, in the postconventional level, the normatively-regulated 
and strategic actions are subsumed in the expressive or representative speech acts in 
argumentation. For instance, authority, which is at first obeyed to ensure physical 
security, becomes arbitrary and the legitimacy of that authority is questioned. Once the 
legitimacy of an act or set of ideas come into doubt, there is a process of restructuring 
which occurs through the thematisation of lifeworlds that constitute these questions.
In sum, Kohlberg’s outline of the three levels demonstrates the role 
communicative rationality plays in the construction of a discourse ethics approach. The 
movement from the conventional to the postconventional is the key here to 
understanding the role that discourse plays, and the importance of retaining the Kantian 
reflective judgement to link the different positions of the moral and the ethical. In other 
words, raising the moral questions of how is valid judgement possible, or in this 
author’s case, how is a valid meta-theory of peace practice to be constructed, present an 
opportunity for exploring and developing a philosophical grounding for a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice. This alternative framework for a facilitated conflict 
resolution is based on a discourse ethics-informed foundation. A formal proceduralist 
approach allows for the justifications and judgements regarding the validity of 
statements among participants to be carried out in the interactive process of dialoguing. 
At the same time, a discourse ethics-based theoretical frame presents the possibility for 
a theory to be critical. This, in turn, means that the foundation can and should be altered 
in light of continued re-evaluation and insights offered by praxis over time. In order to 
reconstruct socio-political institutions and to resolve conflicts, it is important to
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critically reflect on the existing norms and institutions. Consequently, the underlying 
assumptions that perpetuate them can be seen as constructed norms and institutions. 
Once norms and institutions are viewed as constructed, they can be reshaped and 
reconstructed. The process of critical self reflection and deconstruction is carried out by 
discursive means. In the process of raising and contesting claims to validity, moral 
judgements are arrived at that may lead to consensual change.
Habermas’ comparison between Palaeolithic, medieval, and modem societies is 
intended to demonstrate that reproduction of lifeworlds and systems affect individual 
life histories in similar ways. That is, societal and individual evolution of moral 
cognitive development can be seen as a continual and gradual distorted process, that 
continues and is reproduced between and among modem societies. This assertion is 
significant for a Critical Theory of Peace Practice to the extent that there are different 
cognitive moral levels of understanding and actions that shape protracted conflicts. 
These may occur simultaneously, unlike Habermas’ evolutionary framing. However, in 
the process of attempting to transform violent deep-rooted conflicts, a phased transition 
is often necessary in order to move from entrenched attitudes and unwillingness to 
listen, to a situation where the disputants realise the possibility presented by engaging in 
dialogues.
Since it is the task of third parties to suggest this altemative perspective, 
Habermas’ analysis of different societal orders and the types of political institutions 
they produce offers further support to the basic argument. Different societal orders are 
grounded in different communicative practices. Kohlberg’s three level distinction is 
reflected in Habermas’ delineation between three orders of societal development. They 
are archaic/Palaeolithic, developed/civilised, and modem/decentred."^  ^ The Palaeolithic 
is grounded in mythology and is developed in a cosmologically-oriented praxis. In the 
second stage of developed and civilised societal order, the church and the state.
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embodied by the clergy and the monarchy, orient and structure social behavioural 
expectations and norms. Finally, in a modem social order, as religion and the mle of 
kings fall away, institutions are replaced by the previously ordering ones in a complex 
web of conflicting choices. This is what is meant by the decentring of the world. The 
individual can choose from a wide variety to order his or her behavioural expectations 
and norms. At the same time, modernity presents the possibility for a 
critical/reflexively-oriented praxis. Consequently, one could argue that modernity is 
itself defined by individuals’ capacities to reflect upon their relationships, institutions, 
and norms that govern political communities.
In short, in a Palaeolithic societal stmcture, notions of the good are derived from 
the mythological. There is no distinct consciousness of dual modes of socialisation. An 
individual’s place is viewed as a part of the natural whole. What is tme is also ethically 
correct. In the second stage of feudalism, there is a theocentric understanding of the 
good. That is, the preferred order consists of understanding that the monarch forms the 
bridge between this world and the next. Therefore, participants need to develop a 
practical ethos that shows members how to bring nature closer to God. What results is a 
heavenly order on Earth: feudal kingdoms and religious republics.
In the fluid societies of modernity, a reasonable conception of the good replaces 
the dominant theocentric view. The process of formulating order or building normative 
structures are intersubjectively constructed through open-ended reflective discourses. 
The social world is grounded in criticisable rational principles:
To put it briefly, in place of exemplary instructions in the virtuous life and recommended models of the 
‘good life’, one finds an increasingly pronounced, abstract demand for a consciousness, self-critical 
appropriation, the demand that one responsibility makes possession of one’s own individual, 
irreplaceable, and contingent life history,'*^
The abstracting of the self does not lead to a fa it accompli of either alienation 
from the social environment or a cage where social relations are produced in terms of 
concrete power. Rather, in the decentring process of no longer conceiving oneself in
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relation to either monarch or nature, the individual has the possibility to contextualise 
social interactions in a variety of frames. That is, political and social institutions can be 
restructured.
Yet modem society as described by Habermas should be seen as not the most 
developed in evolutionary terms. Rather, it is an analogy of a type of societal 
structuring that allows for transformation to be undertaken by individuals. The modem 
societal order relates to the postconventional level of cognitive moral development 
insofar as at the postconventional modem stage, agents possess the capacity to orient 
themselves toward reaching consensus and understanding. Since individuals are no 
longer obligated to give absolute allegiance to an absolute mler or groups, this creates 
the opportunity to constmct norms and institutions through dialoguing.
Thus, Kohlberg’s leaming process, and the considerations of these different 
societal orders, are designed to show that individuals in modemity can create and 
transform currently inadequate and distorted stmctures of norms. It is fair to say that 
Habermas agrees with the Weberian diagnosis that modemity has produced a share of 
pathologies that have led to the predominance of one type of ordering based on success 
and instmmental rationality.'^  ^ However, Habermas’ insistence that other types of 
rationality can be grasped to constmct and transform public spheres is a central 
component for formulating a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. That is, the 
communicative rationality and practical reason, which have become subordinated to 
instmmental rationality, have much to contribute in grounding a theory for facilitated 
conflict resolution. A framework that features communicative rationality offers an 
expanded conception of rationality. A move away from this strategic and technical 
reason brings up the cmcial role of intersubjective communicative action. As 
communicative rationality flows from and simultaneously comprises discourse ethics, 
the proposed altemative framework can be constmcted on a discourse ethics foundation.
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A theory grounded on discourse ethics introduces the concepts of critique, self­
reflection, and practical reason. These dimensions are overlooked in facilitated conflict 
resolution approaches as those perspectives remain committed to an instrumental 
rationality foundation. Therefore, the focus remains on describing facilitation formats 
and categorising types of third parties, rather than exploring ways of realising an 
individual’s potential for reaching consensus. Furthermore, by grounding a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice on a discourse ethics foundation, particular ways of resolving 
conflicts are open to change as no specific steps are prescribed for disputants and third 
parties to follow. In this way, the formal procedural methodology that is based on 
communicative rationality provides the opening for participants to formulate 
agreements in a process of argumentation and contesting ideas, according to the validity 
claims of truthfulness, normative rightness, sincerity and legitimacy.
A Critical Theory of Peace Practice
46The validity of all norms is tied to discursive will formation.
—Jürgen Habermas, 1975
It is clear that the inferences drawn from the methodology of communicative 
rationality in the previous chapter filters through to a meta-theory of discourse ethics. 
The higher level of discourse ethics is meant to demonstrate that every relationship 
among individuals, groups, and societies is built on cognitive functions. It follows that 
if the content of constructing and practising moral points of view and the process of 
judging the validity of interactions through communication are cognitively performed, 
then these cognitive contents are infused with normative content. The exploration by 
Habermas of numerous psychologists including Piaget, pragmatists such as Kohlberg, 
and linguistic scholars such as Selman, show the bridging role that discourse ethics can
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play in grounding the method of communicative rationality/^ In other words, discourse 
ethics being formal, cognitive, and justificatory suggests a framework for conceiving a 
praxis of resolving violent, protracted conflicts. This is a Habermasian-inspired 
formulation of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice at the meta-theoretical level. It is the 
specific idea of discourse ethics and its associated implications that are relevant for this 
thesis.
First, discourse ethics, at its root, is designed to ground the idea that through 
reasoned agreement and communicative processes, consensus can be achieved. In 
recognising that the complex interplay between the autonomy of individuals, expressed 
or covert, and their roles in communities and societies impinge on the free flow of 
communication, an idealising concept is offered for consideration. It may be difficult to 
realise such a facilitated conflict resolution process. However, the potential for 
conceiving such an environment is important in that we are first and foremost aware of 
the crucial role communicative processes play among disputants and third parties.
The ideas of John W. Burton were singled out as he most systematically 
attempted to put forward a philosophy for a needs theory and the problem-solving 
workshop method. One could argue that Burton’s philosophical basis for conflict 
resolution follows the line of philosophical realism. He recognises that individuals will 
not compromise needs, and only by addressing this issue can the resolution of a conflict 
be hoped for. Yet despite his efforts, the philosophical grounding he proposes is at most 
an expansion of needs theory. It is true to say that Burton attempted to counter his 
contemporaries in suggesting the other side of the coin: human nature is not necessarily 
nasty, brutish, and always motivated by self-interests alone."^  ^ Others in the facilitated 
conflict resolution field who aimed to expand Burton’s formulation follow the 
arguments that through functional co-operation, conflicts can be mitigated."^^
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Burton asserted that man’s nature is co-operative, and due to a lack of finding 
appropriate satisfiers for unmet human needs, such as identity and security, conflicts 
remain unresolved/^ His argument, it was contended, runs into the same difficulty as 
those who took the opposing view of human nature. By not placing the individual in the 
social context of the lifeworld traditions which influences an individual’s orientations, 
as well as the reproduced social structures, the individual as the unit of analysis in 
Burton’s case remains isolated and socially dislocated.
By placing the individual in a socialised sphere, Habermas recognises that the 
individual who possesses the potential to situate him or herself towards reaching 
understanding also operates in the social context. This social-situating of the individual 
overcomes this one-sided perspective. What is at stake here for the facilitation efforts 
of conflict resolution is that the third party as an observer-participant can bring to bear 
such knowledge and create the potential for the transformation of normative structures 
or the contemplation of another altemative, while playing out the various interests of the 
disputing participants in the process.
The socialised individual who represents communities, at the postconventional 
level, possesses the capacity not only to reach the instrumental goal of mitigating the 
violence, but has the ability to conceive of the construction of new social norms. This 
decentred understanding, which is necessary for the transformation of a conflict 
situation, takes into account the employment of the method of communicative 
rationality and contesting validity claims.
The theoretical component, which springs from the meta-theory, is discourse 
ethics. The formalistic nature of borrowing such a framework also contributes to a 
theoretical perspective of facilitated conflict resolution. As argued elsewhere, practices 
and primarily empirical experiences drive many facilitated conflict resolution
253
theoretical frameworks. Scholars and practitioners such as Burton, Kelman, Fisher, and 
Rothman fail to recognise the significant role of meta-theory.^^
The preferred method involves raising and contesting validity claims from all 
affected, including the views of those who do not participate, which would be 
considered in attempting to reach agreements or compromises. These are components 
of the procedure put forward here. This rule or set of procedures is deliberately 
intended not to be prescriptive. Furthermore, as this method arises from the formalistic 
concept of discourse ethics, it avoids merely setting out a list of behavioural 
suggestions. It is true to say that the procedural and detailed suggestions asserted by 
those engaged in problem-solving workshops are important to produce and sustain a 
particular type of atmosphere for the disputants so they can move from a confrontational 
to a consensual environment at the physical and, perhaps, at the psychological level. 
However, to leave a procedural argument and, more importantly, to neglect a theoretical 
formulation, misses a vital point. In order to achieve the instrumental social action of 
reaching a resolution as Burton desires, then a nexus that encourages consideration of 
pragmatic presuppositions, critical self-reflection, and communicative rationality is 
required for conceiving and attempting structural transformations.
The individual is not an isolated abstracted self, as Kant argued, and the 
recognition by Habermas of Hegel’s important contribution of the social community, in 
its role and effect on individuals not only places the abstracted formulation at a more 
practicable level, but in doing so bridges the theory-practice divide and turns it into 
praxis.
Equally essential is that a formalistic meta-theory, and thus a fluid theoretical 
framework, makes it possible in practice for an actualisation of this discourse ethics- 
based approach. The space opened up during a process of dialogue, the implementation 
of the argumentation rule and acceptance and contestation of claims to validity, mean
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that the transformation of the present institutional norms that have thus far shaped the 
conflict situation can be altered. As already stated, the concept of discourse ethics (D) 
denotes that every valid norm would meet with the approval of all concerned if they 
could take part in practical discourse.^^ Since in praxis of conflict resolution the 
inclusion of all affected is usually not possible, the representatives of differing groups 
take on this responsibility. The aim here is that the third party, by virtue of presence, as 
a participant-observer, will be informed about the knowledge of the postconventional 
type and of its related social action.
At the conflict resolution effort level, there is a barrier at the initial stage, erected 
by the opposing parties who have resorted to violence in order to prevail in the 
perceived and real conflicts. The facilitation process begins when the conflicting parties 
have decided through political will that a resolution of the protracted conflict can be 
reached only by engaging in communicative interactions. Any disputing party will be 
burdened with the hostilities felt towards the other, as well as the preconceptions one 
holds about who the enemy is. Therefore, the enemy’s position is viewed to be wrong 
since the disputants’ views are, of course, more correct.
The overcoming of resisting norms requires an altered perspective at the socio- 
cognitive level through a methodology of communicative rationality. In this 
perspective, the role of the third party is more proactive as they are no longer restricted 
to act as a guide and referee. By entering into the resolution process in a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice framework, the third party role is more active than an observer 
who either stands outside the conflict or acts as the psychoanalyst. As the former is not 
possible and the latter is incomplete, the formal concept of discourse ethics and the 
procedural framework of communicative rationality allow the third party role to be a 
constructor in the possible transformation of normative structures. That is, the third 
party individual or team can include this type of approach in the resolution process.
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In sum, the point of departure is not to explore whether and how the hidden 
needs may be better satisfied, but how to transform interpersonal and institutional 
structures through a discourse ethics-based approach, so that the legitimacy of these 
changed frameworks can be sustained outside any particular facilitated conflict 
resolution process— namely back in the political arena. A difficulty previously pointed 
to is the ‘re-entry problem’. By adopting the proposed framework, the ‘re-entry 
problem’, as described, can be better dealt with since any reached agreements would be 
contested in terms of its claims to validity, from the moral point of view in the broad 
public sphere.
The critical part of this conceived theory of peace practice lies in the dialoguing 
process among participants. It is not what Rothman proposes when he argues that the 
potential for critical self-reflection and transformation can be realised only within 
groups. This viewpoint is limited as the transformative potential exists not only within 
groups, but is present in the space between ‘me’ and ‘you’ and ‘we’ and ‘they’. It is in 
this nexus and through immanent critique that the transformation can occur. Naturally, 
such a moment of postconventional form will not take place in every conflict resolution 
effort. However, this critical theory framework makes it possible for the recognition 
and inclusion of such happenings, if and when they arise.
It is argued here that by ascribing to the current thinking in conflict resolution 
perspectives, the ‘critical potential’ will neither be actualised nor even approached since 
the idea for such a happening remains absent. In contrast, by adopting the discourse 
ethics theoretical framework explicated in this chapter, space opens up for such 
moments to affect, reshape, and so help the resolution of conflicts both at the immediate 
necessary level of instrumental action (of achieving a particular goal) and at the deeper 
level of confirming or reconstructing legitimacy in the broad public sphere.
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This theory of peace practice is borne out of discourse ethics and communicative 
rationality. Praxis will, in the end, determine the viability of any theory, including 
critical theory. In the actualising and resolution process, the basic root of a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice is the linguistic and socio-cognitive content of morality. It is 
essential to understand that morality does not refer to rights and wrongs of specific 
values and beliefs, but to how we judge the rightness, truthfulness, intent, and 
legitimacy of those who communicatively interact: how the hearer perceives and relates 
to the speaker.
As communication is dependent on the lifeworlds that structure an individual’s 
cultural beliefs, the system that co-ordinates varying lifeworlds and individual 
pragmatic presuppositions and reflective will, the content of constructing any normative 
social structure is cognitivist in nature.^  ^ The content of what an individual chooses for 
the construction of the three worlds of the objective, subjective and social, arises out of 
both the product of what he or she has learned and how he or she reintegrates this 
knowledge. In other words, at the conventional level, for instance, one learns to connect 
the observer-participant perspective with the previous knowledge and actions as 
perceived to be correct in the preconventional, and the results must be reintegrated or 
rejected.
As discussed earlier, the crucial move from the conventional to the 
postconventional level involves this process on a larger scale. It is the consequent 
decentred understanding of the world (crises develop since what we knew before is no 
longer tenable) which provides the important contribution for facilitated conflict 
resolution. The cognitive content of a facilitation process has indeed been explored by 
scholars such as Fisher and Kelman.^ "^  However, like Burton, they consider only the 
social and psychological factors in practice and do not think it necessary to develop this 
idea at the theoretical and philosophical levels.^^ The point to take from Habermas’
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exploration is that the process of forming the content of a moral point of view is socio- 
cognitive and linguistically mediated.
The socio-cognitive line of formulation allows, in facilitated conflict resolution, 
not only the already recognised element that perceptions are important, but also the 
notion that as individuals operating and interacting in intersubjective environments, we 
actively change aspects of these structures. In the facilitated conflict resolution process, 
we need to reconstitute these socio-cognitive structures in order to move towards the 
steps of building or transforming normative structures. That is to say, the pragmatic 
presuppositions participants bring to a communicative process flow both inwards and 
outwards from the social world. What one participant has learned through the process 
of obedience, conforming or rejecting certain social norms, means that he or she also 
orients him or herself in a specified way towards other individuals (both as an individual 
and as a member of a particular political and social community).
This strand, along with the formalism of discourse ethics, combined with the 
thread of the linguistically-oriented communicative rationality method, suggest a more 
complete theory, which has both critical potential and is critical towards itself, as well 
as being an approach that can be justified in praxis. The justification and thus the 
determinant of legitimacy can only arise from implementing or actualising the critical 
theory in a variety of peace practices. The scholars and practitioners of facilitated 
conflict resolution rightly point out that only the participants in the process can design 
their own solutions. A resolution cannot be imposed for a transformation to occur; 
imposed solutions are mere settlements. Simultaneously, by including a critical 
component at the meta-theoretical level, a Critical Theory of Peace Practice for 
facilitated conflict resolution efforts allows for all involved to seize an opportunity, 
when appropriate, to change the currents of the dominant or hitherto perceived ways of 
ordering social and political institutions.
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The methodology of communicative rationality provides an important 
altemative for creating and recognising these opportunities. Employing various types of 
discourses serve to help in the deconstruction and reconstruction of statements and, 
through them, the deconstmction and reconstitution of political and social institutions 
become possible. In short, a discourse ethics-based framework is interested in 
connecting the strands of communicative rationality methodology with the socio- 
cognitive and formal justificatory ideas.
Only by combining a discourse ethics with communicative rationality can a 
Critical Theory of Peace Practice be complete. It would be flawed to conceive of one 
without the other. By adopting this formal procedural framework, one can avoid the 
pitfalls of being trapped in rules and codes of behaviour during the facilitation problem­
solving workshops themselves. Furthermore, a Critical Theory of Peace Practice can 
provide a philosophical and a more helpful theoretical basis for the facilitation process 
of conflict resolution.
Conclusion
The meta-theoretical and philosophical foundation of discourse ethics is 
significant for it allows this approach to be context-sensitive, whilst being content- 
transcendent. Furthermore, by premising a theory on an expanded concept of 
rationality, a Critical Theory of Peace Practice can contribute beyond the environment 
of problem-solving workshops. Finally, as the validity of this approach can only be 
legitimated or modified in praxis, the practical level is important for validating its 
applicability, as well as providing insights into the refinements which can be reflected 
upon.
In sum, a Habermasian-inspired discourse ethics critical theory framework 
suggests an added dimension to the praxis of facilitated conflict resolution discipline. A
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theory based on discourse ethics and communicative rationality also takes into account 
the different types of knowledge guiding interests, which would impact the facilitation 
prenegotiations and negotiations environments, as well as the process of encouraging 
argumentation in the broader public sphere. Consequently, a possibility for overcoming 
instrumental rationality is created.
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Chapter 6
A Critical Theory of Peace Practice: Praxeological Dimensions
Introduction
The answer has to be discovered, or established, as a result of a process...which essentially cannot 
formulate the answer in advance except in an unspecified way.*
—Jürgen Habermas, 1990 
The meta-theoretical and methodological outlines of a Critical Theory of Peace 
Practice have been presented in chapters four and five. An equally important aspect of 
this proposed framework is the praxeological dimension of practising peace. Scholars 
who note its significance generally overlook this praxeological component of critical 
theory. In the broad discipline of International Relations, Andrew Linklater argues that 
praxeology is an essential feature of critical theory.^ But, as noted in the introduction to 
this thesis, he does not offer any detailed suggestions for how critical theory may be put 
into practice.
This chapter seeks to identify some peace practices that indicate how a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice may manifest itself in concrete social practices. A detailed, 
step-by-step account of the exact features of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice is not 
outlined, as this would run counter to the methodology of communicative rationality. 
As noted in the previous chapters, the methodology of communicative rationality is a 
formal pragmatic one that can be adapted by participants in a variety of situations in 
which third parties can play a number of different roles. Yet, through an exploration of 
a number of the peace-building initiatives that have flourished since the Oslo 
agreement, we can gain intimations of the praxeological dimensions of a Critical Theory 
of Peace Practice. The following discussions revolve around the peace-building efforts 
by different individuals and groups who occupy different levels of Israeli and 
Palestinian societies.
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, a shift in emphasis from 
resolution to transformation via the idea of peace-building will be outlined. 
Subsequently, a number of peace practices that aim to promote changes in attitudes, 
perceptions, norms, and institutions within Israeli and Palestinian societies will be 
discussed. The discussion of these peace-building efforts will provide indications of 
how a Critical Theory of Peace Practice offers an added aspect of connecting the 
various peace practices across societal levels. By including a meta-theoretical 
foundation of discourse ethics with a communicative rationality methodology, as well as 
a praxeological dimension, this proposed framework moves beyond—but is 
complimentary to— the Burtonian facilitated conflict resolution methodology and the 
approach adopted in the Oslo Channel.
From Resolution to Transformation: A Shift in Emphasis
A Critical Theory of Peace Practice offers important implications for peace 
practices such as the Oslo Channel, as well as the facilitation efforts undertaken by 
conflict resolution scholars. At the praxeological level, a Critical Theory of Peace 
Practice offers the opportunity to connect the problem-solving workshops with 
transforming attitudes and perceptions at the broader societal arena. In chapters two and 
three, the re-entry problem was highlighted. Scholars and practitioners of facilitated 
conflict resolution do not fully articulate a framework for engendering and sustaining 
any agreements (which may have been reached in the workshop setting) in the wider 
political public sphere. Burton, Kelman, and Fisher among others, assert that it is 
important to sustain the resolution process outside the facilitation environment. 
However, as their approaches are based on a prescriptive set of guidelines, the ways in 
which changed attitudes, perceptions, and norms, if and when they arise, may be 
translated into the larger public sphere are not developed.
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Other scholars include a broader notion of the third party role as well as the 
approach to be followed not only in resolving conflicts in a problem-solving workshop 
environment, but in the process of building peace.^ One such scholar is John Paul 
Lederach/ In outlining his framework, he shifts the emphasis from resolution to 
transformation since the former implies ending ‘something not desired’ whereas the 
latter suggests something that is ‘taking new form’.^  Transformation combined with 
peace-building, argues Lederach, points to changing the undesired situation as well as 
building long-term sustaining sets of norms and institutions.^ He argues that the 
emphasis in facilitated conflict resolution theories and practices has been focused too 
heavily on addressing the immediate problem of reducing violence.^
Towards the endeavour of peace-building, Lederach argues that different 
initiatives are required at various levels in society in order to transform a conflict 
situation into a process of building and sustaining peace. The levels of interactions 
should cut across various societal spheres so that linkages between them can be 
established.^ By doing so, groups become aware of other peace-building initiatives so 
that new ideas and approaches can be adopted if and where appropriate.
Lederach presents a triangular diagram which describes the variety of third 
parties and the roles they can play at different peace-building levels.^ Lederach asserts 
that a web of interdependence that involves persons at all levels can promote 
participation and the feeling that individuals have a role to play in claiming a piece of 
building a peaceable society. These multi-levels of individuals across different layers of 
societal interactions can connect the official political with the middle community 
leaders with the grass-roots efforts. This peace-building attempt is not only a dynamic 
process, but involves a structure that frames the development of the peace process. 
Rebuilding relationships, argues Lederach, illustrates this process/structure as well as 
connecting the vertical levels of peace-building efforts.
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The emphasis from resolution to peace-building— which includes the notion of 
transformation— is an important feature of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. Peace­
building allows the connection of the many efforts undertaken by individuals, groups 
and political leaders so that any breakthrough, if and when arrived at in the official 
arena, can filter through to the broader societal environment. Furthermore, rather than 
concentrating on the horizontal level where like-minded persons come to meet, peace­
building, as a component of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice, suggests the necessity 
to connect the different levels of peace-building attempts. Additionally, a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice takes into account the social and steering mechanisms within a 
public sphere as discourses and contestation of validity claims can occur at all levels. It 
is this multi-dimensional approach to transforming violent protracted conflicts that this 
altemative framework highlights.
The peace practice of the Oslo Channel and the difficulties of implementing 
agreements contained in the Declaration of Principles reveal the importance of peace­
building so that changed attitudes arrived at by participants in facilitation efforts can be 
linked with changing perceptions of members within both communities. This process of 
carrying across new ideas and norm-building is necessary in order to gain legitimacy 
and acceptance. Such a process of contesting claims can be conducted through 
discourses where statements and positions are judged according to truthfulness, 
sincerity, normative rightness, and legitimacy.
The fourth validity claim (an addition to Habermas’ three suggestions) is 
intended to address this aspect specifically. Since the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles and subsequent accords designed to fully implement the agreements reached 
in Oslo for Palestinian interim self-government in Gaza and the West Bank, many 
obstacles and challenges have arisen. The Israeli Government and the PLO still struggle 
to adhere to the principles and practical measures for allowing Palestinian autonomy.
267
The final status negotiations require both sides to address the most difficult issues 
including Jewish settlements in the Israeli Occupied Territories, Palestinian refugees, 
and political prisoners, as well as the thorny question of Jerusalem. Meanwhile, 
members of both communities are increasingly expressing pessimism regarding this 
peace process. One needs to only glance at the myriad of local press such as H a’aretz 
and the Jerusalem Post in which outspoken and sceptical views are expressed to gauge 
the level of frustrations on both sides at the lack of social and political transformations.
The breakthrough of the Oslo Channel was based on direct negotiations between 
two conflicting sides. The Norwegian third parties, led by Terje R0d-Larsen, sought to 
encourage personal and emotional trust-building.^  ^ Abu Ala noted the importance of a 
personal chemistry between himself and then Director General of the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry (Uri Savir) in helping to overcome the difficulties towards reaching an 
agreement. This small circle of participants’ changed perceptions could not be 
transferred to the wider public arena, since the participants did not include a specific 
procedure for mobilising public support. To this extent, the facilitation process of Oslo 
is similar to facilitated problem-solving workshops. One could argue that the 
Norwegians’ continuing efforts to ensure financial assistance for the PLO from the 
international community helps in the transformation of public attitudes, which are so 
vital for altering political norms and institutions.
Numerous attempts continue at the grass-roots level within Israel and the 
Occupied Territories towards transforming perceptions each holds of the other. These 
sporadic and disparate efforts are suggestive of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice at 
the level of application. These efforts operate within the broader political context in 
which the decisions reached by official decision-makers are rarely taken into account. 
Although the degree of involvement with the official process differs among the various 
peace-building attempts, transformation at the individual, group, and societal level is the
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goal. Facilitated conflict resolution approaches concentrate, as Lederach notes, on the 
political leaders to achieve a breakthrough. Grass-roots efforts indicate how 
transformation at the broader socio-political level may be achieved beyond the 
environment of the problem-solving workshop.
One example of grass-roots peace-building with an official imprimatur involved 
the Norwegian and Israeli Governments and the PLO. They endeavoured to establish a 
‘People-to-People’ initiative, which sought to promote dialogue between members of 
the two communities. Another official effort to promote grass-roots peace-building and 
reconciliation was initiated in the summer of 1996. Under the sponsorship of the Social 
Democratic Student Organisation (SSF, a branch of Norway’s Labour Party which also 
formed the Government) youth members of Israel’s Labour party and Arafat’s PLO, as 
well as the youth leader and the foreign spokeswoman for the Israeli Likud Party 
attended a conference in Sarpsborg, Norway, the site where the Declaration of 
Principles was finally agreed upon in August 1993. Simulated negotiations sessions 
were held among the participants during which they learned that compromise with the 
enemy was possible. The Likud youth leader, Uri Aloni, notes that:
We must all be open for good arguments and be ready to be convinced...! have my ideology and you 
have your ideology, but we can still talk. Peace can’t come from above; peace must come from the 
people.
This official sponsored dialogue process is one of the few examples of talking 
across the divided communities officially authorisied by the political leadership. 
Although the individuals were affiliated with official political parties, the bringing 
together of such groups indicates the transcendence of what Lederach identifies as an 
endeavour in which all too often only like-minded persons meet. This level of 
interaction, which is close to the official political decision-makers, forms one aspect of 
encouraging peace-building. As the public sphere is constituted of numerous groups 
and individuals, it is important to develop an environment of building peace at all levels. 
These two examples suggest that changing perceptions beyond the problem-solving
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workshop is possible by fostering a transformation at the broader level. Although these 
two efforts represent small attempts towards transcending deep-rooted perceptions that 
individuals hold of the other, the promising steps taken by the political leadership have 
not proceeded far enough. The linkages are to the political parties rather than to the 
community. Therefore, the voices of other groups that comprise Israeli and Palestinian 
societies is neglected as the most dominant parties’ voices are reflected by the 
participants who are invited to participate in such peace-building projects.
At a lower level in Lederach’s triangulated hierarchy, Israelis and Palestinians 
have come together at an informal level involving academics and intellectuals. Two 
examples are highlighted here. First, ten Israelis and Palestinians met in July 1991 to 
discuss the future of Israeli-Palestinian relationship, under the sponsorship of Stanford 
University’s Center on Conflict and Negotiation and the Beyond War Foundation. The 
seminars, held over four days, included participants such as Moshe Amirav (a member 
of Jerusalem’s City Council and a former member of the Likud Central Committee), 
Giora Ram Furman (Brigadier General and former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Israeli 
Air Force), Galit Hasan-Rokem (Founder of Women’s Network for Peace in Israel), 
Mamdough al-Aker (founding member of Mandela Institute of Political Prisoners), 
Hanna Siniora (Editor of Al Fajr newspaper in Jerusalem), and Nabeel Shaath (advisor 
to Arafat and member of the Palestinian National Council),
The participants jointly reported their main achievement as working to enlarge 
the ‘public peace process’. T h e  principles these participants agreed to in the published 
document call for equality, mutuality, and reciprocity. The suggestions of mutual 
recognition and the phased implementation of an interim self-government for five years, 
where Palestinians can realise their autonomy, bear similarities to the agreements 
contained in the Oslo Channel’s Declaration of Principles. These participants’ views 
differ from the breakthrough agreement that would come two years later, since they also
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call for the pre-1967 borders, which would mean a return of Gaza and all of the West 
Bank to Palestinian control. This document takes account of fears of Israelis for their 
security as it calls for cessation of violence against Israel’s military and citizens. 
Simultaneously, the human suffering endured by Palestinians under Israeli occupation is 
recognised.
Although the report resulting from these meetings contains principles and 
suggest a framework for establishing a ‘just and lasting peace’, the ways of encouraging 
and building a public peace process are not explicated. The only approach mentioned is 
a distribution of this document in the public domain, which would encourage debate 
among some Israelis and Palestinians to resolve the conflict. The participants agree to 
utilise this document ‘as an educational and political instrument’ to stimulate public 
debate on what is required for a peaceful relationship among the two communities.^"  ^
Secondly, the participants assert that this document will highlight the positive incentives 
of peace; namely, tying it to economic and environmental benefits such as water, oil, 
tourism, and improved living conditions. Third, public opinion polling would be 
encouraged on the question of a two-state solution. Fourth, the costs of continuing 
stalemate would be highlighted. Finally, the participants would encourage a broad 
public peace process by promoting education and training to members of both 
communities, as well as encourage joint meetings and collaborations among 
professionals, student and teachers.
While the participants aimed to promote a public peace process, there is no firm 
evidence that debates on this document were conducted outside this academic-like 
environment. Although the participants were influential members of both communities, 
ways of moving beyond the seminars to establish connections with larger constituencies 
for building confidence and breaking down barriers were not outlined. The document 
suggests specific topics that may be addressed in a public forum, but offers no
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guidelines for approaching or promoting these dialogues. Furthermore, the role played 
by the moderator in the dialogue process is not fully elaborated.
The second notable example of peace building and reconciliation involves an 
academic gathering of Israeli and Palestinian women who met in a facilitation format in 
December 1992.^  ^ The third party panel consisted of six women academics; the 
participants included five representatives from each community. On the Israeli side, 
participants included high-ranking members of the Labour, religious, and Meretz 
parties, while on the Palestinian side, participants included the Palestinian West Bank 
and diaspora women, who largely held centrist or left-wing positions.
Before the start of this facilitation effort, the third parties held meetings with 
each side to explore expectations and to explain the process as there were new 
participants.^  ^ Over the four days, the conflicting parties shared meals and were 
encouraged to state their personal viewpoints regarding the conflict. The inclusion of 
personal positions helped to shift the emphasis from an opposing one based on political 
affiliations, to relating to each other as women. The approach adopted in this initiative 
does not significantly differ from the social-psychological perspectives of Kelman and 
Fisher as reciprocity, continual clarification of misperceptions, and exchanges of 
information are deemed crucial for transforming attitudes and establishing and 
maintaining working trust.
The aspect of being women was not viewed to be essential, but the common 
experiences among the diverging cultures presented the participants with something to 
which they could all relate. An interesting innovation in this facilitation process was the 
post-workshop interviews held seven months after the exploratory dialogues. The 
positive feedback from the women regarding the usefulness of the workshop to create 
new understandings is offered as evidence for the constructive role that unofficial 
dialogues can play towards assisting official negotiations.^^ The participants reported
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that the encounter with a member of the right-wing Israeli religious group provided 
surprising insights into this stratum of Israeli society . That is, both other Israelis and 
Palestinians expressed surprise that a person representing right-wing views could be 
‘reasonable’. T h e r e f o r e ,  the participants agreed the facilitation exercise had 
contributed to breaking down stereotypes of one other.
The organisers and facilitators of this initiative. Babbit and Pearson d'Estrée, put 
forward four questions regarding the utility of their facilitation efforts. They are:
What constitutes ‘transformation of a relationship?’ What characterises the successful transfer of 
leaming from a workshop setting to the political arena? How can an unofficial problem-solving 
workshop make a contribution when official negotiations are also occurring? Is there a unique role for 
politically influential women in building a stable peace?*^
First, they argue that transformation of relationships requires repeated meetings 
of influential disputants in a facilitation format, in order to breakdown entrenched 
attitudes and stereotypes.^^ Second, development of ‘unofficial linkages’ and
‘networks’ are suggested for translating any success achieved in the facilitation format 
to the wider political process.^  ^ Additionally, the authors propose that the participants 
include ‘options generated’ from the facilitation effort.^  ^ Third, as these participants 
were influential members of political parties, their shared experiences could contribute 
to an official peace process .Final ly ,  being women provided a common frame of 
experience, which allowed the participants to more easily relate to one another.^ "^
It is the second question posed that is the most interesting. This facilitation 
effort, like others described in the conflict resolution discipline, includes a recognition 
of the significance of addressing the transformation of attitudes at a broader level. Yet, 
the suggestions of building networks and unofficial linkages cannot transform attitudes, 
norms, and institutions, since ways of engaging with the excluded voices are not taken 
into account. In another words, the changing of perceptions and images are likely to 
remain at the level of elites, academics, and influential political activists, since ways of 
expanding beyond these groups are not deeply considered.
273
Both of these exercises that involved academics and community leaders indicate 
yet another layer in which peace-building, however limited and specific its particular 
aim, is being undertaken. Towards connecting this level with others, a Critical Theory 
of Peace Practice would offer two contributions. First, the methodology of 
communicative rationality would be introduced, where the participants would contest 
the validity of claims being raised. The third party would offer this option, along with 
knowledge of other conflict facilitation efforts, in order to demonstrate that consensual 
agreements are possible. In this way, third parties become direct participants as the 
contributions they offer would directly influence the outcome of a dialogical process. 
The analytic phase, which comprises the central feature of problem-solving workshops, 
would be incorporated into this third party role. Consequently, the third-party role 
becomes more flexible and inclusive. Furthermore, the participants could learn that 
through critical reflection, different foundations of knowledge produce differing 
interests. Therefore, while accommodating the positions of one another, an altemative 
basis that diverges from both conflicting parties’ positions could be constructed.
Second, a Critical Theory of Peace Practice envisions a multidimensional level 
peace-building process in which the role of third parties can vary according to contexts. 
In the facilitation effort, their role has already been described as a full participant to the 
process. In the wider political community, third parties can establish, encourage, and 
promote dialogues within and across the Israeli and Palestinian communities in 
education, through the media and political activism. This entails engaging with the 
often-excluded extremists within each community. Although such a process may be 
initially more difficult, a transformation of attitudes of members and supporters of 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the Palestinian side and sympathisers of Israeli right-wing 
religious and national groups such as Likud are required if a transformation and peace­
building at the societal level is to be achieved. Obviously, it is not possible to transform
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the perceptions of every individual member of society; nevertheless, if attempts are not 
made to break down the barriers and restore distorted communicative processes with 
groups who hold extremist positions, then it will remain difficult to transform attitudes, 
perceptions, and norms at the broad level. A societal transformation is necessary to 
legitimate the reconstruction of norms and institutions, which political decision-makers 
among themselves may have agreed to.
In short, in the Oslo case, agreements reached by Israel and the PLO lost public 
support not only because of a lack of concrete changes in the socio-political landscape, 
but because transformations of attitudes among any significant segment of these two 
groups has yet to develop and take hold. Consequently, there is no environment of 
working trust. Furthermore, as there has been no change among even the political 
officials in either community, it is difficult to foresee how groups in both communities 
with more diverging and opposing views of one another may transform their prejudices 
and deep images of the other. A Critical Theory of Peace Practice, as it is based on 
discourse ethics and an understanding of the need to affect norms and institution 
building, includes a dimension of carrying out dialogues in the public sphere. For 
example, it is often by encouraging the dialogical process among the marginalised 
voices, including extremists in particular, that sustainable societal transformations 
become possible and acceptable.^  ^ The alternatives these participants may construct can 
differ significantly from the positions of the governing political leaderships. However, 
once all segments of society are engaged in a dialogical process and connections 
between them are established and maintained, it becomes possible to reach consensual 
agreements or accommodation.
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, non-governmental organisations within each 
community have sought to implement not only concrete changes, such as in the areas of 
health and education, but also at the political level of altering attitudes within each
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community. These organisations such as the Centre for Non-Violent Action, which 
promotes peace education on the Israeli side and the Palestinian Centre for Peace and 
Democracy, concentrate on peace education. However, their efforts are directed 
towards either influential decision-makers or students. In other words, the audience is 
limited.
At the more grass-roots level, efforts of reconciliation largely spring from direct 
activism and affiliated organisations. One such organisation is the Peace Now 
movement, the largest Israeli organisation which supports and co-ordinates peace 
demonstrations and rallies, in order to build consensus for the official peace process. 
The organisation was founded in 1978 by 348 Israeli reserve officers of the Defence 
F o r c e s . S i n c e  the signing of the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993, 
Peace Now promotes youth-to-youth dialogues within both communities to explain the 
peace process embarked on by the political leaderships. For example. Peace Now has 
conducted at least two dialogue series involving participants of both communities.
First, the ‘Youth Dialogue’ between Palestinians and Israelis began during the 
Intifada in 1987 to demonstrate that there is someone to talk to and to break down 
misperceptions of the other.^  ^ A focus on the youth population is chosen, since the 
young participants have ‘in the past, become some of the strongest advocates for peace 
in their schools, communities and at the national level’. I n i t i a l l y ,  Peace Now’s youth 
members in Jerusalem contacted the Palestinian Friends School in Ramala to suggest an 
exploratory dialogue process. The first meeting in 1991 which included 50 Israelis and 
Palestinians was intense and highly emotional. However, by listening to one another, a 
gradual understanding and confidence among the groups developed. Subsequently, 
larger public dialogues in East Jerusalem and in Europe have continued to foster debate 
and understanding of both Israeli and Palestinian positions and perceptions. In January 
1995, a series of weekend dialogues were held involving 250 participants. In 2000,
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there are approximately 17 dialogue groups at the local level which meet several times a 
year.
Peace Now believes that:
Enduring peace is both inevitable and achievable if Israelis and Palestinians get to know each other as 
individuals, and begin to understand one another’s cultures, histories and worldviews.^^
Peace Now’s format follows a four-stage process. This procedure was developed with 
the input of sociologists, experts on group dynamics, citizens, and activists. First, 
through role-playing and games, participants are encouraged to learn about each other’s 
lives, in order to bring a human dimension to the protracted conflict situation. Second, 
participants present each side’s cultures and value preferences, which shape their 
positions. Third, the emphasis shifts from personal development to political 
discussions. Here, the participants explore their understandings of commonly used 
terms such as security, human rights, autonomy and what each concept means for 
Israelis and Palestinians respectively. Fourth, if participants can reach consensus, joint 
political action is encouraged. For example, in 1999, a joint declaration of principles 
was promoted by all the participants. Additionally, both sides joined together to 
publicly demonstrate their support for the official peace process.
The dialogue groups initiated by Peace Now have resulted in the formation of a 
Palestinian Movement for Peace and Tolerance in Ramala, whose members continue to 
participate in Peace Now, as well as organising other dialogues in that city. The 
following table indicates the number of dialogue groups in Peace Now and Palestinian 
organisations which have similar aims as Peace Now.
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Palestinian Youth Groups Israeli Youth Groups
Location Number of Groups Location Number of Groups
Khan Yunes 1 Tel Aviv 1
Khan Yunes 2 Tel Aviv 2
Gaza A 1 Petah Tiqva 1
Gaza A 2 Ramat Hasharon 1
Gaza B 1 Rehovot
Gaza B 2 Beer Sheva 1
Hebron 1 Beer Sheva 1
Hebron 1 Arad
Hebron 1 Jerusalem 1
Hebron 2 Jerusalem 1
East Jerusalem 1 Jerusalem 1
Ramallah 1 Kfar Saba 1
Kalqilia 1 Raanana 1
Kalqilia 1 Tivon 1
Nablus A 1 Haifa 1
Nablus B 1 Misgaz 1
Nablus C 1 Zichron Ya’acov 1
Note: Each location in the Israeli column represents a branch of Peace Now,
some of which have more than one group of youth that work together in the branch. In
the Palestinian column, locations represent different Palestinian organisations with
which Peace Now works. Again, these organisations have more than one group each.
Each group consists of several dozen young people.
Table 1: Palestinian and Israeli Groups Involved in Youth Dialogue Project
While the experiences gained from participating in these small dialogue groups 
help to establish and cement trust, national seminars are held annually over two days, 
where up to 400 participants are included. The difficult outstanding political issues are 
discussed in smaller groups usually fewer than twelve persons. A special dictionary, 
which contains definitions of terms in Hebrew and Arabic, is used to overcome 
language barriers. However, all participants are involved in social activities such as 
meals and creative projects. For example, in 1999, signs promoting peace, which were 
written in Hebrew and Arabic were used in subsequent demonstrations and rallies.
The national seminars are facilitated by ‘guides’ of Peace Now staff and other 
volunteers of professors and individuals who are entering the Israeli military service, as
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well as organisations from the two communities.^^ Evaluations are held subsequently, 
where successes and failures are discussed so that lessons can be applied to future 
seminars.
The second significant dialogue series sponsored by Peace Now is the Family 
Dialogue.^^ Established in 1998, the Family Dialogue Program aims to bring in 
members of Israeli and Palestinian societies so that a peace process can be as inclusive 
as possible. This dialogue process which now includes men, women and children on the 
Israeli side helped to break down barriers: ‘For many of us, it was our first encounter 
with Palestinians on the grassroots level’ On the Palestinian side, participants include 
residents of the Hebron area and those of refugee camps. As one participant noted, 
‘Here too, for many of us it has been the first opportunity to meet and talk with Israelis 
as equal partners in this struggle’.
This dialogue process involved ordinary members of both communities. All the 
participants were ardent peace supporters and through these dialogues, they learned to 
take up the perspective of the other. Peace Now aims to expand this joint Israeli- 
Palestinian family dialogues to the broader community, in order to introduce a human 
dimension to the conflict. Moreover, promoting reconciliation dialogues across 
communities is another avenue of establishing an environment of co-operation and 
coexistence.
The efforts undertaken by Peace Now demonstrate the need to connect the 
official political process with broader societal ones. A Critical Theory of Peace Practice 
encompasses and argues that such linkages are crucial for transforming protracted deep- 
rooted conflicts. It is by adopting a diversified approach that reconstruction of norms 
and institutions can mean transformation at the socio-political levels. Furthermore, this 
proposed alternative framework would actively suggest to those who participate in 
facilitation efforts, as well as to interested members of conflicting communities, ways of
279
relating the various approaches to conflict resolution. In other words, the formal 
procedure of discourse ethics could be utilised by all participants in a variety of 
contexts. It is not limited to the facilitation exercise of unofficial or official conflict 
resolution attempts, but can move beyond to the public arena where the basis for new 
norms and attitudes must be created for conflict transformation. Although Peace Now 
aims to link both local and national efforts, as well as community and official peace 
processes, the ways in which all of these components may influence one another are not 
fully articulated. Therefore, peace-building remains a top-down process, since the 
activities of Peace Now and the various dialogue groups are designed to support rather 
than suggest alternatives to the Oslo process.
A Critical Theory of Peace Practice, however, allows for a convergence between 
official, community, and societal efforts at various levels. The methodology of 
communicative rationality and the raising of validity claims to truthfulness, sincerity, 
normative rightness, and legitimacy can be carried out in a multiple of settings, 
involving a variety of parties. Furthermore, the meta-theoretical assumptions of this 
theory takes into account the need to view participants as equals, as well as the 
structural conditions which often distort communication and thus perpetuate entrenched 
perceptions. By including these elements, the transformation of attitudes, perceptions, 
and norms at a variety of levels is suggested so that a structural change can occur at the 
socio-political level. These informal dialogue groups of various types indicate that a 
Critical Theory of Peace Practice is possible. Claims to contested norms can be 
reconstructed and altered among participants who subscribe to very different toward 
views. Through the process of argumentation and raising claims to validity, participants 
can gain an understanding of the other’s position as well as together seize upon the 
potential to reach a consensual agreement or arrive at norms that can transform not only 
individuals’ perceptions but the institutions that reflect them.
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Other grass-root efforts to foster co-operation and encourage reconciliation 
demonstrate the lack of connection to other dimensions of peace practices. First, there 
is the small, but long-term series of meetings between teachers of Israeli and Palestinian 
schools. One particular meeting occurred in the Jerusalem boundary-area of Are-ram.^  ^
Another slightly larger scheme is known as the Dialogue Group, sponsored by the 
Rapprochement Centre in Beit Sahour, Israel, and brings together Israelis and 
Palestinians to establish a learning process where perceptions can be reconstructed. 
Additionally, the understanding of the other community is promoted. These meetings 
are comprised of three different age groups, high school and university students, as well 
as adults. The meetings are two-hour sessions and are held on a monthly basis. In 
addition to the direct dialogues between Israelis and Palestinians, lectures and panel 
discussions are held throughout the year. This Dialogue Group established in 1990 
continues to grow as number of participants from both communities and international 
visitors increases. Meanwhile, other dialogue groups proliferate including ones 
sponsored by the Friends School of Ramala, The School’s Director, Khalil Mahshi 
argues:
Talking to the other side makes both sides more realistic, more eager to solve the problem, and 
hopefully, more interested in making concessions. My interest in solving the Palestinian problem leads 
me to want to understand the other side of the conflict, the Israeli side,^^
The majority of peace-building and reconciliation initiatives are based on 
educational programs for encouraging youths to understand the conflict and to establish 
links across the divided communities. For example, there is the conflict resolution 
training programme sponsored by the Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement Between 
People, Israeli Jewish-Arab youth movement (Reut-Sadaka), and the Swedish Peace 
Quest Organisation.^^ This programme aims to encourage youths to explore ways of 
establishing confidence and to gain understanding within their own society, as well as 
between them. One programme involves youths from 21-26 years of age in a six month 
training course that will equip them with skills for approaching conflict resolution.
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gaining a deeper understanding of concepts such as democracy, and breaking down 
stereotypes at the local, regional and international levels. A second group of high 
school students, primarily 16 year olds, will be involved in a year long programme in 
which they will learn similar skills and will be trained by some participants from the 
first group. All of these youths will have had little previous experience in conflict 
resolution or engaging in dialogues with the opposing side. In preparation for these 
meetings, co-ordinators of the three organisations met in Sweden and in Israel.
A larger educational programme is offered by the Israeli/Palestinian Center for 
Research and Information, a joint Israeli-Palestinian think tank that aims to present and 
develop public policies.^^ The organisation’s educational programme known as 
Pathways Into Reconciliation (PIR) asserts that, ‘while peace can be signed by 
statesmen, it must be built between people’. P I R  aims to teach skills that will help 
both communities to diffuse and resolve conflicts so that co-operative peaceful 
relationships can be established and cemented, while promoting the concepts of 
democracy and human rights. This educational project targets teachers of schools in 
Israel, Palestine, and Jordan."^  ^ The three teams jointly developed an educational 
curriculum that includes the current approaches of each group’s schools. Additionally, 
the parties have introduced concepts of democracy and human rights and encouraged 
skills of listening and developing empathy and approaching history from a variety of 
perspectives. The curriculum focused on literature, history, and sociology.
Since its introduction in 1995, over 32 schools within Israeli and Palestinian 
areas have included this curriculum and the numbers continue to grow. Furthermore, 
numerous seminars were held to train the teachers of participating schools, while visits 
to some of the schools were made in order to evaluate its effectiveness. Three 
international, four multinational, and 38 student meetings were held where new 
participants could come to meet and dialogue. This also allowed the teachers and PIR
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to evaluate the curriculum and the ways in which emphasis may be shifted or modified. 
The Internet is foreseen as a medium of encouraging dialogues among students in 
between face-to-face meetings. The focus however, remains on training teachers as 
they are the ‘agents of social change’. B y  enlarging the participation of schools at the 
grass-roots level, PIR project aims to have this curriculum be accepted at the official 
governmental levels.
A final example of the joint educational training efforts to encourage peace­
building is the ‘Children Teaching Children’ programme, which aims to bring together 
Jewish and Arab boys and girls in Israeli s choo l s . About  80% of the Israeli population 
is Jewish and while Palestinians comprise the largest minority, dialogue between them 
is rare. The aim of this project is to encourage children to question stereotypes and 
seemingly fixed positions. Role-playing and games are utilised to help children and 
teachers learn the positions of others. In high schools, for example, the Parliament 
game is played. Participants read out prepared statements in the classrooms about a 
variety of issues. For example, the exclusion of an Arab component to the Israeli 
national flag might be discussed. Three options are put forward on the board: to leave 
the flag unchanged, to add an Arabic symbol to the Jewish flag or to create a new flag 
that reflects both symbols. The children are asked to choose the position that resembles 
their own and then are asked to form groups, according to the choice that has been 
made. Here, the groups put forward their positions and arguments. At the very least, 
the children gain an understanding of the other and learn that co-operation across 
communal lines is possible.
There are many more educational programmes by a variety of institutes designed 
to promote reconciliation including the Israeli Centre for Peace, the Shimon Peres 
Institute which concentrates on economic co-operation, and the Alternative Information 
Centre which aims to provide information independent of Israeli and Palestinian official
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lines. Peace activists, and in particular women, are involved in direct action 
movements."^  ^ Although women have been active within each community in promoting 
issues such as health and education, direct actions have brought together women from 
both communities. By the acts of holding silent, candle-lit vigils and carrying signs of 
statements, women from the two communities have been meeting in places such as 
Jerusalem since 1987."  ^ This direct action of promoting reconciliation and calling for 
the Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories allows women to participate in 
their own villages, towns, and cities.
These types of meetings do not require formal organisation or training, but do 
promote co-operation and empathy on both sides."^  ^ Similar large-scale gatherings of 
silent candle-lit vigils, calling for peace among the two communities have been carried 
out on an annual basis in Jerusalem and in other cities and towns of Israel, Gaza, and the 
West Bank. The participants in such actions can slowly develop relationships that 
introduce a human dimension; that is, the ‘other’ is no longer an invisible enemy upon 
whom perceptions and prejudices can be directed. The diverging communities learn to 
accommodate one another as peace-building finds its foundation on a slow but firm 
basis.
Conclusion
These grass-root efforts, as well as influential academic and official government 
sponsored peace-building processes, provide intimations of the praxeological 
components of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. The process of building peace is 
being explored and attempted on multiple levels and by a variety of groups utilising 
different approaches. However, all too often, these efforts are happening in isolation of 
one another. As Hassassian and Kaufman rightly assert from a survey of literature and 
activities of organisations in the region, there is little interrelationship between the
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different tracks at which peace-building is pursued/^ Therefore, while the multiple 
efforts for practising peace in Israel and the Occupied Territories point out how a 
Critical Theory of Peace Practice can be applied, the framework also provides several 
insights as to how peace-building between the two communities can be expanded.
First, in the informal unofficial prenegotiations stage, the role of the third party 
would be much more proactive. In addition to the knowledge of other conflicts and the 
ways in which they have been attempted to be or actually resolved, the procedure of 
raising and contesting validity claims would be introduced. Equally important is that 
each participant takes up the position of the ‘other’ and aims for not only reaching an 
agreement in the facilitation effort, but ways of engaging with the disputants’ political 
constituencies, in order to argue for and against its legitimacy. This involves a different 
approach to the facilitated process of small workshops involving influential individuals, 
academics, decision-makers and third parties. The added component of an expanded 
understanding of rationality and that different knowledge forms produce varying 
interests, would allow third parties to attain a transformation that can be carried beyond 
the specific environment of problem-solving workshops.
Second, the involvement of non-governmental organisations and community 
groups in promoting peace-building through a variety of avenues would be related back 
to the facilitation effort. Decision-makers must engage in dialogues with the public, 
whose attitudes they are engendering to transform. There will of course be opposition 
from a sector which will oppose any transformation. However, while their voices are 
seemingly damaging to the overall process, they must be heard in order to include them 
and to perhaps gradually change their attitudes and perceptions. A Critical Theory of 
Peace Practice recognises the structural forces which often impinge upon the realisation 
of political and social transformations such as economic deprivation and reticence by 
certain political parties. Therefore, organisations such as Peace Now, rather than
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drawing up their training programmes from a variety of broad academic disciplines and 
experiences, could have the assistance of those who can offer conflict resolution 
approaches, as well as the Critical Theory of Peace Practice perspective. These 
differing frameworks can be incorporated in order to assist the official peace process, as 
well as providing insights and alternatives of transforming norms and institutions, if 
ideas that are contrary to the official process arise and are consensually arrived at. The 
proposed framework would assist and provide possible points of departure for 
modifying or if necessary, renegotiating, the terms on which a peace practice can be 
attempted.
Third, at the grass-roots level of fostering co-operation and breaking down 
barriers by organisations such as the Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy and 
Israeli-based educational programmes, third party participants in dialogues can be 
encouraged to provide creative and alternative ways of transforming the conflict 
situation on a meaningful daily basis, as well as at the socio-political level. These 
grass-roots efforts can provide the impetus for change of attitudes within both 
communities, a type of transformation that has yet to be realised by the efforts of 
political decision-makers. If the desire for transcending protracted conflicts comes not 
only from above as in the Oslo Channel but also from below, as the youth leader of the 
Likud Party asserted, then a convergence between two approaches can arise. These 
processes may compliment or present differing views for reconstructing norms and 
attitudes. The shape of which path to follow, or finding a median of varying 
perspectives, would engage all participants of society so that as many members as 
possible can participate in the reconstitution of societies.
At the more official level of achieving political breakthroughs to encourage a 
transformation of the wider environment, the conflicting parties would explore the 
underlying issues that frame the conflict such as needs-satisfaction requirements. More
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significantly, a dialogical process, rather than a monological form where the third party 
role remains restricted to an analytic one, would form the facilitation process. At the 
levels of building peace and reconciliation by the differing organisations and individuals 
within and across the Israeli and Palestinian communities, a Critical Theory of Peace 
Practice would connect these various levels of peace practices. Therefore, a 
transformation of conflict rather than settlement or small and sporadic changes becomes 
possible to practice.
In sum, a Critical Theory of Peace Practice at the level of praxis entails the 
inclusion of the various dimensions and spheres in which dialogues are under way. 
Each aspect of peace-building, from the official to the grass-roots community relations, 
has a contributive role to play in transforming attitudes, perceptions, norms, and 
institutions. This proposed framework incorporates an understanding at its meta- 
theoretical and philosophical levels that the facilitation effort involves transforming, 
through argumentation and practical discourses, the perceptions of official political 
decision-makers. Simultaneously and equally importantly, a discourse ethics-based 
approach takes into account that transformations at the societal levels are needed and 
are possible to achieve, if the often distorted process of conununication can be 
addressed.
The role of the third party and institutions that promote the connecting points 
through the maze of peace-building efforts would be a necessary practical component of 
applying a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. In this way, both the long-term change 
necessary to first legitimate and then sustain the transformation of protracted conflicts, 
as well as the shorter term requirement for altering the political landscape, can be co­
ordinated towards a common project. Consequently, a Critical Theory of Peace Practice 
can contribute at the stages of more official facilitation processes, encourage the 
mobilisation of public support by promoting debate and contestation of ideas in the
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public sphere, and offer an approach that understands all efforts as a connected attempt 
at conflict resolution. As the framework is a formal procedural one which can be 
adapted according to contexts, the participants are left to choose the content and reach 
consensual agreements, if one can be formulated. Additionally, the proposed Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice would advance the Burtonian aim of allowing the participants 
to judge for themselves the validity of ideas and open up the space for constructing 
ways to transcend protracted conflict situations.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion
The closer the proximity in which competing ‘Gods and demons’ have to live with each other in 
political communities, the more tolerance they demand; but they are not incompatible. Convictions can 
contradict one another only when those concerned with problems define them in a similar way, believe 
them to require resolution, and want to decide issues on the basis of good reasons.*
— Jürgen Habermas, 1998
The illustrative example of the Oslo Channel demonstrates that attempts to 
resolve protracted deep-rooted violent conflicts require the consideration of theoretical 
frameworks. The facilitation process adopted by the Israelis, Palestinians, and the 
Norwegian third parties offers an opening for exploring the extent to which an inclusion 
of facilitated conflict resolution theories would have resulted in a more sustainable 
peace process. However, as scholars including John Burton, Herbert Kelman, and Jay 
Rothman among others, do not move beyond a positivistic philosophical foundation of 
needs and human behavioural theories, their approaches continue to be bounded by 
instrumental rationality.^ Therefore, this thesis set out to explore how a critical theory 
perspective may be used to rethink the meta-theoretical foundations of facilitated 
conflict resolution theories. The critical theory approach adopted here is based on 
Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics and communicative rationality.^ A discourse ethics 
foundation incorporates the dimension of communicative processes which is neglected 
by conflict resolution theorists and practitioners. It has been asserted that a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice offers one promising alternative for third parties to consider in 
the process of engaging in facilitation and peace-building praxis."^
However, like all theories, this proposed one is not without possible pitfalls and 
potential limitations. The numerous critiques against Habermas’ critical theory can be 
divided into two categories. Consequently, the first section of this concluding chapter
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will address some of these possible problem areas. First, the most relevant critiques 
of Habermas will be briefly discussed. The focus here will be on the postmodernists 
who have an important contribution to offer in their arguments that universalisation can 
lead to a process of homogenisation.^ It is contended that despite such foreseeable 
pitfalls, a Habermasian-inspired discourse ethics can address the concerns raised by 
such scholars as Richard Rorty, Max Pensky, and Seyla Benhabib. Additionally, the 
assertions by scholars such as Axel Honneth that Habermas overlooks the power 
dimension in social relationships and language will be discussed.
Second, the challenges presented by the broader social structural steering 
mechanisms, which are embodied in states and markets, for realising a Critical Theory 
of Peace Practice will be outlined.
This will be followed by suggestions for further research agendas that scholars, 
practitioners, and students may engage in to refine and expand the framework proposed 
in this thesis.
Internal Critiques
The ontological illusion of pure theory...promotes the fiction that Socratic dialogue is possible 
everywhere and at any time. From the beginning, philosophy has presumed that the Mundigkeit 
posited with the structure of language is not only anticipated, but real. It is pure theory, wanting to 
derive everything from itself, that succumbs to unacknowledged external conditions and becomes 
ideological.^
— Jurgen Habermas, 1975
Scholars who adopt a postmodern perspective provide perceptive criticisms 
regarding Habermas’ discourse ethics.^ One such thinker is Richard Rorty who 
describes himself as a liberal ironist.^ He argues that when a dialogical process is 
grounded on universalisable claims to validity, employment of discourses can lead to a 
privileging of one voice over others.  ^ Rorty asserts that rather than following a 
Habermasian attachment to universal validity in which the relationships among
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individuals and groups can be reconstituted through the process of argumentation, 
he contends that an understanding of the other’s suffering should comprise the most 
significant part of changing images. The vehicle for engaging with the other does not 
lie in the realm of practical discourses, but can be more fruitfully located in analysing 
texts of various forms of literature including the novel.
Rather than approaching the other as a subject with whom a consensus can be 
reached under the process of contesting universal claims to validity, Rorty contends that 
one must appreciate the strangeness of the other in order to understand the other’s 
suffering. Without this process of including the otherness, the views of marginalised 
groups can become subsumed under a dominant discourse.
Rorty also critiques Habermas’ retainment of an enlightenment spirit; Habermas 
is committed to a philosophical meta-theoretical foundation for transforming the public 
s p h e r e . I n  formulating his postmodern perspective, Rorty contends that the positions 
of Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Derrida provide significant insights for philosophy and 
political p r a c t i c e s . A l l  three thinkers ascribe to the idea that the best possible 
philosophy is a private one among individuals, in which the element of contingency is 
the only certainty.Therefore, Rorty calls for a distinction between a public arena in 
which politics can be practised and a private philosophical sphere. This position directs 
Rorty to argue for engaging in transformations primarily at the margins of society where 
the neglected voices can be encouraged. Since concrete events cannot be understood 
outside of history, time, and space, Habermas’ universalistic and formal discourse ethics 
is viewed to be unhelpful .Rorty argues that we need to recast our understanding of 
what philosophy is, who does it, where and for what purposes. The specified and 
limited role philosophy plays in Rorty’s theoretical construction leads him to suggest 
that emphasis should shift from theory to concrete, local political practice for it is only 
at such knowable, near environments that individuals can attain new understandings.
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Only by relating to the other empathetically as the individual can feel the suffering 
of the other, can changes in relationships arise. Rorty pushes for an aesthetically based 
ethics based on our capacity for empathy that is exemplified through a recourse to 
literature.
In exploring the relationship between individual and solidarity, Max Pensky 
advocates for an ethics of care.^ "^  Like Rorty, he contends that social relationships 
among individuals can be transformed only in particular local cultural contexts where 
the suffering of the other can be experienced.^^ Although Pensky notes the possibilities 
of formulating a perspective on universalistic and consensual validity claims and their 
counterfactual contestations, Pensky maintains that the universal formal character of 
discourse ethics proposed by Habermas can be ‘empty
Pensky suggests a concept of injurability (recognition of individual’s 
vulnerability) to remedy this formalism. He borrows from Emmanuel Levinas who 
defines ethics as ‘the putting-into-question of my spontaneity, by the presence of the 
O t h e r L e v i n a s  aims to ground ethics on a phenomenological analysis in which ‘of 
the appearance of the “infinite” other who is injurable and so beaks the infinite into 
totalising calculable rationality’.^  ^ This approach is a confrontation with alterity, which 
refers to particular forms of ethical obligations by the other.^  ^ As intersubjective 
relationships can only be negotiated through a near-far paradox in which the face of the 
individual and the other are presented for mutual recognition and reciprocity, the 
semiotic analysis preferred by Levinas is also favoured by Pensky.^  ^ The concepts of 
injurability and alterity are incorporated by Pensky to formulate his perspective for 
considering ways of transcending specific contexts.
Pensky also follows Levinas in arguing that relationships among individuals are 
asymmetrical. That is, recognising the injurability of the other requires an individual to 
give up his or her strength and take up the position of the other in order to understand
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the other’s position. Hence, asymmetry is the dimension where transformation can 
take place. Unlike Habermas who maintains that communicative rationality and the 
socially co-ordinating medium of language constitute the foundation of a theoretical 
starting point, Pensky contends that injurability is the foundation and the first language.
Finally, the critique of universal orientation in Habermas’ discourse ethics is 
more sympathetically presented by Seyla Benhabib.^^ She argues that Habermas’ 
conception of communicative ethics over-prioritises universalistic tendencies, at the 
expense of pluralities of individuals and communities.^^ That is, by looking to form 
consensual agreements through a process of argumentation, the differences that exist 
among individuals, groups and communities become marginalised. She follows a 
Habermasian proceduralist discourse ethics when she asserts that the concept of 
legitimacy and democracy entail a publicly reasoned argument to which all in principle 
have equal access.^ "^  Benhabib suggests a broader concept of community, in order to 
take into account the excluded views of feminist, environmentalists, extremists, and 
others. Consequently, an imbalance of Habermas’ unwavering preference for 
universalism can be overcome. Benhabib contends that Habermas’ conception of 
discourse ethics and its consequent democratic practices too sharply demarcates the 
effects of culture on the process of communicative interaction.^^
While incorporating historical and sociological specificities of culture, Benhabib 
nevertheless argues that practical reason constitutes a universal that can transcend 
cul tures .Therefore,  Benhabib contends that practical reason and intersubjective 
communicative interactions do not necessarily mean a homogenising process.^^ To this 
extent, Benhabib is supportive of Habermas’ philosophical orientation. Habermas’ 
position is accepted because he maintains that the content of dialogues must be left to 
the individuals engaged in communicative practices.
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Rorty, Pensky, and Benhabib highlight possible important limitations that 
can arise in adopting a universalistic perspective in the application of discourse ethics. 
The need to be sensitive to the cultural specificities and not to subordinate the views of 
others, are valuable points to incorporate into theoretical frameworks and practices of 
facilitation. For example, the exclusion of parties such as the Palestinian resistance 
movement, Hamas, from the Oslo Channel, has resulted in continuing violent attacks 
against Israeli civilians and the military. Consequently, the sceptics within Israeli 
society assert that since their security cannot be guaranteed by the PLO, a peace with 
Palestinians is a pointless exercise. The scholars and practitioners within the facilitated 
conflict resolution discipline are right to point out the care that should be practised in 
deciding which parties to include and exclude. The power dimensions that pervaded the 
Oslo Channel has been transposed onto the domestic constituencies of both the Israeli 
and Palestinian communities. In short, as an exclusion of voices can mean not a 
transformation, but a deepening of a conflict situation, one must be sensitive to the 
perspectives articulated by marginalised groups and communities.
However, while recognising the important problems pointed out by Rorty, 
Pensky, and Benhabib, Habermas contends that the socially co-ordinating mechanism of 
language cuts across cultures and specificities of political communities in both 
dimensions of p r a x i s . T h e  dialogical process offered by Habermas is rooted in the 
understanding that individuals engage in a variety of discourses in everyday life. 
Discourse ethics is premised on a universal commitment to the idea that each individual 
possesses the capacity to orient him or herself towards reaching understanding and 
consensus.Simultaneously,  discourses reflect everyday practices for they are carried 
out in the social milieu and therefore are context-sensitive. Additionally, the raising and 
contesting of validity claims to truthfulness, sincerity, and normative rightness (as 
Habermas outlines) and legitimacy, must necessarily be context-transcendent and
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universalisable. That is, the process of argumentation and the judging of validity 
claims are not limited to particular group of individuals or communities, but can be 
practised in any number of public spheres. For instance, in ethical-political discourses, 
participants engaged in the process of argumentation can critically examine the 
foundations of society that govern norms and structures, in order to decide who they are 
‘and who they would like to be’.^  ^ Cultural specificity and value differences are 
included in a process of self-reflection, in order to arrive at an understanding of how to 
achieve societal transformation. In short, sensitivity to contexts is acknowledged by 
Habermas when he argues:
In moral argumentation, as in the case of ethical discourses, it must be left to the participants 
themselves to find concrete answers in particular cases; it cannot be known in advance.^^
This self-admitted awareness of the need to locate a proceduralist discourse 
ethics takes into account the objections raised by Rorty, Pensky, and Benhabib. The 
more direct claim by Rorty that politics can only be practised at local levels and his 
view of philosophy are rejected by Habermas.^  ^ He asserts that Rorty has not 
completely undertaken a pragmatic turn, since the semantic notion of truth as being 
separate from the public justification via discourses is maintained. In describing 
Rorty’s position, Habermas notes:
Irony depends essentially on a kind of nostalgie de la venté...because metaphysics has command 
only over the language of knowledge, the aestheticisation of its claim to truth amounts to an 
aestheticisation of the philosophical tradition as mere cultural heritage. '^^
Although it is Rorty’s contention that philosophy cannot provide blueprints, 
nevertheless, philosophy can suggest possible frames that can underlie meta-theories 
and theories. Habermas points out that by putting forward an aesthetics-based ethics 
and a definition of philosophy, Rorty is committed to a certain type of philosophical and 
meta-theoretical positions; namely, the attachment to contingency.^^
This debate is far too broad to be adequately covered even in its briefest 
summaries; however, this assertion is included as a discourse ethics-based approach.
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like any theoretical formulation, contains a philosophical commitment. This is the 
case in Rorty’s self-professed weak theoretical formulation. Therefore, however narrow 
the contributions of philosophy may be for formulating theories and practices, it is 
essential to recognise that theories contain certain philosophical presuppositions. This 
point is vital for facilitated conflict resolution perspectives, since only Burton directly 
addresses the philosophical underpinnings of his theory. All too frequently, scholars 
and practitioners of the discipline are too focused on expanding practices without 
considering the types of theories that inform such practices.
A second category of critique levelled against Habermas is presented by thinkers 
such as Axel Honneth.^  ^ He argues that Habermas overlooks the significance of power 
symmetries and asymmetries. Honneth contends that Habermas’ discourse ethics 
subordinates the struggle for mutual recognition. He follows Hegel’s Jena writings to 
the extent that he maintains that a struggle for recognition forms the ethical foundation 
that leads to moral development.^^ Honneth argues that communicative rationality does 
not necessarily entail a more moral subject and maintains that a moral point of view 
arises from violation of identity claims in socialisation and not through language rules.^^
Honneth asserts that Habermas neglects the role of mutual recognition and the 
asymmetrical relationships among individuals and groups. Moreover, he critique 
Habermas’ general universalistic foundation of discourse ethics.^  ^ The approach 
favoured by Honneth is one that depends on relationships of recognition and their 
violation."^  ^ Moral experiences are not acquired through language but through violation 
of identity c la ims . There fore ,  in order to achieve transformation of norms and 
institutions, Honneth contends that one needs to look at resistance movements at the 
lower marginal classes to find moral experiences using historical and sociological 
approaches."^  ^ Rather than turning to pragmatics as Rorty does or the Levinasian 
formulation of linguistics and ethics of care, Honneth returns to metaphysical
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philosophy of early Hegel to suggest a reorientation of critical theory of society. 
That is, he distinguishes between three types of recognition,"^  ^ They are personal 
relationships, rights-based membership of a society, and the social esteem of 
accomplishment and achievement."^ These three, asserts Honneth, comprise a 
successful constitution of identity. Since social esteem is tied to social labour, labour 
should form a significant element of critical theory
In asserting that communicative processes necessarily involve a power 
dimension, whether that is positive or negative, critics such as Honneth maintain that 
the ideal speech situation abstracts certain ideals which cannot be attained in the 
concrete historical practices of social interactions.
It is fair to say that there are elements within a discourse ethics-informed 
theoretical framework that can fall into the trap of overlooking the power dimension in 
pressing for the prioritisation of consensus building. However, the discourse ethics of 
Habermas is rooted in an understanding that individuals engage in the raising and 
contesting of validity claims in the pragmatic dimension of praxis. Therefore, the 
formulation of a process of argumentation and the inclusion of validity claims 
acknowledge the often-distorted nature of communication. If power relations of 
subordination and domination were insignificant, then individuals would have no need 
to contest claims to validity, adopt a formal rule of argumentation for either consensus 
and legitimacy or rejection, consider a communicative rationality-based approach.
It is precisely due to distorted communication and the one-sided rationalised 
public sphere that a formal universal discourse ethics is proposed. Pensky and Honneth 
point out important signifiers to reflect upon in the process of refining and reshaping a 
discourse ethics-informed approach such as one put forward by Habermas. However, 
Honneth’s return to a Hegelian commitment underestimates the flexibility and 
pragmatically transformative nature of discourse ethics. That is, however universal the
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procedural discourse ethics may be, the content of any dialogical process can only 
be agreed upon by participants.
Furthermore, while non-linguistic forms of communication have a role to play in 
hindering or transforming individual attitudes, perceptions, societal norms, and 
institutions, language remains the co-ordinating mechanism that shapes the development 
and reconstruction of those social norms and institutions. As a result, Honneth’s 
insistence on grounding an approach on the need for a struggle of the moral subject for 
mutual recognition is implied in the intersubjective nature of communicative rationality 
and discourse ethics.
In short, while Honneth, like other critics of Habermas discussed here, has 
insights to offer, the application and justification of discourse ethics involve participants 
who in dialogues, at least in principle and more overtly if a dialogical process continues, 
acknowledge at first the other’s existence and subsequently confirm recognition by 
speaking and hearing. At the level of peace practices, the guidelines that are outlined 
for conducting facilitated problem-solving workshops subordinate the asymmetrical 
relationships that often exist among conflicting parties when they first engage in a 
facilitation process. This is certainly an accurate description of the Oslo Channel’s 
practice where pre-negotiations were conducted by important PLO members, whilst the 
Israeli side was represented by two academics who insisted that they were acting as 
private individuals, despite their known connections with key decision-makers within 
the Israeli Govemment."^  ^ Nevertheless, participants to a conflict situation engage in 
facilitation efforts and direct dialogues because the avenues of communicating have 
broken down. The facilitation process is an endeavour to restore the distorted 
communicative process, which can contribute to a deepening of hostilities and reinforce 
negative perceptions.
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In sum, a Habermasian discourse ethics-informed approach requires the 
consideration of these insights offered by scholars such as Rorty, Pensky, Benhabib, and 
Honneth. By keeping in mind the potential pitfalls these thinkers point out, a 
philosophical and meta-theoretical foundation can include and address such objections. 
Since discourse ethics is based on a universalistic application that simultaneously allows 
for specific contextual practices, the homogenising process that may result of 
discourses, as well as the power symmetries and asymmetries are incorporated in a 
discourse ethics formulation.
Potential Pitfalls: The Broader Context
The second set of possible limitations relate to the praxis of a Critical Theory of 
Peace Practice. These are pointed out by Habermas as he asserts that the structural and 
steering mechanisms that can impinge on the practice of discourse ethics and 
communicative rationality, arise from the atomised relationship between the state and 
market structures.'^  ^ He argues that the increasing power of instrumental reason is 
undermining the communicative capacity of the indiv idual .The  modem state with its 
overarching bureaucratic institutions encourages the subordination of publicity and 
discursive will formation of open, unconstrained discussions, to the commodity form."^  ^
Consequently, the market assumes prima face in human social interactions in the public 
sphere of politics and economics.^^ This public sphere concept for Habermas refers to 
‘a realm of social life in which something like public opinion can be formed’ Public 
opinion, Publizitatsvorschriften, is the task of criticism, which in the public sphere, 
mediates between the individual and society.
The process of transformation, argues Habermas, can be realised when citizens 
can meet freely and openly debate and exchange opinions. A shared consensus through 
publicity can influence decision-making. He asserts that a modem society’s public
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sphere is a top-down formation, which applauds instrumental reason and the pursuit 
of goals to satisfy self interests.^  ^ Increasing bureaucratisation has interrupted the 
development of a different kind of rationality other than the scientific and the technical. 
Hence, the organisation of modem societies presents difficulties for overcoming 
structural inadequacies. Yet, Habermas recognises that a structural transformation is 
not an impossible task.^  ^ He argues, ‘Political compromises would have to be 
legitimised through this process of a public conununity and can be realised by 
reconstructing rationality’.^ "^ Consequently, he contends that a critical theory of society 
must necessarily be based on a different type of rationality. In other words, he calls for 
a paradigmatic shift from historical materialism to the communicative process of 
discourse ethics.
In pursuing a Critical Theory of Peace Practice praxis, the possible limitations 
also lie in the mechanisms of the state and economy. The persistent features of 
underdevelopment, which are often present in protracted conflict situations, can hinder 
the transformation and the rebuilding of social and political norms. The reproduction of 
unequal labour and commodity form can further limit the transformational process of 
establishing peace-building processes.
Although economic co-operation, such as that aimed for during the process of 
the Oslo Channel, can be the basis for engaging in constructive dialogues and 
facilitation efforts, the structural conditions that prevail may limit the progress of 
realising social transformations. In the case of the Oslo Channel, the inability by the 
Palestinian National authority and the governing PLO to bring about economic 
transformation is in part due to lack of co-operation by the international community.^^ 
Suspicious of Arafat’s use of financial assistance, governments and non-governmental 
organisations have been slow in honouring their economic pledges; consequently, the 
Marshall-type plan envisioned by Arafat has failed to materialise. Simultaneously, a
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lack of économie development has failed to convince the Palestinian communities in 
the Occupied Territories of any positive effects to be gained from reaching a settlement 
with Israel. This is in part due to Arafat’s authoritarian style of leadership as he insists 
on maintaining control over the finances for the PLO organisation. This unwillingness 
to provide an open account of financial spending further fuels speculations of how loans 
and aid provided by the international community are dispersed and spent.
More significantly, although an unquestionably important symbolic figure to the 
Palestinians, Arafat and the PLO leadership have failed to mobilise public opinion to 
highlight the positives of agreements contained in the Declaration of Principles. Rather 
than engaging with the public to put forward the merits of this peace process, the PLO 
leadership often reacts to Israeli actions or the dissatisfied movements within the 
Palestinian communities of Gaza and the West Bank.
As a result of these social, political, and structural limitations, both parties have 
yet to convince their respective publics of the advantages of the agreements reached in 
the Oslo Channel. The participants’ vision of linking economic co-operation with a 
realisation by both communities for a need for peace has fallen short. It is interesting to 
note that this relationship of tying political stability of a community to economic co­
operation represents the ultimate ideas embodied in instrumental rationality. This 
connection between political stability and economic development formed the foundation 
of the European Community’s establishment. This link between economic prosperity 
with political stability demonstrates the atomised, but related spheres of states and 
economies. The process of state-building allows a future government to control its 
economic development to a certain degree. In the case of the Palestinians, the small 
territory of Gaza and areas within the West Bank remain significantly dependent on 
Israel and the international community’s generosity for economic stability. Arafat’s
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intention to possibly unilaterally declare the creation of a Palestinian state is aimed 
at not only political independence, but also economic development.
The approach adopted by Israel and the PLO leadership of defining success 
according to economic development with political stability reveals one reason why the 
Oslo Channel has failed to produce a transformation at the broader societal level. That 
is, by relying on an instrumentally rational understanding of how to change political 
realities and social norms and institutions, the participants have overlooked the deeper 
processes of distorted communication. In other words, the understanding displayed by 
the participants to the Oslo Channel do not go to the heart of the conflict situation. A 
process of distorted communication, which has led to such opposing positions, needs to 
be addressed in both a facilitation setting and the broader public arena, in order to 
realise the pragmatic changes these parties seek.
In the process of transforming the structures of states and markets, the 
difficulties of changing and overcoming these limitations are important to recognise for 
they can pose some of the greatest obstacles in the realisation of a Critical Theory of 
Peace Practice. However, as Habermas recognises the potential restrictions of structural 
steering mechanisms, at a meta-theoretical level the steering mechanisms that work to 
impinge upon individuals and groups in their search for transforming normative 
structures are incorporated into a foundation of discourse ethics. Discourse ethics and 
its communicative rationality methodology takes into account the distorted process of 
communication that interrupts consensus-building. Furthermore, the legitimacy of 
norms and institutions can be redeemed and renegotiated in the act of contesting claims 
to validity. Therefore, the possible structural limitations can inhibit a Critical Theory of 
Peace Practice, only to the extent that one must recognise these structural components 
when one attempts to implement any reached consensual agreements.
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Finally, the potential limitation of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice, like 
the facilitated conflict resolution approaches discussed in chapters two and three, is that 
the transformation, if and when acquired, in a facilitated workshop environment may 
not be translated into the wider social public arena. This difficulty was pointed out in 
chapter one in the examination of the Oslo Channel and the type of facilitation approach 
adopted there. Although the participants to the process developed trust and a common 
understanding of the ways in which societies must be transformed, in order to foster co­
operative relationships across communities, the subsequent lack of support by members 
of both Israeli and Palestinian communities have demonstrated the necessary element of 
confronting and overcoming what is known as the ‘re-entry problem’ As the 
agreements reached are implemented extremely slowly, in minuscule incremental steps, 
the corresponding level of trust and transformation of attitudes have failed to be 
translated from the secret talks to the public arenas.
A Critical Theory of Peace Practice perspective would entail a fundamentally 
different starting point in the facilitation process than the style that marked the Oslo 
Channel. For example, a third party would take a more proactive role. From the 
beginning of the limited workshop setting, a third party would suggest that both sides 
explore ways of critically examining one another’s positions. An environment in which 
the parties are not obligated to commit to any particular position means that the 
possibility is greater for exploring a variety of options. The Oslo participants 
acknowledge this point. However, under a Critical Theory of Peace Practice 
framework, the third party would remain in the meeting room, unlike Larsen’s option.^  ^
The aspect of assisting only when requested would still comprise this peace practice. 
However, the third party by engaging in a dialogical process along with the disputing 
parties can suggest ways of re-perceiving, constructing, and seizing moments which can 
lead to a transformation in consensus-building. It is fair to say that no agreements may
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result; nevertheless, a third party can help to unblock the communicative process if 
necessary. Larsen practised this to the extent that he interpreted messages and absorbed 
the frustration of the participants.
However, in a Critical Theory of Peace Practise framework, this interaction 
would constitute an integral part that is connected to the overall facilitation effort, and 
not an exercise conducted outside the meeting-rooms. The third party can still refrain 
from formulating any agreements, since any possible settlements or resolution must 
come from the conflicting parties themselves as the scholars and practitioners of 
facilitated conflict resolution rightly assert. The theory proposed here calls for a 
dialogical, interactive, and intersubjective process. This process is shaped an influenced 
by all individuals and thereby any agreements that may be reached can be examined in 
the process of considering the possible effects in the public spheres of the disputants’ 
communities.
A Critical Theory of Peace Practice has another dimension to offer to the stalled 
status of the Oslo Channel and the agreements contained in the Declaration of 
Principles. The efforts undertaken by grass-roots groups in both communities need to 
be connected with the official political process. The encouragement of the already 
present series of dialogues to increase understandings and transform attitudes an images 
would constitute part of the peace-building effort. This aspect is contained in the 
Declaration of Principles. However, rather than prioritising the creation of official 
dialogue process with seemingly acceptable moderates as in the People to People 
programme, the moderates within the communities, as well as the extremists on both 
sides need to be included. A Critical Theory of Peace Practice recognises that the 
problem-solving workshops at the more official level may not always be able to include 
all that would be affected, if an agreement is to be reached. However, the excluded 
voices, if not initially included at the outset, would be engaged with. This is where the
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aspect of discourse ethics where all who may be affected are allowed to take part 
comes into play. One may argue that the extremists on both the Israeli and Palestinian 
sides are not interested in engaging in a dialogue process. However, these groups’ 
efforts to persuade public opinion in the local press and direct activism indicate that 
gaining legitimacy for their views is considered important. Therefore, the positions of 
these marginalised voices need to be included for a societal and structural 
transformation to be self-sustaining.
By explicitly recognising the significance of encouraging public debate and 
argumentation at various levels, whilst exploring ways of connecting these diverging 
perspectives, the promising theoretical framework proposed here is not restricted to the 
workshop process, but offers insights for the larger efforts of peace-building practices. 
The methodology of communicative rationality and discourse ethics allow for the 
connection of various peace-building efforts in which third parties can play a variety of 
interactive roles. Through encouraging linkages of the multiplicity of dimensions for 
transforming attempts of social norms and institutions, the potential for achieving a 
renegotiation of perceptions and relationships become more realisable. In this way, this 
framework is a broader approach than the facilitated conflict resolution problem-solving 
workshops and offers one promising entry point for affecting the public sphere. In the 
case of Oslo, it might include connecting the grass-roots efforts with the official 
political processes. In other conflict situations, the ways in which the re-entry problem 
would be overcome would depend on the level and types of peace-building efforts 
already present in the public sphere, as well as introducing new or hitherto unconsidered 
ways of approaching the conflict situation.
In short, the procedural suggestions offered in a communicative rationality- 
based methodology are designed to allow the participants to a facilitation process to 
explore ways of transforming not only their own positions and perceptions, but how to
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carry across any reached agreements so that they may be legitimated by the public. 
Simultaneously, a theory that is innately connected with this methodology— discourse 
ethics—rightly insists that through reflective living, individuals, groups, and 
communities can deliberate on the types of norms and the corresponding forms of 
institutions they desire. Political change must be a dual process of elites transforming 
opinions and influencing perceptions; simultaneously, various publics can engage in 
dialogues and a process of argumentation (which is carried out in everyday praxis) to 
shape and influence the positions that their decision-makers adopt and put forward. In 
this way, the potential limitation of confronting and overcoming a ‘re-entry problem’ 
becomes a potential opening for a Critical Theory of Peace Practice. This alternative is 
offered to impact not only the narrow setting of facilitated conflict resolution problem­
solving workshops, but the wider arena of public spheres by grounding its foundation 
not on instrumental, but communicative reason and the universalisable discourse ethics 
meta-theoretical framework.
A Critical Theory of Peace Practice: Where Do We Go from Here?
The meta-theoretical presuppositions of critical theory are that human identity and social relations are 
intersubjectively constituted, historically and contextually contingent.^*
— Stephen T. Leonard, 1990 
There are a number of paths one can take in conducting further research which
can help confirm, refine, or make fallible this framework of a Critical Theory of Peace
Practice. One avenue of further research involves the pragmatic component. Although
this thesis has been largely preoccupied with theoretical foundations, the proposed
framework suggests that the practical application component cannot be excluded.
By engaging in critique and self-reflection, scholars and practitioners, who 
analyse the dynamics of conflicts, may discover new ways of approaching the
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substantive facilitation process. A critical attitude adopted towards analysing the 
development of conflicts can reveal previously overlooked dimensions that may either 
contribute to the continuation of a protracted situation or point to possible ways of 
reaching consensual agreements. This aspect of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice is 
aimed towards the third parties who may directly engage in facilitation or contribute to 
the theoretical and philosophical debates within the discipline. Deconstruction of one’s 
own assumptions and placing them under a microscopic study presents opportunities to 
refine, or if necessary, shift one’s orientations to formulate a perspective that can be 
applicable across many dimensions in which peace-building practices are being 
attempted. By being aware of one’s own presuppositions and philosophical 
dispositions, one can more clearly offer a guide to strategic action that follows such 
framings.
It is important to note that this third-party awareness is not one to be imposed or 
spelled out in precise step-by-step detail. The substantive content and specific 
procedures of conflict transformative processes can only be agreed upon and arrived at 
by the participants. However, as third parties contribute to such efforts in dialogues, the 
knowledge they possess, as well as any alternative ways of conceiving the conflict 
becomes part of the communicative interactions. Whilst disputants may not be familiar 
with or cannot engage in mutual communicative interactions due to power distortions 
that continue to protract the conflict situation, third parties can point out the embedded 
nature of language and the contingencies of social norms and institutions.
By arguing for a meta-theoretical rethinking of facilitated conflict resolution 
theories, at the formalistic level, this promising alternative is aimed at re-orienting their 
frameworks. By incorporating meta-theoretical and a fallibilistic foundation, this 
framework is better able to respond to experiences and ideas learned in concrete 
practices. As a Critical Theory of Peace Practice is a promising point from which a
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reconstruction of facilitated conflict resolution perspectives can be re-energised, it 
should occupy a significant space in the theory and practice of conflict resolution 
approaches. At the level of pragmatic praxis, if this alternative framework had been 
included in the facilitation process of the Oslo Channel, for example, adopting a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice might have helped to transfer changed attitudes within the 
facilitation process to the broader public arenas. A Critical Theory of Peace Practice is 
intended to affect individuals, groups, and communities at a variety of levels. The 
changed perceptions, if and when arrived at, in the realm of facilitated, confidential 
workshops can and must be connected with the broader efforts within and among 
conflicting communities, in order to transform societal perceptions, norms and 
institutions. An interconnected approach as envisioned by this proposed framework 
confirms legitimacy, whilst allowing parties to contest competing claims to validity. 
Hence, a more sustainable peace, which is a process of societal transformation, becomes 
an easier task to be practised.
Some Final Remarks
This thesis has argued that meta-theoretical foundations can be shown to affect 
not only construction of theories, but also the pragmatic ways in which the theoretical 
frameworks are practised. An inclusion of a Critical Theory of Peace Practice in the 
field of facilitated conflict resolution has at least three possible benefits. First, a 
perspective that calls for grounding a theory on communicative rationality aims to 
bridge the dichotomy presented in international politics: particularism versus 
universalism. The modem world is comprised of decentred fragmented group of 
political communities. The predominant depiction within the International Relations 
discipline of the state as a unitary actor, which engages in power balancing exercises by 
forming advantageous alliances, has come under challenge by previously excluded
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groups and communities. Communities within states yearn for political 
independence, while other groups involve many states as they carry out their conflictual 
violent relations across national boundaries. A discourse ethics-based approach asserts 
that a theory cannot be grounded on either absolute. Rather, one can acknowledge the 
coexistence of both transcendental and contextual elements that comprise individuals, 
groups and societal orientations. Consequently, the understanding of international 
politics and the ways it is practised must be approached from a variety of entry points 
and angles. The relationships cannot be separated out to one level, but rather must be 
considered interconnected across levels.
Second, the perspective proposed by this author is intended to offer an avenue 
for understanding the establishment and escalation of conflicts, which extend beyond 
needs theory and social-psychological perspectives that dominate facilitated conflict 
resolution approaches. Simultaneously, it aims to offer an alternative account for 
approaching facilitation efforts from the traditional forms of mediation employed in 
international politics. Consequently, a Critical Theory of Peace Practice is designed to 
reintegrate the often separated discipline of peace and conflict studies back into an 
International Relations discipline. Additionally, by insisting that other types of 
rationality can be used to formulate a basis for theoretical frameworks, the dominance 
of realism and neo-realism enjoyed in International Relations discipline can be 
challenged at a fundamental philosophical level.^^
Finally, a theoretical framework based on discourse ethics and communicative 
rationality methodology can assist in transforming participants’ understandings of the 
other, in a facilitation workshop process, as well as in the wider public sphere. This 
alternative perspective aims to affect the process of constructing norms, institutions, and 
perceptions across cultural cleavages. Simultaneously, a Critical Theory of Peace 
Practice framework takes into account the value differences that exist among both the
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politically powerful and the politically marginalised individuals, groups and 
communities to produce a societal transformation. By including this context-sensitive, 
context-transcendent approach as one among a plethora of perspectives by third parties 
and disputants, all the participants can together can engage in a learning process that can 
bring about historic breakthroughs. Simultaneously, this theory can help to mobilise a 
transformation of entrenched attitudes and perceptions in the broader public sphere. 
Only by encouraging both transformative processes, can years of enmity be transformed 
into non-violent societal relationships in which the legitimacy of ideas are continually 
reassessed and if necessary, renegotiated.
The extent to which a Critical Theory of Peace Practice can be elaborated and 
refined is a task of further research. The possible objections raised by postmodernists, 
for example, is an important dimension to engage with in the process of validating or 
sharpening and confirming the legitimacy of this proposed alternative.^^ Engaging in 
debates with scholars and practitioners can only help to further refine the features of this 
proposed alternative. The most significant points and contributions for facilitated 
conflict resolution theories and practices are two-fold.
First, in order to transform not only attitudes of individuals that comprise 
political communities, but their norms and institutions, a dialogical process requires the 
connection of peace-building praxis at various levels. A consideration of how to 
connect the various dialogues requires actively formulating ways of connecting the 
various dimensions of dialogues. However incomplete or fragmented dialogues may be 
among opposing communities, the establishment and development of dialogues in 
which the parties orient themselves, in the first instance, to understand the other’s 
positions, helps to foster an environment of confidence-building and a recognition that 
the ‘other’ is not an abstract enemy upon whom most extreme prejudices can be placed. 
Connecting these small segments to the larger more official political process of attempts
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at reaching agreements for conflict transformation allows for a common dialogical 
process to be understood, although the content of each naturally would diverge.
The more official political conflict transforming process often will aim for a 
breakthrough following secret dialogues. The discourse ethics foundation of a Critical 
Theory of Peace Practice allows for equal participation by all parties including third 
parties where the dialogues are free-flowing and is not dutifully bounded to facilitated 
analysis. Hence, claims raised by every participant can be contested and mutually re­
negotiated. It is fair to say that the conflicting parties may decide to disagree and break 
off dialogue. However, social relationships are continued through the co-ordinating 
mechanism of language, and equally importantly, for resolution of protracted deep- 
rooted conflicts requires re-negotiating of views, norms and institutions. In another 
words, a dialogical process is always under way. A discourse ethics approach like 
facilitated conflict resolution perspectives is intended to allow the parties to grasp an 
opportunity of potential transformation if and when they arise. However, unlike 
facilitated conflict resolution approaches, a Critical Theory of Peace practice is intended 
to formulate ways of overcoming distorted communicative processes rather than 
locating satisfiers to nonnegotiable human needs. This proceduralist frame presents a 
broad content in which participants can decide the particularities of content.
It may appear in arguing for the various dialogues that this alternative theory is 
predisposed towards a hierarchy in that the dialogical process it offers is preferred to the 
dialogues already present in the broader level of public sphere. However, such an 
understanding is inaccurate. Since interactions by participants and process influence 
one another (even if the influence from one may be grater than another) changes will be 
made to both the discourse ethics-inspired approach of facilitated dialogues that result in 
an official agreement with the smaller more marginal seemingly dialogues by activists 
and social movements. The interchange between these spheres affects all participants.
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A discourse ethics approach contends that a common dialogical process of 
argumentation can occur. The more instrumentally rationality based arguments of 
smaller groups or a official political ones (if they have are conducted on such basis and 
have not adopted a discourse based framework in facilitation process) the inclusive 
nature of communicative rationality will allow for the inclusion of these power-based 
dialogues and understandings.
The second contribution a Critical Theory of Peace Practice offers for facilitated 
conflict resolution discipline lies in communicative rationality. An orientation that is 
not restricted to a form of reason and rationality that prioritise success and goals at the 
expense of communicative interactions is the reason that facilitated conflict resolution 
approaches remain unable to fulfil the potential of allowing the parties to find their own 
solutions. A discourse ethics approach allows for the inclusion and rebalancing of 
instrumental rationality. It includes a methodology of communicative rationality and 
thereby restores the significant role of not only communicative processes, but the 
application of practical reason. In the descriptive accounts offered by facilitated 
conflict resolution scholars and practitioners, the importance of motivations and 
cognitive behaviours are emphasised. A Critical Theory of Peace Practice attempts to 
move beyond this narrow conception of human behavioural approaches by premising its 
foundation on the socially integrative role of language. The process of transforming and 
re-negotiating normative structures and attitudes is a slow on-going process that is 
continually reshaped by interactions among individuals through the employment of 
discourses. The ways in which dialogues are carried out are often first predicated on 
power asymmetries. The nature of protracted deep-rooted conflicts indicate that these 
asymmetries are either concrete or perceived to be real. Whichever the case may be, 
both shape the relationship of individuals in communities when they engage in 
argumentations. A third party who holds no specific interests for the direction of peace-
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building has a role to play at various points, ranging from encouraging and 
participating in communal dialogues to arranging problem-solving type workshops.
In the task of validating and refining the proposed alternative articulated in this 
thesis, one may also consider developments in peace-building efforts such as Northern 
Ireland or South Africa. Both protracted deep-rooted conflict situations have insights to 
offer in that the transformation of social norms an institutions are under way, since the 
political decision-makers have learned that only through the employment of discourses 
in which arguments can be raised and contested, can legitimacy be gained in the wider 
public sphere. These attempts at co-operation under reconstructed political 
arrangements indicate the need for multi-level consensus building processes. The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict transformation process faces a further test of legitimacy and 
the agreements first reached by a few individuals who realised that new norms and 
institutions were necessary, in order to arrive at a self-sustaining peace process. The 
test lies in the debates by many more voices (some who were initially excluded) as well 
as by new political arrivals and a variety of community groups who have diligently 
endeavoured to reshape and break down perceptions and barriers in the process of 
reconstructing norms and institutions, as well as creating new understandings.
As practices and theory are intrinsically connected in everyday praxis, the 
facilitated conflict resolution discipline has lacked a meta-theoretical level of critical 
theory. This is the reason why a Critical Theory of Peace Practice is ultimately 
suggested for rethinking such meta-theoretical foundations.
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Appendix 
Interview with Even Aas 
Oslo, 6 May 1995
LS : How and when were you approached?
EA: I was asked two or three days before the first meeting in Sapsborg, in January 1993
I think. I was just finishing a meeting and Terje Larsen came in and asked me if I 
had some time. This was at FAFO. He asked me if I could close my mouth, yes of 
course I can. And he asked me if I would be a part of a process and I said yes. 
Then he told me about the process, what's going to happen and at that time I think I 
was the first or second person at FAFO who really knew about what was going to 
happen because we had to be secretive. Then he asked me if I would organise the 
first meeting, look into the meeting rooms, find the location, and rent cars and all 
that sort of thing. And on the evening in January, we went to the airport. I was the 
only one besides Teije who picked them up - both the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
So we were driving the whole night and I had a nightcap with all of them. In a way 
that was the first meeting. And from that time I was involved more or less in the 
process. I had almost the same role that Geir Pedersen, but I was involved from the 
very beginning.
»  «
LS: What was the trust level between the disputants as well as each towards Norway?
FA: In some way I think it was important that Norway was involved because they
trusted Teije R0d Larsen and they believed he was truthful all the time and when he 
involved people from the Norwegian side, I think they also trusted them as well. 
So when we looked for other meeting places, we were looking for comfortable 
places, cosy and relaxed which affects positively the people. Also, they would be
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more inclined to start talking informally. That's important because that meant no 
publicity. I think that was one of the main keys to the eventual success.
»  «
LS: How would you describe the atmosphere in the early stages? Was the Oslo effort
only agreed to because of a breakdown in the Washington talks?
EA: I think all those who were involved in the Norway channel were serious in wanting
peace from their hearts. When you believe in something, then it is possible to 
realise it. I think after the first two or three meetings in Norway, the Israelis and the 
Palestinians thought it could produce something.
»  «
LS: That was when it became upgraded?
EA: Yes, the DO? was drafted in March or April. It is called the Sapsborg Declaration.
»  «
LS: And the DOP comes from that?
EA: Actually the DOP is built on the Sapsborg Declaration.
»  «
LS: After that point in March, was it a matter of working out the actual text of the
DOP?
EA: It was a matter of building up trust among the participants because then they started
talking about the upgrading of the channel.
»  «
LS : Were you surprised at the turn of events ?
EA: If people had asked in March or April about the prospects or told me about them, I
would have thought the eventual outcome was a crazy and remote possibility 
because the parties had made the negotiations and not the Norwegians. I think it 
was an honour to have been involved in the process. Always I hoped it should
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succeed in some way and after the first tree meetings, the world in the Middle East 
had already changed because the Israelis and the Palestinians had sat together. 
From then on, there was the point of no return.
»  «
LS: While they negotiated, the Norwegian side did what?
EA: Sometimes we would sit down and just watch TV. When they asked for help
especially from Teije and Mona, they gave it. They made all the steps; I mean the 
parties, they decided when we should be involved or not; that was a loose rule.
»  «
LS: Was it a good idea to mix track 1 with track 2 diplomacy?
EA: Not an easy question. You couldn't have had a Norway or Oslo Channel without
the Washington talks; that's impossible. I think you had many factors that made it
possible for a success. The main point was that the people who were involved 
believed in peace. Terje Larsen was trusted by both sides. Also, the Gulf War and 
you have to think about that because before the Gulf War, the PLO was actually the 
main enemy for the Israelis. Afterwards, there was an increase of many 
fundamentalists groups so the PLO was now seen to be a moderate group. They 
were also nearly bankrupt. There were also changes in the Israeli Government. It 
is also important to note that the Norwegians were seen not to have a particular self 
interest in being involved - A different approach from the Americans and the 
Germans for example.
»  «
LS: What was the reception of FAFO'S Living Conditions Survey?
EA: It was two processes that happen to be under the same umbrella. The most
important thing for the parties in Norway was the peace process. Maybe you could 
do this process without the Living Conditions Studies, but it helped probably to
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build relationships because Teije got to know many people through it. I'm not sure 
because the survey had been going on years before the peace process. Marianne 
Heiberg presented a draft report in the first meeting and she left. Then they started 
negotiating. The presentation was only a half day.
»  «
LS : How long was the first meeting ?
EA: It started actually when we arrived; with the Palestinians, during the nightcap.
After lunch, they began to work.
»  «
LS: Was Stoltenberg present in these meetings or did he work through Egeland?
EA: Stoltenberg was not present. Jan Egeland came to the first lunch.
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Interview with Abu Ala 
Ramala, 16 May 1995
AA: Have you met with Uri Savir? He is one of the main key players. One of the two
traitors.
»  «
LS : Why do you say that?
AA: Uri Savir and I are the two traitors.
» «
LS: How would you describe the development of the Oslo Channel? At what point did
you make contact or were you approached?
AA: I always call the Oslo Channel an accident. At that time the negotiations in
Washington were going nowhere. Many people started to look for other 
possibilities of how to meet, how to progress forward. At that time, I was the co­
ordinator of the multilateral negotiations. I was in charge of all the working groups 
in the multilaterals and I consider those negotiations to be very important. As you 
know, the Madrid Process worked along two tracks: the bilateral and the
multilateral. My point of view is that the bilateral one discussed the questions of 
the past rather than how to find a solution. The multilateral one, on the other hand, 
was more about issues of the future; how to create co-operation between the parties 
concerned in order to maintain stability and create prosperity. I received a call from 
Hanan Ashrawi. She said to me, "Abu Ala, there is an Israeli who wants to meet 
you." I told her that I had never met an Israeli up until that time. She replied, "He's 
a good friend and beheves in self-determination, etc., etc." I decided to go ahead, 
since she said he was interested.
» «
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LS: And this was?
AA: He was Yair Hirschfeld. At first, I was reluctant, but then Faisal Husseini also
called me again and then another trusted person came to me in my office in Tunis 
and asked why I did not agree to meet the Israeli. I told him that I was not totally 
against it. He said that it wasn't a negotiation session. I thought if it is not official, 
why not meet him. Anyway, he pointed out that both of us would be in London in 
December 1992. He said you can meet him and there was no commitment.
Then, I was in London and I said why not, since Yair Hirschfeld is an 
Israeli academic. So we met in the lobby of a hotel and we talked. It was not a bad 
meeting, for a first meeting, between an Israeli and not just any Palestinian, but an 
official member of the FLO. I said to him, "Who are you?" He said, "I'm 
Professor" I said, "I know but who are you and how are you connected to the 
Israeli Government." He said, "No, I'm not officially affiliated with the Israeli 
Government. I'm an interested individual, know and am a friend of Yossi Beilin." 
At that time, Yossi Beilin was in London. So this was my assessment: since he was
in London with Yossi Beilin, it has some meaning. He said that he met with Dan
Kurtzer of the US. I said, "Okay, this is also something." We finished that meeting 
and he asked for another one. He met with others and then we met again and he 
proposed that we come to meet in Oslo. I thought, why Oslo.
»  «
LS : You were not at this point approached by Terje R0d-Larsen ?
AA: No, I met Teije Rpd-Larsen and his wife. She is more important than Teije R0d-
Larsen.
»  «
LS: Because?
AA: Because she's important. Because she is an official representative of the Norwegian
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Government.
»  «
LS : So back to why Oslo ?
AA: At that time, it sprung to my mind that any meetings should be held in Stockholm,
Sweden. The Palestinian-American dialogues had started from there; therefore, the 
Scandinavian country seemed a more likely meeting place. I asked Hirschfeld if he 
had talked to any Norwegians to which he gave an affirmative response. I said
okay and that I would think it over and consult. I came back to Tunis and met with
Chairman Arafat and also Abu Mazen. Both of them said it was a good idea, why 
not try. Then Teije Rpd-Larsen came over from Oslo and invited us to come to 
Norway.
» «
LS : Did he express a particular agenda for the first meeting ?
AA: No, just to meet, but he also mentioned that at the time FAFO had been working on
a study of living conditions in the Occupied Territories. He said that a report on the 
findings would serve as a cover. The first meeting was in January. I told everyone 
in the meeting-room, "Look, we can make individual exercises of criticising or 
praising one or the other, for another two years or more. We can continue to claim 
that all of Palestine is ours and you can claim it is all yours. Then, we will not 
reach an agreement. To reach an agreement, let's start on a clean slate, let's put all 
this - it is the conflict of the century - all this aside and see what we can do with it.” 
»  «
LS: What factors contributed to the decision to continue with Oslo?
AA: I said, "Let's start to look for a way of finding an agreement, perhaps based on
principles.” This idea of a Declaration Of Principles is a Palestinian idea, although 
we did not use the precise word “principles”. All the substance of the Declaration
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of Principles comes from the Palestinian side. It is based on ten points, which had 
been previously sent to the Americans, and through other channels, to the Israelis. 
They were refused by both of them unequivocally. These points form the backbone 
of this agreement. The first meeting finished and Hirschfeld and Pundak said they 
would meet with Beilin or others in the Government. I did the same on my side 
and we agreed to continue with other meetings.
I would like to say that concerning the Norwegians, they played a very 
important role. In the first meeting, Teije was there and Mona too. Marianne was 
also there, but only to present the FAFO report. Afterwards, the Israelis and the 
Palestinians continued alone. Teije Larsen acted as a facilitator, no more than that. 
When there was tension, he would come to us and tell us or we would tell him 
something. In this way, he acted as a communicator and interpreter of messages; 
this is the role the Norwegians generally played.
We continued this way until April and then I told them, "Look, if no official 
Israeli comes to the next meeting, everything is finished." At that time, the draft of 
the Declaration of Principles had been finished.
»  «
LS: Were you going under the assumption that an Israeli official would come?
AA: That is what we hoped because, until that time, we had been going this unofficial
way. Without an Israeli official at that stage, I didn't see much point in continuing. 
Someone with decision-making capability on that side was necessary at that stage 
of things.
Uri Savir, the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was sent 
and this was the first time that an Israeli official and a Palestinian official formally 
met. This was a significant development and an important element of that meeting. 
During this first meeting with Uri Savir, I beheve a chemistry developed and we
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felt an agreement could be reached.
»  «
LS: Was it a good idea to have first, the academics participate, rather than to start
directly with ojficials?
AA: As a matter of fact for us, we were very, very, serious. We, I mean not just me
personally, but the PLO, wanted to see if the Israelis were serious or not in wanting 
to reach an agreement. Because we had made many initiatives in the past, now was 
the time to see if anything would finally come from it. But no doubt, both 
Hirschfeld and Pundak played a very important role in the peace process.
»  «
LS: In what sense?
AA: In the sense that firstly, they started and continued with genuine intentions.
»  «
LS: Do you think the Norwegians played a crucial role?
AA: As I said, they played a role; how much of one is questionable. I don't believe in
fate or all that nonsense, but we took an advantage of an opportunity when it 
presented itself. It was one possible avenue out of many and luckily, it worked out.
Besides, Mona Juul was much more key....
»  «
LS: In what way?
AA: She's the diplomat: the one close to power decision-makers and when you are
trying to get an agreement, that's the essential thing.
»  «
LS: And Larsen?
AA: I'm not going on record to say he didn't help, of course he did, probably more than I
realise now. But you must understand where I'm coming from: years of talking to
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many Israelis, all of them going nowhere. Then, due to coincidences and lack of 
progress anywhere else, the Oslo Channel produced a workable agreement. 
Hirschfeld and Pundak seemed realistic in knowing what could be achieved and 
what couldn't. Plus, we knew that they had Government contacts and that this 
avenue was being reported back to somebody high up and so we decided to 
continue.
»  «
LS: Is it fair to characterise the process as consisting o f two phases?
AA: Yes, the first period before Savir and Singer came, you could say that was a testing
of waters, exchanging ideas. It was good, but soon we wanted more official 
representatives from Israel. The academics played a key role, since we knew about 
them from others and knew they were sincere in wanting to find a breakthrough. It 
was important to us that they weren't interested in just getting headlines, but in 
helping to produce results.
»  «
LS : Was secrecy essential ?
AA: Yes. It's quite amazing that it did stay secret. With secrecy, you don't have to
perform for the circus all the time. You can say what you really feel without 
having it reported or, all too often even worse, having meanings become distorted. 
Nothing like a misunderstood journalist to confuse and complicate issues. More 
importantly, it meant that all sides could come to formulate an agreement, which 
would not be liked by many segments.
» «
LS: In that case, why did you agree to what some have criticised as a cave-in to Israel's
demands?
AA: What we had up until then was nothing. Gaza and Jericho may seem little, and
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there are flawed components to the DOP [Declaration of Principles] but that's why 
it's a framework: a starting point and not an end point. It is essential to realise this. 
It can go wrong, others may opt out, but I don't see a reason to. There is only one 
alternative, I am convinced, and that is a return to violence and nobody wants that. 
Also, you must see that what we, as Palestinians, gained was recognition as did 
Israel. Mutual recognition, which came after the DOP, was also important. In the 
pre-negotiations phase, it was the first time an Israeli and a Palestinian had come 
face-to-face and recognised that they had to talk to one another, if an agreement 
could be thought about. This seems very simple, but it was something that had not 
occurred until that time. The historic nature of the DOP is lost, when you see that 
delays come upon delays in its implementation, but the DOP has changed the face 
of Middle East politics.
»  «
LS : The arrival of Savir and Singer...
AA: That was good. Savir followed through with the ideas discussed and then we knew
we had their attention. You think it's going all right and you are hopeful, but you 
never know until one crystal moment of a demonstration of faith.
»  «
LS : The collapse of the talks...
AA: Yes, yes. Singer wanted to re-negotiate the text and agreements encompassed in
the draft of the DOP. We needed clarifications and assurances, which they seemed 
to back away from. For a time, it seemed like we were losing everything we had 
worked for; that is, all of us had worked for. The way to achieve co-operation is 
through talking, but not always about the abstract principles. Maybe, it has to end 
up there, so it is open enough for others to expand and improve. But things like 
economic co-operation, that's a pragmatic thing that both sides can see the necessity
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of. It's in everybody's interest, for instance, that Palestinians’ living conditions, 
economically speaking, improve in the Occupied Territories. The more developed 
a society, the greater the likelihood in a reduction of extremism and 
fundamentalism. Of course, it can still happen, but if you see concrete 
improvements then the peace process provides positive proof to those sceptics and 
confirms confidence to those who are already committed.
»  «
LS: One of the obstacles Israelis see is a threat of their security in terms of Hamas...
AA: Look, we can't control everybody. You refer to us as terrorists ....
»  «
LS: No, I did not. But you must recognise this legitimate concern.
AA: Yes, and we are working to curb violence wherever it occurs. It would be nice if
Israel did the same, but do you see them doing it, not too often.
»  «
LS: The delays in implementing the DOP is in part due to Israel's hesitation, due to
their fears about maintaining security?
AA: 1 believe it is indeed attributed to the security problem. They must help us to
establish a peace, if a peace is to become the norm. For too long in this region, 
strife not co-operation has been the basis of relating to each other. For too long, 
conflict has been the norm and not just living daily routine lives as one might do in 
other less conflict-ridden societies.
» «
LS : How would you define peace ?
AA: Peace is an absence of violence: violence that is politically organised and
maintained by a government. Peace is also concerned with improving economic 
conditions.
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»  «
LS: Does that involve a certain political structure?
AA: I would maintain, and perhaps I am wrong, that the PNA (Palestinian National
authority) and the PLO generally have worked to establish more democratic 
principles in Gaza than many other governments in the Middle East.
»  «
LS: What are the obstacles to the Oslo process?
AA: There are many, as I have said. The dates have been put back and hopefully, this
does not mean future ones will also be deferred, which will mean the final status 
negotiations will not commence in time to meet the deadline of May 1999. But it's
still a good agreement, the best that could have been arrived at and it is definitely
better than no agreement. If we didn't have the DOP, no doubt there would be more 
talks going on now, and where would we all be.
»  «
LS: What are the lessons of The Oslo Channel?
AA: It's always easy in hindsight to say, this was right and that was wrong. But the most
vital lesson, I believe, is that you have to talk to one another without direction from 
a third party who asserts how you should negotiate, how you may reach 
agreements, if conflicts are to be lessened.
»  «
LS : How do you see the future prospects ?
AA: I hope this breakthrough will see some fruits that all can see. Without it, the
genuine intentions of everybody involved in the Oslo process may have been in 
vain, but I sincerely hope this is not the case. I am optimistic, since the 
relationships built up among those involved continue to develop. This trust- 
building process can see us through many difficult times that are bound to arise. At
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the end of the day, we don't have any other choice. You can only fight for so long 
if you want to progress and improve lives. If you want peace, then you have to start 
talking and listening.
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Interview with Hassan Asfour 
Gaza, Occupied Territories, 23 May 1995
LS: Were you present from the start of the Oslo process?
HA: Yes, I joined my colleagues as a part of the PLO. There were others involved in
the Washington talks, but we decided to explore this one; after all, why not.
»  «
LS: What made you decide to continue with this exploratory meeting?
HA: I think it was the serious wilhngness shown by the Israeli academics. Although
they were not official representatives of the Government, we all knew on the 
Palestinian side that they had very close ties with Beilin and that meant Peres 
probably knew something about it. If this was so, then it had potential.
»  «
LS: The DOP, why Gaza First?
HA: It was a common framework, which we could all live with. This, though it seems
minor, was a breakthrough. The Washington talks, much like the Madrid 
Conference, wasn’t going anywhere and the prospects looked very gloomy. The
Gaza First, which became Gaza Plus, since it included Jericho, was something both
Tunis and Jerusalem would accept I thought.
»  «
LS: Abu Ala led the PLO delegation?
HA: I guess you could say that, but we were really all equals. Some had more to say
at one point, of course Abu Mazen was quite important too.
»  «
LS: From January to May, would you agree with others and describe this period as
the pre-negotiations phase?
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HA: Yes, these meetings, though they produced something, still we were beginning to
think maybe they weren’t developing so well, since no officials from the Israeli 
Government joined the talks.
»  «
LS : What was the Norwegians ’ role ?
HA: I would say they facihtated: they left us to find our own way to success or failure.
They did not impose a solution, they could not impose a solution. Larsen and his 
colleagues were helpful.
»  «
LS: Was this third-party role a role that could have been fulfilled by another: say
Egyptians?
HA: That’s neither here nor there. But, I suppose not, Norway had credibility with
both sides like Egypt. But you see, there was an Egyptian channel going on 
simultaneously; there were channels all over the place. We didn’t know that this 
one would produce an agreement in the beginning, but when we saw that Israel 
was at last ready to recognise the Palestinians as a people, then we knew this 
was promising.
»  «
LS: How did the talks change?
HA: We demanded that Israel show good faith and send someone official to continue the
negotiations. At the same time, the Washington talks were restarted.
»  «
LS: You were pleased then with the arrival of Savir and Singer?
HA: We knew they meant business when they turned up. Savir was the head of the
Foreign Ministry, this meant that Israel was taking this avenue seriously, as 
serious as we were about it.
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»  «
LS: This is when the official negotiations began?
HA: Yes. There were times when it seemed that all the hard work would go to waste.
The Israelis started to re-write the agreement, to change the parameters.
»  «
LS: How?
HA: We had already agreed upon a text framework. Singer changed all that; many
things and terms had to be re-negotiated and re-defined. This meant more 
obstacles.
»  «
LS: The talks came close to a collapse in August?
HA: Yes. This was a part of that re-negotiating, re-defining. We had to keep what
we gained and were determined not to lose that.
»  «
LS: The dijficult, some would say the crucial questions were deferred. Was this
because an Oslo Channel would not have been possible otherwise?
HA: I think so. You see, the Declaration of Principles is precisely that: it’s up to all of
us to see that these ideas come to fruition. The issues were deferred because we 
needed a starting point and Gaza and Jericho self-rule was an important first step.
»  «
LS: Can you apply Oslo elsewhere?
HA: No. A set of particular circumstances allowed it to happen. Of course, you
could say that a facilitator is better than someone insisting that you follow a 
prescribed formula.
»  «
LS: How would you define a facilitator?
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HA: A facilitator is someone or a group of people who assist those in conflict to find a
way of talking; preferably bilaterally. They don’t interfere, order directions, they 
don’t engage in bargaining with you. Additionally, they don’t explicitly pursue 
their self interests.
»  «
LS: Are you optimistic about the prospects?
HA: Not necessarily. There are many problems. Delays have been experienced in the
implementation already and they seem likely to continue. But, hopefully the 
agreement reached back then means that a peace between the two peoples is 
imaginable.
»  «
LS : How would you define peace ?
HA: I would define peace as an absence of violence. A recognition that both can coexist
without the annihilation of the other. Israel must halt the land confiscations. When 
Israel engages in this policy, they are not securing Israel, but are threatening 
Palestinians. Consequently, some turn to violence because they feel they have 
nothing to lose.
»  «
LS: Israelis might argue that the PLO must control the extremist elements. ..
HA: Extremism and terrorism, yes there are some elements, but we are trying the best
we can. You must understand that the Palestinian police force is not so as 
advanced. We need technical assistance, and all the funds pledged at the signing of 
the DOP, not much has come this way. Without a firm economic foundation, it is 
very difficult to promote peace and co-existence with what some still believe to be a 
mortal enemy. Israel has the advantage that although they, like us, have extremist 
elements, their economy is much more sound. The people on the ground must see
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that a peace deal is worth it; otherwise, the huge potential may be lost.
»  «
LS: Are there any lessons to be learned from Oslo?
HA: It’s always easy with hindsight; you should have done that, should not have done
this. But, what is done is done and you can’t change the past. But, you can reshape 
events. One of the important ingredients during the talks (all the way through,
especially in the beginning) was that you could freely express ideas and that we 
agreed not to blame each other for the past. This is a circle that we get too often 
stuck in and then you can’t move forward at all.
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Summary of Interview with Yossi Beilin 
Jerusalem, 19 May 1995
YB: There were a number of attempts to establish a dialogue with Palestinians. I always
believed that we had to talk to one another if the political landscape was to change. 
It needs to change because you can’t fight forever. Eventually, both sides realise 
that you have to reach an accommodation and co-operate which can benefit 
everyone.
In the beginning, I had contacts and meetings with Terje R0d-Larsen and 
Jan Egeland. The idea was to meet with Faisal Husseini who appeared to me as 
a moderate Palestinian. But for various reasons, such a meeting in Norway 
never took place.
When I learned of the emerging links between Hirschfeld and Pundak 
with Larsen and Abu Ala, I told Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak that it was a 
good idea to meet with them. Everyone was going to be in London anyway and 
so a plausible cover was possible.
I informed the Foreign Minister [Shimon Peres] of the talks in Oslo as 
they happened. These talks semed to promise something really different from 
the Washington talks. Although Yair and Ron had my full support, it was made 
clear to the PLO that they were acting as private individuals. Of course, the 
PLO representatives knew that Yair and Ron had contacts within the Israeli 
Government. But they did not know how far up those links went.
Shimon Peres always offered support but stayed in the background. As 
the talks developed and the pre-negotiations stage was upgraded to a negotiation 
phase. Prime Minister Rabin I think was then informed. The US State
Department was briefed but they did not take this seriously.
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I think the stalled status in Washington provided inspiration to everyone 
in Oslo to find something. Additionally, the secrecy, chemistry and trust that 
grew from the interactions among us and them made an agreement possible.
The Norwegians played a key role. Larsen, I would say was the leader of 
the third-party team. The presence of Jan Egeland from the very start reassured 
all of us that Norway was serious in their commitment to this channel. Then 
Foreign Minister Stoltenberg who in the beginning funded and silently 
supported the first meeting was crucial. You needed someone to take such a 
gamble and he wasn’t afraid to. A more reticent politician might have dismissed 
hosting such sensitive talks when it was illegal for an Israeli to meet with a 
member of the PLO.
Larsen also stayed with the whole process all the way through and saw 
everyone through the difficulties when problems arose in late summer. The 
intervention of Stoltenberg’s successor, Holst, was helpful too as he helped with 
the Letters of Mutual Recognition.
I believe that this Declaration of Principles is the best agreement that 
could have been reached. It has flaws; no agreement is perfect. But it was a 
breakthrough. Israel and the PLO have agreed to recognise each other and the 
fact that we have to live together on a small piece of land. How much we keep 
and how much they get is always up for re-negotiation. You have to give and 
take. Peace-building is a slow process but now we can speak of peace rather 
than how to stop the violence. Of course, the PLO has to work to reduce the 
violent attacks against Israelis. But I am hopeful for the future. What is the 
alternative; violence? Who wants that? As I said, you can’t fight forever.
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Interview with Jan Egeland 
Oslo, 4 May 1995
LS: When and how were you initially approached?
JE: I would say that I am one of the three or four founding fathers of the whole
process, which sprang out of Norway's close relationship with Israel's Labour 
Party since 1948. One could also say it sprang out of the predecessors: the 
courageous rapprochement contacts with the PLO leadership from 1976 
onwards. These are necessary pre-conditions for everything. It was also due to 
the people in my office, my colleague Mona Juul.
But other important aspects included the PLO, some of its members 
came to Oslo to indicate, through several emissaries from 1991-93, that they 
would like to start dialogues with a Norwegian contact who also had links with 
Israel. That was in part due to a change in the Swedish Government. The 
Swedish Social Democrats had left power in October 1991 and they had played 
an important role, never between Israel and the PLO, but between PLO and the 
United States. Arafat was giving indications that we, Norway, could play a role, 
since we had the good relations with Israel. So you could say that already in 
1991 and 92 that we knew that the PLO wanted such a channel through us. We 
then had the first indications, through Terje R0d Larsen that Yossi Beilin (while 
he was in opposition. May 1992) was interested in exploring possibilities for 
dialogues with Palestinians. Larsen and myself had constant contacts and I 
funded his work in the region such as the Living Conditions surveys. He 
contacted me immediately after the Yossi Beilin meeting, where they had 
explored this as just as an academic exercise, nothing more than an idea. There 
were some contacts with Faisal Husseini. We formalised the offer of a secret 
channel in a secret meeting between myself and Yossi Beilin, where also Larsen 
and Juul were present on the Norwegian side and Yair Hirschfeld on the Israeli 
side. We did, however, at that point think Yossi Beilin and a couple of aides
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should meet Faisal Husseini and a couple of aides perhaps including Tunis PLO 
representatives.
»  «
LS: Was that in Oslo or London?
JE: The secret meeting was in Tel Aviv on 11 September 1992. It has been reported
the 9th but I know it was the 11th because the next day was my birthday and I 
received a T-shirt from some of the others in the delegation, who said, "There is 
place for peace". The people who gave the T-shirt did not know of the secret 
meeting the night before.
»  «
LS: To what extent was Stoltenberg involved?
IE: He knew of all of this. I would say that are four founding fathers on the
Norwegians side were myself, Stoltenberg, and Mona Juul on the Ministry side, 
and Larsen at FAFO. We worked closely as a small-knit team. Abu Ala, who 
was the PLO contact and chief negotiator, was one of the emissaries who came 
to us, to explore closer PLO Norway contacts. Mona and I connected with Terje 
Rpd-Larsen after Abu Ala had met with me here in this office: [the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Oslo].
Then, the meeting between Faisal Husseini and Beilin was scheduled 
several times, but it did not work. Part of the problem was that it was important 
to find the right format as it involved Beilin. At that time, official contacts 
between Israel and the PLO were prohibited under Israeli law. Therefore, Beilin 
was hesitant, dead against an informed contact with any members of the PLO. 
We did discuss with him indirect ways that he could happen to meet one of the 
PLO members. He had purposely brought along Yair Hirschfeld to the 
September meeting. A December meeting in London took place between 
Hirschfeld and Abu Ala, with Larsen present. After that, it was decided to try 
the Sarpsborg meeting where we met.
I believe your John Burton would describe Yair and that January 
Sarpsborg meeting as a workshop because it was confidential, informal and
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confidence-building between the two academics and three people from the 
Palestinian side who comprised an official delegation.
»  «
LS: Was there a specific purpose or objective for the first meeting in December?
JE: In retrospect, some of the books and some of us might have given the
impression that we had the idea of establishing, even myself I said, a channel. 
Yes, the PLO wanted to have a channel in the sense they wanted to have a way 
of communicating with the Israeli Government. We also discussed ways of 
having channels in terms of passing messages and information and so forth. 
Someone could go through us and we could facilitate contacts. There was not 
even in our wildest dreams, a hope of negotiating any agreements secretly in 
Norway, which operated in parallel to the official negotiations. Mona Juul and 
myself went to Madrid in '91. We had proposed then a way for Norway to help 
promote confidence-building measures (CBMs as we call them). We met with 
the Israeli and Palestinian delegations, so it shows all the way back to that time, 
that we had such an idea. But the purpose of the London meeting in December 
and even the one in Sarpsborg was to have one meeting, then to see what it 
would produce and maybe have one more if it was successful.
»  «
LS: Was the rule o f bilateralism established at the outset of the meetings?
JE: Yes, the Israelis especially insisted that they wanted direct contact with the
opposite side. You se, I have worked in a variety of situations including 
arranging talks between the Guatemalan Government and the guerrilla leaders, 
where Norway is one of the friends of the peace process. We have peace talks 
and even reached an agreement in Oslo. We also helped to formulate a partial 
agreement, which brought together the SPLA and the Government of Sudan in 
Oslo. I have also helped to facilitate contacts between the Tamil Tigers and the 
Sri Lankan Government. I would say having been involved in these and other 
peace talks directly, my ideal position as a peacemaker is to be the active, but 
discrete facilitator and not a mediator.
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»  «
LS: How would you define the role of a facilitator?
JE: A facilitator is one who encourages the parties to come to the table, offers them
all the facilities to meet, a safe environment, a secure environment, a positive 
one. You shouldn't meet in a shack, you should have the facility to really relax 
and not think of any practical problems. This avoids questions such as is one 
room bigger than the other; hence, is one side getting better food than the other, 
is one side being better treated than the other. One should take this really 
seriously. We were mathematically working out, in meticulous detail, treating 
both sides exactly the same, especially the Palestinians who are very, very, 
interested to see if the Israeli Government is receiving better treatment.
»  «
LS: Have there been similar channels such as the Oslo one in other conflict
resolution attempts in your experience in this department?
JE: I would advise against generalising too much here. We tried; I can be as
indiscreet as to say that we tried to use our PLO Israel model, which was hugely
successful in terms of it being the first agreement after thirty years of attempts
by so many actors. Most European countries have attempted to mediate, in 
conjunction with America many times. We, for example, tried to bring the 
Government of Khartoum and the SPLA to Oslo with the same notions, saying 
our model is that “you sit down and you attempt to find an agreement through 
exchange of views. What we can do is to provide you with facilities, advice, 
encouragement, but we would not like to be involved in substantive questions 
such as: whether to start with Gaza and end up with Jerusalem or vice versa, 
whether to declare an independent state in southern Sudan or definitely exclude 
it.” But we saw that the disputants from Sudan did not want to do that direct 
kind of negotiations. They wanted a mediator because they felt that even in such 
informal, confidential and confidence-building workshops, they didn't 
communicate. For ideological or other reasons, because of ingrained suspicions, 
they lacked the skills to articulate their positions.
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What one should not underestimate is that guerrilla movements and even 
governments (but especially opposition movements) do not have a breed of able 
negotiators. If they did have academics and others who could be good 
negotiators, an Oslo Channel-like process could have worked. However, it is 
more likely that they would not have enjoyed the confidence of their leadership. 
I mean if you talk about the Tamil Tigers or the SPLA and their leaderships, 
these are not people who delegate a lot of authority and delegate a lot of trust to 
their people.
»  «
LS : But why trust Norway ?
JE: It was a combination of all these things. I think the parties to the other conflicts
who have been here - the Government and guerrillas of Guatemala who have 
started a peace process in Oslo in 1990 and are still negotiating now under UN 
auspices -  know that Norway has been a strong participant. They trust us and 
we gave the same facilities to them as to the Israelis and the PLO delegation. 
But, for many reasons, the progress there has been much slower or the parties 
were much less interested or much less able to communicate.
Regarding the Oslo Channel, we were immensely lucky as well. We had 
the right people to invite at the right moment in history. In Sarpsborg, they sat 
down the very first evening and started to set the rules of negotiations. Then, 
they decided on informal rules, not talking about the past was very important. 
The problem is always, someone states “you did this in 1992, you did that in 
1674, you have massacred our people, you have violated human rights, etc.” 
The parties agreed that if they were going to talk about the past, they would sit 
there forever. So they decided to talk about the future. This was a functional 
approach; they were economists, sociologists and historians and that kind of 
people. They were not politicians.
»  «
LS: Do you think that was an important factor?
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JE: That was very important. The official Israeli view is that in a way, one stumbled
into this by coincidence, in a way that suddenly after the third meeting, we had a 
pledged draft of the DOP, which although had been conceived many times 
before, it was intriguing for Peres and Rabin simply because it included so many 
interesting elements. First, they liked starting with Gaza and agreeing to 
disagree about, for the time being, Jerusalem and the settlements. Secondly, 
they knew it was sanctioned by Arafat. If it had been just Israeli and PLO 
academics meeting, they would not have been so interested. This was one-and- 
a-half track in a way with full support of Norway. Me being there for the 
meetings showed that a serious government, who the parties trusted, really had 
the confidence in these people and what they were doing.
»  «
LS: Were you present at all the meetings?
JE: I was only coming down to host an informal luncheon, to meet them. I
personally would meet them often at the VIP facilities at the airport. They had 
to use my name always; we had used my name always to book the facilities. 
They wouldn't take just any name. Terje or Mona could not book it. I would 
also go to the meetings to see them and talk with them. But neither I nor 
anybody else actually took part in the negotiations. The one who spent the most 
time with them was Terje.
»  «
LS: US was informed by you initially and then the information flow stopped some
time in May?
JE: Yes. On behalf of the Government, I informed them intensively in the
beginning. I used a secret phone to the State Department. The Israelis also had 
a few contacts with them.
»  «
LS : What did you say ?
JE: I informed the US that what was being developed was important and I thought
that they should be involved. They said they couldn't, since the PLO was
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involved. Then also Thorvald Stoltenberg informed Christopher in March. In 
April, there was a change of Foreign Ministers here. In May, there was a 
meeting in Oslo of a refugee committee where we understood that they spread 
the whole knowledge about the channel to a wider circle of diplomats on the 
American side. So, we told the Israelis who told the Americans that this was not 
the way to go. From that point on, we did not inform the State Department too 
much. We don't really know how much the Israelis were informing the US or 
how much the Palestinians were informing the Egyptians and how much the 
Palestinians might inform the Russians. But everyone outside the Oslo Channel 
including the US, I would say, was taken by surprise when there was an 
agreement in August.
»  «
LS: Could you have continued the Oslo Channel or was it due to the press that you
finished it?
JE: No. I mean we had a mountain of rumours as we came to July and August that
there were secret back channels cooking. A couple of times Norway was 
referred to; often, Egypt was more mentioned and even American attempts were 
mentioned. But, it was very clear that sooner or later, it had to be known. It was 
secret even after the initial signing of the agreement here in August. I think we 
could have kept it secret; we are quite good at designing strategies for deception 
vis-à-vis the media. I think we could have explained this in terms of FAFO's 
Standards of Living conditions surveys, informal contacts or our involvement in 
the official peace process. But, this would have been very difficult for all sides. 
And it was discussed how one should present the DOP and the mutual 
recognition step. I am happy to say that the Americans themselves were quite 
happy, understood by themselves and not by our encouragement, that the true 
story had to be the one presented. Because if not, it would come out anyhow 
later on. I think we could have gone on, but not too long because the circle of 
people becoming involved was increasing all the time.
»  «
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LS: Has there been a continuing Oslo Channel to work out the follow-up problems?
Did you give any opinion on whether DOP was the way to go?
JE: In terms of the substance of the latter half of the question: the settlements in
Jerusalem, well, nobody's naive. Everybody knew that they were pushing in 
front of them, delaying the two trickiest questions. It was a high gamble and it 
still is. What we hoped was that through negotiating, through implementing the 
agreements and through starting to co-operate, one would build more trust 
between the two sides, so that one could see new ways of solving these problems 
in the future, which one didn't have at that point. It was a time when they were 
enemies. When two enemies meet to discuss Jerusalem, there is nothing to agree 
on. If two friends meet to discuss Jerusalem, maybe they can work out some 
kind of a settlement. Even the issue of Jewish settlements: between friends, 
maybe the settlements could stay, be integrated with the Palestinian people and 
so on. A trust-building process that would lead to the possibility of agreeing on 
resolving problems was, and still is, the idea.
Yes, there have been back channels, there are back channels, and 
there will always be back channels. We are involved in some activities, in
others, we are not. It is in the Middle East that is revolutionarily different now
from when we started, since there is now mutual recognition. They may meet 
anywhere; in Jerusalem or Gaza, anywhere directly without a facilitator today. 
But, still we are asked; we are called for. We were called for the temporary 
international crisis in Hebron and headed the committee for aid co-ordination. 
We were asked to be the shepherd for a liaison committee between the Israelis 
and the Palestinians, which has been set up and where they need a shepherd, we 
are constantly asked.
»  «
LS: Finally, any lessons to be learned from Oslo?
JE: I don't know. The biggest lesson is probably that it is possible, the biggest
lesson now after having spent four years with the negotiations in four different 
continents, I would say, is that maybe one in a hundred attempts will succeed;
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still it’s worth it. Because the benefits are so extraordinary compared to the 
input. The Oslo Channel cost us, it was tough work for the 45 people involved 
on the Norwegian side, maybe altogether 1 million dollars at the most. The 
actual negotiation phase was half of that I would say. It is a small investment 
compared to the cost of providing continuous humanitarian relief on the count 
that there is a war. I don't exclude that they will ask us or maybe even others to 
facilitate talks on Jerusalem and the settlements. I constantly see that they get 
bogged down on stupid side questions, which may be resolved if they met 
directly face-to-face with a third party facilitator. Many of these things are now 
solved in one or two people meetings, it could be two generals meeting in the 
halls of another meeting and settling things, which are extraordinarily important. 
It's much more fluid now than it was before. For a facilitator, the role is there to 
stay forever, in all conflictual environments and also in the Middle East context.
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Interview with Marianne Heiberg 
Jerusalem, 18 May 1995
LS : At what point were you approached for the Oslo process ?
MH: To give you the full background, first Teije R0d-Larsen is married to a Norwegian
diplomat and they were stationed in Cairo. This was not long after the Palestinian 
Declaration of Independence in 1980. The Palestinians began to think that a
Palestinian state was perhaps not all that far away. They recognised that to run a
state you needed information about the people who would administrate it. That 
type of information did not systematically exist and Teije was at that time Director 
of FAFO, which specialises among other things, in what is called living conditions 
surveys. At that time, I was working in the Occupied Territories. I had been asked 
by the Ministry of Development Corporation to look at all projects in the Occupied 
Territories that received assistance. I did so and issued a highly critical report and 
was subsequently asked to do the same for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Teije 
R0d-Larsen came back from Cairo and I arrived back in Norway too, and he asked 
me to carry out a Living Conditions Survey. Due to my previous work on these 
reports for the Foreign Ministry, people there also wanted this information, to better 
target their projects as well. Therefore, they funded this report.
So, Teije and I were commuting for some time between Jerusalem and 
Oslo, in order to create the political space, which would be necessary for such an 
ambitious and large-scale project. Also, since there was a low intensity warfare 
going on, the Intifada, many organisations who had considered similar projects had 
pulled out, because if you had the co-operation of the Israelis then you didn’t have 
the trust of the Palestinians. If you had the co-operation from the Palestinians and 
didn’t have the help from Israel, then you would encounter all sorts of obstacles on
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the ground in implementing such a project. So, we spent a lot of time talking to 
both sides.
»  «
LS: After you wrote the report, were you asked to present it or what happened exactly?
MH: I think of all the people working on the project, I was the only one who was aware
that something parallel to this report was also transpiring. This made it fairly
difficult to write up the report, because in normal circumstances you would only
take into consideration academic standards. In this case, those academic standards 
had to be preserved, while at the same time, the political concerns had to be 
protected. One had to be very careful about the language, the names and still keep 
to a deadline. A part of the credibility that Norway enjoyed was to a certain extent 
derived from the scientific standards that were upheld. The Palestinians and the 
Israelis realised that we would go to enormous lengths to prevent any political bias.
The Israelis realised that the data would be accurate as possible, and we would not 
enter into the report, preconceived ideas.
»  «
LS: Was that credibility established from the trust-building process that you had been
engaged in?
MH: I think very much so. We explained what we wanted to do very clearly and in a
detailed way, from project design to recruitment and so on. So, both sides were 
kept informed frequently of how it was developing and how we generally operated.
I think the message came through that we were at least politically neutral. What 
we wanted to do was to produce accurate results and keep the interpretation of that 
data as faithfully academically high as possible.
»  «
LS: What was to be your role after completing this report?
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MH: One of the objectives of the whole project was to produce a quality of
comprehensive and credible data, which could function as a base-line for the
perceptions of both Israelis and Palestinians. Because in the absence of that sort of 
data, one of the things that was going on was the war images of both Israelis and 
Palestinians having completely different conceptions as to what realities are. This 
makes discussions among them very difficult because you don’t share a common 
set of assumptions of where the starting point is. The project got done fairly
quickly, due to Teije’s immense ability to sell and that got us involved in the
multilateral working groups. The report’s first public presentation was in that
group that was held in Oslo, May 1993. Of course, the negotiations had started
already.
»  «
LS: When you presented the FAFO report in Sarpsborg, January 1993, were you aware
of the hidden agenda of the meeting there?
MH: I was fully informed. I knew what had happened before this meeting and how it
had come about. It is also just the fact that you are taken down to Sarpsborg and I 
was not allowed to tell my colleagues where I was going or that I had been there.
»  «
LS: You were informed by Terje R0d-Larsen?
MH: Yes.
»  «
LS: Is it accurate to describe the Norwegian role as facilitators, when it is explained
that they provided the organisational framework for the talks?
MH: What is most appropriate for a role for a third party team always varies, of course,
from case to case. But, in this particular case, you have to remember that the 
Israelis and Palestinians were already talking to each other in Washington and they
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wanted to continue to talk to each other. They wanted to find a resolution to the 
conflict. Also, what I think is extremely important to the success of those 
negotiations is there was a general intellectual consensus. There was an agreement 
on the basic architecture; where there was very little agreement, was on the details. 
But, the basic assumptions were shared by both sides and, of course, then you have 
a starting point.
»  «
LS: What do you attribute that to; luck, willingness to talk?
MH: I think basically, it was a result of the very long process of attempts at an Israeli-
Palestinian agreement proceeding from Camp David. Many of the elements that 
are in the DOP were also in the Camp David Accords. Then, you also had the 
whole framework from Madrid. The fact the agreement was phased, I think is very 
important as well as the fact of not allocating blame for the past at that stage. The 
basic ideas that they were talking about in Oslo were not new. They had been 
brought up before and this is what I mean by the existence of a general intellectual 
consensus.
»  «
LS: Was it this general intellectual consensus that saw the parties through the difficult
periods of negotiations for example, when Singer sought clarifications and other 
concessions from the Palestinians?
MH: I think the consensus made it possible for them to succeed in the end. This is the
problem with the final status issues, here, there is no intellectual consensus. This is 
why it makes it impossible to negotiate on the subject now.
»  «
LS: The only way of establishing an intellectual consensus, in order to bring the parties
to the table, is to engage in years of trust-building?
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MH: There were a few things that were critical to the success of the Channel.
1. The broad intellectual consensus of what the final agreement should look like.
2. The military option was no longer there. Neither party felt that they could gain 
anything substantively from a military option.
3. Neither of these two are present in the former Yugoslavia. Also, of course both 
Arafat and Rabin felt they had a shared historical mission.
»  «
LS: Was it important to involve the Israeli academics at the start for the sake of
deniability as well as to provide an informal setting?
MH: It couldn’t have been done in any other way, because from the Israeli Government
they had no guarantee that this would succeed. I don’t think they would have taken 
such a risk, which was a big one. That is, Israel directly negotiating with the PLO 
with no sense of direction, where the initial talk would lead to. The academic 
setting allowed it to be an exploratory phase, to see if something could be reached. 
When Uri Savir and Joel Singer came in, one of the first things they had to do was 
to roll back some of the concessions made by the Israeli academics.
This process, I would describe as one-and-ahalf track, since it mixes the 
direct bargaining approach at the high political level with other non-official persons 
such as Pundak and Hirschfeld.
»  «
LS: Is that a better way to proceed? Do you believe such a formula is necessary to
sustain a process?
MH: I don’t know, to what extent you can generalise.
»  «
LS: You believe Oslo is a unique case?
MH: I think there are many elements that can be applied to other conflicts. But, I agree
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with Yossi Beilin when he says that to call it a model, is perhaps going too far. 
There were a lot of circumstances, which were special to this case. For one thing, 
the fact that you had a change of government on the Israeli side; that was critical. 
The fact that the PLO was in a very weak position was also, I believe quite, 
important.
»  «
LS: In your view is the Oslo accords an actual agreement in itself or a road that can
lead to peace? The threat of terrorism and the Israeli land policies: are they 
obstacles that can be overcome or very serious difficulties?
MH: It’s not a peace treaty. It is the beginning of a process that will hopefully lead to
peace. There were two very critical assumptions that were made in the deal, that 
were thought to be by the Israelis and the Palestinians to be absolutely critical in the 
success of the Channel. One was, as was mentioned in the earlier drafts of the 
DOP, is a type of Marshall Plan for the Palestinians. You need this, in order to 
quickly translate this agreement into concrete benefits on the ground, so people can 
see something, so you can consolidate and expand. As you know, this has yet to 
happen. Secondly, in order to successfully negotiate the final status agreement for 
which there is no intellectual consensus now, you have to change perceptions, you 
have to change attitudes. Attitudes are historically defined here, as instinctively 
antagonistic. The Palestinians and the Israelis do not see each other as groups who 
are able to operate with good intentions. Annex III of the DOP is probably more 
important than the body of the agreement itself, because it sets up a whole series of 
mixed commissions and committees between both sides. The idea there is to start 
with the practice of co-operation, which would develop into an ethos of co­
operation. This process would be mutually assuring to both sides and would build 
up confidence in each other. Over a three year period, the concrete co-operation
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was meant to change the attitudes of the Israeli and Palestinian population, which 
would make it possible to negotiate that which is not now negotiable. Again, that 
hasn’t happened either; one could say the reverse has occurred. Terrorism 
obviously has deeply affected Israeli attitudes. I think Rabin feels it has narrowed 
his room of manoeuvrability. The Palestinians have probably been given a task that 
is almost undoable in many ways. Therefore, their manoeuvrability has also been 
restricted. As far as I can see, Israel is now in full control of the process. There is a 
basic difference between Rabin and Peres. For Rabin, the Middle East conflict is 
essentially an inter-state conflict. In it, the Palestinians are symbolically extremely 
important, but that conflict does not lie at the core of the conflict. He seems to feel, 
what is important now, is Syria. Israel has a peace treaty with Egypt and Jordan 
and now it’s Syria. The Palestinians for him are basically a public relations 
problem that needs to be dealt with at all times, but they are not the critical 
problem. Shimon Peres, on the other hand, feels that obviously inter-state peace is 
extremely important, but without a real reconciliation between the Israelis and 
Palestinians who are the core, then the inter-state situation can quickly unravel, by 
making the internal constraints inside Egypt, Jordan and Syria of such a nature that 
the agreements themselves would not be considered to be legitimate. If you see, for 
example, the Arab reaction to the appropriation of land in Jerusalem, I have a 
feeling that - Shimon Peres’ view is more humane - but I think he also might be 
more correct in the analysis that unless you have a real agreement among the 
Israelis and the Palestinians based on equity, agreements with other countries 
would always be very dodgy.
»  «
LS: Would the opening created by the Oslo process erode if Rabin’s policies were to be
adopted by the PLO?
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MH: Arafat’s popularity among the intellectual class in the Palestinian society is very
low. He still has strong support, as far as we can see, among the people at the 
grassroots. But, it will in the end, depend on his ability to deliver concrete results.
What is holding him now very much in place, is that there is no other alternative to
Arafat. All others including Abu Ala and Abu Mazen have support, but only within 
very specialised sectors of the society. That is, if Arafat was somehow replaced, 
then the Palestinian national movement would disintegrate.
»  «
LS: Are there any lessons to be learned from Oslo?
MH: At the time, it was the best agreement available; that is without a doubt. If one
watched the intensity of the negotiations, I don’t think there was much more there 
that either side could have gotten. But, where I feel the agreement is essentially 
flawed, is that in the way the transfer of power and authority was structured. It 
made the task of the Palestinians to create viable institutions close to impossible. 
When you are given authority for all the things that cost money such as health, 
education, social welfare, but not given adequate authority to deal with matters that 
create wealth such as the economy, you have a terrible problem. To be given 
authority over a few and not all the sectors, it becomes very difficult to produce 
results.
What makes this situation a unique experience is that it is not a process of 
decolonisation. In a process of decolonisation, you have one set of people in 
control of offices of administration, governing rules etc. going out and you have a 
group of new people sitting in their chairs. Here, you have to start from zero and 
you have to start by piece-meal. You have authority over this, but not over that. It 
became a very eclectic basis and that basis in the beginning did not have access to 
economic resources, which are required for any type of institution.
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»  «
LS: Is it only through building trust and confidence such as the mixed committees you
mentioned that attitudes can be changed?
MH: I’ve said on many other occasions, I don’t think negotiations need to be predicated
on trust. When you start negotiating, normally, you don’t trust. But you do have to 
generate it, in order to succeed. That trust has now greatly eroded both at the level 
of political elites and certainly among the population as a whole. One does not see 
an increase in the confidence between the two peoples, despite the increased 
frequency of interactions.
»  «
LS: So you would say for starting negotiations, mainly political willingness is needed?
How do you reverse the declining confidence among the two groups?
MH: What is very strongly affecting the Palestinian attitudes, is of course the continuing
land confiscations, the fact that you have underground military units which still 
operate and torture, the fact that are a great number of political prisoners, border 
closures, long curfews as in Hebron. People don’t see change on the ground and I 
think that it is very important for the Israeli Government to exercise maximum 
restraint regarding these types of measures, because they are so unpopular. On the 
Israeli side, there is one issue that dominates everything else and that is security. 
Of course, the two very large attacks that hurt Israeli citizens only reinforce the idea 
that the PLO and the PNA [Palestinian National Authority] are incapable of 
guaranteeing their security. Under such circumstances, it is not possible to be seen 
to be giving Palestinians control. Here, I think the options available to Mr. Arafat 
are much more limited because he doesn’t have the power to go after the armed 
groups without the risk of a civil war.
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Interview with Yair Hirschfeld 
Jerusalem, 24 May 1995
LS: Can you tell me how it all started?
YH: My story is basically this. Through my academic work as a professor and my
involvement with the Economic Co-operation Foundation, I got in touch with the 
Palestinian leadership, which was in late 1979 or early 1980.
»  «
LS: Then you were teaching where?
YH: I was teaching at Tel Aviv University. By early 1982, I told Yossi Beihn and
Shimon Peres of my contacts with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. 
From this point onwards, I worked very closely mainly with Yossi Beihn, but also 
Shimon Peres on the ongoing dialogues with the West Bank and Gaza leadership. 
»  «
LS: Was there a particular reason that you first made contact with the local Palestinian
leadership?
YH: It is a very long story. In short, because I was dealing with Iran in 1979,1 was on
Austrian TV quite a lot about the whole Iranian situation. It appears that then 
Austrian Prime Minister saw me and asked to meet with me. So, I obliged and we 
started an ongoing dialogue. At a certain stage, I told him that instead of interfering 
in the ideological conflict, which was complicated and a lose-lose situation, he 
should look at more practical ways of helping for instance, offering economic 
support to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. I convinced him at last. So, 
I organised a very strong political Palestinian delegation to Vienna and that’s how I 
came into contact with the Palestinian leadership. This had consequences. The 
story, when told to Peres and Beilin, seemed to impress them a lot. I know these
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two individuals for a number of years. I also had contact with the Palestinians at 
the same time.
On December 14, 1988, you remember Arafat accepted the conditions for 
dialogues with the US, which included the recognition of Israel’s right to exist and 
an end to terrorist activities, which also form the basis of Security Council 
Resolution 242. Then, the Palestinians came to me to develop contacts. The 
dialogues became enormously intense; they went on twice, sometimes three times a 
week in Jerusalem and Ramala, mainly to discuss with the local leadership 
including Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi. Before December 1988, I would 
call that the pre-pre-negotiations stage. We didn’t know if they wanted to negotiate 
with us or not. After the 14 December 1988, they had said that they wanted to
negotiate with us. The question at stake was if both sides want to negotiate, how do
you get everyone to the negotiating table? So, that is when I would say we moved 
into the pre-negotiations phase.
»  «
LS; But, in the pre-pre-negotiations phase, you maintained these contacts in the hopes 
that it might lead to a negotiations forum?
YH: Yes. I learned a lot during that time.
»  «
LS: For instance?
YH: A friend took me aside at one stage and said to me, "Yair, whoever you speak to,
before you tell them what you think, sit down and listen."
»  «
LS: It was the personal trust developed during that time period, which allowed them to
come to you?
YH: I believe so, yes. One thing that was unique about my contacts is that it was always
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kept confidential. I never went through the press and the press never knew
anything about this, which was almost unlike every other contact between the
Israelis and Palestinians.
»  «
LS: Did you believe it was essential to keep it confidential?
YH: Oh yes. Then after January-February 1989,1 had a big meeting with some Israehs
(persons who are important players today) including Yossi Beilin and the coalition 
of the PLO. The meeting itself wasn’t very successful, but it started an opening to 
dialogues. The question was really how to find a way of coming together to 
negotiate. The technique that was developed, I would call a three step approach.
1. First, I would speak very freely about everything; any subject I thought 
worth mentioning.
2. Then I met with Yossi Beilin and sometimes these meetings produced 
very substantive ideas.
3. Then these would be passed on to Shimon Peres.
This went on in 1989, at the end of which, became the Baker I Proposals. This 
actually eventually led to the break-up of the Israeli Government because Peres was 
all for it. This was in March 1990. We continue to maintain contacts with the 
Palestinians.
»  «
LS: This was always with the local leadership?
YH: Yes, always with the local leadership.
»  «
LS: Did you feel that they were independent of Arafat?
YH: That is the problem; they were everything  ^but independent of Arafat. Then, on 23
June 1992, there were elections here in Israel and the Labour Party was able to form
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a government with Peres as Foreign Minister, Yossi Beilin as his deputy and Rabin 
as Prime Minister. The expectations then were very high and I would say this was 
perhaps the start of another back-channel. In May of 1992, Ron Pundak joined me 
and we continued this activity with very bad results. The truth is that between mid 
August 1992 until the autumn, the official negotiations as well as the back-channel 
were moving from bad to worse.
»  «
LS: Why?
YH: For a variety of reasons. The most important reason was probably that the
politicians who comprised the Washington Delegation well, the structure was bad. 
For one thing, there were coalitions of different groups who were not unified with a 
particular leadership. The common denominator and the decision-making 
capability were very, very low.
»  «
LS : Was that also true for the back-channel ?
YH: No, the back-channel was different. But, on this front the inside leadership did not
have enough legitimacy to take decisions. Then, another problem with the 
negotiations in Washington was that they were all public. Everything was on the 
record; the press was always there. All the conditions were there to present a show, 
rather than to really negotiate. Out of frustration, I was always told by Faisal 
Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi "Yair, come meet someone from the outside."
In November 1991,1 had read papers by Abu Ala, which he had submitted 
to the EEC and I was quite impressed by them. I said if I want to meet somebody 
from the outside, I want to meet Abu Ala.
»  «
LS: Meaning outside the local leadership?
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YH: Yes, the Tunis leadership. In a meeting with Hanan, she said Abu Ala would be in
London and suggested we might meet there. I left my phone number of where I 
would be in London with her. We set up a meeting in London in early December 
and it was the first meeting with Abu Ala, the head of the PLO office in London 
and myself. It was quite good for a first meeting and we decided to meet again, 
which we did that same day. In between, I met with Teije to get support from the 
Norwegian Government, as I knew about his connections.
»  «
LS : How did your contact with him begin ?
YH: That is also a long story. Teije R0d-Larsen came here in May 1992 and met with
Yossi and offered to help with practical research matters concerning the 
Palestinians as well as with the ongoing dialogue with the Palestinians. Yossi 
Beilin directed him on both issues to me. So, we met in June and it went okay. I 
was impressed by him and thought he was genuine and had a feeling he definitely 
wanted to contribute something. Then we had some meetings with Jan Egeland 
who was a Deputy Minister in Norway’s Foreign Ministry. It was clear that they 
wanted to play a role and made some proposals to bring over Faisal Husseini to 
Oslo. That wasn’t practical, since I already knew him and it was cheaper and easier 
for me to go to Jerusalem than to Norway.
But when I met with Abu Ala, I knew in order to meet him again, I needed 
someone who would give me a place to stay, who would pay for the airfare to see 
him. Since I knew the Norwegians were interested, I took the chance and asked 
Terje, which he said might be possible.
»  «
LS: Did you then go back and inform Beilin of the impending meeting in January, to be
held in Sarpsborg?
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YH: No. By chance, everybody was in London in December. So I met with Larsen and
upon asking him, he offered me his support immediately. Yossi Beilin was also in 
London for the same conference as Abu Ala, but they wouldn’t meet, they couldn’t 
meet. I met with Yossi and told him about the day’s developments and asked for 
his reaction. He didn’t stop me, he could have said to break off all contacts, to 
forget the idea. But, he didn’t. If Yossi Beilin had recommended that the contacts 
should be discontinued, I probably would have.
But then we decided to go to Oslo and it began in January. From January 
20 to May 20 1993, we had five sessions I believe.
»  «
LS: Were they strictly bilateral from the beginning?
YH: Yes. The first was set up as an academic seminar, because we didn’t know the law
prohibiting official contacts between Israel and the PLO would be cancelled. It was 
lifted by Israel on time, but the meeting was set up in such a way that we would be 
received by Jan Egeland and Teije R0d-Larsen at a joint lunch. During that time, 
there would be a general discussion. Then, the Israelis and Palestinians would go 
into a separate room and the Norwegians would stay outside. So it was all bilateral. 
»  «
LS: Would you say that the informal nature of the pre-negotiations phase was
important as you were able to thrash around ideas without fear of commitment?
YH: Well, it was more than that. At that first meeting, Abu Ala said to us, "Erst, out of
Gaza”. The minute he said it, I knew we had real substance to go on. The second 
meeting was when we came with the first draft of the Declaration of Principles - 
DOP. I had written it with Yossi’s knowledge. He told me to see how it would be 
received. This first draft became the basis for our discussions and so they were 
very detailed and focused. Basically, we had to show that all issues could be solved
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and that on these issues, compromise by both sides could be made. At the end of 
the second meeting, there was a document that had a lot of brackets, where the two 
positions were laid out. After this second meeting, Yossi Beilin reported in quite 
detail to Shimon Peres. As I understand it, Peres immediately brought it to the 
attention of Rabin.
By the time of the third meeting, we already had some discussions with 
Peres as well as Beilin. So having established a common framework in which we 
could work, we turned to discussing more practical matters like how the PLO 
would come to Gaza. So, for them, there was a significant change from one 
meeting to the other. It was at this point, I believe that the Egyptians were 
informed by the Palestinian side. The Americans, as you know, were informed 
from the very beginning. Then, there was also a lot of activity in between sessions.
For example, we said we would only continue with these meetings if the 
Palestinians would restart the Washington negotiations, which had broken off and 
they obliged. We also demanded that more co-operation be given in the multi­
lateral talks. So, by the end of May, we had a document with many solutions that 
arose out of compromises. But, the concept was different from the Washington 
channel.
»  «
LS: How?
YH: The main difference was that the Washington talks were based on Camp David.
Camp David, as you know, spoke about negotiations for an internal agreement. 
These were to be finalised and then you would have an interim agreement. But, 
there it stops. There is a transfer of authority and the Palestinians take over. This 
was a hard step to implement, practically speaking. So the negotiations were 
terribly difficult, since the Palestinians were afraid that they would get too little
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authority, while the Israelis were afraid that the Palestinians would get too much 
authority. We bridged this seemingly huge gap easily for we went on the principle 
of gradualism that there would be early empowerment, the PLO would estabhsh 
themselves in Gaza and the Israeli authority would still remain in tact. There would 
be a kind of co-operation. Then ,slowly on this sliding scale, the transfer of 
authority would be carried out, one step after the other.
»  «
LS: Was the end product of the DOP significantly different from the first draft?
YH: Yes. Most of the suggestions and compromises were adopted. But, some concepts
were changed. The basic concept was to move gradually and slowly and what we 
ended up with was a concept of gradualism, but then things moved very quickly.
»  «
LS: You continued on after the first two meetings because you believed in the
willingness and the level of commitment by the Palestinian side?
YH: If you go into a dialogue like this, you never know how far you go, you never know
when you end. You must be mentally willing at any point to stand up and walk out 
of the negotiations.
»  «
LS: So what was it that kept both sides there?
YH: A good question! There was an understanding that we could bridge the gap, that
we could only gain from talking. There was a sense of progress, of something 
being achieved. There was also a sense of extreme potential, which probably kept 
us there. Additionally, both sides feared the growing militancy of fundamentahsts. 
There were a lot of factors that made it politically desirable for both sides to be 
committed to peace. There was clearly a unique chance that presented itself.
»  «
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LS: What do you believe are the particular advantages of academics such as yourself
and Ron Pundak starting the process, rather than beginning with Uri Savir and 
Joel Singer directly meeting with the Palestinians?
YH: There were some very evident advantages. If Uri Savir had started the negotiations,
it would have meant that Israel recognized the PLO Government. If we speak to 
them, it doesn’t signify anything. We had an enormous advantage, what we call a 
complete deniability factor. With Uri Savir, as Director General of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the deniability factor would have been extremely difficult. But, 
when Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak speak to some members of the PLO, one 
could say it is a meeting simply between two loony professors and some PLO guys. 
This is one reason why we had to be academics and nothing else. Also, we had the 
advantage of either extractability or what I call the "waste-basket principle". This 
principle allows you to put forward all kinds of ideas and put them on the table. 
Then, you could come back and say, "you know, I said this and that, suggested this, 
three weeks ago. But now you had better forget about it." You could think out 
loud without being obligated to a particular position. This works both between the 
two groups and also within each side. Obviously, secrecy was enormously 
important. The long established contacts among the different peoples were also 
helpful.
Ron and myself were different kinds of persons than those who were 
usually involved in such negotiating processes. Usually, they were officials - 
representatives or even foreign ministers themselves, army people. We spoke a 
language different from them, an easier and softer one. But, we were not peace- 
nicks all full of admiration who didn’t have the know-how to speak the language, 
which politicians could understand and furthermore, agree to. As we were 
academics, we were unusual for them and so it was less restrictive.
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» «
LS: How would you characterise the role that Larsen and his team played? Would you
say they facilitated, to the extent of providing organisational assistance or did they
contribute more?
YH: Jimmy Carter wrote ten points in what the Norwegians did. If I remember
accurately, it goes as follows. First, they were facilitators in providing a place,
making the arrangements that made it possible to meet. Secondly, they offered 
some political relevance. The fact that the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was 
involved in it and after the Foreign Minister himself, made it easier for the 
Palestinians to accept the lack of symmetry in the positions. They were high- 
ranking officials where we were non-ranking academics. The fact that there was 
Norwegian political prestige involved, helped to overcome this lack of symmetry. 
This was very important. Third, in between the sessions, they kept contact with 
both sides. To know what is going on: for example, statements made by Arafat 
would be related to us by the Norwegians in their contexts. Therefore, we knew 
how to report it back to the Israeli Government. This was crucial between the 
sessions. Fourth, they helped us when asked; for instance, with some wording of 
the DOP. Of course, we and the Palestinians had to work out the major things by 
ourselves for we alone must hve together in the coming centuries. But, in 
discussions and changing the vocabulary, sometimes you take an obstinate 
defensive position even for strategic reasons. So, sometimes we would go to Teije 
and express our frustrations with a position being adopted by the Palestinians or we 
would tell him we might be able to move regarding a point. We would also indicate 
where we couldn’t move, we would tell Teije to relay to the Palestinians not to 
push on a particular issue, because the room wasn’t there to give.
Fifth, Teije went to Tunis and Jerusalem and somehow created a connection
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with the leadership beyond us.
Sixth, then, the Norwegian contribution changed. As the process continued, 
as paradoxical as it may sound, as it moved from back-channel to the second phase, 
Peres asked Teije and then Minister Holst to directly pass messages from and to 
Arafat, which they did. Seventh, at a later stage, Peres even invited Holst at the 
very end of the negotiations to offer some bridging proposals. Eighth, Norwegians 
were important in informing the Americans. We informed the Americans, but so 
did Teije. This meant that double information would be relayed and we could be 
assured of American approval. Ninth, then Foreign Minister Holst suggested that 
Israel and the PLO exchange Letters of Mutual Recognition. This would be a 
significant symbolic gesture. Tenth, most importantly and demanding, in late 
August, the Norwegians started the drive in organising international support, 
economically and financially, for the Palestinians. They are still in this position to 
this very day.
»  «
LS: Uri Savir entered as Palestinians demanded to see proof that the Israelis were
serious about the Oslo Channel?
YH: We asked them that they restart the talks in Washington, that they co-operate in the
multi-laterals and Faisal Husseini be sent back to Washington. They obliged and 
said that they had proved their trustworthiness to us the Israelis, now they wanted to 
move into negotiations with more official people.
»  «
LS : Savir was chosen by Peres ?
YH: Jointly by him and Rabin.
»  «
LS : Did you and Ron stay on when Savir and Singer joined the process ?
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YH: Yes.
»  «
LS: You stayed until the end of August?
YH: Yes, until early September.
»  «
LS: As Terje Larsen points out, his dealings with you dramatically decreased when
Savir and Singer entered the process for they led the Israeli team. Would you say
this is correct?
YH: No, I would say not. Of course, Uri Savir was the head of the delegation, which I
headed it up until that time. Uri Savir sometimes would go back to Jerusalem and I 
would remain behind. We almost had an agreement by the 6th of July 1993. Then 
throughout July, things took a turn for the worse.
»  «
LS: Why?
YH: The Palestinians went back on some of the agreements and new demands were
made. We almost broke off talks at the end of July. Then, in August, Ron went to 
Paris to obtain some information. I went alone to Paris on the 7th of August, to 
meet with Teije Larsen and Abu Ala. We discussed the whole night long and that 
meeting was quite decisive, because it was very close to the point where the Israeli 
side was thinking of breaking off the negotiations.
»  «
LS: But his contact with you in the meeting room environment diminished?
YH: Yes, perhaps. Things from inside the negotiations room and outside of it are
perceived very differently, depending on where you are located in the situation.
»  «
LS: Larsen did mention the importance of the August 7th meeting. So you decided to
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continue after that discussion?
YH: The Paris meeting’s’ purpose was to improve the atmosphere. He came with some
compromising proposals. There were some terrible ideas about Gaza, things that 
were totally impossible from our side. If I had gone home with those ideas, it 
would have been the end. So I wrote a text, which I thought the Government would 
find acceptable. I told him I had to find an acceptable text or I wouldn’t go home. I 
mean I would go back without any text at all. Fortunately it helped that Abu Ala 
went along with my idea.
»  «
LS: Can you mention an example of one of the unacceptable ideas?
YH: I don’t remember exactly. Basically, they wanted to gain control of Gaza without
any negotiations, which was something unrealistic.
»  «
LS: You came with a document to suggest?
YH: No, there I wrote on top of a piece of paper, which was the Palestinian version. But
I told him his Palestinian version wasn’t sellable to the Israeli Government. So, 
another way had to be found. So what I suggested became that Palestinian version. 
»  «
LS: What do you attribute to the eventual success of the Oslo Channel?
YH: There is no one single factor. There are many historical factors including the end of
the Cold War, the Gulf War which had created a new relationship between Israel 
and the PLO, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to both the PLO and Israel and 
perhaps the weakened position of Arafat. The two sides were also tired of the 
conflict. Politically, the new government of Israel wanted to build a peace with the 
Palestinians. On the Palestinian side, Arafat could not permit a break-up of the 
negotiations, because this would feed into the rhetoric of Hamas and it wasn’t easy
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for him to make things succeed in Washington because he may be pushed out of his 
position. Personally, the Israeli leadership wanted to succeed in achieving peace. 
There was also a certain understanding of the historical importance of such an 
opportunity.
»  «
LS : What was your interest in seeing Oslo through ?
YH: For Ron and me, the moment towards an Israeli-Palestinian understanding is an
existential question. Warfare must be brought to an end, we have to learn to live 
together. There is nothing more important than that, to make life worth living for 
both sides.
»  «
LS: Do you believe Oslo was a unique case or could some elements be generalised?
YH: You can draw some general conclusions. Basically, until 20* May 1993, you could
have called this activity as a back-channel. After 20th May, one would characterise 
it as secret diplomatic negotiations in which we continued to participate, but they 
are different in nature. I believe one can learn a lot; particularly, about the back- 
channel. To have secret negotiations, to feel free to say and what you want to say 
and not what you should say, to have open brain-storming sessions, deniability, the 
waste-basket principle; these are all important. Using this back-channel dialogue to 
effect the reality outside, I believe, is an example for other situations of conflict. 
What you need are interested and committed people to achieve an agreement on 
both sides. The Norwegian contribution is not one of mediation, but facilitation. 
Facilitating means you have both sides who are willing to engage in such a process.
»  «
LS: This waste-basket principle, was it an idea you introduced at the first meeting?
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YH: It was an agreed thing, almost a given in such an informal environment by both
sides. The importance of not talking about the past and thus getting stuck in it, 
should not be underestimated.
»  «
LS: Are there any lessons to be learned from the Oslo Channel?
YH: The lessons are not to go into history, but to speak honestly and directly, not to
have protocol, but an open approach. But, at the same time, you should have an 
understanding in writing of how the details hopefully will work; that is something 
to be learned.
»  «
LS: How would you define peace? What is necessary for it?
YH: In this particular instance, the Middle East, we started out with negotiations and
adopted a Declaration of Principles; this is very important. Then, there was a 
common understanding that developed and we knew it would be a gradual process, 
with many negotiations. In this DOP, there are many different steps, which are to 
be followed: first, giving empowerment to the Palestinians in Gaza; then, holding of 
elections for the Legislative Assembly; redeployment of Israeli troops and so on. 
From there, we agreed to work towards final status negotiations, which also might 
be developed in a gradual way, until a final peace. So, we haven’t established yet a 
final and everlasting peace between us and the Palestinians, but together we opened 
the process.
For me, in order to establish peace, you have to build the edifice, the 
structure and support on five fundamental pillars.
1. Pillar of legality: a legal legitimacy; that is, a legal understanding that this is the end of 
a conflict and one would no longer use any forms of violence against each other. But, 
the conflict may continue to be played out in the courts and negotiations. But, there is a
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legally binding understanding and this, I believe, is the first important component of 
peace.
2. The component of deterrence; that is, you have the means to make it worthwhile for the 
other side not to break the agreements. For in matters of security, you have ways of 
defending yourself effectively. Deterrence is important to peace, because people do not 
always love each other and although you may have peace, there will always be those 
who will resent it and so you need deterrence.
3. Creating a vested interest in peace; that is, you need to encourage economic 
development, social stability, to create enticements for both sides to co-operate, while 
preserving each side’s independence.
4. Institution building. People are transient in that eventually, one gets old or dies at some 
stage. Consequently, we need institutions for they create structures that can help to 
maintain peaceful relations for longer period of time - beyond the lifespan of human 
beings.
5. International legitimacy and support. This is my view and I give no hierarchy to which 
one is most essential, only they are all necessary.
Peace doesn’t mean you love each other and peace doesn’t mean being happy 
always, for we cannot be.
»  «
LS : Does it mean tolerance ?
YH: Not necessarily. Obviously, you need people to be tolerant, but toleration alone
will not contribute towards a peaceful society.
»  «
LS: Are you optimistic about the road ahead opened by the Oslo Channel?
YH: I don’t think there is any alternative, in the long-run. Churchill said that people
tend to take the right decisions, but only after they have exhausted all other
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possibilities. So, perhaps the Israelis and the Palestinians may have yet to pass 
through some more alternatives before we take the right decision.
»  «
LS: Do you foresee a recourse to the Oslo Channel, to overcome some of the remaining
obstacles?
YH: I think the public way of negotiations is quite self destructive and causes a lot of
difficulties. In negotiations, you go through a lot of ups and downs and crisis 
situations. If they are kept secret, then they are easier to deal with. What I mean is, 
if the ups and downs are publicized and the whole country has to go through them, 
it has usually a very negative impact on the negotiation process. So yes, I am a 
strong advocate for secret negotiations.
»  «
LS: Do you see a recourse to a role for academics such as yourselves in this particular
conflict and a role for third parties in other protracted situations?
YH: One never knows, but we can’t replicate Oslo for one important reason. There, we
had the monopoly on the dialogue. There were other channels, but none were so 
structured in the sense that both sides were there as well as the Norwegian third 
parties. So, we basically had a monopoly on the dialogue. Fortunately, today there 
is no longer a monopoly. Now if Rabin wants to speak to Arafat, he can call him 
directly and they can meet tomorrow. Therefore, they don’t need us and the same 
is true for the Palestinians. If things take a course for the worse, they may come 
and ask us for help. Obviously, there are a lot of things that academics can do, but 
not in the same capacity as before.
»  «
LS: What about academics acting as facilitators by assisting the parties at the table?
YH: Maybe, in some ways yes, maybe. We are no longer needed in that sense now.
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which is a positive development. The channels of dialogues are all open. The 
impact we can have is to act as a feedback channel. The channels are open. 
Both sides don’t always understand what the other side is saying and it is 
probably easier for us to listen more effectively to both sides and to tell them 
what the other side is trying to communicate. I believe we still enjoy the 
confidence of both sides.
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Interview with Mona Juul 
Tel Aviv, 24 May 1995
LS: How did you become involved in the Oslo Process?
MJ: We went to visit the region. We met with some members of the PLO in Norway
and we also travelled to the Occupied Territories. We got in touch with a lot of 
people who later turned out to be quite crucial for what became the Oslo Channel.
Then you have the FAFO role to speak of. This started when myself and 
my husband, Teqe Rpd-Larsen, were in Egypt. There, we got in touch with the 
Palestinian community there, especially with the head of the Palestinian Red 
Crescent and also with the leader of the PLO. We both talked with him and my
husband learned especially from Fati Arafat with the Red Crescent about the
problems affecting the Palestinians. For instance, he complained that they lacked 
actual information about the situation of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories 
and he was in charge of planning for health. They didn’t know the actual facts on 
the ground, the health problems caused by the Intifada, the police reaction etc. This 
gave us a great deal of knowledge. Then, my husband suggested that FAFO could 
make a survey of the living conditions, since FAFO specialised in that. This idea 
was agreed to and during the process of negotiating political acceptance by both 
sides to conduct such a study, my husband came in contact with key players on the 
Israeli side including Yossi Beilin, who was then a Member of Parliament and on 
the Palestinian side, the local players like Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi and 
later also with the PLO in Tunis.
Teije eventually went to Jerusalem where he also suggested that Norway 
could play a role in establishing contacts between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
In September 1992, myself and my husband along with Jan Egeland met 
with Yossi Beilin where we discussed the possibility of having meetings in Norway
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with Faisal Husseini. This didn’t work out. I suppose we saw no need for it, since 
they were already meeting here in the Middle East, why should they go to Norway.
These preliminary ideas became more concrete when a representative of Yossi 
Beilin, Yair Hirschfeld, met Abu Ala. They were in London as well as my 
husband. It became very concrete that they wanted to come to Norway to talk 
together and to see if there was a possibility of starting a dialogue.
»  «
LS : Was Stoltenberg informed at this stage ?
MJ: Definitely. I can’t remember whether we talked about it, before it became a
concrete suggestion. But, as soon as that occurred through the FAFO channel, 
under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry, he was of course informed.
»  «
LS : Was there a specific purpose for the first meeting ?
MJ: It depends. From our point of view, we saw it as a very important first step: just to
get them together. At that time, a meeting between representatives of the PLO and 
Israelis who had such close links to the decision-makers was quite extraordinary, 
since Israeli law did not allow contacts with anyone officially connected to the 
PLO. Although the Israeli side was represented by non-officials, we all knew that 
they were sent by officials. Therefore, I don’t think this whole thing about creating 
a back-channel by all sides holds so much favour, since everybody saw that the 
talks in Washington weren’t going anywhere. Everyone had this in the back of 
their minds and thought it would be useful, if one could have another forum to 
discuss issues that didn’t necessarily have to be presented in the press.
»  «
LS: So this process was not meant as an alternative to the Washington negotiations?
MJ: No. It was meant to be a fomm that could produce some results, which would then
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be fed back into the Washington process. I believe initially all those who came to 
the meeting thought that it could breathed new life into the official talks. Their 
starting point was very much on the economic side; they wanted to encourage 
economic co-operation. Abu Ala was a PLO economic advisor and Hirschfeld and 
Pundak’s institute was also concerned with economic issues. But, I think they very 
quickly saw it as an opportunity to explore how to work out the political problems. 
»  «
LS: A sa part of the Norwegian third party team, were you present in the talks?
MJ: What we did was the following. I left after lunch the first day. We seem to develop
a pattern; we met them when they came, ate with them and then we went into 
another room where we waited around in case assistance was requested. We 
always insisted that they needed to talk directly. From the first day, we gave them 
the possibility to be left alone, to solve their own problems. So they realised we 
didn’t want to impose on them. If they wanted us, we were there.
»  «
LS: What motivated Norway to become involved in such a process?
MJ: It’s important to consider the Norwegian foreign policy. We have always had a
very strong commitment and involvement in conflict-plagued areas. We have been 
active in the multilateral talks. If the Norwegian foreign policy was purely 
concentrated on our own self interest, the traditional power-politics model, we 
probably would not have been so eager to get involved. You see, it has been a 
tradition in Norwegian foreign policy to be helpful, which is reflected in our huge 
foreign aid budget and assistance to the third-world countries. When it comes to 
the Middle East, in Norway as elsewhere, it has a special place. We learn about the 
Israeli-Palestinian problem in our education and it has always been a strong interest 
as well for the CDU.
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Additionally, we had a very active Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, 
who saw the possibilities for developing our strong contacts. Also, it became more 
apparent when Sweden was seen to play a role that we could contribute something 
as well. We have been criticised, over the years, for being too pro-Israeli, but 
Stoltenberg saw that this good relationship with Israel could be an asset when it 
came to our relationship with the Palestinians. We became interested in the 
Palestinians, in part due to our good relationship with Israel. Other countries have 
good relationships with one side or the other and that hasn’t helped. So, it was a 
combination of these factors as well as the wishes of both sides that allowed 
Norway to play such an active role and to develop a relationship.
»  «
LS: The period between January and April have been characterised as the pre­
negotiations stage and the subsequent one as the official negotiations stage. Would 
you agree with this?
MJ: Yes definitely, although in the first phase they worked on documents - especially a
draft of the DOP. But, that time was considered to be a creative and sounding- 
board environment where different opinions could be freely expressed. When Uri 
Savir and particularly Joel Singer arrived, the whole structure I believe was 
changed into a more formalistic and legalistic format. At that time, the official 
wording became more apparent.
I would like to point out that this kind of pre-negotiations phase is 
extremely important for the parties spent a lot of time in getting to know each other, 
building trust, getting the feeling that there was a common desire to find a solution.
How the solution would look was not immediately clear, but the consensus to find 
a solution developed. The first day, Uri Savir came and checked out the 
representatives on the Palestinian side. But, there was a feeling that one could do
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business. I think both phases were necessary.
»  «
LS: The other participants to this process have described the Norwegian role as
facilitation insofar as your side provided the administrative and organisational 
assistance. Is this a correct characterisation? Was this idea the product of anyone 
in particular or were you responding to the wishes of the two sides?
MJ: I think we were responding to the parties’ desires, but at the same time, we
encouraged them in that direction. We saw the need for them to sit down and 
discuss the problems. It is important that we were not there to tell them how to 
solve the problems for this has been too long a place where everybody has come in 
and said, ‘this is the solution for you.’ I believe the Oslo process was a unique 
opportunity for them to speak directly and that was the lucky thing. The parties had 
reached a stage where they felt they were ready to talk and we saw it as necessary 
that when the talks started, we remained to assist whenever requested, but only 
when needed. So the facilitation was a conscious decision. There were also times 
when we were more involved, especially the periods between the meetings.
During these times, we were the only source of contact between them. 
Every time there was a break and they left to consult their leaders, they would come 
back with responses from their perspective capitals and superiors. This needed to 
be communicated back to the others, in order to decide whether there was a reason 
to have a new meeting or not. In that process, that was our role and particularly by 
Terje. You had to interpret the information and communicate it in such a way that 
was most helpful. For instance, one side would ask for clarification or ask what 
was meant by a certain term or wording. This had to be carefully interpreted. We 
also came up with concrete suggestions to bridge the gaps. This was more 
prevalent in the process of writing the Letters of Mutual Recognition, where our
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new Foreign Minister Holst was definitely very active in coming up with 
suggestions. They were simple but important ones, which would be acceptable to 
both sides. So yes, during the period up until the DOP, we did play mainly the role 
as facilitators.
»  «
LS: Do you believe the secrecy component was an essential part of the success of the
Oslo Channel?
MJ: The secrecy component has advantages as well as disadvantages. It is important to
have a confidential process where the parties feel free to discuss all kinds of ideas, 
which would not play well in the press. However, secrecy can mean that 
agreements reached do not receive sufficient public support at home. The 
negotiating parties may formulate a series of agreements that all can live with, but 
the task of convincing the public back home is never so simple. The key is to 
translate the agreements that have arisen from secret talks into a framework that can 
be accepted as legitimate by those whom the parties are representing.
»  «
LS: Do you believe there are any lessons to be learned from Oslo?
MJ: The Oslo Channel had its particular elements that cannot be reproduced. At the
same time, the open approach adopted by all of us in the type of facilitation is an 
aspect that can be applied elsewhere. Additionally, it is essential that conflicting 
parties are given the opportunity to dialogue directly and face-to-face. The 
Washington negotiations were fraught with difficulties not only because they were 
held under media scrutiny, but more importantly, they did not give the Palestinians 
a direct voice.
»  «
LS: How do you see the future for the implementation of the DOP?
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MJ: It is a first step to peace. Peace is a process in my view; it is never complete. There
will always be difficult and diverging issues, but Oslo started the path for the parties 
to work towards resolving this conflict and reducing violence. Both political 
communities will be severely tested, but I believe that there is no other alternative. 
You can either return to violence or continue with dialogues. The DGF estabhshed 
a framework; it can be altered if the parties wish to. At the end of the day, politics 
and peace must be decided by those who are directly affected. A third party has an 
important role to play insofar as facilitation can help to clarify issues and suggest 
ways of overcoming differences that the disputing parties may not be able to see.
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Interview with Terje R0d-Larsen 
Gaza Occupied Territories, 16 May 1995
LS: How did the concept of the Oslo Channel come about?
TL: First, there is the macro-background because Mona and myself lived in Cairo, when
she was posted there. I was never particularly interested in the Middle East 
conflict, although I was active in student politics. So I knew very little about it, but 
I think that was an advantage to me because I looked at it with fresh eyes. And 
very soon I became interested in it; read about it, talked to people about it. Then, I 
spent time making contacts with the local people in Cairo. I visited a tailor every 
day and saw in his shop how he bargained. I went to the market and eventually, 
understood not necessarily the Arab mind, but the Egyptian mind. Also, I believe 
their bargaining techniques are very different from ones used in Europe. These 
were my two learning experiences.
Then, there was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1991 Gulf War. 
On the basis of what I had learned about the conflict and the great game of the 
Middle East, I saw that these global power shifts would have tremendous impacts 
on the conflict. First, it would be no longer possible for the actors to play on the 
Cold War as they had done previously. Second, money would dry up in particular 
for the PLO as the traditional Eastern European sources not only reduce then- 
political backing, but also their financial support. Third, the PLO's position in the 
Gulf War left the coffers of the organisation in a bad state. Then, of course, there 
were big problems inside the PLO because there had been no movement for many, 
many years; the PLO was in deep crisis. At the same time, the Intifada had put 
such a strain on the Israelis that they were also desperately looking for some way 
out, particularly from Gaza.
409
So this is my macro-analysis. I saw that the rules of the game had suddenly 
changed. In Cairo, I started a FAFO Living Conditions Survey in Egypt and got to 
know Arafat's brother - President of the Red Crescent. He indicated that it was 
necessary to conduct a study of living conditions in the Occupied Territories as 
well. I suggested a full survey of living conditions and so I flew over here 
[Jerusalem] for the first time. I decided that a report had to be accepted by both 
Israeli and Palestinian parties, completely non-biased and objective. In other 
words, it had to be a real piece of social science and not a propaganda piece. I 
asked Marianne to join FAFO because she had knowledge of the area as well as 
being a social scientist. So, she joined as director and took care of the social 
scientific work, while I took care of the political negotiations. Through that, I got 
to know both parties very well including the Israelis, especially those in the trade 
union organisations. So, I used the link to make contact with the Israeli 
establishment. At the same time, I also got to know all the Palestinian leaders here.
At this time, Madrid had taken place and the Washington negotiations were 
going full blast, but with no results. To quote Minister Peres, I saw that the 
Washington negotiations were a comedy, ‘an ongoing press conference’ and very 
little else. I saw that there was a big discrepancy between what the Palestinian 
leaders locally told me and what they were saying in front of the cameras. 
Likewise, what the Israeli friends told me privately was very different from what 
they were saying on camera in Washington. This made me think that a second- 
track should be established, away from the public eye. I didn’t think that this could 
be achieved through a governmental body, because then it would eventually leak to 
the press. Because in modem times, it is close to impossible I would say to have an 
apparatus such as a Foreign Ministry involved in a secret operation. It's just a 
question of time before it leaks out into the pubhc arena. I also thought by using a
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non-govemmental body, it would be easier for the parties to talk because it could be 
done in an informal way and there could be deniability. I first suggested this to 
Faisal Husseini, a local Palestinian leader and he fully agreed with me.
»  «
LS: This was in '91 ?
TL: No, it was in early spring of '92. I didn't though have a counterpart on the Israeli
side. But coincidentally, I was asked for lunch with Yossi Beilin who was an up- 
and-coming left-wing Labour politician. So, during the lunch, we agreed on one 
thing. I suggested my second-track solution and he expressed great interest in it. I 
said, ‘Would you like to meet with Faisal Husseini secretly?’ And he said, ‘Yes, 
can you arrange it?’ The meeting was arranged here in room 16 of the Colony 
Hotel and we talked about how to arrange for a back channel and agreed to do it. 
Then, I related this to Mona and she informed Jan Egeland and we agreed to use 
FAFO, but with both of their involvement from the Foreign Ministry. We flew 
down here with Husseini and Yossi Beilin.
Also, I was of the opinion that the PLO in Tunis was old-fashioned, 
revolutionary thugs out of the 1960s and completely outdated. I thought that the 
local leadership was modem, moderate, sophisticated and the future of the 
Palestinians.
However, when I was asked by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry to 
accompany a delegation to some multi-lateral peace talks, I learned that the PLO 
was sitting in the backroom and directed absolutely everything, even though they 
were not on the floor. They were not even allowed in the room; neither the Israelis 
nor the Americans wanted to shake their hands. What I understood then was that 
they were making all the decisions including those of the local leadership who 
acted as a puppet on strings. I realised many mistakes were being made because the
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PLO leaders could not be on the floor. It became evident that a peace deal would 
be impossible without the PLO’s involvement. The man who was running the 
Palestinian show was Abu Ala and I met him briefly in February. I was taken by 
his radiating charm and by his very moderate views on the Palestinian issue. He 
invited me many times to go to Tunis, but I declined as I was afraid of photo 
opportunities with Arafat, which would have destroyed my image with the Israelis 
here. So, I wanted to wait until the Living Conditions Survey was over; afterwards, 
I flew to Tunis.
There, Abu Ala asked me if I could formally approach the Foreign Ministry 
in Norway, which I fully endorsed. I returned to Norway and informed Mona and 
Egeland of Abu Ala’s interest. They were also convinced that we should engage 
with the PLO, since our attempts with the local Palestinian leadership had failed.
I then contacted Yossi Beilin and persuaded him to send a representative. 
On 20th January 1993, he sent Hirschfeld and Pundak to Oslo. Abu Ala and two of 
his colleagues also came. It was arranged as a seminar on the living conditions 
study so I asked Marianne to come to the first meeting. She presented the basic 
findings of the study and when she left the negotiations started.
»  «
LS: The first meeting happened in January, were you present during that or was it
immediately a bilateral approach?
TL: Actually, I remember vividly, first...I did my degree on organisational theory and I
was interested in how the dynamics of small groups differed from big formal 
organisations. So I asked both parties that I only wanted two people from each side 
and I wanted them to live with me in a small place for as long a time as possible, to 
get them to grow together as people do in small groups. What I thought was that 
this conflict is so terribly complicated and the Israeh image of the PLO and the
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PLO's image of the Israeli leaders were both totally false. We had to break down 
the images and to build an emotional trust between the leaders on a personal basis. 
Therefore, there was an emphasis on the emotional, rather than the cognitive aspect. 
This was the core of the facilitation theory.
Going back to your question, after lunch Mona and Marianne left. The 
parties hardly listened to what they had said and were very impatient. I sat with 
them for a couple of hours where the rules of the game were defined. Then, I was 
asked to be in the meeting. I said, ‘No, because this is your own problem, you have 
to learn to know each other, to learn and solve the problem between you, without 
any third parties.’ So, I showed them into a room and waited until they finished 
their business. We aU had dinner together where the conversations continued. This 
was the pattern of the negotiations, with few exceptions. But, on numerous 
occasions, they asked me to come into the meetings. I never entered the meeting 
room without both parties asking me to do so.
However, this pattern changed all the time. There were two arenas of 
negotiations. One was the meetings and the other was the telephone conversations. 
Between the meetings, that went on from 20 January to September, there were 
telephone conversations, but no physical lines between Tunis and Israel. Secondly, 
the Israelis were forbidden to talk to the PLO. Therefore, all the communication 
between the meetings were conducted by telephone. That puts you in a very 
powerful position because you had to interpret the messages, not only just to give
them. So actually, there were two arenas here. In the telephone arena, there was
very active participation on my part, not only as a facilitator, but as a go-between. 
» «
LS : How would you define facilitation ?
TL: I would define a facilitator as someone or a group of people who provides the
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organisational structure around the negotiations and I would say a few rules apply 
here. One is that there has to be complete equality in the way you treat them, down 
to the smallest detail. When we met them at the airport, we always picked them up 
in the same kind of a car; one wasn't more flashy than the other. When I picked up 
the Israelis, the next time I picked up the Palestinians. If I rode with Abu Ala from 
the airport, I would always ride back with the Israelis. We also tried to have exactly 
the similar rooms. This treatment of equality was very important. Also, I worked 
to developed a friendship with all of them. Additionally, I functioned as the 
punching ball because a tremendous amount of aggression develops in such 
situations. Instead of slugging it out with each other, you offer yourself as the 
punching ball. This also paradoxically brings you into a very powerful position 
because when you are a punching ball, you learn the positions of tlie parties very 
well.
So there is this emotional aspect because if trust is to be built, it has to be 
established around personal relationships, on an emotional basis. That's why the 
meals and drinks in the evening were important. They encouraged an atmosphere 
of trust and confidence. When serious, it is necessary to be serious; but, you can 
divert tensions by saying unpleasant things in a humorous way.
»  «
LS: They must have had a great deal o f trust in you personally to say, * Let's try this
Oslo approach’?
TL: I think they took a risk, but both parties trusted me to be passionately engaged in
the conflict, while being completely unbiased. Maybe there were some suspicions 
at different points in time. They thought perhaps I was more sympathetic to one 
position than to the other. But I think they trusted me completely and that's why 
trust grew and grew as the process developed.
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»  «
LS: What do you attribute this ability to remain objective, neutral to? Was it looking at
the Middle East with fresh eyes?
TL: Yes, because one of the things I learned when I was with FAFO here was that very
few people had a balanced view of things, particularly social scientists if I may say 
so. They seemed to adopt very ideological positions. I think that I came in here 
without any biases, with fresh eyes and I was actually quite appalled by social 
scientists who were so biased: either extremely pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian. So 
they were not seeing the conflict as objectively as they should.
Imagine a four field table, you have on the horizontal line, public and private. On 
the vertical line, you have pre-negotiations and negotiations. I thought, why did 
they have public negotiations and go directly into negotiations in Washington? 
What is the difference between negotiations and pre-negotiations? As I see it, in 
pre-negotiations, the most important things are twofold. First, building trust 
between the key actors; that is an emotional act. Second, it is to establish a belief 
between the parties that it is possible to find some sort of a solution; that is a 
rational act. What they did in Washington was plunge directly into negotiations. 
What I think was important in Oslo was to build the personal trust and to arrive at a 
conclusion that some sort of a solution was possible. That's how the Declaration of 
Principles was developed. Oslo was a kind of pre-negotiations. It was not public in 
the sense that it was secret, an NGO (non-govemmental organisation) arranged it 
under the cover of an academic exercise, which is necessary to have deniability.
So in the four field table, you have Oslo in one comer and Washington in 
the other. The Oslo and the non-public sectors of the table is what I call Oslo 
diplomacy. This is the outer frame. The inner frame was to combine facilitation, 
which involves organising the logistics to create the most conducive environment.
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in order to help generate and promote trust. Then, there was also the go-between 
element and the telephone arena was particularly important here. What was also 
important was that I had to convince the parties each time to come back for the next 
meeting. Consequently, a part of facilitation is to threaten and to charm them into 
coming back. So, in May 1993, the process was upgraded. The Palestinians 
refused to continue meeting with only the academics, since they believed they had 
reached a stage where real negotiations should commence. Then we switched from 
pre-negotiations to the negotiating stage. Uri Savir came as the official 
representative of the Israeli Government as well as the lawyer Joel Singer.
»  «
LS: Were you at any time consulted or invited to present ideas on how to tackle various
issues?
TL: Again, up to this pre-negotiations stage, I had almost solely related to Abu Ala and
Hirschfeld. After Savir came in, I only communicated with Savir on the Israeli side 
during the actual negotiations. Again you have to distinguish between the 
telephone arena and the meeting room arena. In the process of drafting the DOP, I 
don't think that I ever went into the meetings to make suggestions. But in the 
telephone arena, the difference was that you were always asked for advice. ‘What 
do you think we should do with this? How should we answer this?’ I always tried 
to restrain myself from coming up with any suggestions of my own. What I did 
was elaborate on their own ideas. To put it in a negative way, there is a huge room 
for manipulating the parties when you are the go-between in this respect. Actually, 
many times I did, but this was strictly on the telephone. You must keep in mind 
that the Oslo Channel was twofold. It was comprised of the DOP as well as the 
negotiations of mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel. They were the two 
products of the Oslo Channel.
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»  «
LS : That happened after August?
TL: Exactly. Since the signing of the DOP, Mona and I were asked to assist when there
were crises. After the Hebron Massacre, I was in Tunis for twenty days. After 
some days, they asked Mona to join me. In Tunis, I did exactly the opposite of 
what I did in Oslo. That is, I outlined three suggestions in writing as to how the 
parties could overcome this crisis. They were called the Larsen Proposals, the last 
of which was adopted by the PLO. So at that stage, I played a very active role as a 
negotiator. But going back to the DOP and the Letters of Mutual Recognition, I 
think if I had played an active role in the meetings, we would have failed as 
facilitators. They trusted us to play that role.
»  «
LS : The process would have failed for what reason ?
TL: On numerous occasions I was asked to go into the negotiating room. When you are
there, you become an audience; they speak to impress you. They say things which 
they wouldn't say, if there were no listeners in the room. Being in the room has a 
very negative effect on negotiations as they are too often tempted to use you as an 
audience. Then, attention becomes diverted from the issues. So actually I left
because it was so obvious that it was not constructive for me to be there. Also,
when you are a mediator, you will often be heavily manipulated by the parties. If 
you are a facilitator, there is no reason to manipulate you. If you are a go-between, 
there will be temptations to manipulate you, but not as strongly as when you are a 
mediator. So many times, I knew I was asked to convey messages in a specific 
way. This is very dangerous because then when this is discovered by the other 
party, you are perceived as biased and you destroy your role.
»  «
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LS: Do you think the Oslo Channel was unique?
TL: I think going back to the four field table, we combined pre-negotiations and secret
talks. The combination of facilitator and go-between, maybe this type of a role has 
been practised before. You see, the original intention was that we should be a 
second-track to the negotiations in Washington. Oslo was not meant to be an 
alternative, but was suppose to provide input and support the Washington talks. 
But, the parties were so pleased with the way we handled the process that they 
decided to develop the dialogues in Oslo. The parties felt strongly that this process 
was progressing in the right direction.
»  «
LS: Is the DOP flawed in that its greatest strength is its greatest weakness?
TL: No, I would not say that. The general principles do not constitute a weakness, but
contain strengths. I have very strong opinions on this because so far we have been 
discussing the organisational pattern, not the substance. Before I leave this, I have 
to emphasise that in my opinion, the success of Oslo was strongly dependent on the 
personalities involved. So as I said in my speech in the secret signing ceremony, on 
20^ August 1993, the Palestinians and Israelis were lucky because they had the 
right leaders. Because without the personalities of Abu Ala and Savir in particular, 
it would have been impossible to reach an agreement.
»  «
LS: Personalities in terms of being open-minded?
TL: Yes, being open-minded and the trust that was built between them are deeply
emotionally rooted. The chemistry between them, which was there from the 
very start, was also important. If you were unlucky with the personalities, this 
relationship never would have developed and without the relationship 
developing, there would not have been an Oslo Channel, I am convinced. Being
418
immodest, I think there was a good triangular relationship between them and 
myself that produced the magic of Oslo. When you pick facilitators and 
negotiators, you have to choose them very carefully. The most difficult thing is 
that Oslo is a particular kind of a diplomacy. The difficulty in applying it to 
other conflicts is very personality-sensitive.
Now, let me go into substance. The Oslo accords are very 
misunderstood; it is not a peace treaty. What it defines is a road towards a 
possible peace. Oslo is a road and is not a fixed point in time; it is dynamic. 
What the DOP defines is the time it will take to travel along this road. Along 
this road are definite milestones. There are toll stations and right now they are 
at a toll station; they are at an impasse. So Oslo is a road and I believe it would 
have been impossible to go any other way than through a DOP. It would have 
been impossible for the parties to agree on a comprehensive peace treaty. I 
think then the road of Oslo has its own dynamics and I believe very strongly that 
will push the parties past the difficult toll stations and from milestone to 
milestone. The reason for my belief is that there simply is no way back as I see 
it, because the alternative involves much more blood, so much more suffering. 
There is only one way and that is to carry on, to go on ahead.
»  «
LS: How active have you been after Oslo? Do you think terrorism and Israeli land
policies threaten the road paved in Oslo?
TL: There are two issues that are very tricky: one has the name Jerusalem and the other
settlements. I believe that Arafat will get most of the West Bank in the not too 
distant future and he will get statehood before the final status negotiations. In that 
situation, the settlers will leave Gaza. If he has statehood, Arafat has to assume 
responsibility for security. The settlers will leave and I don't think that will be a big
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problem in Gaza. However, the settlers will have to leave the West Bank 
eventually, but there will be lots of conflicts and I fear lots of violence. The most 
difficult issue is Jerusalem and I think this will remain an issue of conflict for 
decades to come. So what do I believe? I believe that Oslo within the next twelve 
months will give Palestinians a state in Gaza. There will remain a big problem with 
the settlers in the West Bank, but eventually this will be solved. The only way to 
solve it is for the settlers to leave. Lastly, I think that the Jerusalem issue will stay 
an issue for decades. Chances are that violence will continue to erupt.
» «
LS: If you were to do it again, is there anything you would do differently?
TL: Nobody has ever asked me that question. I have never thought about it. This does
not sound particularly self-effacing and is something for me to ponder. However, 
with the elements that were present, I don't think I would have done anything 
differently. There were certain mistakes made, but they were outside my control. 
The Oslo Channel was a complete success in that it was a secret operation. After it 
was publicly announced, there was of course the glamour and most importantly, the 
parties obtained recognition from the other. Uri Savir became the most famous 
diplomat ever and Joel Singer became a star as an international lawyer. Mona and 
myself both became very famous and our lives changed completely as we became 
international public figures. Also, I joined the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and 
was later appointed to my present position.
After Oslo was made public, I had wanted to return to the academic world 
and Mona was planning on continuing her position as a diplomat. I was a visiting 
scholar at Columbia University where I had a nice office and a secretary. I even 
went to New York and found a flat for us. But then Holst suddenly passed away 
and the new Foreign Minister pleaded with me to stay. Consequently, I promised
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to stay for another six months and then go to New York. Then, the UN Secretary 
General offered me this position and I found it very difficult to refuse.
»  «
LS: Going over a couple of points finally, when you said the channel was very
personality-dependent, was there a particular Oslo spirit? You have been 
described as an atypical Norwegian?
TL: The Norwegian Foreign Ministry showed enormous flexibility by allowing a NGO
to play such a leading role.
»  «
LS: Stoltenberg accepted that, he knew about it?
TL: Yes. He knew about it, but he never participated personally. But not many foreign
ministers would have shown the flexibility and the vision. Very few other 
governments would have resisted the temptation to assume a full mediator role. I 
think Norwegians are actually very self-effacing and I am an exception in that 
respect. I know lots of people who say that I am not a typical Norwegian and in 
many ways I agree.
»  «
LS : At least you are not a product of the Norwegian. ..
TL: I'm much more extroverted than the average Norwegian and I think that there were
elements of luck here. But, this chemistry between Uri, Abu Ala and myself, which 
produced the core of the magic so-to-speak in the channel, was not a specifically 
Norwegian trait; it was more due to personalities. If I didn’t have Mona as both an 
emotional and intellectual support, I don't think I would have been able to run that 
sort of a marathon; to operate in the Middle East conflict is intellectually very 
demanding. I mean if you go into it and lots of people can do it, what is really 
difficult is the emotional side. I was very close to a breakdown many, many times
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during the process because it was going around the clock and there were enormous 
emotions and aggressions directed at you. That is an extremely tough thing to deal 
with 24-7.
»  «
LS: Your previous distinction between wanting to affect the emotional and the
cognitive, what do you mean by cognitive?
TL: When I talk about the cognitive, I mean the substance, the conflict itself and the
ways of solving it. That's a cognitive problem. You have to find arguments, give 
consistent descriptions, make conclusions, etc. But, this conflict is very much a 
conflict over what I would call ‘political emotional’ issues. A conflict about having 
dignity on the Palestinian side, on not being humiliated. This is the core of the 
political issue; self respect as a people; self respect as persons. You cannot establish 
an empirical fact-base here. It's very much about value-related questions on the 
ought and ought-nots. It is emotionally related. To develop a mutual respect 
between these negotiators and the ability to perceive each other as human beings, to 
recognise that the opposition is someone you can talk to, are prerequisites for 
resolving the conflict. That is why the pre-negotiation stage is necessary for two 
reasons. First, trust must be established and developed among the parties, which is 
an emotional act. Secondly, the parties need to come to believe that bilateral 
solutions are possible and a harmful unilateral one is not the only way to resolve the 
conflict. So, I think it is very fruitful to describe the basic pattern that I follow. It is 
the distinction between private and covert versus the public and overt. There are 
also pre-negotiations and negotiations. I think you have to conceptualise it this 
way.
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Interview with Geir Pedersen 
Oslo, 5 May 1995
LS: Can you tell me a bit about your background?
GP: I worked in the Foreign Ministry in Germany and in China for four years. Before
that, I was at Oslo's Foreign Ministry's Africa and Middle East Desk where I 
studied history of Ethiopia and Eritria.
»  «
LS: How did you become involved in the establishment of the Oslo Channel?
GP: At that time, I was travelling back and forth from Bonn to Oslo. It was decided that
I should start working with FAFO and due to that, I was asked to take part in this 
Oslo Channel, to keep the circle limited. I was to start working at FAFO in 
summer 1993 where I would have to become involved as head of the International 
Section.
»  «
LS : You were approached by whom ?
GP: By Teije R0d-Larsen.
»  «
LS: When?
GP: I was asked by the foreign ministry officially, but my guess is that Teije R0d-
Larsen, who was taking care of the actual operation, talked with Jan Egeland about 
it.
»  «
LS: You first observed a meeting in April?
GP: Yes I think you're right, in April.
»  «
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LS : Can you describe what happened?
GP: The meeting took place at Holmenkollen Park Hotel Rica here in Oslo. Abu Ala
and his two Palestinian colleagues as well as Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak on 
the Israeli side were present.
»  «
LS : Who was on the Norwegian side ?
GP: As far as I remember, it was Teije and myself. Jan was in Jerusalem together with
Stoltenberg during those days. I think Mona was working with Mr Holst, away on 
atrip.
»  «
LS : Was the atmosphere trust-building or direct bargaining ?
GP: This was my first meeting. I had met Abu Ala once before. Of course, I was
briefed in detail by Teije before the meeting, but I was positively surprised by what 
I thought was a very good atmosphere at the meeting. People obviously had 
learned about each other in previous meetings and they cracked jokes and had a 
good time. As you know, we were not present when the real negotiations were 
going on. We were informed by the Palestinians and the Israelis whenever they 
wanted to, but the rule from the outset was that there should be no direct Norwegian 
participation in the actual negotiations. A second important rule was that there 
should be no fight about history or the past.
At this meeting, one important topic was that Hirschfeld and Pundak had to 
prove that they were more than mere academics. In other words, they really 
represented the Israeli Government so the Palestinians could see a reason to 
continue with this channel. The Palestinians insisted that At the next meeting, an 
official representative of the Israeli Government should accompany Hirschfeld and 
Pundak. At the meeting, we all discussed the upcoming refugee working group
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meeting, which was scheduled to take place in Oslo on 20th May 1993. We also 
discussed how this secret channel could be used to ensure the success of that 
meeting, which could provide stimulus for the ongoing bilateral negotiations.
»  «
LS: So when the Israelis and Palestinians met, you and Terje for example, would go
outside and do what?
GP: We would meet them at the airport. Teije would then be briefed by the Israeli
delegation, since he had been in close contact with both Israelis and the Palestinians 
in between the meetings. The Palestinians would call from Tunis and the messages 
would then be relayed to Jerusalem, since there were no direct telephone links 
between the two capitals. So, Teqe called the Israelis and inform them of the 
messages from the Palestinians and the other way round. Therefore, Teije had a 
rather clear picture of what the topics and problems of the meetings would be, since 
he would sometimes test out with the parties new ideas and new solutions, on 
behalf of one party. Then, he would check with them when we met at the airport 
and tried to get a clear picture of the current mood; were the parties optimistic, 
pessimistic, more negative now than before. Before the start of the meeting, at the 
airport for example, Teije tried to gage whether we should approach one side and 
discuss with the representatives, certain problems that was perceived to have 
developed in between the meetings. I think Teije’s role was to keep the operation 
running smoothly. He believed that the parties should learn to know each other 
quite well. He also tried to sense where the tough confrontations might arise and 
what could we do to help ease those confrontations outside the negotiating room.
That was what I learned from this meeting. During breaks, we would go for 
a walk or a stroll with the parties. During coffee breaks, lunches and dinners, we 
would sit together with them and discuss what was going on as well as any other
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relevant topics.
»  «
LS : How many other meetings did you attend?
GP: I was involved in the rest of the meetings.
»  «
LS: Were you brought in strictly because you would be working at FAFO or did it
develop into another dimension?
GP: I think my basic task was to help smooth the operations on the Norwegian side, to
work very closely obviously with Teije, to try to sit down and think of different 
scenarios, to be a support for him in the process, to see to all the practical details 
including arranging for hiring of all the cars, transportation and the meeting rooms. 
We wanted to eliminate any obstacles for them. We also tried not to have too 
many persons involved on the Norwegian side. Since we were not a part of the 
negotiations, it was important not to have them send messages to different 
Norwegians. Therefore, the parties sent messages via Teije and that was a very 
important task for him. But, Teije also discussed with them how particular issues 
or miscommunication could be overcome.
»  «
LS: What did you do specifically to keep the process operating smoothly?
GP: Keeping it a secret was one of the most important tasks, because we knew if it
wasn't kept a secret, the whole thing would blow up. I think it helped tremendously 
that Teije was able to absorb some of the anger. Frustrations were directed towards 
him during the negotiation process. This ability of his helped the whole process as 
the Palestinians would sometimes aim their aggression directly at Teije, rather than 
towards the Israelis and the other way round. This was perhaps because he was the 
one giving the bad message and he knew and understood that was his task, an
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important role to promote a positive outcome.
» «
LS: Were you ever directly approached by someone from the press?
GP: I think no one in the press could imagine what was going on. No one guessed that
Norway could play any role similar to what we actually did. There were a few
speculations in the press, hinting at some developments in Oslo. That was just after
the refugee working group meeting. I think it was the AFP, which had speculated 
that the Israelis and Palestinians were meeting in Oslo, but under American 
leadership. It was easy for us to deny any knowledge of this, since this was not 
what we were involved in.
»  «
LS: What about the US State Department, were they informed?
GP: That was true after the Israelis upgraded the negotiations. Then, we stopped
because we thought it was up to the parties themselves to inform the Americans.
Jan was in direct contact with the Americans via the embassy here in Oslo and also
met with Dan Kurtzer.
»  «
LS: The positive feedback received concerning FAFO’s Living Conditions Survey in the
Occupied Territories, would you say that helped in gaining the trust of both sides?
GP: Yes, I think it is true. The report presented by Marianne helped enormously as the
parties saw it as a unique contribution to the understanding of the conflict. 
However, I also think that Teije Rpd-Larsen organised the whole concept and the 
different meetings. The way he organised is perhaps a very important factor, which 
helped the parties reach a successful conclusion. The whole historical setting was 
of course the most important factor in explaining why an agreement was possible. 
» «
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LS: Historical in terms of the contacts?
GP: I mean the macro-level historical developments including the fall of the Soviet
Union, the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War where you had, for the first time, 
Americans fighting on the same side as the leading Arab states against Iraq. One of 
the consequences of that was the ending of the notion of a unified Arab nation. The 
FLO also suffered severe financial consequences for supporting Hussain. 
Additionally, there was the development of the Intifada, a Labour victory in 
Norway and the Labour victory in Israel. This meant that the very good 
relationship which had existed between the two Labour parties created a very good 
setting for Norway to play a role. Also, since the 1970s we had developed contacts 
with the FLO.
»  «
LS: Why do you think the Washington negotiations were not progressing well?
GF: From a theoretical point of view, in the Washington negotiations, they made a
mistake by not going through a pre-negotiations stage. They started with direct 
negotiations in a public setting. Our understanding was that before you proceed to 
public negotiations in a difficult conflict situation such as the Israeli-Falestinian 
one, you needed a process of building confidence. This confidence-building should 
be a part of the pre-negotiations process. It should not be done in public, but in a 
non-public setting where the parties could have deniability, learn to know each 
other and to build trust, etc. So, the Oslo Channel included a pre-negotiations 
phase. Consequently, we think we helped the overall process. Without this pre­
negotiation stage, I don't think a positive conclusion would have been possible.
»  «
LS: Have you been involved in more direct diplomacy? If so, how would you compare
it with the Oslo Channel?
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GP: I think the whole concept of negotiating a Declaration of Principle was built on the
Israeli experience with the negotiations of the Camp David agreement, where you 
had a similar concept. As long as you put down all the points you will not negotiate 
before signing a DOP, you don’t need a large bureaucracy to work out the details. 
The negative side to that is you defer the issues that may eventually undermine the 
original agreement; in this case, Jerusalem, refugees, settlement and relationships 
with neighbours and along borders. It was also significant that both parties had
developed possible scenarios for a negotiated settlement. In other words, there was
a culture of dialoguing by academics and activists between the two communities. 
But, to put it in a narrower political setting, you had to be realistic. When Joel 
Singer started to participate in the meetings, the whole concept became much more 
concrete and much more precise. Quite a different document resulted from the one 
that had been drafted in earlier meetings. You could say that what I labelled the 
pre-negotiations, non-public phase was from January to May 1993. Then, the real 
negotiations commenced with the outcome of the DOP. Nevertheless, if you didn't 
have the pre-negotiations phase where Ron Pundak and Yair Hirschfeld were 
meeting with Abu Ala and establishing a very firm relationship, where they could 
try out different scenarios and solutions, it would not have been possible for Joel 
Singer and Uri Savir to come in and develop a more concrete and precise language 
for the DOP.
»  «
LS: Do you think it was essential that the channel remained secret?
GP: Yes, that was a key to the success because that meant Joel singer and Uri Savir
didn’t have to go home to their constituencies. The same applied for the 
Palestinians as they did not have to explain each step. Both sides had a small group 
that could sit down and analyse what was going on without arguing it out in the
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press or the street. I think it also contributed to building confidence, since you 
could then have more open and frank discussions within the private arena.
» «
LS: Did you get a sense of how the levels of tensions changed during the coffee breaks?
GP: Yes, definitely. Sometimes they would stand in the corridors and yell at each other.
Sometimes, it would be a very friendly atmosphere. This would shift from 
breakfast to lunch, from lunch to coffee, from coffee to dinner and then during the 
evening as well depending on the stage of the negotiations.
»  «
LS : Did it get more tense in the official stages, from May onwards ?
GP: Yes, it did because obviously the devil is in the details. Each side had to consult
either Jerusalem or Tunis all the time. The kind of language to use involved a lot of 
tough discussions particularly regarding the issue of Jerusalem. I remember many 
times when Abu Ala hardly talked to Teije.
»  «
LS : Were you present during the Stockholm meeting ?
GP: No, I did not go to Stockholm, but I remained very much involved during that stage
as well. I think you could say that the involvement diminished after a meeting in 
1993, which occurred subsequent to the official signing in Washington. That was 
to deal with the problems of implementing the DOP.
»  «
LS : Was that public ?
GP: Yes, but at that time it was one of many meetings which involved Peres, Savir,
Singer, on the Israeli side and Abu Ala, Nabil and a few others on the 
Palestinian side.
»  «
430
LS: Do you believe that the approach used in the Oslo Channel can be applied to other
conflicts?
GP: I think it would be very difficult to repeat. But, there is some general knowledge to
draw on. For instance, the concept of pre-negotiations where you can have the 
assistance of a non-biased third party could help to facilitate other conflicts.
»  «
LS: When you were first approached by Terje R0d-Larsen, were you a bit sceptical of
the process as he described it?
GP: I didn't really know what to think. I had some experience in the Foreign Ministry
with negotiations between the Eritrians and the other disputants. So I knew that 
Norway was asked to help in many conflicts. I understood that if the parties 
wished, Norway could play a distinctive role, since there was a special relationship 
between Norway and Israel and Norway and the PLO. Also, it was the right 
moment because of the stalemated nature of the Madrid and Washington talks. So I 
was convinced by Teije and Jan of the substantial contribution that could be made 
to the peace process.
»  «
LS: Had this facilitation process, as you have described it, been attempted in other
conflict resolution efforts or was it a new idea?
GP: This is a very good question and I have discussed it very much with Terje. I think
he would tell you that this is the half of the Social Democratic model, where you 
have the negotiations between the employees and employers. FAFO started out as 
a Norwegian think-tank for trade unions and Teije would claim that he learned a lot 
from the ways that negotiations were being led by trade unions in Scandinavia.
»  «
LS : Were you surprised by this type o f pre-negotiations ?
431
GP: No, I was not surprised in the sense that I knew that Norway had been approached
by all the parties earlier. Being a small country with obviously no strong vested 
interest, Norway was well-suited to play a facilitative role. We were trusted by the 
US as well as by both parties. Norway has been an ally of the US and the two 
sides. Additionally, we understood that at a certain stage that it would be extremely 
important to get the US on board. One thing was the political strength and prestige 
that the positive sanction of the agreement by the US would mean for a successful 
channel. Also, we knew that if the DOP was to succeed, a large economic aid 
programme was necessary for the Palestinian areas. The US would have to take the 
lead in any such effort. Therefore, it was extremely important to get the us support 
for the agreement and I think that both the Palestinians and the Israelis would agree 
with that assessment.
»  «
LS: Who funded the meetings?
GP: The Norwegian Foreign Ministry via FAFO.
»  «
LS: After the public announcement of the DOP, would there have been any point in
continuing to explore other issues or was it not possible because of the press?
GP: Yes, it would have been possible because after the announcement, the channel was
very much public. As you know, when Peres came here, it was not public. After 
his trip to the US, the media started writing about what was going on. During that 
time, the late Foreign Minister Holst was very heavily engaged along with Teije in 
the direct negotiations. In early September, we were more or less consumed by 
those negotiations concerning the Letters of Mutual Recognition.
»  «
LS: You were present at the signing of the DOP in Norway August 20,1993?
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GP: Yes, I was present at the signing of the DOP. The Letters of Mutual Recognition
was at that time only an idea.
»  «
LS: In December 1993, you discussed how to follow-up the Oslo process?
GP: Yes, there were many meetings in the autumn of 1993 which covered topics
including the funding part, the setting up of a liaison committee with the World 
Bank and other Gulf countries. We also discussed how to follow-up the 
implementation of the DOP. You had very early discussions between the Israelis 
and Palestinians on how large the area of Jericho should be. There were many good 
direct contacts between the parties - good in the sense it was directly between them. 
Then, you had this meeting in December.
»  «
LS : That was public ?
GP: No, that was the whole concept; when they met that it should not be public. We
managed for a couple of days to keep the whole thing secret then the media realised 
Peres was there. Obviously, after the signing of the DOP, any secret negotiations in 
Oslo would be terribly difficult.
»  «
LS: Would it have been possible to bring back the academics to discuss an Oslo II
Channel, for example?
GP: My guess is that at this stage, the two parties knew each other so well that it should
have been possible for them to move forward directly. But, then you have the 
whole question of how should you prepare for the final status negotiations. There 
will definitely be personalities both on the Palestinian and the Israeli side, arguing 
that to prepare for that, you need non-public pre-negotiations contacts, where 
academics and others would have a role to play. But, that depends on how you
433
define the real problems and the development of the peace process. As you know, 
both on the Palestinian and the Israeli side, there are different opinions on how to 
move forward. Some people would say you should now skip all the stages and start 
directly negotiating the final status.
»  «
LS : How do you see the future prospects ?
GP: It is very easy to see all the problems ahead. There are bound to be many problems
and mistakes will be made. At the same time, I think the leaders of Israel and the 
PLO understand that they are now dependent on each other for success. Hopefully, 
that can help to find a sensible, concrete solution to all the problems ahead. The 
willingness on both the Palestinian and the Israeli side for a lasting peace is 
genuine; moreover, there are no alternatives. The only alternative to this is 
anarchy. No one has an interest in this. Consequently, if peace is not achieved it 
will be more by default, rather then by people wanting to sabotage the 
development. Of course, there is the question of the fundamentalists on both sides.
But, I am still optimistic in the sense that while I see a lot of problems ahead, the 
peace process is on the right track.
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Interview with Shimon Peres 
Jerusalem, 22 May 1995
LS: When were you first informed about the Oslo Channel?
SP: There were many channels with the PLO. I preferred this channel because Abu Ala
showed a capacity to change things. The nominations of representatives chosen by 
the PLO for other meetings would always turn out so that there was something that 
would make our participation impossible. But, with Abu Ala as a participant in this 
channel, I thought it could be a valuable one.
»  «
LS: Did you have direct contact with Larsen or was that accomplished by Beilin?
SP: There was this channel that was conducted by Yair Hirschfeld and we selected this
one. It was one among many others. What was special about it was that Abu Ala 
had shown interest and he produced results.
»  «
LS: So there was no particular reason to trust the Norwegians as a third party? It was
merely an accident in having them?
SP: Yes. I do think Larsen and others including Holst did play a positive role, because
they were keen, sincere and willing contributors.
»  «
LS: You were aware that the Norwegians informed the US State Department?
SP: Yes, I knew, but at the beginning it was one of many talks that were going around
town, so-to-speak. When it became serious and Mr Holst (the Foreign Minister of 
Norway) became actively involved, we co-ordinated what to tell whom. We were 
careful not to tell the US too much, in order to keep the negotiations secret. But as 
things developed, it was necessary to inform the Americans - Mr Holst and myself
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went to California and informed Mr Christopher.
»  «
LS: Would you say that the secret element was an important factor?
SP: Yes.
»  «
LS: The stage when things entered a more serious phase was in April, May?
SP: Yes.
»  «
LS: Why did you decide to limit the information to the US State Department?
SP: Through Holst, information was given to the US, but more importantly, the
negotiations were still continuing in Washington. One of the reasons that Israel 
decided for this Oslo Channel was because we saw the talks in Washington were 
going nowhere. So, before we could cancel one, we had to be sure there was 
another. So another reason not to inform too much was that the Americans were 
co-ordinating the talks in Washington.
»  «
LS: What would you attribute to the success of the Oslo Channel? Abu Ala’s ability to
obtain results?
SP: The Palestinians themselves found the Washington talks futile from their point of
view. It was time to talk directly.
»  «
LS: How would you characterise Norway’s role? Did they just provide a conducive
atmosphere?
SP: No, I think they did much more than that. They helped to bridge the many gaps,
which occurred throughout the discussions.
»  «
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LS: Was it the strength of Larsen’s personality as some have suggested or a team effort
that made the difference?
SP: No, it was a team effort, whose constituent members happened to be at the right
places. So all this worked out very nicely.
»  «
LS: Would you describe the Oslo Channel as a peace treaty or the beginning of a
process to peace?
SP: It is both. It produced the DOP. Until peace becomes comprehensive, we may have
pieces of peace.
»  «
LS : How would you define peace ?
SP: Every epoch in history has a different definition. Peace means an understanding
that you cannot defend the conflict, develop your economy and satisfy the needs of 
people, unless you turn the nation of confinement into a region of co-operation, 
with global participation. When you actually give up the prejudices of yesterday 
and begin to develop new occasions for building understanding: this is the meaning
of peace. You cannot embark upon a modem age, while all the time being arrested
and held up by the conflicts of yesterday. The walls of hatred and the walls of 
suspicions that have typified foreign relations must be altered.
»  «
LS: In the New Middle East, which you envisioned in your book, do you believe Israel,
in relation to the Palestinian question has escaped the historical prejudices?
SP: I think it is not an escape, but a new age. This is my opinion. If Israel wants to
integrate outside the Middle East, what is needed for the Middle East is to integrate 
itself around Israel. It is not a geographical definition, but a conceptual one.
»  «
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LS: Given the developments of dialogues between Israel and Jordan as well as with
Syria, is this reconceptualisation already underway?
SP: No, you cannot decide who defines himself as a nation or community. It is not
for us to decide, but we cannot ignore it. We don’t want another country with a 
civil war. Actually, there never was a historic Palestinian state or people. But, as 
they have formed now, we have to relate to their expectations.
»  «
LS: Are terrorism, Arafat’s inability thus far to deliver concrete results for his people
and Israel’s land confiscation policies obstacles to be overcome or do they present 
a real challenge to the process that began in Oslo?
SP: I don’t think so. Solutions through further negotiations can help resolve some of
these difficulties. I must point out that there is not terrorism on both sides, but only 
on one side. The other side just responds. Also, the response is of a double nature. 
It is military policemen who stop the terror, who punish terrorists. Another way to 
respond is by economic and psychological means. But, basically, the problem 
stems from the fact that there are two religions, two languages, two peoples who 
reside on a land that is very small and poor. War has been quite well-known to 
both sides. It is complicated by the situation where you have Arab people living in 
Jerusalem and in Israel and you have Jewish persons surrounding Arab 
communities. So, we need to handle this puzzle carefully.
»  «
LS: Do you think the attitudes that must be changed for a New Middle East to come to
fruition is possible, given the economic deprivation particularly in Gaza and the 
West Bank?
SP: There is such a long and confhctual history in this region for hundreds of years,
which has caused tremendous damage. You cannot answer really the needs of the
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people by simple inspiration, but by getting rid of the old conflicts, wars and 
addressing the necessary means for education and development.
You also need compromise by both sides for politics. Pohtics, you see, is 
the art of human relations. All the weaknesses and strengths that human beings 
possess are expressed in politics. Politics is the art of human relations either 
individually or collectively.
»  «
LS: Referring to the Oslo Channel once again, would you characterise this as a unique
case or can some of its elements be applied to resolve other conflicts?
SP: Let’s not exaggerate the importance of the channel. The real significance is in the
choice, the will. After all, nobody pushed us to make peace with the PLO. So, the 
real necessary component was already there. A channel without a decision is like 
an empty story. What does the channel mean? It’s like having a pipe without 
having water; if there is no water, what do you need the pipe for?
»  «
LS: Where did the willingness come from? Was it partly a result o f the frustrations and
a recognition that the public, bilateral talks were not progressing?
SP: Yes, the Madrid and the Washington talks didn’t go anywhere. It became just an
exchange of positions because both parties avoided taking decisions. When you 
don’t take decisions, you espouse formulas, definitions and excuses. This takes a 
lot of time and does not give much fulfilment. There is nothing that can replace 
direct face-to-face dialogues to realize will to pursue another way of 
communicating and finding ways of co-operating. As the Washington talks did not 
allow for that, we chose to explore Oslo as it was possible to talk directly with the 
PLO there.
»  «
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LS: Was there, though, a particular reason that the choice was made at that particular
time?
SP: For me, yes. We tried to make peace with Jordan in 1987 in contacts with King
Hussain, but those attempts were torpedoed by the Israeli Likud Government. I felt 
we were left with no choice, but to confront the Palestinian problem.
»  «
LS: Do you still believe that the stability in the Middle East is intrinsically linked to a
peace with the Palestinians?
SP: The Palestinians are not necessarily the single most essential question to work on
for a lessening of conflict in this region, but if you do not deal with this important 
situation, then it means all the problems are made that much more complex.
»  «
LS: What do you see for the future prospects resulting from the Declaration of
Principles?
SP: The Declaration of Principles is the first step in the right direction and I think many
other steps will follow. There is no longer any justification for war. There is also 
no more support from the superpowers for wars. The superpowers have themselves 
reached a tired point. Additionally, the wealth and well-being of nations no longer 
is so dependent on land or natural resources but on science and technology and 
knowledge of how to utilise them: it is a new epoch. All these things cannot be 
accomplished by wars. Therefore, I think there is a major change which is taking 
place.
» «
LS: What about the continuing involvement and significant financial support of Israel
by the US. Can you still say, given this, there is a new epoch?
SP: Yes, America has changed its role too. Yes, they provide assistance to us but they
440
are now also beginning to support the PLO financially. The conception of how to 
deal with Israel and Palestinians has changed from the American viewpoint.
»  «
LS: Do you believe the agreements spelled out in the DOP will be fully implemented, in
the very near future?
SP: As long as the Palestinians are strong enough.
»  «
LS: What do they have to do to prove that they are 'strong enough’?
SP: Most importantly, we need to be convinced that they can control the terrorist
groups, which live among the larger population. Instead of political coalitions and 
many armed groups, what is needed, is one united armed force.
»  «
LS: But does Arafat and the PLO Government possess enough control over judicial
means and power to bring about such developments?
SP: If they don’t, they will fall down because terrorism is aimed against them as well as
us.
»  «
LS: You said that the DOP is the first of many steps.
SP: Yes.
»  «
LS: In which direction would you like the road to go?
SP: Well, we have to end the conflict with Syria and Lebanon. We have to negotiate
with the Palestinians for a permanent solution and we all have to reconstruct a new 
peace. So we gain a capacity to provide hope and ways for each country to co­
operatively engage in relationships with the other countries around it.
»  «
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LS: Is this a process that will take decades?
SP: Not necessarily. Things are happening ... Where were you bom?
LS: In South Korea.
SP: Look what happened to your country and how it has become an important
economic country. Young persons from Korea, for example, are now able to study
in different countries pursuing higher education. While doing so, new relationships 
are formed with persons from a whole variety of nations. Such students today are 
tomorrow’s potential leaders and influential decision-makers. These relationships 
can help to diffuse the dangerous relations in other places.
»  «
LS: If a possible resolution is foreseeable in the not too distant future, can people leam
to support the official government agreements?
SP: I think it’s possible. We can no longer stop in our own place. The peoples of
Eastern Europe overcame the Iron Curtain and manage to have peaceful societies.
»  «
LS: Going back to the approach used in the Oslo Channel, although the negotiations
were bilateral, would you say that the role of the Norwegians as a part of this 
approach is better than the usual process of direct bargaining between diplomats?
SP: No, I wouldn’t monopolise one over the other. I believe you have to keep your
mind open for different arrangements. With the Egyptians, for instance, it was done 
differently. There are no rules and regulations, but there are structures that should 
be adopted in a given situation.
»  «
LS: Do you believe this first step of the DOP has sufficiently addressed the needs of
identity for the Palestinians on one hand and security for the Israelis on the other?
SP: The answer is yes. I believe it is still continuing; it is not perfect of course, but yes
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I believe it is.
»  «
LS: There has been much emphasis placed on the personal relationships which
developed from the Oslo process between Abu Ala and Uri Savir, for example. Do 
you believe these are lasting and can help towards implementing the agreements of 
the DOP as well as with further discussions?
SP: Clearly, it helps, but it is not a condition. It can help, but only up to a given point
because every problem has its own character.
»  «
LS: Is it necessary to generate trust for the resolution of a conflict?
SP: I don’t believe that negotiations are built upon complete trust. It is an art of
convincing. What you need is creativeness, introduction of new ideas because 
peace is not a result of personal relationships, but arises from objective solutions. 
One must not fall a victim to any side’s accepted positions. The Egyptians have a 
proverb; whenever you reach the Nile, you must be strong enough to carry the
cargo and the person across it. So, I would say that when you have two parties,
each of them has a position. The greatest task is to listen and try to understand the 
other’s position, in order to release both parties from their previous positions so that 
compromises can be made.
»  «
LS: If the willingness by the conflicting parties exists, do you believe a third party can
play a constructive role or is that third party then not needed?
SP: It’s not problematic. A third party can harm or help. You see, basically, I am not a
great believer in rules and regulations; one must be very inventive.
»  «
LS: Were you open to the Oslo process, since it was another avenue being presented for
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that open-minded approach which is so important in finding a way out of a conflict 
situation?
SP: The Oslo Channel as such was not an approach; that is, nobody had a clear
framework that was presented for others. It started out with just one meting. But, I 
knew in my heart that the Palestinian option was the only one. We were waiting for 
the opportunity and got it. We found Arafat to be in a very weak position. A friend 
of mine warned Israel should be careful for Arafat might disappear, and then who 
would replace him. I thought he had a good point and so I said ‘let’s go and seek 
Arafat.’
»  «
LS: Do you still believe that?
SP: Yes.
»  «
LS: You don't believe there is anyone else at present who is capable of seeing through
the Palestinian cause?
SP: I don’t believe in looking for ideal leaders. You don’t find them domestically, you
don’t find them abroad. You must deal with people as they are and the fact is that 
Arafat made up his mind to make peace with Israel. I respect him for that.
»  «
LS : Were you debriefed after each meeting by Beilin ?
SP: No, the negotiations were conducted by Uri Savir and Joel Singer who related
information back to Beilin. They did a marvellous job.
»  «
LS: From January to April 1993, would you characterise that period as a pre-
negotiations phase?
SP: There really weren’t negotiations; there were exchanges of views. As long as there
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was nobody from the Israeli Government, it was simply a symposium.
»  «
LS: Was that a significant step in leading towards the negotiations?
SP: I don’t think it was important. You see, the idea of Gaza First wasn’t borne out of
those negotiations. It was made before. The idea of Gaza was sold to the 
Palestinians, with the help of the Egyptians at another place. So, Oslo was one 
channel. There was another with Egyptians and others in a parallel way.
»  «
LS: Was there a particular reason why this Oslo Channel succeeded as opposed to the
others that were under way?
SP: What held us back for a time was that the Palestinians had not shown that they
could produce results. This was important for us. We needed to know if we entered 
into a dialogue and compromises, especially in matters relating to security, the 
Palestinians could deliver so that our security wasn’t threatened. But, as things 
developed in Oslo, the outcome became undeniable. As long as results were not 
guaranteed to be produced, we didn’t want participation of anybody from our 
Cabinet.
»  «
LS: Were you at any time in touch with the local leadership or was it your
understanding that Faisal always received his instructions from Arafat?
SP: I was in touch with Faisal Husseini several times, at my home. We talked, but he
wasn’t aware of this Oslo Channel.
»  «
LS: Were there contacts with him before this channel?
SP: There was. Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi were involved in the Washington
talks. The negotiations in Norway were supposed to be completely separate; so.
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they weren’t connected.
»  «
LS: Larsen mentioned that initially he approached Faisal Husseini because he believed
that he was the ‘future of the Palestinian leadership’?
SP: I’m sure he learned quickly the man who decides is Arafat.
»  «
LS : Then you are optimistic about the future of the process ?
SP: We have a long way to go; many things can go wrong. But, at the end of the day,
you have to decide what you want: violence or peace, to look to the future and the 
possible or to the past and what is only knowable.
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Interview with Ron Pundak 
Tel Aviv, 14 May 1995
LS : Tell me a bit about yourself?
RP: I am 40 and obtained my PhD from SO AS in London in 1991 and my BA from the
University of Tel Aviv in Middle East Studies. Between universities, I worked for 
the government as a researcher.
In mid 1992, I resumed my contacts with Yair Hirschfeld whom I knew 
from my university days in Tel Aviv. He approached me and suggested that I join 
him in his activities. Yair was then in the midst of an intensive back-channel with 
the Palestinians in the Territories; that is, mainly in Jerusalem, but also in the West 
Bank and Gaza. So, I joined the activities in April 1992 when the government was 
still in the hands of the Likud Party, a right-wing government.
We started working together mainly on two things. First, the peace­
building activities, which were semi-political in nature. Second, we were running 
the Economic Co-operation Foundation. This was created by Hirschfeld and Beilin 
sometime in 1991, in order to put under one umbrella, the activities regarding 
economic development and co-operation, mainly with the Palestinians. This 
foundation, which at the time was quite small but active, needed a boost. 
Therefore, I was brought into the organisation.
»  «
LS: This was legal?
RP: Yes, contacts with Palestinians were legal; those with the PLO were not. At the
beginning of 1992, we dealt only with Palestinians in the Territories.
» «
LS: How did the Oslo Channel start? At what point did you become involved?
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RP: I was involved from the very beginning. What happened was that we were dealing
with this kind of back-channel activities. We had very good contacts with Yossi 
Beilin, Shimon Peres and other ministers of the new government, which came to 
power in that summer. We found ourselves in a situation where we also had good 
contacts with the Palestinian leadership, mainly with Faisal Husseini and Hanan 
Ashrawi among others. We tried to facilitate the peace process from the outside 
coming such as offering ideas to both sides or communicating them from one party 
to another. This was done on a private basis. We were completely independent and 
were not subordinate to anyone. We were very close to Yossi Beilin at the Foreign 
Ministry, but we were not under any supervision or hierarchy. At that time, the 
situation was a stalemate. We always were searching for other ways of 
encouraging the peace process: in the multi-lateral talks, we were more successful 
than the bilaterals.
The whole idea of Oslo didn't come from the Norwegians or from Yossi 
Beilin; in fact, it just developed. The development was due to the fact that we all 
searched for different ways of assisting the parties. Yair, Beilin and myself met 
with the Norwegians who offered any assistance we needed. The suggestion, in 
the beginning, was that we should talk with the PLO, but the answer from Beilin 
and the Government was a flat no.
At a certain stage, we were in Hanan Ashrawi's house. Both she and Faisal 
Husseini told us that without the PLO, nothing would happen. This would be 
though still illegal. Then she came up with this suggestion, ‘why won't you go and 
meet Abu Ala.’ When she mentioned Abu Ala, she did not mean to create a 
political, back-channel with him, since he was not a political figure. He was not 
dealing with the bilateral issues in Washington, but was working behind-the-scenes 
with the multi-lateral talks. He was more responsible for economic matters. As we
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were engaged in general dialogues regarding economic issues with the Palestinians, 
active behind-the-scenes in developing ideas for the multi-lateral track, and since 
she knew we had very good contacts with Yossi Beilin who also happened to be the 
leader of the Israeli multi-lateral team, she thought it would be a good idea that we 
meet Abu Ala. In spite of the fact this was illegal, we could find a way of meeting 
him as private individuals. As far as I understood it and still do, what she suggested 
was not meant to lead to what we now call the Oslo Channel. This was just an idea 
of meeting Abu Ala and we decided it was a good one. The question was where to 
meet him. This was at the end of November.
In the beginning of December 1992, Yair was planning to go as an 
academician to a seminar in Europe. He told Hanan that he would be in Europe at 
that time. She contacted the PLO in Tunis and was informed that Abu Ala was 
going to be in London at the same time. Yair related where he would be and said 
that he would wait for a telephone call from Abu Ala. The first meeting between 
them, which occurred in early December, was like many others. Nobody at that 
time knew it would develop.
»  «
LS : There was no specific objective ?
RP: No, Yair and myself hoped that this might go somewhere, but we didn't know.
At that time, we were trying a lot of different approaches. It was like throwing 
an arrow; hopefully, it would fall on the right target. The immediate decision 
was that this kind of a meeting should continue, though no one knew where it 
would lead to.
There were two meetings on the same day and the decision after the second 
was to continue it and the question was when and where. Then, the idea to meet in 
Norway came as before meeting with Abu Ala, Yair had met with Larsen. Larsen,
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being an intelligent and quick guy who also understands and grasps politics, saw 
that there was perhaps a potential for something. Now he reminded Yair of the 
previous promises made by Norwegians that if anything was needed, assistance 
could be provided. Larsen said that he would be happy to facihtate. Yair and I 
were carrying this out on our private time and money. If something did develop 
and the meetings were to continue, we needed support from someone. We did not 
want the Israeli Government to support us because we wanted to remain 
independent. We trusted Larsen and had good relations with Egeland and others in 
the Norwegian Government as well as with FAFO. But, we were not absolutely 
sure. After London, Oslo was not a 100 percent venue for we did have other 
alternatives.
»  «
LS : You could have turned to another party ?
RP: We even thought of going to Tunis directly and rely on the fact that both of us have
foreign passports. But, it was immediately brushed aside because we decided it was 
politically and tactically wrong. If we went and played in their court, that would be 
bad. Oslo was looking good because talks then could be kept secret, which would 
not have been the case if we contacted Tunis ourselves. It was better to have 
someone in the middle. We trusted Larsen due to previous contacts on other 
academic issues and Yair and him developed a chemistry.
» «
LS: Abu Ala felt he could trust you and Larsen? Why did you decide to pursue such
a channel which involved risk?
RP: Well, Norway was taking a risk but only in hosting us and as for us, we had been
doing it all along. But as for Abu Ala, I believe that Yair impressed him and he 
knew about our different activities and links to the Israeli decision-making
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apparatus. He probably heard from Faisal and others about our activities. So, 
we were connected, people knew about us, we had a track record. Yair, in his 
many years of dialoguing with the Palestinians, also gained their trust. 
Additionally, in the past he was involved in different back-channel activities 
with them. One of the main difference between us and others was that we were 
not just academics who knew something about the area. We had a track record 
which was important. The brave or bold decision by Egeland was to put all of 
his weight on this channel, but this was based on the fact that he knew us and 
Yossi Beilin.
»  «
LS: When did it become clear that Norway was the best one to utilise?
RP: Larsen immediately got involved. So we had his enthusiasm. Prior to this, it was
our decision that we would like to pursue this track and the easiest thing was to 
agree to Larsen's suggestion as he would host and bring the Palestinians and us to 
Norway. Within a short span of time, the dialogues between us and Larsen became 
quite intensive. Larsen himself opened a dialogue with Abu Ala and based on the 
fact that he knew Abu Ala from a previous meeting in January 1991, it was easy for 
Larsen to make quick contacts.
»  «
LS: And you knew this had the tacit support of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry?
RP: No, at that time we didn't expect or think we needed it. We wanted a venue, the
creation of a meeting. Someone volunteered to handle the administrative matters 
and we accepted the invitation to an ostensibly academic meeting; this was of 
course a cover, but that is how it was planned.
»  «
LS: Was that important?
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RP: It was important to create a situation where we would meet a FLO delegation,
which was totally against Israeli law. The meeting with Abu Ala in London could 
have been explained away, but this meeting on such a level needed to be done
under a type of a meeting, an academic one; that is what Larsen arranged. We
found out the night before we left Israel that the Israeli Cabinet abolished the law 
forbidding contacts with members of the FLO. There was a presentation by a 
FAFO representative, but neither the FLO delegation nor Yair and myself had the 
patience to hsten because it wasn't the reason we came.
» «
LS: How would you describe the role played by the Norwegian third parties?
RF: In the beginning, they mainly provided coffee and talked to us during breaks. The
atmosphere and the facility they provided were important. From the very start,
Larsen played not only the role of host, but a kind of a third party who was there to 
deliver messages. He also would feel out the one side and come back to the other 
with his readings, insights and try to assist in overcoming the many problems. We 
did not have such problems at that first meeting, but it was very important to have 
someone like him there. After the first meeting, he did not participate in any of the 
sessions and was not involved in any of the direct meetings. Egeland’s appearance 
at lunch before the first meeting was also very helpful. It was an indication of the 
Norwegian Government’s tacit support, which was not only important for that fact 
itself, but gave the Palestinians, I believe, a feeling that the Norwegians were taking 
us (the two academics) seriously. That is, there was a hidden message that we had 
very good access to the political decision-making process.
»  «
LS: You and Hirschfeld established the loose framework of for example, not talking
about the past?
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RP: I don't remember who decided it. I remember one of the Palestinians at that
meeting started to talk about the past. Immediately, the others and us ceased the
opportunity and said, the past should not be discussed. The past is important and 
should be remembered, but it should not dictate our discussions for we wanted a 
better future. It was clear among us that this was an opening of a new chapter.
»  «
LS: So the purpose of the first meeting near Oslo was to explore issues?
RP: Exactly. It could have ended there.
»  «
LS: What made you decide to proceed; just personal chemistry, the ability to directly
talk about the issues?
RP: It was a combination of the two. First, Immediately, we were able to create very
good relationships professionally and personally: a chemistry, an understanding. 
To some extent, it was influenced by the people from both sides. Second, we came 
to listen and to convey our ideas. But, the messages given by the Palestinians were 
very, very, impressive. It was clear to us that they were there to make deals and not 
to make speeches. There have been so many occasions when Israelis and 
Palestinians were present and the emphasis was more on delivering speeches. But, 
on that occasion the objective they presented impressed us. So that pushed us to 
come back.
»  «
LS: Was the secrecy as well as the fact they were not direct politicians important?
RP: To the second question, I would say no. On the contrary, Abu Ala was then a high-
ranked politician. We were again impressed by the level of the Palestinian 
delegation and so knew they were serious. The substance of the meeting combined 
with both sides' enthusiasm to try and find a way to break the deadlock, were
453
important. Also, it was important that the two leaders of the Palestinian delegation, 
including Abu Ala, were both in the political as well as the economic arena. They 
had an understanding of what we call a ‘New Middle East’. As I already 
mentioned, Yair and I also dealt with economic matters in the Middle East and 
were from the same school as Beilin and Peres. That is, we believe in a new 
Middle East based on co-operation, economically and politically. Therefore, we 
immediately had a common language about the future. The verbal good will also 
helped and it was so different from the typical negotiations of the past.
Our whole approach was fundamentally different. From the beginning, 
Yair and myself thought that this was a possible win-win situation and not a 0-sum 
or win-lose one. We wanted to see a development that would lead to a prosperous 
Palestinian entity, rather than a weak, fearful neighbour beside us.
»  «
LS: You were present through all the meetings until August?
RP: Yes.
»  «
LS: Would it be correct to characterise the period between January and April as the
pre-negotiations phase and from May to August as the negotiation stage?
RP: Yes and no and this is why. We tend to say so, since between January and April,
we negotiated the draft of the DOP [Declaration of Principles]. WE did negotiate 
and they were very tough and direct. But, we call that period pre-negotiations as 
we were not negotiating officially, on behalf of anybody but for ourselves. 
Nevertheless, I would characterise those sessions as negotiations, since Peres was 
already instructing us and Rabin was in the picture.
So, towards April we were almost negotiating on behalf of Peres, although 
the Palestinians were not aware of this fact. In short, we call the period from
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January to April or May pre-negotiations, because all ideas were jointly formulated 
and we considered the consequences for both sides. It is difficult to decide how to 
describe it as we had tough, serious, long discussions until April as well.
But, when we had the draft and entered into the second phase, when Mr 
Savir and Singer came, it became an official track. Then, real negotiations started 
because it was between the PLO and the state of Israel.
» «
LS: The Oslo process endured for which reasons?
RP: Many things made it possible. First, both sides wanted to complete an agreement.
So, in spite all of the problems, it was clear that both sides would put in the extra 
mile, in order to reach an agreement. Therefore, even during the worst days when it 
looked as if everything would collapse, we knew eventually a deal could be made. 
With this knowledge, everyone made the effort, of course not at any cost, but there 
was enough ground covered to make it possible.
Second, the team in Oslo was completely devoted to this process. Third, 
the Norwegians also helped very much, but I would not say that they were vital.
»  «
LS: Would you then describe a good third party as one who is active only when invited?
RP: The Norwegians were in a very awkward situation. Just think about it, you have
the Israelis and Palestinians discussing in a closed room for many hours and coming 
out only for a bite to eat. You have important individuals either affihated with or 
representing the Norwegian Government sitting outside, pouring coffee and waiting 
to hear how it is going. In spite of his importance, he is waiting, only to be there if 
a problem arises. Larsen did this very successfully. When we or the Palestinians 
felt that the talks were not progressing, we would complain to him and he would 
convey these messages to the other side. So, he and others who comprised the
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Norwegian team had a role to play and their friendly, intelligent style helped 
everyone.
I could not even now think of a better way to do it. I do not mean that only 
Norwegians can assist in this way. The fact that they did not impose themselves 
upon us was crucial. They were always there and willing to help. They also 
travelled to Jerusalem and Tunis when problems did arise, in order to convey 
messages. I would not say that if they were not there, the dialogues would not have 
happened; but, their presence made everything easier.
»  «
LS: Were you aware that the US State Department was informed?
RP: The first information came from us. We informed them.
»  «
LS : Did that continue ?
RP: We had an ongoing dialogue with Kurtzer. So, he was in the picture throughout the
process. We did not inform the department all the time, only every now and then. 
Prior to this, we encouraged the Norwegians to make contact with someone in the 
US State Department. The Palestinians were also very keen because if the 
Americans were in the picture then it was serious.
»  «
LS : What was Kurtzer's reaction ?
RP: He was encouraging. He said to pursue this channel. Tf you are successful that is
wonderful.’ He said though at the same time, ‘we will pursue our channel: the
official Washington track.’ AS a matter of fact, this was the same reaction we 
received from Rabin. When he heard about it, he did not object, but indicated that
the Washington track would continue. It seems then that by enlarge, the American
administration did not take this seriously. Even when the Norwegians informed
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them of how successfully it was turning out to be, luckily I believe, they did not 
take it seriously.
» «
LS: Why luckily?
RP: Because I think that they would have probably entered into the picture like an
elephant on the charge.
»  «
LS: Do you think the confidential aspect was important?
RP: The confidential aspect was crucial. Without this, the Oslo Channel would not
have happened.
»  «
LS: In drafting and reworking the DOP, was the issue of settlements addressed or
deferred?
RP: As apart of negotiations, we discussed everything. It was clear in drafting the DOP
that deferment of this issue was the only agreement we could reach for the moment.
Therefore, we agreed not to include it in the draft of the DOP. This did not change 
when Savir and Singer entered into the process.
»  «
LS: In retrospect, was this issue one that could have been eventually addressed?
RP: No, because from the start, we told the Palestinians that was a non-starter. We
believed we knew what the mobile and the immobile issues were, at least on our 
side. We did have to convince the Palestinians where Rabin’s boundary-lines lay. 
In the beginning, they did not believe that Rabin would endorse the agreement 
which finally resulted. We told them, ‘Rabin is not whom you portray him to be.’
They viewed him as a Likud leader. But, we pointed out what we believed were
non-starter issues including Jerusalem and the settlements. If we wanted to achieve
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something these things had to be put aside.
»  «
LS : Did they have non-starters ?
RP: They had demands, but some things we said would not be accepted. I believed we
had a unique knowledge of what would be acceptable to the Israeli Government 
and the Palestinians, since we had worked with Palestinians for a long time.
»  «
LS: Then you do not believe that the general principles on which the Oslo Channel is
based, which have been termed its greatest strength is not also its greatest 
weakness?
RP: No, Oslo meant two things. First, It created a new dynamic relationship and a
breakthrough between the Israelis and the Arab world. It was the understanding 
that the only way to have a breakthrough with the Arab world in general was to 
reach an agreement with the Palestinians. Second, We all wanted to put in place 
principles that would guide a political process, which hopefully will lead to a peace 
between the Palestinian people and the Israelis. The Oslo Channel was possible 
because it was about principles. Also, there are agreements within the document as 
well as some very detailed principles. The idea of Oslo was to create a mechanism 
and set the guidelines, which would make future negotiations easier. With 
hindsight, I would not have changed anything in the way the Oslo Channel 
operated.
»  «
LS: The DOP came out of the bilateral negotiations and the Norwegians did not have
any input?
RP: No, the Norwegians did not have any input into the substance.
»  «
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LS: In saying you would not have changed anything during the Oslo Channel, you
would not have opened it up to a multi-lateral process, for example?
RP: No, never. I think the advantage of Oslo was that we were isolated and far away,
both from the day-to-day problems and the strains of mental pressures of being in 
the region itself. Also, the combination of informal brainstorming with negotiations 
enabled us to put ideas on the table, which any person in an official track cannot do. 
Together, we developed a formula and went back and forth to our leaderships. 
This approach allowed us to offer changes and agree upon them, without having to 
commit to a set of ideas before the final document was produced. I think this type 
of conducting talks was an impossible task in Washington. Additionally, the 
Norwegians played exactly the right role: not that of a moderator or a mediator. 
When we needed them, they were there to help and did so. They were not involved 
in formulating principles. At certain stages, we provided the Norwegians with texts 
not for feedback, but to reinforce our confidence in them and also to show results. 
After all, they invested a lot of time, effort and money. We wanted to encourage 
them to continue with the process.
»  «
LS : Did your role remain active throughout the process ?
RP: Yes, but there was a clear change. One could say until May, Yair was at the
steering wheel and I was in front with him; navigating, assisting and changing him 
from time to time. When Savir and Singer arrived, we went and sat in the back­
seats. Our role was less important, but it was still a team effort; not only in the
discussions inside, but also we used our knowledge from the first five months. A
trust had developed between the Palestinians and us and we shared almost the same 
desire, not politically, but to succeed. It was like developing an embryo; you could 
not have just begun with the officials.
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»  «
LS: Were you approached by the press at any point?
RP: No. But the press tried to find out. But, at that time it was so far-fetched that
nobody even went to verify it. Even when rumours came out for a while, nobody
picked it up and developed the story.
»  «
LS: Jan Egeland mentioned that there was a consideration of continuing the Oslo
process after agreeing on the DOP, to possibly work on other issues. Did you stop 
because you thought that was all that could be achieved?
RP: We thought that was what we came to do. We ended our official role when the
DOP was signed. When Rabin can meet Arafat in public, this was our aim.
»  «
LS: Are you still involved in the process?
RP: I would say in and out. At Holst’s funeral, Yair joined the Israeli delegation and
participated in some of the meetings. The message is that although we are out, we 
are still consulted.
»  «
LS: Was Oslo a unique case or could some of its elements be applied to other
conflictual situations?
RP: I think it can be carried through but under one condition. It should not be ever
thought of as a political science model. I believe history does not repeat. However,
segments of history in different varieties and ways can provide clues. One can also 
leam from events. The concept of Oslo maybe modified to specific arenas, peoples 
and areas.
»  «
LS: Is there a case for referring back to an Oslo Channel environment to work out
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further issues?
RP: Not necessarily. I think the two sides can just continue the negotiations, unless
there are some very unique ideas or a situation arises where informal groups and a 
third party could be more helpful. Otherwise, the scope is wide enough for the 
officials to meet publicly or secretly.
»  «
LS: But referring back to a more non-political arena would not be helpful?
RP: Of course the potentiality is always there.
» «
LS: What would you say about the future prospects of the Oslo Channel? Has the
personal relationships that developed during the negotiations effected the political 
process?
RP: The relationship between Savir and Abu Ala is not particularly personal; I mean,
they are not friends. But, they developed a kind of a language, a type of 
understanding as a result of Oslo. This, I believe, allows them to tackle problems in 
the official track. But, during the negotiations from May to September 1993, the 
personal angle was definitely important. I would not say that today, we have better 
relations with Abu Ala than with others in the Palestinian National Authority.
»  «
LS: What has been the recognition for you both in this region?
RP: No, no. People recognise the names Ron Pundak and Yair Hirschfeld when the
Oslo Channel is mentioned. But, we did not receive any recognition, not even a 
thank you letter from anyone officially; we were not expecting anything. We did 
not become involved for recognition.
»  «
LS : What was your motive for starting initially ?
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RP: For many years, I believe both Yair and myself, each in his own way thought and
still do, that the only way for Israel to exist in the Middle East is through peace. 
The only way that peace can prevail in this area is through an understanding 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. On top of this, both of us disagree with a 
former Israeli Prime Minister who said that there are no Palestinian people. On the 
contrary, I believe there are Palestinians with great aspirations and they should be 
free to realise them, in a way that would create a good neighbour. Also, politically 
we thought then the time was right and we had a window of opportunity. History 
put us in a situation, to be instrumental in this process.
Someone asked me if without me and Yair whether the Oslo Channel 
would have been started at all. My answer is that it would have started, but in a 
different way. The time was ripe for such a process, but needed somebody to give 
it a push. I believe we were the ones who gave the first push. Perhaps, Yair and 
myself were intellectually courageous and just a little more far-sighted than others, 
with the stamina and personal strength to continue, against all odds. There were 
times during the process when probably some would have said, ‘to hell with it’. 
But the eventual outcome of the Oslo Channel was worth all the frustrations. We 
knew we had to reach an agreement with the Palestinians if we wanted to find a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East. I think that Jordan would not have been 
so expedient in coming to an agreement without such developments. Like conflicts, 
peace can be infectious.
462
Interview with Uri Savir 
Jerusalem, 24 May 1995
LS: How did you become involved in the Oslo Channel?
US: As you know the channel started officially with Pundak and Yair Hirschfeld and I
was associated with Yossi Beilin. The reports started coming in January or 
February.
»  «
LS : So you were aware of it from January ?
US: Yes, from the beginning of the Norway talks and the first draft of the DOP
document. We had a small team who looked through the document. The channel 
became more and more credible and the PLO seemed to be able to deliver. 
Simultaneously, the Washington track became paralysed; therefore, we decided to 
move the Oslo Channel to a more official track. I was called two weeks after being 
appointed Director of the Foreign Ministry, in mid May 1993. Then, the Prime 
Minister and Beilin decided that I should go to Oslo to meet with Abu Ala and the 
Palestinians, to test the waters and to find out if the mandate was workable. For 
example, they wanted to see if the PLO would agree to keep Jerusalem outside the 
autonomy, which was one of the big obstacles in the Washington talks and was a 
condition from our point of view.
»  «
LS : What did you find when you arrived in Oslo ?
US: I was very impressed by the people I met and by the seriousness of their intentions.
I think what impressed me most was not that the Palestinians accepted certain 
conditions for the continuation of the talks, but that they had a basic philosophy of 
the future. In other words, the solution of the Palestinian problem would be 
resolved by creating a new type of a co-operation with Israel. Rather than resolving
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the issues only through negotiations, there was a whole philosophy here of 
cordiality, co-operation and mutual dependence.
»  «
LS: Based on your observations, you reported back to Peres that the negotiations
should continue?
US: Yes, very much so. I also recommended that a lawyer should be added and that is
when Yossi Beilin suggested that Joel Singer could be brought over from the States. 
On my second trip, Joel joined me and the professors. A lot of work had already 
been done in Israel, some basic questions were prepared that were still unanswered. 
»  «
LS: You were present in all the meetings through late August?
US: Yes, I was in the meetings from then until the signing of the DOP on August 19 and
20. Then, Joel and myself alone were involved in two more rounds; one in Oslo 
and another in Paris concerning the wording of the Letters of Mutual Recognition 
from August 22 and September 9.
»  «
LS: Do you think Pundak and Hirschfeld played a crucial role in that they already
helped to developed a framework before your arrival?
US: Yes, I think they played a very constructive role because they developed the
concept. It is the concept that is important and not so much the document or the 
agreement. It was clearly a concept that could be developed into an agreement. 
They also were a conduit for the PLO to send messages. I think in both these ways, 
they played a very significant role.
»  «
LS: How would you characterize the role played by Larsen and his team?
US: Let me first say another word about Hirschfeld and Pundak. I think the academics
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greatly helped the process as they were able to explore ideas that could not be 
discussed officially. In terms of Teije Rpd-Larsen, I think he was the psychological 
architect of this rapprochement. He had the credibility on both sides and he helped 
to enhance (almost like an unseen player) the mutual credibility by putting always 
the emphasis on the positive intentions of the other side. Secondly, he created the 
optimal conditions for secret negotiations. He encouraged a framework that turned 
two delegations into one group: of course with different interests, but with common 
ambitions to come to an agreement. Especially, when we were in Jerusalem and 
Tunis, Teije Rpd-Larsen communicated messages in a very constructive way. He 
also created opportunities for us to express our frustrations and anger during 
negotiations in a way that was not destructive for the negotiations themselves. 
Furthermore, he an his wife Mona were absolutely determined to make it work. 
This was very helpful especially, during the difficult hours. In that way, Larsen 
helped develop a new kind of a diplomatic role. He was not a mediator, since he 
and the other Norwegians did not participate in the negotiations. They worked as a 
most effective facilitator, which is perhaps more difficult than the role of a 
mediator.
»  «
LS : How would you describe a facilitator?
US: I think that a facilitator understands that a deal has to be reached by both sides.
1. The facilitator encourages both sides to find the common ground and to 
distinguish between the futile and the essential.
2. A facilitator such as Larsen helps to keep the sides talking and steers the 
parties away from becoming side-tracked by very nerve-racking, long 
hours of negotiations and fatigue.
3. A facilitator assists in creating the necessary environment and
465
conditions where negotiations can be held.
4. A facilitator helps the parties to define the common interests and creates 
a condition in which the personal relationships within such a back-
channel can be used in an effective way.
»  «
LS: To what, do you attribute the durability and eventual success of the Oslo Channel?
US: I think a main reason was the political structural elements. Both sides decided that
a deal was necessary, given the regional and international changes. Additionally, 
Rabin, Peres and Arafat all chose to proceed with the talks in Norway. Regarding 
why these negotiations worked better than others at that time; I would say first, they 
were secret which allowed us to explore certain ideas, which cannot be discussed in 
open negotiations. This significantly advanced the talks, since you have an 
opportunity to compromise without being looked at as if you are compromising, in 
the media's eye for example. You can also adopt bargaining positions that are
easier to retreat from. The process becomes a lavatory where you can explore
constructive new ideas that surpass the preconceived notions of what kind of an
agreement you want to achieve. All of this is characteristic of such a channel and a
special Norwegian flavour, where you have a facilitator with very special 
characteristics , with a lack of selfishness in a way.
»  «
LS: What does the Oslo Channel represent for you?
US: It's the beginning of the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are two main
aspects. First, the real achievement is the mutual recognition between the two 
peoples. Second, the Oslo Channel presents a road map towards a different kind of 
relationship, which does not involve Palestinian rejection of Israel and an Israeli 
rejection of the Palestinians. Since the process was based on healthy values and
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common interests, this road map together with mutual recognition will serve both 
sides and help them to overcome all the obstacles, difficulties and oppositions that 
are a part of the implementation process.
»  «
LS: Do you think there are lessons to be learned from the Oslo process?
US: I think the lesson to be learned is that that there is a great pohtical importance in
being able to lay out principles rather than details for policy change. One should 
not be hypnotized by incremental diplomacy that very often slows down a historical 
process, but realize the advantage of formulating those principles, based on 
fundamental policy change under the given circumstances of the day.
»  «
LS: Do you think the DOP and the other agreements are presently under serious
threat?
US: I think that the process will always be challenged, in terms of obstacles on the
ground, public oppositions and violence. But, I believe people tend to confuse 
agreements with the problems. You can see the enormous strengths of these 
agreements as the parties have overcome so many obstacles, land-mines and the 
physical mines.
»  «
LS: Do you think that the Oslo Channel is a unique case or could some of its elements
be extended into resolving other conflicts?
US: I think they can be generalized in terms of some of the elements. Obviously, some
of them are unique such as the types of the participating parties and the historical 
period. The generaliseable elements include secret negotiations, exploration of 
ideas by non-officials and formulating principles for implementing and continuing 
peace-building.
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»  «
LS: Do you think this is a better way than direct negotiations?
US: I would say that mixing is good. It is advantageous to have an unofficial stage in
the beginning and an official one afterwards.
»  «
LS: How would you define peace in the Middle East?
US: Peace is an inevitable process, based on a very fundamental change of countries'
and societies' definitions of their self interests. The problem right now is that
people see the change, but that vision, which is in front of them is not yet captured 
in the mind. The mind-set is slower to change than events. Therefore, once 
attitudinal changes are created in societies, it becomes an irreversible process that 
filters down to the benefit of all affected societies.
»  «
LS: How long will that take and what do you mean by inevitable ?
US: No doubt, it will take quite a while because the conflict has been so long and
attitudes are so entrenched. But, I believe that Oslo is inevitable, irreversible if we 
will stick to Oslo.
»  «
LS: You think that is the only course to follow?
US: It is the only course, if one wants to follow the path towards peace. There is no
irreversible course in history; people could decide to backtrack, but that would lead 
to disaster. That is always the alternative and those who have criticized the 
imperfections of Oslo never take into account it was either Oslo or deterioration to 
growing fundamentahsm, extremism and the danger of war. So this was a non- 
typical victory of reason and vision, in contrast to conflicting emotions and 
paralysis, looking only at the past. We shall see the new realities that the Israeli and
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Palestinian leadership created. What has been proved is that there is no 
predestination of Israeli relations with the Palestinians, but it depends ultimately on 
both sides.
»  «
LS: Finally, are you optimistic about the future prospects?
US: I will give you an answer which is contradictory. I don't think that optimism or
pessimism is that useful as both lead to paralysis. It really depends on what we do. 
Having said that, we have the opportunity to do the right thing. In contradiction to 
what I said before, yes, I am very optimistic.
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Interview with Thorvald Stoltenberg 
Geneva, 20 June 1995
LS: How did you become involved in the Oslo Channel?
TS: I have a long history in the Middle East, in particular with Israelis and
Palestinians. I met with interested members of the PLO, which included 
Chairman Yasser Arafat in 1981 and 1982 in Tunis. He expressed an acute 
interest in establishing direct dialogues with the Israeli Government. I pursued 
this and worked over the next two years towards helping the two sides to meet. 
Unfortunately, a meeting with a leading figure of the PLO in 1983, designed for 
such a purpose, had disastrous consequences. I was in the Montechoro hotel 
lobby in Albufeira, Portugal when I saw before my eyes, a Palestinian friend
gunned down. It was a terrible shock and reminded me how dangerous 
engaging in a peace process is. Later, I would leam that he was assassinated by 
Abu Nidal’s organisation, an opponent of Arafat’s. This experience did not 
deter me, but it did make me more cautious in how I approached things.
Then, in 1987 I became Norway’s Foreign Minister. My Deputy, Jan 
Egeland, first told me about a possible meeting between Israelis and the PLO in 
1992. This was after having tried to arrange meetings between local Palestinian 
leaders such as Faisal Husseini and Israelis. I, along with others, believed that 
he represented the future of the Palestinian community and could speak more 
directly for those who lived in the territories of Gaza and the West Bank.
»  «
LS: This was during the Washington talks?
TS: Yes. The Madrid and Washington talks didn’t seem to be going anywhere and
everyone was pretty pessimistic.
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»  «
LS : Your contacts with the Palestinians...
TS: Yes, as I said I worked to forge links with Palestinians both within Israel and
outside. When the Swedish Socialist Government lost their election, my friend 
who had been the Foreign Minister told me that I should work to have a 
balanced relationship between Israel and the PLO. Up until that time, Sweden 
had been very close with the PLO.
»  «
LS: Jan Egeland informed you when?
TS: From the very beginning. Even before what you would now call the Oslo
Channel, we had meetings with Yossi Beilin.
»  «
LS: Were you in favour when the possibility o f a meeting between Hirschfeld,
Pundak and the PLO was brought to your attention?
TS: Oh most definitely. The stalled Washington talks convinced everyone
concerned that you had to talk to the PLO directly, if an agreement was to be 
eventually found. In Washington, not only were the talks public but the real 
decision-makers were being excluded.
»  «
LS : Were you present during any of the meetings ?
TS: No, I left things to Jan Egeland. I knew he was capable and by remaining in the
background, I believed more progress could be made. Too many cooks can 
spoil the pot you see.
»  «
LS: Did you inform the Americans from the beginning?
TS: Briefings were given without too much details to Dan Kurtzer of the State
471
Department. I believe, but do not know for sure, that Israel and the PLO did the 
same.
»  «
LS: Do you believe that the type of role you played was more or less helpful than the
more active one taken up by your successor Holst?
TS: There’s a time and a place for a variety of approaches. I believe one does not
have to exclude the other. But, I preferred to remain in the background. I do 
regret that I had to transfer away to work on Bosnia, though this opportunity was 
too good to refuse.
»  «
LS: What is your assessment of the Oslo Channel now?
TS: I believe it was important for Norway to have a foreign policy that invested in
peace as much as in military defence. As one must be prepared to defend oneself 
and the people of one’s community, so must one be prepared for peace. If you 
are not able to seize an opportunity for resolving conflicts when one presents 
itself, then this can set a country back for decades. I don’t mean just in terms of 
enmity, but there are other hidden high costs like a stifling in the growth of 
economies, societies, etc. Yes, the Oslo Channel has its limitations, but it was 
never designed to be an end-all document.
I now work on former Yugoslavia. You can make a comparison between 
the approaches adopted here and Oslo. It is difficult to know which is better. In 
Oslo, the broad principles were agreed, people decided that they had to talk to 
one another, gradually building and fostering trust and to recognise one 
another’s existence. These are vital ingredients for transforming societies but 
harder for people to appreciate sometimes, as real concrete short-term results 
can be harder to see. In Bosnia, on the other hand, talks revolved around the
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minutest detail; can the parties agree about how to cross the bridge, who should 
have control of it. These talks were about practical issues and detailed steps, but 
no broad agreement on how differing ethnic communities could live peacefully 
and co-operatively. The lack of this broader agreement may defeat the detailed 
steps, which produce immediate results.
